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Preface 
This dissertation has grown out of the contested theoretical and popular debates 
surrounding postfeminism. The postfeminist phenomenon has confounded and split 
contemporary critics with its contradictory significations, its definitional ambiguity and 
its pluralistic outlook. Commentators have applied a number of preconceived frameworks 
and classifications in order to define and categorize postfeminism. They have claimed the 
term for various and even oppositional understandings and appropriations that range from 
a backlash rhetoric, Girl Power to poststructuralist feminism. As I intend to show, these 
interpretative schemes have often been upheld at the expense of postfeminism's 
paradoxical multiplicity. In the following, I contend that postfeminism cannot be 
discussed as an easily identifiable, singular and totalizing movement and, instead, it 
illustrates a methodological crisis that exceeds the logic of non-contradiction. In fact, I 
argue that postfeminism blurs the binary as it depicts the struggle between previously 
antagonistic stances and establishes a non-dualistic and ambiguous in-betweenness. My 
analysis seeks to counter the critical need for categorization and question the continued 
insistence upon an either/or structure. I will explore the gap between binary formulations 
as a locus of difficulty and a potentially productive space for a new understanding of 
postfeminist theory and practice. 
The dissertation is divided in three parts that position, contextualize and textualize 
postfeminist discourses. The first part aims to provide an overview of the postfeminist 
landscape, introduce a new postfeminist strategy of theorization and depict the various 
manifestations of postfeminism. I suggest that postfeminism cannot be conceptualized 
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with recourse to simplistic definitions and epistemological foundations as it represents a 
'shaky ground', a site of contest and revision that eschews monological thinking. I put 
forward the idea of a contextual definition of postfeminism that takes into account its 
thoroughly situated nature and its relation to other discourses and theories. Postfeminism 
exists both as a theoretical and popular movement, combining a range of viewpoints from 
conflicting sources. It is steeped in the language and principles of feminism, patriarchy, 
postmodemism and the media, creating a multi-dimensional postfeminist context that 
depolarizes and incorporates seemingly incompatible opposites. In this way, 
postfeminism exploits and expands the discursive junctures to posit its own pluralistic 
propositions. It effects a double movement whereby it manages to reinforce as much as 
subvert the presuppositions that inform its emergence. I assert that postfeminism is 
characterized by a paradoxical stance that intermingles complicity and critique by 
undercutting their mutual exclusivity. Postfeminism's complicitous critique always works 
within conventions in order to undermine them and, thus, it cannot be appropriated to a 
single and non-contradictory theoretical position. On the contrary, postfeminist theorizing 
walks a tightrope between subversion and conformity, whereby it relies on a process of 
resignification to re-contextualize and re-employ the norms of power/discourse. 
Part two of the dissertation takes up the idea of postfeminist contexts to situate 
postfeminism in the intersections of feminism, postmodemism and popular culture. I 
examine the interactions between these discourses as wen as their internal complexities in 
order to highlight the flexible and dynamic relationships that give rise to postfeminism. I 
argue that postfeminist meanings are context-specific and have to be reassessed 
continuously with regard to their discursive surroundings. At the same time, I insist that 
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postfeminism cannot be subsumed and arrogated into easily distinguishable categories of 
feminism, popular mainstream and postmodem theory. Postfeminism is located in the 
ongoing struggle between and within discourses and it cannot be reduced to a distinct 
unanimous position. Thus, I resist a static contextualization that seeks to immobilize and 
finalize postfeminist locations and I declare that the postfeminist landscape is a complex 
and paradoxical field of convergence where feminism, postmodemism and the media are 
brought into contact and conflict. Moreover, I maintain that these postfeminist 'origins' 
are themselves areas of contention and dispute rather than unified and coherent 
monoliths. Postfeminism emerges from the heterogeneous links and contradictions within 
and between discursive fields, emphasizing the diverse and multiple ways in which 
discourse is reproduced. 
The dissertation's third section considers textual representations of postfeminism 
and in particular, it focuses on the figure of the 'postfeminist woman' who has variously 
been described as a backlash anti-feminist, a sexy 'do-me feminist', a Girlie feminist etc. 
I contend that the 'new woman' of postfeminism rearticulates the tensions between 
feminism, femininity and femaleness as she adopts a non-dichotomous and contradictory 
subject position that transcends dualities. She is characterized by a desire to 'have it all' 
as she refuses to compromise on her joint aspirations for public and private success, 
feminine and feminist values. I discuss diverse manifestations of the postfeminist woman, 
exemplified by the Singleton, the Cinderella and the Supergirl who blur binary 
distinctions in their quest for a pluralistic and utopian wholeness. I suggest that these 
postfeminist women seek to negotiate the conflicting demands of heterosexual romance 
and professional achievement, feminine embodiment and feminist agency, female 
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passivity and masculine activity. They inhabit an ambiguous space that holds together 
these varied and even antagonistic stances and they endeavor to reconcile their 
incongruous multiplicity. In fact, the postfeminist Singleton, Cinderella and SupergirI 
lack a harmonious inner balance and they are marked by struggle rather than resolution. 
Their attempts to cross the dualism and occupy an in-between space are presented as 
hazardous and perplexing, potentially alienating them from their social and emotional 
contexts. These postfeminist heroines epitomize postfeminism's frontier discourse that 
understands heterogeneity as an explosive and strenuous combination of contradictory 
beliefs, theories and practices. 
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1. Positioning Postfeminism 
1.1 On Shaky Ground: Defining Postfeminism 
So much has happened to sweep away all the ground rules that a 
consensus seems almost impossible. All those ideals that were 
once held as absolute truths [ ... J have been debunked or debased. 
[ ... ] It becomes clear that the only certainty [ ... ] is confusion. 
Elle magazine 'The Age of Confusion' (November 1986) 
'The defining feature of our era is that there is no defining feature', Suzanna Danuta 
Walters notes, identifying in this way the predicament of the 'post' age (Walters 1991: 
104). Patrick Imbert expresses a similar sentiment in his description of the 'Post' as 'the 
capacity to go beyond the naivety of an epistemology trying to refer to stable entities, be 
they essence, or a Cartesian conception of the subject' (lmbert 1999: 25). In fact, the 
concept of truth and the very idea of a foundation for knowledge have been questioned 
and problematized by deconstructive critiques mounted by poststructuralist, 
postmodernist and multiculturalist theorists. While the nuances of the critique posited by 
these theorists fundamenta]]y differ, and while each school in itself encompasses a wide 
range of viewpoints, together they constitute a powerful attack against foundationalist 
and epistemological thinking, unified conceptions of truth and essentialist definitions of 
sUbjectivity. In this age of confusion, the orderly dialectic has been replaced by ambiguity 
and uncertainty as knowledge and truth have been exposed as plural and situated in 
context. As Fernando de Toro explains, this relativization of the grand narratives, of the 
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metanarratives of Western history and enlightened modernity, does not imply that 'there 
is no truth, but that truth is constructed, and if we accept the constructedness of truth then 
we can only conclude that Truth as such does not exist' (de Toro 1999: 13). Instead, there 
is a plurality of perspectives and a multiplicity of truths or 'trues' manifested in various 
discursive articulations (de Toro 1999: 13). 
Accordingly, len Ang suggests that one of the most prominent features of living 
in this 'realm of uncertainty' or 'postmodern world' means 'living with a heightened 
sense of permanent and pervasive cultural contradiction' (Ang 1996: 162; 1). In the 
postmodern context, 'uncertainty is a built-in feature', 'a necessary and inevitable 
condition in contemporary culture' and any sense of order and security, of structure and 
progress, has to be recognized as provisional and circumstantial (Ang 1996: 163; 162). 
Thus, one has to relinquish the search for generalized absolutes or forms of knowledge, 
for a stable position from which a fixed and definitive truth can be established. 
Consequently, as Ang reveals, the 'intellectual challenge posed by the postmodern' 
consists of 'the need to come to terms with the emergence of a cultural space which is no 
longer circumscribed by fixed boundaries, hierarchies and identities and by universalist, 
modernist concepts of truth and knowledge' (Ang 1996: 3). In a similar manner, John 
Fekete notes that in this 'post' age, one has to 'get on without the Good-God-Gold 
standards' and learn to 'be at ease with limited warranties [ ... J without the false security 
of inherited guarantees' and the easy recourse to fixed categories of value (Fekete 1987: 
17). 
Distancing itself from the totalizing principles of universal reason, rationality and 
truth, postmodernity signals an awareness and recognition ofthe epistemological limits of 
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those beliefs, what Lyotard has called the loss of master narratives (Lyotard 1984). As a 
heuristic category, the postmodem casts doubt on these truth claims and insists that their 
generalizable and ubiquitous status has to be interrogated. In Judith Butler's words, 'what 
it's really about is opening up the possibility of questioning what our assumptions are and 
[ ... ] encouraging us to live in the anxiety of that questioning without closing it down too 
quickly' (quoted in Olson and Worsham 2000: 736). In this way, the postmodem can be 
interpreted as 'not so much a concept' but 'as a problematic: "a complex of 
heterogeneous but interrelated questions which will not be silenced by any spuriously 
unitary answer'" (Hutcheon 1989a: 15). Its various deconstructive discourses are 
characterized by an open and flexible descriptive structure that highlights the ideological 
subtext of cultural practices and creates 'a set of problems and basic issues [ ... ] that were 
not particularly problematic before but certainly are now' (Hutcheon 1988: 222; 224). 
The postmodem undermines any sense of closure and finality as it replaces 
foundationalist principles and concepts with a perpetual examination of supposedly 
indisputable and irrefutable givens. 
This precariousness and provisionality are defining features of all 'post' 
movements or terms and they are encapsulated by the semantic indefiniteness of the 
prefix whose connotations may be complex if not contradictory. As Rostislav Kocourek 
points out in his discussion of the prefix 'post' in contemporary English terminology, 'an 
expression "post" + X can either be X or non-X, or both at the same time, which makes 
the derivative motivationally ambiguous' (Kocourek 1996: 106). This programmatic 
indeterminacy and interpretative openness are inherent in all 'post' terms that thereby 
become issues of debate about whether the prefix signifies an end of a particular type of 
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influence or a recognition of the fundamental importance of the latter. The 'post' prefix 
can be employed to point to a complete rupture with the term that follows the hyphen for, 
as Amelia Jones declares, 'what is post but the signification of a kind of termination - a 
temporal designation of whatever it prefaces as ended, done with, obsolete' (Jones 1990: 
8). Diametrically opposed to this view is the idea that the prefix denotes a genealogy that 
entails revision or strong family resemblance. In this case, the 'post' signifies 'a 
dependence on, a continuity with, that which follows', leading some critics to 
conceptualize a 'post' movement as an intensification or a 'new face' of what preceded it 
(Best and Kellner 1991: 29). 
More problematically, 'post' can also occupy an uneasy middle ground 
suggesting an infiltration and appropriation, a 'parasite riding on the back of the original 
movement which benefits from the ground it has won but uses this for its own means' 
(Kastelein 1994: 5). There is always a paradox at the heart of the 'post' as the "'Post 
Position" signals its contradictory dependence on and independence from that which 
temporally preceded it and which literally made it possible' (Hutcheon 1988: 17). 'It 
marks neither a simple and radical break from it nor a straightforward continuity with it; 
it is both and neither' (Hutcheon 1988: 17). Thus, as Sarah Gamble reveals, 'the prefix 
"post" does not necessarily always direct us back the way we've come' (Gamble 2001: 
44). Instead, its trajectory is bewilderingly uncertain which makes it ultimately 
impossible and redundant to offer a single definition of any 'post' expression as this 
reductive strategy narrows the critical potential, the instructive ambiguity and 
contradictoriness of the prefix. 
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On the semantic battleground of the prefix 'post', the supposedly latest 
newcomer, postfeminism, is no exception to the definitional struggle: it has variously 
been identified as a conservative and media-assisted backlash, power feminism, third 
wave feminism and post modem or poststructuralist feminism. l The confusion about the 
meaning of 'post' gives rise to multiple and divergent understandings of postfeminism, 
definitions that extend beyond mere variation to opposition. As will be revealed, 
postfeminism cannot be reduced to a distinct, unanimous explanatory stance as it 
incorporates and combines elements of each of these positions. The postfeminist 
movement is testament to the complexity of its cultural moment and thus, it assembles 
seemingly disparate and even contradictory theories and ideas. In fact, postfeminism is 
context-specific and depends for its definition largely on the critical surroundings in 
which the term is employed. It is not a fixed conceptual category but an open and ever-
changing problematic that takes on diverse meanings and signifies in a variety of 
conflicting ways, depending on the contexts of use. Postfeminism is not monolithic either 
in its theory or its practice, nor can a model of it be constructed that would even solicit a 
majority consensus among those who identify with the general classification. Moreover, 
its critical focus and political directionality are mutable and unstable as the 'post' 
movement engages with both patriarchy and earlier feminist analyses. In a similar 
inclusive manner, the postfeminist domain also reconciles academic and media 
frameworks, stretching into the realms of postmodem theory and popular culture. 
In effect, as a result of its plurality of meaning and its contextual variability, 
postfeminism has been taken up and appropriated by a number of oppositional discourses 
and rival strains of thought. This has engendered a number of resigned critical comments 
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deploring that 'postfeminism remains a product of assumption' as 'exactly what it 
constitutes - even whether it exists at all as a valid phenomenon - is a matter for 
frequently impassioned debate' (Coppock 1995: 4; Gamble 2001: 43). Yet, at the same 
time, the crucial importance and vitality of the term have been stressed and it is seen to be 
denominating 'an age or time that we live in, a social and cultural climate' (Elsby: 3). As 
Amanda Lotz stresses, postfeminism can be 'an extremely valuable descriptor for 
recognizing and analyzing recent shifts in female representations and ideas about 
feminism' (Lotz 2001: 106). Exhibiting a plasticity that enables it to be employed in 
multiple and contradictory ways, postfeminism is 'a powerful, pervasive and versatile 
cultural concept' that 'is and can be so many different things' (Projansky 2001: 68). 
Postfeminism is denounced by its critics for its elusiveness and slipperiness 
whereby the term refuses to adopt and be determined by a singular and definite meaning. 
As Lotz bemoans, 'we seem to have entered an alternate language universe where words 
can simultaneously connote a meaning and its opposite' (Lotz 2001: 105). This pluralistic 
evasiveness implies that postfeminism cannot be fixed to a stable definitional stance and 
it cannot be established as a locus of truth, a totalizing and unified foundation. 
Postfeminist advocates are adamant that 'the changeable life' of the term postfeminism 
'does not preclude the possibility of its use' but means that it 'becomes questionable', 
requesting us 'to ask how it plays, what investments it bears, what aims it achieves, what 
alterations it undergoes' (Butler 1997a: 162). Postfeminism cannot be fully secured and 
mastered in advance but it always remains vulnerable to interrogation and doubt. Rather 
than lamenting postfeminism's disputability and instability as a sign of disunity, 
postfeminists argue that the term's contentious unpredictability should be embraced, so 
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that it can be 'released [ ... ] into a future of multiple significations' (Butler 1992: 16). 
Accordingly, the postfeminist problematic can be discussed as a contested site of 
permanent openness and resignifiability that resists being totalized or summarized by a 
strict descriptive category. Postfeminism's mobility indicates that it cannot be normalized 
and paralyzed by a monological structure of meaning. Instead, the postfeminist 
movement signifies in a number of highly varied and even contradictory ways and 
directions, refusing to be settled and constrained by a rigid designation. 
In this way, postfeminism represents and depicts a shaky ground, a shifting terrain 
that cannot be consolidated as it is in a process of perpetual replication and displacement. 
There is no original or authentic postfeminism that holds the key to its meaning and 
could be credited with the postfeminist agenda or outlook. Nor is there a stable and 
unified origin from which this genuine postfeminism could be fashioned. As a 
consequence, there is no secure and certain foundation that can determine and verify 
postfeminism's authenticity and legitimacy or set up a normative hierarchy that can 
distinguish the original from the counterfeit. Rather, there are postfeminist permutations 
that are constantly being reproduced and redefined by the discourses and theories that 
inform their emergence. Postfeminism is not grounded on a firm and indisputable base, a 
generalizable and uniform epistemology, but it is persistently being (re)constructed and 
(re)articulated. Thus, postfeminist significations are never complete as they are always 
subject to further re-significations and re-appropriations. In other words, the signifier 
'postfeminism' does not have a fixed and stable referent but it is mobilized in the service 
of diverse and often incompatible productions. Configurations of the term differ in 
emphasis and meaning and they range from a nostalgic and pro-patriarchal stance to a 
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feminist embrace of difference and plurality. Moreover, in its most ambiguous and 
controversial representations, postfeminism depicts the struggle between dualities and it 
blurs the binary as it combines previously antagonistic stances in a contentious and 
contradictory postfeminist landscape. 
In effect, postfeminism opens up the process of meaning construction by 
emphasizing that 'signification is not a founding act', a closed circuit that determines and 
fixes meaning once and for all (Butler 1990a: 145). Following the theorist Judith Butler, 
it can be identified as an enabling 'site of contest and revision', characterized by 
'strategic provisionality (rather than [ ... ] strategic essentialism), (Butler 1993b: 312). 
Butler notes that all signification can be described as 'a regulated process of repetition', 
taking 'place within the orbit of the compulsion to repeat' (Butler 1990a: 145). 
Consequently, meaning can never be fully secured while knowledge itself becomes an 
ongoing operation that can never reach an absolute certainty. As Butler puts it, there is an 
inherent instability, a 'deconstituting possibility in the very process of repetition' and it is 
'by virtue of this reiteration that gaps and fissures are opened up [ ... ] as that which 
escapes and exceeds the norm' (Butler 1993a: 10). Within a Butlerian framework, 'a 
variation on that repetition' is seen to produce 'the possibility of a complex 
reconfiguration and redeployment', a transgressive resignification that constructs a new 
and unanticipated significative content (Butler 1990a: 145). Thus, subversion becomes 
possible only within the practices of repetitive signifying and it can be achieved by a 
'failure to repeat, a de-formity' or 'failed copy' that deviates from the norm and 'repeats 
against its origin' (Butler 1990a: 141; 146; Butler 1997b: 94). For Butler, the reiterative 
nature of signification could potentially destabilize and de-sediment meaning to such an 
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extent that it is 'permanently unclear what precisely [a] sign signifies' (quoted in Seldon 
et al 1997: 257). 
While the notion of reiterability is crucial to the understanding of the postfeminist 
movement as it points to the instability and lability of its constitution, I am also cautious 
to avoid what Barry Rutland designates 'an idealism of the signifier' (Rutland 1999: 77). 
In fact, the contingency of the signification process should not be interpreted as a 
complete breakdown of meaning that sets the signifier 'on the loose'. free to refer to 
innumerable signifieds and displaced from materiality altogether. Butler circumvents the 
potentiality of anarchic signification by placing her concept of resignifiability within a 
complex matrix of power relations that 'can be neither withdrawn nor refused, but only 
redeployed' (Butler 1990a: 124). She resists the idea of free-floating meanings by 
holding on to a dynamic conception of power that limits random and erratic significations 
while simultaneously generating the possibilities for a transgressive repetition. In this 
way, the process of signification is regulated but not fully determined, preserving the 
prospect of a subversive resignification, a perpetual risk of catachresis. 
In the following, I adopt a similar logic in my refutation of an indefinitely 
dispersed postfeminism and I stress the importance of foreclosure and delimitation while 
also redefining these binding structures as renewable and unstable. I agree with Butler's 
understanding of power as 'a constitutive constraint' that is regulatory and normative as 
well as productive and enabling (Butler 1993a: xi). For Butler, power's double-edged 
implications reside in its reiterability as 'there is no power that acts, but only a reiterated 
acting that is power in its persistence and instability' (Butler 1993a: 9). Rather than 
simply being an externally imposed force, power is compelled to repeat itself for 'if the 
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conditions of power are to persist, they must be reiterated' (Butler 1997b: 16). This 
repetition (re)establishes the existing laws but it also refashions the normative shackles 
by creating a domain of risk. In other words, the power structure's dependence on 
repetitious acts of renewal engenders its precariousness as it leaves open the possibility of 
change and diversity. Butler particularly stresses this destabilizing possibility in the 
process of reiteration, explaining that 'to operate within the matrix of power is not the 
same as to replicate uncritically relations of domination. It offers the possibility of a 
repetition of the law which is not its consolidation, but its displacement' (Butler 1990a: 
30). However, Butler also emphasizes that this transgressive rearticulation is not a 
straightforward or 'pure opposition to power, only a recrafting of its terms from resources 
invariably impure' (quoted in Osborne and Segal 1994: 39). Thus, it is no longer viable to 
seek recourse to simple and paralyzing models of structural oppression as subversion is 
not in a direct, antithetical relationship of external opposition to power. Establishing what 
counts as a dissident repetition is not an easy task but rather, there is a 'subversive 
confusion' (Butler 1990a: 139). In Butler's words, it 'is not first an appropriation and 
then a subversion. Sometimes it is both at once; sometimes it remains caught in an 
irresolvable tension, and sometimes a fatally unsubversive appropriation takes place' 
(B utler 1993a: 128). 
With regard to postfeminism, Butler's insights have to be rephrased as her theory 
of resignification appears to rely on a normative understanding and the existence of an 
'original' whose meaning can be displaced and resignified. As Butler argues, the failure 
'to repeat loyally' can amount to a subversive repetition and resignification that 'fails to 
reinstate the norm "in the right way'" (Butler 1993a: 124; 138; my emphasis). Moreover, 
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she explains that 'the effects of catachresis [ ... J are possible only when terms that have 
traditionally signified in certain ways are misappropriated for other kinds of purposes' 
(Butler 1997a: 144). The repetitive process of signification is 'at once a reenactment and 
reexperiencing of a set of meanings already socially established' (Butler 1990a: 140). In 
other words, Butler presupposes that signification has a 'proper' functioning and signs 
have standardized meanings and therefore, there is a hierarchy or criterion that separates 
loyal from disloyal copies, the original from the fake. As she reveals, 'the resignification 
of norms is thus a function of their inefficacy, and so the question of subversion, of 
working the weakness in the norm becomes a matter of inhabiting the practices of its 
rearticulation' (Butler 1993a: 237; emphasis in text). Butler retains the idea that 
foundations and conventions are indispensable, insisting that she is not an 'anti-
foundationalist' (Butler 1995: 133). These epistemological grounds allow her to preserve 
the distinction between transgression and conformity, between a subversive/abnormal and 
a non-subversive/normal appropriation. However, paradoxically, Butler also undermines 
and deconstructs this notion of originality or normality by stating that it is a myth that is 
retroactively put into place, creating the illusion, 'the idea of the natural and the original' 
(Butler 1990a: 138; 31; emphasis in text). The original or 'loyal' copy is no more 'real' 
or authentic than its resignified counterfeit. Instead, the norm/original is a copy that has 
been construed and tenuously constituted in time whereas the failed and resignified copy 
'deviat[es] the citational chain toward a more possible future to expand' previous 
meaning(s) (Butler 1993a: 22). Thus, Butler's conception of resignifiability 
simultaneously uses and abolishes foundationalist assumptions as she both upholds and 
questions intelligible and hierarchizable norms. 
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In order to demystify this Butlerian paradox, it is important to realize that she 
considers her own normative foundations to be part of the signification process, rather 
than its authenticating and pre-existing suppositions. Butler's understanding relies on the 
idea of a non-totalizing universality that is an open-ended, contested site of persistent 
crisis. Accordingly, she does not discuss the deconstruction of universal conventions in 
terms of their negation or dismissal. On the contrary, she notes that 'to deconstruct [ ... ] 
[is] to call into question, and perhaps most importantly, to open up a term [ ... ] to a reuse 
or redeployment that previously has not been authorized' (Butler 1992: 15). In this way, 
deconstruction postulates a destabilization of meaning as it rejects a univalent 
signification in favor of a mutable construction. As Butler declares, 'to call a 
presupposition into question is not the same as doing away with it; rather, it is to free it 
up from its metaphysical lodgings in order to occupy and to serve very different [ ... ] 
aims' (Butler 1992: 17). 
This conception of deconstruction as a questioning rather than an annihilating 
impulse implies that Butler can maintain and refer to the notion of an original and its 
failed copy, to norms and their subversion while also undercutting the epistemological 
grounding of these ideas. Her critique is not a complete repudiation of all philosophical 
prerequisites but rather a way of interrogating their construction as pre-given or 
foundationalist premises. Butler reveals that 'the point is not to level a prohibition against 
using ontological terms' but, on the contrary, one should 'use them more', 'exploit and 
restage them, subject them to abuse so that they can no longer do their usual work' 
(quoted in Meijer and Prins 1998: 279). Her critical stance is summarized by the claim 
that 'there are existing conventions that govern the scope of rights considered to be 
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universal' which, however, is 'not the same as to claim that the scope of universal rights 
has been decided once and for all' (Butler 1995: 130).2 
Thus, Butler proposes a set of challenges that are historically provisional, but they 
are not for that reason any less necessary to engage. She offers a perception of normative 
delimitation as temporalized and mutable rather than fixed and determinate. In her view, 
conventions and constraints must be 'constituted again and again', implying that there is 
a possibility of reiteration and variation (Butler 1995: 135). By emphasizing the 
provisionality and constitutive instability of structure, Butler dislodges the antithesis 
between normality and abnormality, original and counterfeit, loyal and disloyal copy. 
These polarities exceed the logic of non-contradiction as they are no longer seen to be in 
an either/or relationship. In this way, the notion of an authentic original is not opposed to 
its unfaithful copy but rather, the original itself is a copy that has been materialized and 
put into place by a continuous repetition. Normativity is thus rethought as a changeable 
but nonetheless binding matrix that is 'neither fully determined [ ... ] nor fully 
determining (but significantly and partially both)' (Butler 1997b: 17). 
In what follows, I argue that postfeminism's various articulations are contingent 
on a contextualized configuration that situates and provisionally constitutes the term's 
significations. I supplement Butler's notion of resignifiability with a model of 
positionality that constructs postfeminism as a relational term, definable only within a 
(constantly moving) context. Butler's terminology has to be adapted as postfeminism has 
no recourse to a distinct postferrilnist norm or original, an idea which Butler 
simultaneously maintains and deconstructs. While postfeminism cannot be 
comprehended by referring to an authentic foundation, a firm and monological 
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epistemology, it can nevertheless be bounded and situated. In fact, postfeminism's 
plurality of meaning does not dissolve into a meaningless plurality, a free zone of its own 
making. Postfeminist significations do not eternally expand and multiply to the point 
where it may become pointless to determine any sense and purpose. Instead, 
postfeminism is defined by a particular position, 'a place from where meaning is 
constructed, rather than simply the place where a meaning can be discovered' (Alcoff 
1987-88: 434). Thus, I introduce the notion of a contextual stabilization of meaning that 
sets up a positional definition, a mutable and localized delimitation of signification. I 
employ the Butlerian concept of reiterability to examine postfeminism's precarious 
construction and I contend that her idea of a productive constraint takes the form of a 
contextual positioning within a postfeminist framework. 
Butler herself acknowledges the importance of context, 'where context is the 
effective historicity and spatiality of the sign' (Butler 1997b: 96). She stresses the 
possibility of opening up a gap between the originating context/intention by which a term 
is animated and the effects it produces. This citational slippage or disruption creates the 
possibility of new and unanticipated meanings, a 'reterritorialization' or 'expropriation 
for non-ordinary means' (Butler 1993a: 231; Butler 1997a: 160). As Butler notes, the 
contexts a term assumes must not be 'quite the same as the ones in which it originates' 
(Butler 1997a: 15). The force and meaning of an utterance are not 'exclusively 
determined by prior contexts or "positions'" as a term may gain its force precisely by 
virtue of a 'break with context' (Butler 1997a: 145). This decontextualization 'rattlers] 
the otherwise firm sense of context that [ ... ] a term invokes' and reinscribes the latter 
with a 'non-ordinary meaning' that contests 'what has become sedimented in and as the 
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ordinary' (Butler 1997a: 145). Resignification can thus be discussed as a 
'deterritorializing' project that cites 'the norms of power in a radically new context' 
(Olson and Worsham 2000: 741). Butler establishes a causal connection between 
meaning and context whereby signification is a contexualized expression that can be 
displaced and reappropriated in unexpected ways and with unintended effects. 
However, Butler has also been criticized on account of her theory's abstractness 
as it does not take sufficient notice of the intricate contextual entanglements that give rise 
to new significations. Suzanna Danuta Walters notes that 'too often, mere lip service is 
given to the specific historical, social, and political configurations' that make certain 
significations possible and others constrained (Walters 1996: 855). Moreover, Butler's 
theory 'often seems ahistorical and [ ... ] uninterested in cultural specificity' in a way that 
'can produce a flattening out of power relations' (Piggford 1999: 284; Harris 1999: 119). 
Butler's insights are seen to be universalistic as it is not enough to assert that all meaning 
is constituted within complex and specific regimes of power and domination. According 
to Walters, those regimes must be explicitly part of the analytical structure, 'rather than 
asides to be tossed around and then ignored' (Walters 1996: 856). This criticism is 
reinforced by Lois McNay who states that. within Butler's theories, there remains 'a 
tendency to valorize the act of resignification per se' as a generalized and structural 
potentiality at the expense of a more sustained consideration of the positional 
construction of meaning (McNay 1999: 187). Thus, 'the problem with the concept of 
resignification [ ... ] is that its status as a symbolic mechanism is not sufficient' to analyse 
the unstable and ambiguous relations between resignificatory practices and the contextual 
structures that frame them (McNay 1999: 182-183). Ultimately, the weakness of 'Butler's 
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primarily symbolic concept of power is that it underestimates the extent to which there 
can be a systemic recuperation of seemingly radical practices' (McNay 1999: 182). 
McNay's objections relate to Butler's emphasis on the potentially subversive aspects of 
resignification and her disregard for more conservative and hegemonic repetitions that do 
not break with their contexts and reinforce rather than transgress their original 
constraints. 
Even though Butler's work centers on the exploration of recontextualized and 
denaturalized significations, I believe that McNay oversimplifies her position as an 
uncritical appraisal of resignificatory acts. In fact, 'there is less a problem with Butler's 
writing than there is with its reception and perception' (Harris 1999: 119). Butler's critics 
have seized upon her theories as representing a single and unimpeachable position that 
can be transferred into all areas of existence in a way that ignores the specificity of the 
terrain that Butler covers. Butler is well aware that resignification by itself is not a 
transgressive act but 'depends on a context and reception in which subversive confusions 
can be fostered' (Butler1990a: 139). She understands the historicity and peculiarity of 
subversion, noting that 'there must be a way to understand what makes certain kinds of 
[ ... ] repetitions effectively disruptive, truly troubling, and which repetitions become 
domesticated and recirculated as instruments of cultural hegemony' (Butler 1990a: 139). 
However, Butler does not put forward this criterion of subversion, this unmistakable 
proof of transgression, but she advances a theory or proposal which points to the 
generalized potentiality of such are-appropriation. 
In this way, Butler stops short of a politics of location that explores subversion as 
a process of interpretation, open to contestation and contingent on a historical, material 
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and discursive position.3 She does not translate her theories into a blueprint for a practical 
politics as she tends to give preference to 'the text over context', 'the linguistic over the 
social', theory over practice (Harris 1999: 119). As she summarizes her theoretical task, 
'it seems that [ ... ] repetition is inevitable, and that the strategic question remains, what 
best use is to be made of repetition?' (Butler 1997a: 37). She focuses on those 'forms of 
repetition that do not constitute a simple imitation, reproduction, and, hence, 
consolidation of the law' (Butler 1990a: 31). Simultaneously, Butler acknowledges that 
this exercise of agency is bound to be an ambivalent struggle that cannot be achieved at a 
distance as it takes place within the constraints of compulsion. Thus, Butler's work is not 
so much a misjudgment and dismissal of (re)significatory ambiguity but a critical 
examination of the subversive possibilities within a repetitive structure of signification. 
In the following, I will build on Butler's work and develop her, admittedly, 
unspecified notion of context in order to explore the genesis of postfeminism as a 
reiterated phenomenon that is simultaneously constructed and positioned by a process of 
ongoing and constant renewal. Rather than trying to define postfeminism through an 
eradication or dissolution of its conflicting elements, this study situates and locates the 
term in order to include and focus on its contradictions and controversy. I argue that 
postfeminism emerges and achieves its various significations by being contextualised and 
momentarily stabilized. However, this definitional fastening or fixation is not static and 
unalterable as postfeminism is not bound to a particular context and meaning. Instead, it 
is reiterable and can be repeated and resignified in ways that reverse and dislocate its 
previous significations. Thus, every contextualization always bears the risk of a de-
contextualization or de-territorialization and a reinsciption with an alternative meaning. 
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Using Judith Butler's formulation, postfeminism is constituted by its situation/context but 
it is not determined by it, where determination forecloses the potential for resignification 
(Butler 1990a: 142). Postfeminism's multiplicity and ambiguity of meaning derive 
precisely from the term's decontextualization, from its break with prior contexts and its 
capacity to assume new locations and denotations. The term postfeminism acquires a new 
meaning or connotation when it is displaced from the context in which it has previously 
been deployed. In this way, postfeminism is enabled by this permanent possibility of 
resignification that requires opening new contexts and de-sedimenting other postfeminist 
positions. 
Postfeminism takes on divergent (and even contradictory) significative contents 
when it is inserted and made to mean in concrete contextual settings. Adopting Fabio 
Cleto's terminology, it can be identified as a 'nomadic category' 'operative with different 
ends at different times and for different groups' (Cleto 1999: 35; 15). In approaching 
such a polyvalent and multifarious term, it is necessary to localize its configuration and to 
explore the friction produced by its positionings. Postfeminism cannot be assessed and 
defined by a particular set of attributes or characteristics but has to be described 
dynamically, in the relationship and tension between its specific manifestations and its 
contexts. Instead of fixing and securing a singular and monolithic definition for 
postfeminism, I demarcate a fluid postfeminist landscape in which meaning is never a 
finality but always in process. Accordingly, postfeminist denotations and values are 
highly varied and plural as they are continuously being reconstructed and resignified by 
their contextual relations. At the same time, I insist that postfeminism's multiple 
significations do not imply, as Baudrillard provocatively dec1ares, that 'meaning is only 
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an ambiguous and inconsequential accident' (Baudrillard 1983: 11). Postfeminist 
meanings do not 'implode as if sucked into a black hole', but they are always irreducibly 
context-bound, constructed in radically heterogeneous and shifting ways by complex 
power structures (Best and Kellner 1991: 121). 
Consequently, I want to problematize the notion of postfeminist contexts by 
stressing that these positions represent conflictual negotiations within a network of 
power/discourse. I emphasize that the heterogeneity of postfeminism does not preclude 
disagreement but, on the contrary, it fosters it. Postfeminist contexts are not mutually 
exclusive but they are interlocking and interacting, superimposed upon one another. 
Postfeminism's localized expressions do not make up a finite totality, a unity of diverse 
meanings and identities as they actively engage with and contest one another, refusing to 
be contained in an orderly hierarchy. Importantly, in its most challenging and equivocal 
representations, postfeminism is situated inter-contextually, in the interaction between 
discourses, theories and frameworks. Postfeminism's contextuality does not take the form 
of a rigid and static site but can be discussed in terms of a mobile and unstable struggle, a 
crossing of epistemological, methodological and discursive perimeters and confines. As 
will be discussed, postfeminism emerges from and participates in the contentious 
intersections between feminism, postmodernism, patriarchy and popular culture. 
Postfeminism is not synonymous with any of these contextual settings but sits uneasily 
between these locations, reflecting their conflicts and tensions. In this way, the range and 
variety of postfeminist voices do not unite in harmony and they cannot be ranked or 
classified according to neatly sub-divided categories and contexts. Postfeminisms 
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overlap, contradict, reinforce and undermine each other, forming an ambiguous space that 
disregards hierarchical and dualistic logic. 
In fact, postfeminism can be identified as an inter-(con)textual movement or 
transfer between discourses and theories, creating a multi-directional and equivocal 
junction that challenges closure and a centralized meaning. Postfeminism's inherent 
interdiscursivity 'inevitably takes the form of boundary-crossing', generating 'the 
deferral and rewriting of "parent" texts' (O'Donnell and Davis 1989: xiv).4 This 
unwillingness to adhere to and situate itself in a stable and unitary relation to its 
instituting discourses has brought about the charge of postfeminist parasitism. 
Postfeminism is criticized for 'feeding upon its hosts' and abusing the very (con)texts 
that make up the postfeminist landscape (Dentith 2000: 188). It is said to be a 
contaminating presence that dilutes the 'original' movementsltheories and replaces them 
with a realm of impurity and ambiguity. Contrastingly, I mitigate the force of these 
critical perceptions by contending that there is no unsullied and unified point of origin 
that postfeminism attacks and neutralizes. I question the notions of originalityl 
authenticity and the idea of an autonomous postfeminist 'text', with an immanent 
meaning. I argue that postfeminism cannot be understood reductively as a disuniting or 
disruptive presence that undermines and splinters previously coherent unities. Instead, 
postfeminism's assemblage of contradictory viewpoints and theories reflects rather than 
produces the disjointed nature of its (con)texts. These 'originals' are no more united than 
postfeminism and, in their most unequivocal representations, they are based on a 
'temporary stability that is constantly destabilized because of the difference contained 
both within and without' them (Harris 1999: 183). In this way, postfeminism's discursive 
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and theoretical contexts can be discussed as areas of contention rather than easily 
identifiable, singular and transcultural phenomena. Postfeminism arises from and is 
emblematic of the disputes surrounding the encounters of a number of highly varied 
coalitions, loosely associated by the overall terms of feminism, postmodernism, 
patriarchy and popular culture. The postfeminist movement can be located in 'the clash 
between competing discourses, the contradictions within and between discursive fields 
and the diverse and multiple ways in which power is reproduced and reinstated' (Harris 
1999: 173). Postfeminism does not offer a notion of synthesis or wholeness but it relies 
on a complex and multiple account of power/discourse. Its oscillatory movement cannot 
be described as a straightforward alliance of juxtapositions, a free-for-all ambiguity, but 
rather as a permanent struggle over meanings and an interplay of contradictions. 
As a result of this dynamic and unstable positioning, postfeminist texts and 
contents do not abide to a simplistic categorization that classifies, tames and brings to 
intelligibility postfeminism's controversial and paradoxical plurality. Postfeminism's 
contextual ambiguity is mirrored on the level of signification as the postfeminist 
landscape brings together and unseats a string of antithetical qualities and positions on 
which 'bourgeois epistemic and ontological order arranges and perpetuates itself' (Cleto 
1999: 15). As will be revealed, postfeminism questions and crosses the binary opposition 
between complicity and critique, feminism and femininity, subject and object, agency and 
passivity, signifier and signified. Postfeminism does not locate truth in any of these 
polarities and instead, sabotages and collapses the barrier between them. It effects a 
destabilization of and a movement across binaries in order to establish an ambiguous in-
betweenness. As Fernando de Toro explains, 'post-theory' implies 'exploiting the in-
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between spaces [ ... ] a transitory space, a space other, a third space that is not here/there, 
but both' (de Toro 1999: 20). In this way, postfeminism's various (con)textual 
expressions share a defiance of an orderly and uniform structure as they undercut 
absolute oppositions and reject the either/or dichotomy of these antitheses. The 
postfeminist movement operates in the productive and contested middle space between 
binaries, exceeding their limits and undermining their mutual exclusivity. The 
hierarchized pair is unsettled and its relationality is altered in an attempt to appropriate its 
meaning and restructure its dynamic. 
In other words, postfeminist theory and practice blur binary distinctions in their 
ambivalent conjunctions of hitherto incompatible and irreconcilable opposites. 
Accordingly, postfeminism's critical position is complicit and subversive at the same 
time, while the postfeminist self can be described as both an agent and a subject, 
displaying a feminist consciousness along with a feminine body. These binarisms are 
transcontextualized in an effort to re-describe and reconfigure their relations and values. 
As Barbara Kastelein points out, postfeminism 'appears to be no longer perturbed by 
[ .•• J dualistic constraints' as it 'finds ways to declare the boundaries no longer relevant' 
(Kastelein 1994: 8). Thus, postfeminism works to reshape and transform the existing 
balance of either/or contrasts and re-assemble them in a non-dichotomous way. It 
employs the notion of resignifiability to reinscribe and relocate dualisms, reveal the 
porousness of their division and their overlapping features. The 'post' movement sets up 
a negotiating space between these extremes as it creates a contentious and controversial 
intersection that resignifies and redefines both sides of the binary. Within this 
postfeminist realm, meanings are constructed relationally, existing between (con)texts 
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and discourses. Hence, a postfeminist text can be characterized as an 'intertext', a 
dynamic site involving a perpetual play of referentiality between and within texts (Allen 
2000: 1). The postfeminist landscape is an inter-(con)textual space that challenges closed 
systems of signification and permits the recognition of systematic limits while 
encouraging 'the intertextual dialogue that will dissolve and reconfigure those limits' 
(O'Donnell and Davies 1989: xiv; xv). 
Postfeminism's intertextual strategy can be described as a form of recycling that 
seeks to dislocate, destabilize and finally alter the meaning of terms that have previously 
signified in another way. Postfeminist advocates insist that this 'expropriating' or 
deterritorializing process manufactures a 'critical distance from the ur-text' and thereby, 
effects a disruption in the relation between signifier and signified, opening up the 
possibility for a transgressive resignification and redeployment (Dentith 2000: 155; 
Butler 1993b: 314). Myra Macdonald refers to this rearticulation of the processes of 
signification as a 'reading against the grain' that searches for inconsistencies and gaps to 
produce a subversive reading (Macdonald 1995: 37). Significations are transvalued as 
they are distanced from their prior denotations and significatory boundaries and they are 
relocated in new contextual surroundings. This reappropriation exploits the power of 
familiar images and recontextualizes them in order to 'de-naturalize them, make visible 
the concealed mechanisms which work to make them seem transparent' (Hutcheon 
1989a: 44). In Adrienne Rich's words, this is an act of 're-vision [ ... ] of looking back, of 
seeing with fresh eyes, of entering an old text from a new critical direction' (Rich 1979: 
35). The 'old vessel' is invaded and 'filled with new wine' and the 'relation to the past' is 
unsettled, 'revealing the past as changing in response to the present and as capable of 
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transforming present and future as well' (Ostriker 1982: 72; Greene 1991: 292). This 
suggests 'a view of the past not as fixed and finished but as so vitally connected to the 
present that it takes on new meaning in response to present questions and needs' (Greene 
1991: 305). In this way, postfeminism represents a comment on the present as much as on 
the past as it recalls and revises, invokes and undercuts those (con)texts that contribute to 
its emergence. The past evolves in confrontation with the present and it can be seen as an 
ever-changing construct that is open to reinterpretation and reconstruction. Within 
postfeminism, past and present interact, allowing 'a circling back over material that 
enables repetition with revision' (Greene 1991: 307). 
I contend that this revisioning process cannot be conceptualized simplistically as 
one has to take into account the double-edged implications of the trope of recycling that 
preserves the texts it seeks to superimpose, incorporating the old into the new. In fact. 
recycling signifies transformation and change but, at the same time, the recycled 
object/text still carries traces of its prior uses and functions. According to Judith Butler, 
this logic of 'renewal through synthesis' is an inherent part of postmodernity for, 'if 
anything. the postmodern casts doubt upon the possibility of a "new" that is not in some 
way already implicated in the "old'" ( Hutcheon 1985: 97; Butler 1992: 6). Within 
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postfeminism, there is a paradoxical cultural recombination or 'intertextual echoing' that 
marks 'the difference from the past' but. simultaneously, also 'works to affirm [ ... ] the 
connection with the past' (Gitlin 1989: 350; Hutcheon 1989b: 5). As Adrienne Rich 
asserts, this is 'a difficult and dangerous walking on the ice' as this 'revisionist' impulse 
has a double allegiance (Rich 1979: 35). This recycling project 'operates through the 
deployment of signs with already standardized meanings' and thus, 'recuperation is ever 
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a real possibility' (Lloyd 1999: 206). Myra Macdonald explains that this method of 
appropriation may only temporarily shift the balance of power as 'reading against the 
grain, after all, leaves the grain exactly where it was' (Macdonald 1995: 38). The reuse 
and rearrangement of significatory processes is characterized by an ambiguity of purpose 
and meaning as it cannot escape the inter-dependence ofthe old and the new, the 
dominant and the contestatory. 
This doubleness implies that postfeminism is engaged in 'the intertextual 
"bouncing" [ ... J between complicity and distance' and therefore, it is liable to oscillate 
in and out of a critical attitude (Hutcheon 1985: 32). Postfeminism works the border 
between a subversive questioning and an unavoidable recuperation as the necessary 
semiotic gap that generates the problematic within which an old signification is 
manipulable constantly threatens to contract and collapse. The critical gap between 
signifier and signified can tum into a closeness or proximity that could be mistaken for an 
essentialist synonymy that veils the constructedness and changeability of meanings. In 
this way, there is no totalizing structure that guarantees in advance that a resignified 
repetition will not be recuperated and the norm reinforced, or indeed that any such 
improper or disloyal citation may simply be perceived as poor copies of the norm. 
Postfeminism epitomizes this double-voiced ambivalence whereby distance/difference is 
no longer opposed to nearness/sameness but these previously antithetical positions are 
combined in a paradoxical embrace. 
In fact, I propose that postfeminism's ambiguous resignification or appropriation 
technique can be discussed as a parodic strategy that manages simultaneously to inscribe 
continuity while also permitting critical distance and change. I argue that parody 
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represents a polyvalent and pluralistic way of understanding postfeminism's inter-
(con)textual relations and spectrum of meaning. Parody can be seen as 'a perfect mode of 
criticism' for postfeminism as it enshrines the past and questions it, paradoxically both 
incorporating and cha))enging that which it parodies (Hutcheon 1989b: 11; 6). As Linda 
Hutcheon dec1ares, in parody 'we have found a new model for our signifying practices 
today', one that substitutes the notion of an 'original inscription' with the idea of a 
'para))el script' (Hutcheon 1990: 132). It can be described as both 'a way to preserve 
continuity in discontinuity' and 'a repetition with critical distance that allows ironic 
signaling of difference at the very heart of similarity' (Hutcheon 1985: 97; Hutcheon 
1988: 26). This bi-directionality is an inherent characteristic of parody that can be 
normative and unprogressive as we)) as provocative and revolutionary.5 Parody has a dual 
potential whereby 'it can subvert the accents of authority and police the boundaries of the 
sayable', it can be 'both conservative and transformative, both "mystificatory" and 
critical' (Dentith 2000: 27; Hutcheon 1985: 10 1). Thus, there are two generally opposed 
descriptions of parody, of which one 'plays the game' of the established order and 
constantly monitors 'the dangerous extremes' while the other parodic mode is 'broadly 
subversive of authority' and can effectively deconstruct the established order (Dentith 
2000: 27; Weber 1995: 65). 
In particular, Linda Hutcheon proposes a theory of postmodern parody as 
'repetition with critical distance' in order to discuss the paradoxical idea of reiteration or 
citation as the basis for critique and subversion, of 'repetition as a source of freedom' 
(Hutcheon 1985: 6; 10). In Hutcheon's definition, parody is a form of imitation, but 
'imitation characterized by ironic inversion' that offers a productive-creative approach to 
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tradition (Hutcheon 1985: 7; 6). It can be discussed as a manipulation of intertextual 
codes engaged in the unceasing struggle over meanings and values. According to this 
view, it is not a matter of nostalgic imitation of the past but rather a modern recoding, 
capable of transformative power in creating new syntheses. This parodic mode of 
postmodernity marks difference rather than similarity and it comes to be recognized as an 
ironic form of criticism that transgresses through appropriation and "'de-doxifies" our 
assumptions about our representations of [the] past' (Hutcheon 1989a: 98). Thus, 
postmodern parody is a value-prob1ematizing, de-naturalizing form of acknowledging 
and contesting the history of representations, of ironical1y revising and revisiting the past. 
Contrastingly, Fredric Jameson adopts a far less optimistic view in his 
description of postmodern parody as nostalgic escapism. Jameson asserts that, in 
postmodernism, 'parody finds itself without a vocation' and it has been replaced by 
pastiche, defined as 'blank parody', 'without any of parody's ulterior motives' and 
'amputated of the satiric impulse' (Jameson 1993: 73; 74). Pastiche can be distinguished 
from parody on the grounds that it takes no critical distance from the material it recycles. 
It is imitative rather than transformative in its relationship to other texts, operating by 
similarity and correspondence. Unlike Hutcheon, Jameson does not embrace postmodern 
parody as a 'bitextual synthesis' but he refers to it as a monotextual form, a 'neutral 
practice of mimicry' (Hutcheon 1985: 33; Jameson 1983: 114). Pastiche comes to be seen 
as characteristic of postmodernism, expressing 'the cultural logic of late capitalism' that 
prevents 'the recourse to any discourse of nature or tradition [ ... ] which could be used to 
measure or ironise the forms that are pastiched' (Jameson 1993: 62; Dentith 2000: 184). 
As Jameson notes, pastiche lacks 'that still latent feeling that there exists something 
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normal compared to which what is being imitated is rather comic' (Jameson 1983: 114).6 
According to Jameson, postmodern parody is a sign of imprisonment in the past, an 
'alarming and pathological symptom of a society that has become incapable of dealing 
with time and history' (Jameson 1983: 117). Pastiche does not allow a confrontation with 
the present and it is dismissed as a nostalgic recovery of past meanings, symptomatic of 
an inescapably intertextual history. The critical force carried by parody has been 
supplanted by a depthless and ahistorical nostalgia that equalizes all identities, styles and 
images as it privileges heterogeneity and random difference.7 Thus, Jameson offers a 
description of postmodern parody as a value-free, de-historicized quotation of the past, an 
empty realm of pastiche and an apt mode for a culture in which, as Baudrillard declares, 
'all that are left are pieces. All that remains to be done is to play with the pieces. Playing 
with the pieces - that is postmodern' (Baudrillard 1984: 24). 
For the purpose of this study, I suggest that postmodernlpostfeminist parody 
crosses the distinction between Hutcheon's ironic repetition ofthe past and Jameson's 
nostalgic pastiche. I argue that postfeminism's parodic resignification or trans-
contextualization is always fundamentally hybrid and double-voiced as the direction of 
its politics cannot be permanently defined. The intent of parody cannot be settled and 
fixed as its ideological status is ambiguous, both legitimizing and subverting that which it 
parodies. Parody has the paradoxical effect of preserving the form it attacks through a 
double process of installing and ironizing. This marks the central paradox of parody 
whereby its transgression is always authorized by the very norm it seeks to subvert, so 
that 'in imitating, even with critical difference, parody reinforces' (Hutcheon 1985: 26). 
Parody represents an authorized transgression, characterized by the dual drives of 
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conservative and revolutionary forces that stress difference as well as sameness and 
stasis. Any attempt to offer an essentializing or transhistorical definition of parody is 
bound to be unsuccessful and redundant as it is impossible and even undesirable to grant 
the parodic mode a single social or political direction and value.8 Parody's functions vary 
in intention and meaning, ranging from serious criticism to a playful mockery, to 
conservative nostalgia. Moreover, the two sides or 'hands' of parodic repetition are 
neither entirely separable nor simply opposable but rather ambivalently intertwined, 
'each hand caressing and contaminating the other in a parasitic embrace' {Weber 1995: 
68). Thus, one cannot establish two distinct parodic realms (one conservative and one 
subversive) but instead, one has to negotiate a fluctuating middle ground that refuses to 
come down on either side of the binary. 
In effect, I maintain that within postfeminism, parody's ironic and nostalgic 
impulses can be combined in an ironic nostalgic stance that introduces the contradictory 
idea of reiteration that is complicitous and critical at the same time. I suggest that in 
postfeminist parody, edgy irony and sentimentalized nostalgia can coexist and may be 
conflated. Jameson's distinction between pastiche and parody becomes blurry as 
nostalgia is exploited and ironized. This paradoxical move invokes and simultaneously 
undercuts representations of the past, interrogating the norm that, according to Jameson, 
traditional parody assumes. Nostalgia is no longer described as an uncritical embrace of 
bygone values and certainties but it is problematized and gains an ironic distance to the 
past. As Linda Hutcheon explains, 'nostalgia [ ... ] does not simply repeat or duplicate 
memory' but instead, creates a sense of the past through a 'complex projection' 
(Hutcheon 1998: 3).9 Nostalgia effects a construction and distortion ofthe past in 
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conjunction with the present and it operates through a 'historical inversion' whereby 'the 
ideal that is not being lived now is projected into the past' (Hutcheon 1998: 3). Nostalgia 
is not a simple recording of past issues but it always involves an act of fabrication and 
creation that redefines these issues. This process of construction opens up a gap for 
reflective thought about the present and the past while also permitting an ironizing of 
nostalgia that both reinforces and subverts the look backward for authenticity. 
In the postfeminist landscape, the hybrid notion of an ironized nostalgia finds its 
expression in the reinscription and transvaluation of significations whereby, for instance, 
the adoption of a normative femininity is resignified as a feminist method of resistance 
and empowerment. As will be discussed, stereotypical feminine images are called up and 
employed in a postfeminist context in a way that is both ironic and/or nostalgic. Sarah 
Gamble encapsulates this ironic/nostalgic move in her provocative description of 
postfeminism as an age in which 'women dress like bimbos, yet claim male privileges 
and attitudes' (Gamble 2001: 43). An ironically nostalgic interpretation of this 
postfeminist appropriation emphasizes women's control of and distance from their own 
objectification, insisting that contemporary expressions of femininity, including the 
wearing of the old trappings of female exploitation, can be comprehended in terms of 
self-definition and self-gratification. Yet, at the same time, this recourse to femininity can 
never fully escape the charge of complicity and co-option that makes women collude 
with a patriarchal system in order to preserve stereotypical male and female roles. In this 
way, the ironic/nostalgic stance that constructs the feminine self/body as a means to 
female/feminist emancipation is always characterized by an ambiguous invocation of past 
and present. Postfeminist resignification operates in a contradictory field of citation that 
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repeats not just nostalgically, 'but with a critical recognition of the temptation to 
nostalgia' that creates an ironic distantiation (Robertson 1996: 5). 
Thus, ironized nostalgia is caught in a changeable and dynamic relationship of 
both rupture and continuity, refusing to be characterized as either ironic critique or 
nostalgic creation and insisting that it can be both, at the same time. In ironized nostalgia, 
parody's nostalgic and ironic elements are merged in an ambivalent union that exhibits 
difference as well as continuum and importantly, does not offer a resolution of 
contradictions but foregrounds them. Accordingly, I resist Jean Baudrillard's appraisal of 
parody as 'the most serious crime' that 'makes obedience and transgression equivalent' 
and 'cancels out the difference upon which the law is based' (Baudrillard 1993: 198). On 
the contrary, I maintain that parody does not erase distance or difference in a neutralizing 
act; rather, it creates a paradoxical space in which continuity and discontinuity, 
transformation and stasis are no longer in a mutually exclusive relationship but are 
combined in a partly progressive and partly retrograde double movement. 
In this way, parody is socially and politically multivalent and its workings can 
only be considered at particular historical moments and differing social situations. As 
Dentith declares, 
we have to recognize [ ... ] that parody's direction of attack cannot be decided 
upon in abstraction from the particular social and historical circumstances in 
which the parodic act is performed, and therefore that no single or political 
meaning can be attached to it. (Dentith 2000: 28) 
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Parody's context-dependent nature does not indicate that its uses are neutral but it implies 
that its social/political course cannot be deduced in advance as it requires a contextual 
understanding. Parody can be identified as 'one of the techniques of self-referentiality' 
that reveals an awareness of 'the importance to signification of the circumstances 
surrounding any utterance' (Hutcheon 1985: 85).10 In order to emphasize the parodic 
plurality and paradox, it can be discussed as a 'mode' in the spectrum of possible 
intertextual relations whose ethos should be labeled as 'unmarked, with a number of 
possibilities for marking' (Hutcheon 1985: 60), 
Ultimately, parody's doubly coded and context-specific status makes it a ready 
vehicle for the contradictions and ambiguities of postmodernismlpostfeminism at large. It 
is 'the paradoxical post modern way of coming to terms with the past', calling into 
question 'the temptation toward the monolithic in modern thinking' and marking the 
intersection of complicity and critique, creation and recreation (Hutcheon 1985: 116; 10 1; 
Hutcheon 1989b: 14). Postfeminism embraces this parodic mode in order to put forward 
its controversial critique that is simultaneously conservative and transgressive, obedient 
and subversive. Parody's bi-directionality and its political unmarkedness make it a 
perfect instrument to express postfeminism's contextual variability and multiplicity of 
meaning. The postfeminist parodic position is unashamedly paradoxical and it refuses to 
be defined by binary categories as either radical or reactionary, innovative or orthodox. In 
fact, postfeminism should not be considered as a blueprint for either feminist 
transgression or patriarchal containment but as a site of struggle and cultural negotiation 
that no longer adheres to a dichotomized conception and way of thinking. Instead, it 
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appropriates and trans-contextualizes these distinctions in order to offer its own parodic, 
contradictory interpretation of postmodernity. 
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1.2 Beyond the Binary or Theorizing on the Postfeminist Frontier 
Something has happened. In the last two decades, before the end of this century, 
we have witnessed the emergence of the Post. This is a symptom of a society and 
a culture unable to name what is taking place in the very crux of its activity. The 
Post, then, comes to replace that which we know is there, but which we do not 
quite manage to signal. 
Fernando de Toro, 'Explorations on Post-Theory: New Times' (1999) 
'Western culture has entered a New Age, one which is stiIl searching for its name', 
Fernando de Toro states in his 'Explorations on Post-Theory', emphasizing that 'we are 
at the very threshold, on the very liminal space of a new production, practice and thinking 
of theory' (de Toro 1999: 10; emphasis in text). These new times are defined as 'post-
theoretical' in their introduction of a new strategy and a new awareness and in their 
'search for a "beyond", a third theoretical space' (de Toro 1999: 9; 10). The notion of 
post-theory refers to the limits of theory as well as the surpassing of those limits, 
implying a work of reconstruction, 'a further effort of theorization that transcends 
theory's current horizon' (Rutland 1999: 72). Post-theory does not signify the end of 
theoretical activity or a renunciation of theory, a completion of the theorizing project 
whereby 'there is simply no further novelty to be squeezed from it' (Rutland 1999: 72). 
The post-theoretical stance works 'within, but perhaps also against, the parameters of 
theory', 'mov[ing] us from the exclusionary logic of either/or to the inclusionary logic of 
both/and' (Rutland 1999: 72; 74). This new mode of understanding disengages the 
dualistic frameworks of Platonism in order to affirm the positivity of difference and to 
account for change and changing contexts. In this way, 'the endless battle of two 
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competing elements through the vertical axis of hierarchy' has been replaced by and 
transformed into 'a horizontal and pluralistic model' that is beyond the binary in its 
rejection of polarized positions (Kastelein 1994: 216). 
Postfeminism exemplifies and epitomizes this post-theoretical condition as it 
cannot be ascribed to a single and consistent theoretical, practical and definitional stance, 
but instead, it effects a double gesture, a 'philosophical positioning of "both at once'" 
(Harris 1999: 19). This two-sidedness is at the heart of the postfeminist debate and it is 
expressed in a number of ways and contexts. Areas of discussion encompass 
postfeminism's holding together of antitheses, its controversial positioning as a cultural 
and theoretical movement, its plurality of meaning and its focal ambiguity. In effect, 
postfeminism dissolves disciplinary, epistemological and significatory boundaries and it 
embraces a state of permanent transition. It stages a simultaneous and contradictory 
deployment of heterogeneous theoretical apparatuses, either in concert with one another .-
or against one another. As will be discussed, the postfeminist movement blends and holds 
together theories from diverse fields and disciplines, including feminism, postmodernism 
and popular culture. In the process of these often problematical conjunctions, the 
underlying epistemologies are brought into contact and conflict, establishing a space for 
their deconstruction and redefinition. In this way, postfeminism represents the capacity to 
rewrite and 'the conscience that there is a constant slippage of meaning opening 
interstices in any systematic effort to control production' (lmbert 1999: 25). 
Adopting Geraldine Harris's phrase, postfeminism is characterized by 'a politics 
of undecidability' that walks a tightrope between complicity and critique and 
'acknowledges the impossibility of theoretical purity or perfectly political1y correct 
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practices' (Harris 1999: 21; 186). The politics of undecidability does not depend on a 
priori laws, pre-existing assumptions, universal truths or appeals to absolute authorities. 
Instead, it promotes a double movement of exploitation and contestation, use and abuse, 
rupture and continuity. This bi-directionality depolarizes the postfeminist landscape and 
it is exhibited by ambivalent and pluralistic descriptions of power, critique, subjectivity 
and agency. This form of politics accepts the necessity of working within what already 
exists and forging a future from resources inevitably impure. As Harris notes, the politics 
of undecidability strives to discover a position between 'wild hope and total pessimism', 
in order to deal pragmatically with the fact that 'we are always within that which we 
would criticize without faIIing into passivity or relativism' (Harris 1999: 180). Similarly, 
Judith Butler designates 'a politics of discomfort' as a 'politics of both hope and anxiety', 
Whose key terms are not fully secured in advance and whose futural form cannot be fully 
anticipated (Butler 1997a: 161). She forges the notion of 'living the political in medias 
res' in order to describe this 'reconfiguration of our "place" and our "ground'" (Butler 
1995: 131). These variously named politics acknowledge that a transformation of the 
political is taking place and its outcome cannot be fuIly explained or decided upon from 
within the present without limiting the possibilities of this transformation. Consequently, 
foundationalist presuppositions and transcendental grounds have to be re-conceptualized 
as contingent and delimited rather than uncontested and necessary, as complex and 
temporary circumstances rather than inevitable constraints. This does not imply a politics 
of pure flux and ceaseless change but means that, ultimately, there are 'no rules for 
subversion or resistance, no guarantees of efficacy, only a process of [ ... ] making 
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provisional decisions, which are always invested with power relations [ ... ] always 
haunted by their own internal contradiction' (Harris 1999: 187).1 
Postfeminism is engaged in and constructed by this continuing process of 
provisionality whereby it is defined in contradictory ways that cannot be made to adhere 
and that render its meaning resignifiable. Postfeminism, then, is a questionable category 
that is temporarily stabilized by its locations and contextual surroundings but it is also 
subject to destabilization and decontextualization. In this way, the postfeminist 
movement expresses a number of situated, interdependent and provisional relationships 
in which polarities can never be fully and finally distinguished as they are not in an 
absolute, either/or opposition but perceptible only within and through each other. This 
study examines postfeminism's ambiguity of text and context by foregrounding notions 
of relationality, the interconnectedness of differences and the interplay of meanings 
within discursive formations. I explore the parallel lines as well as links between feminist 
and non-feminist strands of contemporary social, political and cultural theory that have 
led to the emergence of postfeminism. A clear distinction between the pressures from 
inside and outside feminism cannot be made as they overlap in areas of critique in 
conceptual and theoretical terms. 
In fact, I dismiss a politics of purity that establishes a clear line demarcating the 
inside and outside of hegemonic culture or differentiating the 'oppressor' from the 
'oppressed'. My research is influenced by the Althusserian insight that there is no outside 
of ideology, no way to step, untainted, out of the hegemonic. Within postfeminism, any 
opposition or critical move can only be made from the inside as it is already part of 
hegemonic constructions of reality. I agree with the theorist Martin-Barbero that 'we 
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need to recognize that the hegemonic does not dominate us from without but rather 
penetrates us' and therefore, 'it is not just against it but from within it that we are waging 
war' (Martin-Barbero 1988: 448; my emphasis). I believe that one of the lessons of the 
postmodem problematic is that one cannot take up an external position with regard to 
what one contests and that, consequently, one is always implicated in the value one 
chooses to cha11enge. In this way, I am wary of the Cartesian conception of an intrinsic 
and ontological resistance or critical capacity that opposes hegemonic forces in terms of a 
diametrical antagonism and mutual exteriority. Instead, I emphasize the interlacing and 
intermingling of opposition and complicity and I insist that there is no critical expression 
outside discursive and hegemonic constraints. 
In the following, I will adopt Linda Hutcheon's notion of complicitous critique to 
highlight the paradoxical nature and political content of 'post' derivatives that always 
work within conventions in order to subvert them. According to Hutcheon, 
this is a strange kind of critique, one bound up [ ... ] with its own complicity with 
power and domination, one that acknowledges that it cannot escape implication in 
that which it nevertheless still wants to analyze and maybe even undermine. 
(Hutcheon 1989a: 4) 
This is the only form of contestation available to the postmodernJpostfeminist subject 
who can no longer criticize, judge and find 'truth' from an autonomous and transcendent 
outside. The Enlightenment ideals of authorial originality and intentionality have been 
questioned by postmodem critique and they have been established as thoroughly 
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ideological, constructed by social and discursive forces. The postmodern subject cannot 
be seen as a positive entity in itself, a repository of bold independence, inner strength and 
creativity. Instead, postmodernism and postfeminism articulate a self that is always 
within power structures and inhabits a critical space that is complicitous and entangled 
with what it seeks to counter. Postfeminism exemplifies this paradoxical merger of 
conformity and resistance as it simultaneously uses and abuses, installs and impairs the 
very concepts and movements that contribute to its emergence and formulate its 
meaning(s). It can be described as a contradictory and problematical phenomenon whose 
wholesale commitment to plurality cannot be specified and pinned down to a distinct 
postfeminist criteria or stance. Postfeminism's complicitous critique ensures that it 
cannot employ and rely on starkly polarized, either/or categories and that, instead, it is 
unavoidably compromised and controversial. 
In this way, I do not endeavor to settle the disagreement over postfeminism's 
directionality and its motivational ambiguity and instead, I maintain that it sits on the 
fence and literally becomes a point of interrogation. In other words, I resist binary 
formulations that seek to fix and define postfeminism's meaning and politics as either 
feminist or non-feminist, academic or popular, subversive or contained, neo-conservative 
or radically revolutionary. Within postfeminism, these distinctions operate and circulate 
in a fluid fashion and they cannot be explained by a dualistic logic that works to restrict 
the range of possible viewing positions. In what follows, I want to rethink the terms of 
the postfeminist debate by questioning the either/or structure that underlies many 
articulations of postfeminism. Adopting Linda Hutcheon's terminology, postfeminism 
can be described as 'much more resolutely dialogic or paradoxical' (Hutcheon 1990: 
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132). Its complicitous critique and constant double encoding, whereby it can act both as a 
legitimizing and a subversive force, cause some critics to reject it utterly while others 
acclaim it enthusiastically. The discrepancy of postfeminist interpretations is brought 
about by the fact that only one side of the contradiction is seen or valued and the 
ambivalent 'dialogism of encoding' is resolved into 'monologic decoding' (Hutcheon 
1990: 132). 
In my reading, postfeminism blurs the binary and it is an inherent part of the 
postmodern age of confusion, undermining the polarization of feminist and non-feminist, 
academic and popular, transgressive and conservative. It is precisely at the junctures of 
such binarisms that postfeminism posits its pluralistic propositions and exposes the 
multiple and often contradictory subject positions that are available in a postmodern era. 
In this way, postfeminism can be identified as a 'frontier discourse' that 'bring[s] us to 
the edge of what we know and encourage[s] us to go beyond' (Mann 1994: 223). The 
postfeminist frontier results from 'the gradual breakdown of [ ... ] organizing structures 
that continue to exist only in various states of disarray' and it negotiates between and 
intersects with various contextual and discursive stances (Mann 1994: 226). As len Ang 
suggests, 'not order, but chaos is the starting point' for a discussion about 'the cultural 
contradictions of life in (post)modernity' (Ang 1996: 172; 9). Ang discusses the 
postmodern realm of uncertainty as a 'truly chaotic system' whereby chaos is 
acknowledged as a positive force, 'impossible to domesticate' (Ang 1996: 175).2 Chaos is 
not defined negatively as a lack of order or a void signifying absence but it is transvalued 
as having 'primacy over order', doing away with 'any notion of an essence of social 
order' (Ang 1996: 175; 172). 
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Postfeminism's indeterminacy of meaning and 'chaotic' plurality can be 
interpreted as supplying an inexhaustible well of information that assembles the 
multivalent and conflicting voices of postfeminist subjects and texts. However, the 
existence of diversity should not be construed as a confirmation of a liberal pluralist 
paradise that is free from power and that celebrates difference for its own sake. Ang notes 
that this 'excessive romanticism' presupposes 'a space in which power is so evenly 
diffused that everybody is happily living ever after in a harmonious plurality of 
juxtaposed meanings and identities' (Ang 1996: 169). In fact, postfeminism does not seek 
to reconcile its often contradictory elements and resolve them into a pleasing and 
consonant whole but instead, it creates a site of struggle and a terrain of exchange 
between these ideas and contexts. On the postfeminist battlefield, heterogeneity has to be 
theorized as an explosive and strenuous combination of warring factions whose beliefs 
and principles sit together uneasily. The outcome of these intersections is not a uniform 
and consensual unity but an unstable coalition, always on the verge of disintegration. In 
this way, postfeminism can be seen as a powerhouse of conflicting ideas, in which 
tensions are deliberately left unresolved and contradictions deliberately left manifest. 
Thus, indeterminacy and diversity do not mark a lack of power and cannot be 
divorced from the structures of domination. Postfeminism's embrace of pluralism cannot 
displace a concern with formations of power/discourse but has to be built on a complex 
understanding of the workings of power connections. Rather than being 'a privilege that 
one might possess', power should be deciphered 'in a network of relations, constantly in 
tension, in activity' (Foucault 1977: 26). Power is not a homogeneous apparatus but a 
diverse and broadly based matrix, defining 'innumerable points of confrontation, focuses 
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of instability, each of which has its own risks of conflict, of struggles, and of an at least 
temporary inversion of the power relations' (Foucault 1977: 27). These micro-physics of 
power reveal that contention and dispute can be found throughout the power matrix that 
is fractured by fissures and cracks rather than being a unanimous and unified bloc of 
domination. As Geraldine Harris emphasizes, 
"Authority", or power, is not singular and is always being reinstated and 
reinterpreted in a multitude of different ways across and within different 
institutions and as such must always be disputed in its own terms, on its own 
groundless ground. (Harris 1999: 76) 
Consequently, power should not be conceptualized negatively as a repressive 
instrument but has to be understood as a productive force that creates diversity, 
multiplicity and even resistance. As Foucault notes, 
we must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: 
it "excludes", it "represses", it "censors", it "abstracts", it "masks", it "conceals". 
In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and 
rituals of truth. (Foucault 1977: 194) 
My understanding of postfeminism is influenced by this 'optimistic' description of power 
that focuses on its productivity and contingency and that consists in saying that 'so many 
things can be changed, fragile as they are, bound up more with circumstances than 
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necessities, more arbitrary than self-evident' (Foucault 1988a: 156). In particular, my 
approach is informed by the Foucauldian insight that sees power and resistance as 
inescapably allied and insists that while 'power is "always already there'" and 'one is 
never "outside" it', 'this does not entail the necessity of accepting an inescapable form of 
domination or an absolute privilege on the side of the law' (Foucault 1980: 141).3 In fact, 
'to say that one can never be "outside" power does not mean that one is trapped and 
condemned to defeat no matter what' (Foucault 1980: 141-142). The omnipresence of 
power should not be conflated with its omnipotence but it means that while power is 
everywhere, it is indissociable from contestation and struggle. In this way, resistance is 
'the compatriot of power', it co-exists with and is an inherent part of power structures, 
creating a paradoxical situation where subordination to power becomes the very 
condition of agency and critique (Foucault 1980: 142). As Foucault notes, 'as soon as 
there is a power relation, there is a possibility of resistance' which is 'formed right at the 
point where relations of power are exercised' (Foucault 1988a: 123; Foucault 1980: 142). 
In this oxymoronic formulation, power enables or breeds resistance and 
subjugation engenders the possibility for agential capabilities and subjectivity. Discursive 
construction and determinism are not in a diametrical opposition to agency but they are 
the premises of this subjective potential. Foucault's alliance of power and resistance 
involves a reconsideration of both concepts in terms of their heterogeneity and their 
irregular distribution. The structures of domination are unveiled as a network of relations 
in which no one holds absolute power or is absolutely powerless.4 The intersection of 
power and resistance entails the contingency and vulnerability of power relations and also 
implies that counteraction and antagonism towards power can never be established and 
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defined in a clear-cut and straightforward antithesis. On the contrary, resistance is always 
bound up with what it opposes, complicit with what it seeks to criticize and ultimately 
ambivalent in its contra- character and strategies. In this way, 
there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebeHions, 
or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of 
them a special case [ ... ] by definition, they can only exist in the strategic field of 
power relations. But this does not mean that they are only a reaction or rebound, 
forming with respect to the basic domination an underside that is in the end 
always passive, doomed to perpetual defeat. (Foucault 1978: 95-96) 
The key assumption behind these micrological strategies is that 'since power is 
decentred and plural, so in turn must be forms of political struggle' (Best and Kellner 
1991: 56). The very idea of revolution is seen to be erroneous insofar as it relies on a 
large-scale social transformation radiating from a central point. In fact, agency and any 
revolutionary potential should not be judged by what Jonathan Dollimore refers to as 
'impossible criteria: complete transformation of the social (Le. revolution), or total 
personal liberation within, or escape from it (i.e. redemption)' (Dollimore 1991: 85). As 
Dollimore notes, this presupposes an 'agency of change too subjective and a criterion of 
success too total' to be realized in a world whose absolutes and universal principles have 
been questioned and undermined by postmodern deconstruction (Dollimore 1991: 85). 
Furthermore, to imply that subversion or resistance is always legible in the same way, 
everywhere and at any time, is to appropriate it to a single, pre-existing 'outside' 
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authority and to decide in advance on the terms and conditions of this contestation. 
Consequently, there is no one theory or strategy that can explain how subversion may be 
achieved in any given situation or sphere. 
This pluralistic ambivalence has important political and critical implications as it 
relies on a model of postfeminist agency that does not relate to patriarchal/feminist! 
hegemonic structures in a straightforward, linear and/or oppositional manner but that 
formulates concepts of resistance and creativity within these boundaries. Postfeminism 
faces the impossibility of finding a totalizing model to resolve the postmodern 
contradiction of installing and subverting prevailing norms. Its politics of resistance and 
concept of agency are always articulated within constraints, making the postfeminist 
challenge politically ambivalent and ambidextrous. Postfeminist notions of critique 
cannot be based on a philosophical fantasy of transcendence and omnipotence that 
defines critical capacities as a priori ontological structures of subjectivity and proclaims 
that criticism itself can take the form of a radical revolution or overturn of hegemonic 
structures of dominance. 
This study proposes that postfeminist theories of agency and critique can no 
longer be imported from the Cartesian conception of the self as a given, a constituting 
and autonomous individual. The postfeminist agent is a constructed and constituted 
subject, a product of discourse and power that does not exist in any pre-given sense. 
There is no "I" that predates its own discursive constitution, no internal truth or essence 
that transcends the workings of power. Instead, the self is positioned in and constructed 
by a network of power that s/he can never rise above. In fact, 'to be a subject is to be born 
into a world in which norms are already acting on you from the very beginning' (Olson 
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and Worsham 2000: 747). There is nothing outside the regime of power, no one 
independent of it. It follows that there is no structure of subjectivity that is not always 
already within matrices of power and there is no '''ontologically intact reflexivity", no 
reflexivity that is not itself culturally constructed' (Fraser 1995: 66). The claustrophobia 
of this vision is apparent as it implies the loss of autonomy/selfuood and the destruction 
of the philosophical prerequisites to critical thinking and emancipatory politics. As Susan 
Hekman points out, the assumption is that 'abandoning the constituting subject entails 
abandoning the possibility of agency and action, that is, the possibility of creating 
meaning' (Hekman 1991: 58) .. 
I argue that postfeminism does not adhere to the negativity of this conclusion and 
instead, formulates concepts of agency and resistance that understand foreclosure not as 
an end in itself but as a temporally renewable structure. Postfeminist resistance redefines 
the authorial "I" and explodes the dichotomy that opposes the constituting subject of 
enlightened modernity to the constituted self of constructivist postmodernity.5 This 
polarization itself is a product of a modernist, subject-centered epistemology that relies 
on an oppositional, hierarchical structure that sees the constituting self as omnipotent and 
autonomous and its constituted counterpart as wholly determined. Postfeminism rejects 
the dualism on which these two conceptions rest and it insists that the postfeminist self is 
both constructed and critical, an agent and a product of structural/discursive forces. Since 
slhe is never outside these confines, hislher agency can no longer be described as an 
innate and transcendental quality located in some inner space but it has to be reinterpreted 
in non-Cartesian terms and recast within the matrices of power/discourse. I propose that 
the subject's discursive determination does not imply the end of critical analysis and the 
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impossibility of resistance but it means that agency always occurs within and is 
delimitated by boundaries and, therefore, it cannot be found in a realm outside power. 
The postfeminist subject is 'free and yet bounded', inhabiting a contradictory space that 
is simultaneously constraining and liberating, productive and oppressive (Ang 1996: 
165). S/he cannot be regarded as an oppressed and helpless victim, subjected to a 
totalizing power, but neither is s/he a free-willed and autonomous individual.6 This 
understanding of subjectivity combines agency and subjection, undermining the 
dichotomous perception that opposes a subject's will and autonomy to his/her 
subordination to power/discourse. Agency is no longer seen in antithesis to power as an 
autonomous psychic inside that actively battles against an external oppression.7 On the 
contrary, both terms are theorized in non-dualistic and non-exclusive ways, evoking the 
contradictory condition of Jree-yet-boundedness, characteristic of living in the 
postmodern realm of uncertainty. 
The postfeminist stance does not simply replace the constituting subject with the 
constituted one, nor does it try to mediate between the two positions by incorporating and 
grafting key elements of the Cartesian transcendental constitutor onto the postmodern 
self. Instead, postfeminism displaces this dichotomy altogether and refuses to perpetuate 
the opposition between the rational, autonomous, constituting self and its antithesis found 
in the realm of the constituted. Importantly, the notions of intentionality, creativity and 
resistance no longer require recourse to an untainted inner world but they are produced by 
and within discursive constraints. This redefinition of the agential capacity entails that 
'construction is not opposed to agency; it is the necessary scene of agency, the very terms 
in which agency is articulated' (Butler 1990a: 147). The simplistic equation of power 
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with imposition is dismissed in favor of a reformulation of power 'as that which is not 
only pressed on a subject but forms a subject, that is, is pressed on a subject by its 
formation' (Butler 1997b: 7). Paradoxically, a subject is formed by its very subordination 
and becomes a subject by virtue of being made subject (to). Slhe only gains the potential 
to be and act as a result of hislher insertion in and subjection to the structures of 
power/discourse. 
Drawing on a Foucauldian and Althusserian frame, Judith Butler considers the 
paradox of subject formation, explaining that "'subjection" signifies the process of 
becoming subordinated by power as well as the process of becoming a subject' (Butler 
1997b: 2).8 Subjection is 'neither simply the domination of a subject nor its production, 
but designates a certain kind of restriction in production, a restriction without which the 
production of the subject cannot take place' (Butler 1997b: 84). Butler employs the term 
'subjectivation' (a translation from the French assujetissement) to denote 'both the 
becoming of the subject and the process of subjection - one inhabits the figure of 
autonomy only by becoming subjected to a power, a subjection which implies a radical 
dependency' (Butler 1997b: 83). According to this rearticulation, subjection is 
understood not only as a subordination but also as 'a securing and maintaining, a putting 
into place of a subject, a subjectivation' (Butler 1997b: 90-91). This dialectic of subject 
formation describes a subject instituted through constraint and redefines power as 
constituting both the subject and the condition for hislher de-constitution. 
Power is characterized by a double valence of subordination and production 
whereby it is 'not simply what we oppose but also, in a strong sense, what we depend on 
for our existence and what we harbor and preserve in the beings that we are' (Butler 
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1997b: 2).9 Constraints and norms can simultaneously be described as restrictive and 
productive, inflicting a necessary violence onto the subject that confines as well as impels 
his/her critical capacity. This implies a rigorous reconsideration and reformulation of the 
concept of agency in non-Cartesian terms whereby it is no longer positioned in an 
antagonistic relation to construction/constitution but it is the product of discursive forces. 
This insider position indicates that postfeminist agency is bound to be ambivalent and 
complicitous as it is conditioned by limitations that it also seeks to alter in unexpected 
and potentially subversive ways. Paradoxically formulated, the constraints of 
power/discourse are characterized by a liberating determinism that confines as well as 
creates, oppresses as well as relieves. This productive restraint establishes 'an 
ambivalence at the site where the subject emerges' whereby s/he is brought into being by 
his/her subjection while his/her agency and resistance become 'a matter of escaping 
without leaving' (Butler 1997b: 7; Ang 1996: 179). 
Judith Butler rephrases this idea when she notes that 'emancipation will never be 
the transcendence of power as such' as 'there is no opposition to power which is not itself 
part of the very workings of power'(Butler 1995: 137).10 Within a Butlerian framework, 
agency is derived from 'the very power regimes which constitute us, and which we 
oppose' and thus, it can be seen as the effect of these confines (Butler 1995: 136). As 
Butler notes, 'resistance appears [ ... ] as a part of power, its self-subversion' (Butler 
1997b: 93). The agential capacity is not a transcendental attribute, inferred from the 
structures of the self, but is constituted in and through power/discourse formations. 
According to Butler, the discursive matrix is the enabling structure that brings agency and 
resistance into being. As she notes, 
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critique [ ... J always takes place immanent to the regime of discourse/power 
whose claims it seeks to adjudicate, which is to say that the practice of "critique" 
is implicated in the very power-relations it seeks to adjudicate. (Butler 1995: 138) 
Consequently, power should not be understood as an unbreakable deadlock as it harbors 
its own possibilities of being resignified or criticized from within. In this way. since there 
is no possibility of standing outside the discursive conventions that constitute the subject. 
the only possible form of critique implies a reworking of the very conventions by which 
slhe is enabled. Agency is redefined as a resignification and a 'subversive citation from 
Within' that is to be found 'precisely at such junctures where discourse is renewed' 
(Butler 1995: 135). 
I contend that this critical stance can be identified as a postfeminist politics of 
resistance, characterized by an internalized challenge that makes use of its insider 
position to infiltrate and subvert power structures. This postfeminist critique is willing to 
exploit its own implication in and complicity with the networks of power/discourse in 
order to question these confines from within. Consequently, resistance can effectively be 
described as a 'turning of power against itself to produce alternative modalities of power' 
and establish 'a kind of political contestation that is not a "pure" opposition, a 
transcendence of contemporary relations of power' (Butler 1993a: 241).)) Adopting 
Fernando de Toro's terminology, this new critical position can be identified as 'in-
habiting the', the resignification of totalizing and hegemonic discourses and their 
subversion from the inside (de Toro 1999: 14; emphasis in text). Following de Toro's 
insight that 'it is not possible to continue speaking from the margins' and remain outside 
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of the very systems one attempts to dismantle, 'we have one solution: inhabit the Centre, 
appropriate its discourses only to subvert them' (de Toro 1999: 16; 19). Thus, 'the Post-
Modern condition' has opened up a concrete space in which counter-discourses can 
locate themselves 'inside and not outside' in order to effect 'an appropriation of the 
centre's logos, so that it can be deconstructed from within' (de Toro 1999: 14; 19; 
emphasis in text). In the decentered space of postmodernism, there is no inside or outside 
of hegemony, no binary structure or dichotomous thinking that would make it possible to 
distinguish the center from the margins, the oppressor from the oppressed. De Toro notes 
that these terms cannot continue to be interpreted dualistically but rather, 'they must be 
problematized if we are ever to move forward and construct [the] third space of the in-
between' (de Toro 1999: 15). In other words, any counter discourse (if such a term can 
still be employed) is always located within hegemonic structures and any form of critique 
can only be made from the inside. As de Toro notes, 'it is paramount to get within the 
master discourses; not to emulate them in a servile manner [ ... ] but to deconstruct them, 
and in their cracks inscribe a new and changing dynamic discursivity' (de Toro 1999: 
16).12 
In particular, as I will demonstrate, postfeminism takes up and develops this 
deconstructive stance of appropriation by suggesting that women can use this strategy to 
resignify and reinterpret patriarchal representations. As Barbara Kastelein points out, 
'this model of defiance' is a 'refusal to be fixed by men's definitions or reified by the 
male gaze' (Kastelein 1994: 30).13 In fact, it is only through the reworking of a dominant 
discourse that 'her own heteroglossia may be freed, that she may, in other words, be freed 
to speak' (quoted in Kastelein 1994: 169). Ultimately, this postfeminist position can 
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amount to a paradoxical stand entitled 'femmenism' that, in an ironic reversal of Audre 
Lorde's bon mot, insists on 'using the master's tools to dismantle the master's house' 
(Delombart 1995: 22). This is an attempt to 'de-doxify' the givens that 'go without 
saying', hollow them out from inside and deconstruct their processes of signification 
(Hutcheon 1989a: 119). The novelist Julie Burchill provides a pertinent description of 
this postfeminist manifesto in her request to her readers: 'let us not sermonize and sulk; 
let us not miserabilise and moan. Let us instead read between the lines, and decode their 
[ ... ] minds' (Burchill 1992: 42-43).14 
This critique from within engages and works with the female subject's 
discursive/social constitution and positioning within a complex grid of disciplinary, 
normalizing, panoptic powers that survey and judge her every move. Her agency is 
redefined as an appropriation of these constraints as she makes use of the language, 
attitudes and hierarchical structures that have previously been described as oppressive 
and she refashions them as weapons of attack and subversion. This deconstructive and 
resignificatory critique breaks through the epistemology of the Cartesian subject and 
adopts a poststructuralistlconstructionist account of SUbjectivity. Controversially, the 
subject's determined status and her confinement within hegemonic/patriarchal power 
structures do not entail the loss of critical capacities and politics. On the contrary, agency 
Occurs within the context of these restrictions and it is to be found in the potentialities of 
resignification, in the contingent possibility opened up by the constituting relations. 
De Toro emphasizes that 'it is here where deconstruction becomes a political 
discourse' as 'any substantial change in power relations will only be able to take place 
from inside' (de Toro 1999: 16).15 The task of any critical and/or political endeavor is 
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not to establish a viewpoint outside of constructed identities but it is to locate subversive 
strategies that are enabled by those constructions. At the same time, a contemporary 
criticism/politics has to be aware of the double binds inherent in these appropriative 
strategies as the denaturalized resignifications can be re-appropriated into the dominant 
ideology. As Jon Erickson rightly asserts, 'transgression through appropriation can be a 
martyr to its own effects' (quoted in Thompson 1997: 363). In this way, new and 
alternative methodologies have to be constructed that do not rely on a binary logic or an 
essentializing model of agency and that take into account this ambivalent form of critique 
that reinforces as much as it subverts. This implies relinquishing the fantasy of an 
unbiased perspective and formulating a critical theory/practice in the midst of a 
ubiquitous and panoptic power matrix. 
In locating and contextualizing postfeminism, I seek to articulate a politics of 
Complexity that accounts for ambiguity and gives equal importance to the different 
critical stances that inform its emergence. As Teresa de Lauretis notes, 'to live the 
contradiction [ ... ] is the condition of feminism here and now' and consequently, there is 
no right or wrong way to understand postfeminism, no privileged critical agenda that 
could resolve its plurality (de Lauretis 1987: 26). This study is concerned from the outset 
not to pre-empt any characterization of postfeminism and to accept its flexibility or 
doubleness whereby it incorporates, for example, misogyny and anti-feminism as we]) as 
resilience and pro-feminism. I do not intend to determine the 'meaning' of postfeminism 
and immobilize the term in a number of polarized positions, nor do I seek to settle the 
transgression/containment debate and establish a definite and final answer to the 
questions regarding postfeminism's feminist/anti-feminist, empoweringldisempowering 
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elements. My analysis is an extrapolation of the various manifestations of postfeminism, 
the differing contexts that locate and construct postfeminist meanings. As will be shown, 
a singular and distinct definition of postfeminism cannot (and should not) be achieved as 
the interactions of 'post' and 'feminism', the intersections of prefix and root, are highly 
varied and conflicting. A criticism that insists on the necessity of binary distinctions will 
be doomed to conclude with unsatisfactory generalizations and simplifications, instead of 
recognizing that postfeminism is a composite fil1ed with subversive and conservative, 
feminist and non-feminist contents, whose meaning and orientation are relative to its 
contexts. 
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1.3 Modern Janus or the Different Faces of Postfeminism 
Currently, feminism seems to be a term without any clear significance. The 
'anything goes' approach to the definition of the word has rendered it practically 
meaningless. 
bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (1984) 
'The question [ ... J becomes, how can we make sense of the "post" in "postfeminism"', 
Misha Kavka observes in her analysis of 'the situation of feminism within time' (Kavka 
2002: 31; 30). As I have suggested in the previous chapters, postfeminism's multiplicity 
of meaning stems from the definitional indeterminacy of the prefix 'post'. Additionally, 
as this section will reveal, the notion of a postfeminist theory and identity is 
problematized by the fact that the root of postfeminism, feminism itself, is far from 
having a universally agreed agenda and definition.' As Sarah Gamble emphasizes, 
feminism 'has always been a dynamic and multifaceted movement' that 'is nothing if not 
paradoxical' (Gamble 2001: xiii; Cott 1986: 49). It has never had 'a single, clearly 
defined, common ideology' or been constituted around 'a political party or a central 
organization or leaders or an agreed policy or manifesto, or even been based upon an 
agreed principle of collective action' (Harris 1999: 9). Lacking a single and totalizing 
definition, feminism is engaged in a non-linear history of multiple significations that are 
determined and circumscribed by the contexts in which the term is used (and abused). 
The movement's meanings are always relative to particular constructions for, as Lynne 
Alice notes, 'feminism has only working definitions since it is dynamic, constantly 
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changing ideology with many aspects including the personal, the political and the 
philosophical' (Alice 1995: 12). The feminist movement exists on both local and abstract 
levels, dealing with specific issues and consisting of diverse individuals while promoting 
a universal politics of equality for women. Feminists are simultaneously united by their 
investment in a general concept of justice and fractured by the multiple goals and 
personal practices that delineate the particular conceptualization of justice to which they 
aspire. Thus, 'to read feminism's history [ ... ] is to uncover records of debates, schisms, 
and differing viewpoints', and from this perspective, the postfeminist debate merely 
dramatizes a situation which has always held true for feminism (Gamble 2001: xiii). 
In fact, some critics suggest that postfeminism may constitute nothing more than 
'feminism's "coming of age'" and 'the latest divergence in the constantly shifting 
parameters of feminist thought' (Brooks 1997: 1; Gamble 2001: xiii). In the following, I 
argue that postfeminism's appropriation of its feminist origins is more complex and 
insidious than a simple rewriting or modernization and it can even harbor antifeminist 
potential. In its various manifestations, postfeminism exhibits a number of relations to 
feminism ranging from complacency to hostility, admiration to repudiation. In its most 
denunciatory expressions, postfeminism misreads and classifies feminism as a monolithic 
movement that is archaic, binaristic and unproductive for the experiences of 
contemporary women. In order to position themselves in opposition to a supposedly 
unified and old-fashioned feminist entity, postfeminists try to define and categorize their 
roots and they often end up distorting and reducing feminism's diversity. At the same 
time, feminism's definitional plurality survives and is reinforced by each descriptive and 
sectionalizing attempt as the proposed explanations vary and even contradict one another. 
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This exemplifies the postfeminist paradox, indicating both an attempt to announce the 
end of or an inherent change in feminism while also creating a site for feminist politics, a 
platform for new feminist debate. Thus, postfeminism provides 'a focal point for 
articulating the meaning [ ... ] and constituencies of feminism today', debating the usage, 
appropriation, or rejection of the term (Kavka 2002: 29; 32). 
In this way, postfeminism's multidimensionality is ensured by its prefix and its 
root as both terms encompass a wide range of descriptions. In this section, I will give a 
summary and delineation' of postfeminisms prevalent in theoretical and cultural fields of, 
reference that situate themselves differently with regard to the root feminism. Each 
postfeminist articulation is by itself a definitional act that (re)constructs the notion of a 
feminist movement and its own relation to it. In order to demystify and unravel the 
interpretive openness and the multifaceted nature of postfeminism, the interconnections 
between 'post' and 'feminism', prefix and root, have to examined. The relationship 
between feminist and postfeminist discourses is highly unstable and fluid, problematizing 
and pluralizing the conceptualizations of both terms. Confusion rules as postfeminism is 
variously identified and defined as anti-feminist backlash, pro-feminist Third Wave, Girl 
Power dismissive of feminist politics, trendy me-first power feminism and academic 
poststructuralist feminism. There seems to be a simultaneous denial, use and misuse of 
feminism, an unscrupulous embrace of contradiction and ambiguity that negotiates areas 
of tension that, as I intend to show, can be used productively within postfeminist practice 
and theory. 
As Barbara Kastelein notes, postfeminism is not required to be theoretically 
consistent because it is not a grounded politics nor answerable to a social movement but 
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'more of a cultural tendency, amorphous and contradictory' (Kastelein 1994: 32; 
Silverton Rosenfelt 1991: 272). She reveals that postfeminism is 'beyond feminism 
although feminism is part of it and strategically post-feminists need to have it both ways' 
(Kastelein 1994: 32). Postfeminism's inherent two-sidedness means that there is a co-
occurrence of critique and stereotyping while incorporating some feminist insights and 
theories. Judith Stacey neatly encapsulates this controversy in her description of 
postfeminism as 'the simultaneous incorporation, revision, and depoliticisation of many 
of the central goals of second wave feminism' (Stacey 1987: 8). Similarly, Janice 
Winship declares that, 'if it means anything useful', the term 'postfeminist' refers to the 
way in which the 'boundaries between feminists and non-feminists have become fuzzy' 
(Winship 1987: 149). The either/or structure that distinguishes feminist ideals and 
models from their non-feminist counterparts has been replaced by a composite 
postfeminist space marked by ambivalence and complexity. According to Winship, this 
blurring of the binary is to a large extent due to the fact that 'some feminist ideas no 
longer have an oppositional charge but have become part of many people's, not just a 
minority's, common sense' (Winship 1987: 149). The implication is not that feminism is 
a movement of the past, nor does it indicate that all feminist demands have been met and 
that, therefore, feminism is now redundant. On the contrary, it suggests that 'feminism no 
longer has a simple coherence around a set of easily defined principles' and instead, it is 
characterized by 'a much richer, more diverse and contradictory mix than it ever was in 
the 1970s' (Winship 1987: 149). 
Approached in this way, the prefix 'post' does not indicate the eradication of the 
women's movement or the dismissal of feminism tout court but can be viewed as 
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analogous to 'postrevolutionary' or 'post second-wave' (Stacey 1987: 8; Hollows 2000: 
198). As Julie Ewington points out, 'it is not feminism that we are "post" but one 
historical phase of feminist politics' (Ewington 1994: 119). Postfeminism encourages 
feminism to develop an understanding of its own historicity, 'an account of its own 
temporality that does not simply mimic the modernist grand narrative of progress' (Elam 
1997: 67). It attributes a historical specificity to second-wave feminism, for, as Charlotte 
Brunsdon asks, 'why should 1970s feminism have a copyright on feminism?' (Brunsdon 
1997: 101). In this way, the term 'postfeminism' is employed to describe a critical 
Position in relation to the feminism of women's liberation, signifying both the 
achievements of and challenges for modern feminist politics. 
On the one hand, postfeminism's interrogative stance can be interpreted as a 
healthy rewriting of feminism, a sign that the women's movement is continuously in 
process, transforming and changing itself. Accordingly; the adoption of a postfeminist 
Position does not imply abandoning the feminist project but it means jettisoning a certain 
kind of politically correct feminist identity.2 Yet, at the same time, one can argue that this 
definition of postfeminism as a self-critical, evaluative mode is simply too optimistic as 
'in the end postfeminism is always more than a criticism of feminism and a caricaturing 
of individual feminists' (Alice 1995: 25). The 'inflammatory myth of new beginnings 
and revisionings' disguises the fact that postfeminism 'operates like a chimera, or 
perhaps even a conceit', misrepresenting and undermining feminist politics and reducing 
all feminisms, and their long (and far from unified) histories to a caricaturized version of 
1970s feminism (Alice 1995: 26). The mythologizing of feminism into a fictionalized 
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second wave is criticized as an invasion of the feminist body and a vicious attempt to 
debilitate and sabotage the women's movement. 
While I do not underestimate postfeminism's distortional elements, I maintain 
that the 'post' movement cannot be defined simplistically as anti-feminism and blatant 
sexism. The relation to earlier feminist waves is far more complicated than a 
straightforward dichotomy as postfeminist discourses use and are consciously informed 
by feminism's egalitarianism, its notions of empowerment and agency. I insist that 
feminism remains an inevitable and multivalent component of postfeminism investing it 
with a productive plurality. Postfeminism and feminism are entangled with each other 
and, as a debating couple, they should not be viewed reductively in opposition. Instead, 
my understanding of the (post)feminist coupling sees feminist and postfeminist stances as 
allied and entwined, creating a dynamic and multi-faceted context that is made up of 
diverse standpoints and theories.3 In fact, the i11usion of a feminist monolith has to be 
discarded from the start as feminism has never enjoyed a blissful state of unity or 
exhibited a universally agreed agenda. As Nancy F. Cott notes, 'feminism is nothing if 
not paradoxical' as 
[it] asks for sexual equality that includes sexual difference. It aims for individual 
freedoms by mobilizing sex solidarity. It posits that women recognize their unity 
while it stands for diversity among women. It requires gender consciousness for 
its basis yet calls for the elimination of prescribed gender roles. (Cott 1986: 49; 
Cott 1987: 5) 
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These paradoxes are rooted in the actual situation of women and they have always been 
the subject of feminist debate and controversy.4 In this way, a strict conceptualization of 
feminism cannot be upheld and should be replaced by the notion of feminist contexts, 
made up of differing views and strategies on how the plight of women can be advanced. 
One can argue that postfeminism's definitional plurality derives directly from its 
feminist roots and is a result of feminism's inherent diversity and disunion. Yet, both 
terms' multidimensionality has been suppressed from outside and within feminism in an 
attempt to establish two different and coherent positions. The interconnections between 
postfeminism and feminism are fraught with conceptual and epistemological dilemmas as 
both camps try to immobilize one another in strict definitional straitjackets. Much pro-
and contra- postfeminist rhetoric relies on a reductive binary structure in order to conjure 
up a pole of negativity against which postfeminism can define itself and lay bare the 
faults of feminist orthodoxy or, alternatively, reminisce nostalgically about a mythical 
feminist past characterized by a homogeneous and unified women's movement. As Jane 
Kalbfleisch points out in her discussion of the feminism-postfeminism coupling, the 
potential for overlap, the ambiguity between the two groups and the possibility of conflict 
within each one, are rendered abstract, almost nonexistent (Kalbfleisch 1997). She 
distinguishes two rhetorical positions that, although very different in nature, both 
eradicate the contradictions within (post)feminism. On the one hand, this occurs through 
a polarization of feminism and postfeminism that Kalbfleisch aptly names 'the rhetoric of 
oppOsition' whereby division is given presence through the assumption that feminism and 
postfeminism are fully distinguishable and distinct. In this sense, the term 'postfeminist' 
describes a non-feminist stance and it can be read as an active term of negation that 
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attempts to move beyond a feminist era and its theoretical and cultural practices. 'The 
prefix "post", in this prescriptive sense, signifies an active rupture (coupure) with what 
preceded it' (Best and Kellner 1991: 29). This rupture can be interpreted positively as a 
liberation from old, constraining and oppressive conditions and as an affirmation of new 
developments. At the same time, the new 'post' term can carry negative connotations and 
be understood as a 'deplorable regression, as a loss of traditional values, certainties and 
stabilities' (Best and Kellner 1991: 29). Thus, the tendency to construct a dichotomy and 
present the relationship between feminism and postfeminism in binary terms, can take the 
form of anti- and pro-postfeminism. Postfeminism is either embraced whole-heartedly, 
thereby denouncing earlier feminist movements, or it is rejected as an opportunistic move 
on the part of patriarchy, 'the introduction of a particular vigorous and invasive weed into 
the otherwise healthy garden offeminism' (Elam 1997: 55). 
On the pro-postfeminist side of the debate, one finds a generation of young -
Women who appear to speak from somewhere outside and above the body of feminist 
theory. In this instance, the term 'postfeminism' is used to suggest that the project of 
feminism has ended, either because it has been completed or because it has failed and is 
no longer valid. As Rebecca Walker notes in her introduction to the anthology To Be 
&al: Te11ing the Truth and Changing the Face of Feminism (1995): 
Young women coming of age today wrestle with the term [feminist] because we 
have a very different vantage point on the world than that of our foremothers. 
[ ... ] For many of us it seems that to be a feminist in the way that we have seen 
and understood feminism is to conform to an identity and way of living that 
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doesn't allow for individuality, complexity, or less than perfect personal histories. 
We fear that the identity will dictate and regulate our lives, instantaneously pitting 
us against someone, forcing us to choose inflexible and unchanging sides, female 
against male, black against white, oppressed against oppressor, good against bad. 
(Walker 1995: xxxiii; my emphasis) 
A critical as well as temporal or generational distance is established between the new 
postfeminists and the old second wavers who hold on to a dated, old guard and rigid 
feminism. Postfeminism poses as 'the new and improved mind of feminism', a feminism 
fit for the new millennium, whereas the women's liberation movement is described as 
'embarrassingly out of touch', 'no longer moving, no longer valid, no longer relevant' 
(Cacoullos 2001: 80). 
The mass media is partially responsible for this premature burial of feminism and 
it is in the popular press that the most clear-cut and dualistic representations of feminism 
and postfeminism appear. As Dow asserts, the media has always had a hard time 
understanding the complexity of feminist ideology and it 'has found this story an easy 
One to write, casting it as a battle between the rigid, irrational ideologues of victim 
feminism and the rational, commonsensical approach of their detractors' (Dow 1996: 
207). In this context, postfeminism tends to be used as indicative of ajoyous liberation 
from the ideological shackles of a hopelessly outdated feminist movement. Claudia 
Wallis in the Time cover story of 4th December 1989 confirms the sensibleness of the 
Supposed rejection of feminism by asserting that, after all, 'hairy legs haunt the feminist 
Jl1ovement; as do images of being strident and lesbian' (quoted in Jones 1994: 19). The 
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postfeminist on the other hand is 'fun, indifferent to, or even critical of "politics", 
cheerfully apathetic, sexy and independent. She has no need for liberation or solidarity 
with other women' (Elsby: 2). 
These media-assisted versions of postfeminism assume that the changes wrought 
by the women's movement in the 1970s were beneficial and that the political demands of 
first and second wave feminism have now been met (enfranchisement, equal pay, sexual 
liberation etc.).5 In this popular sense, postfeminism encapsulates the belief that 'the 
seventies struggle for "women's rights" has achieved all that was reasonable to achieve, 
and the excess of such feminist lobbying has been "exposed" as a passe anti-male fad' 
(Alice 1995: 7). It assumes that the women's movement took care of oppressive 
institutions and that now it is up to individual women to make personal choices that 
simply reinforce those fundamental societal changes. As Vicki Coppock emphasizes, 'if 
the claim to a "post-feminist" society is underpinned by anyone principle it is that 
women have "made it", or they have the opportunity to "make it'" (Coppock 1995: 4).6 It 
is argued that 'alI ha[s] been achieved, in fact over-achieved' to the extent that 'feminism 
has [ ... ] become irrelevant to the lives of young women today' (Coppock 1995: 3; 
Sonnet 1999: 170). In this case, the 'post' signifies a 'going beyond' or moving on from 
feminism, with the implicit assumption that its critiques and demands have been 
accommodated and absorbed enough to permit a withdrawal from feminist politics and 
coalition. 
Accordingly. postfeminism's advocate Rene Denf eld starts her book The New 
Victorians: A Young Woman's Challenge to the Old Feminist Order (1995) with the 
observation that: 
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For women of my generation, feminism is our birthright. [ ... ] We know what it is 
to live without excessive confinement. We are the first generation to grow up 
expecting equal opportunity and equal education, as well as the freedom to 
express our sexuality. [ ... ] This belief may translate into the pursuit of a career 
or it may mean demanding respect for raising children - women of my 
generation believe in the right to choose. (Dent eld 1995: 2) 
For Denf eld, old-style feminism 'has become as confining as what it pretends to combat' 
and it is totalitarian and inflexible in its upholding of views that are reminiscent of those 
of an earlier age (Denf eld 1995: 5). In fact, she defines feminism as the 'New 
Victorianism' that creates 'the very same morally pure yet helplessly martyred role that 
women suffered from a century ago' (Dent eld 1995: 10). Denf e]d's postfeminist mantra 
of "choice" depends on an illusion of freedom and opportunity as it denies the continued 
need for a collective feminist politics. In this new age of free choice, feminism is shorn of 
its political program and the heralded postfeminist choice is 'freed of the necessity of 
thinking about the political and social ramifications of the act of choosing' (Probyn 1990: 
156). Denfeld's attitude towards earlier feminist generations is influenced by a 
dangerously simplistic and dualistic view that constructs feminism as monolithic and 
dead whereas postfeminism is diverse and alive. She bases her critique on a binary 
structure that categorizes the relationship between feminism and postfeminism in terms 
of mutual exteriority and negates the possibility of interaction. Denf eld relies on a 
fictional and distorted account of a demonized feminism to satisfy a progressive narrative 
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structure that, as Deborah L. Siegel notes, might be summarized as 'Down with the "bad" 
feminism and up with the good!' (Siegel 1997b: 67). 
A similar 'rhetoric of opposition' is employed by the anti-postfeminist proponents 
who preserve a myth of feminist linear progress by locating postfeminism with a sexist 
patriarchy as the latest version of 'the same old thing'. According to this view, with the 
advent of postfeminism, sexism has not been eradicated but its nature has been 
transformed into a more indirect and insidious form. Postfeminism has emerged as 'a 
hegemonic negotiation of second-wave ideals', 'working with "patriarchal" theory' and 
employing feminist notions of equality and agency for non-feminist goals (Dow 1996: 
88; de Toro 1999: 16). In particular, the popular media has co-opted and appropriated the 
language of choice and empowerment in order to 'sell back to us our status as 
patriarchy's slaves' (Woodlock: 2). The media Trojan horse pretends to advance 
feminism and retains the idea of equality for women while harboring antifeminist 
weaponry and gutting the underlying principles of the feminist movement. Postfeminism 
is the selling point in the creation of an illusion of progress and it is packaged as a less 
radical and patriarchal-friendly version of feminism requiring 'the least ideological 
adjustment from men and from culture at large (and concomitantly, the most adjustment 
from women themselves), (Dow 1996: 88). Thus, postfeminism is defined by its 
opponents as a conservative and reactionary phenomenon, lacking an inherent opposition 
to patriarchal culture and male-dominated institutions. It is no threat to the status quo as it 
remains confined within male-defined parameters and uses the rhetoric of the women's 
liberation to incorporate feminism into a project that could not be identified as feminist. 
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This negative reading of postfeminism inserts a hyphen between 'post' and 
'feminism', implying that feminism has been sabotaged by its new, trendy prefix to the 
extent that 'texts [ ... J in proclaiming [ ... J the advent of postfeminism, are actually 
engaged in negating the critiques and undermining the goals of feminism, in effect, 
delivering us back into a prefeminist world' (Modleski 1991: 3). The most influential 
definition of postfeminism through reference to a rhetoric of relapse is Susan Faludi's, 
who in Backlash: The Undeclared War Against Women (1992) portrays postfeminism as 
a devastating reaction against the ground gained by the second wave. The term 'backlash' 
implies a rejection of feminist goals, an attempt to demonize the women's liberation 
movement and return them to the subordinate roles of a bygone era. As Faludi explains, 
'the last decade has seen a powerful counter-assault on women's rights, a backlash, an 
attempt to retract the handful of small and hard-won victories that the feminist movement 
did manage to win for women' (Faludi 1992: 12). For Faludi, postfeminism is the 
backlash and, rather than being an overtly hostile response to the second wave, its 
persuasiveness lies in its ability to define itself as an ironic, pseudo-intellectual critique of 
the feminist movement. Thus, 'the backlash is at once sophisticated and banal, 
deceptively "progressive" and proudly backward' (Faludi 1992: 12). In order to unmask 
this wolf in sheep's clothing, women are advised to 'act' and revive the feminist 
movement for 'no one can ever take from women the justness of their cause' (Faludi 
1991: 498). While Faludi is extremely convincing about the breadth and depth of the 
backlash, her definition of postfeminism as backlash oversimplifies and diminishes the 
definitional ambiguity and heterogeneity of the 'post' movement. Postfeminist and 
backlash discourses certainly coincide in a number of ways but postfeminism is far more 
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problematic and contradictory than a wholesale rejection of the women's movement. In 
this way, Faludi's anti-postfeminism and Denf.eld's pro-postfeminism alike represent the 
relationship between feminism and postfeminism as mutually exclusive and 
incompatible. The either/or formulation of the binary couple implies that only one term 
can subsist by obliterating the other. Thus, postfeminism can only exist to the exclusion 
of feminism, and feminism can only exist to the exclusion of postfeminism. Insisting on 
the necessity of dichotomous distinctions, the pro-/anti-postfeminist proponents refuse to 
envisage a site of struggle and exchange between feminism and postfeminism, an 
ambiguous (post)feminist space that is beyond the binary and that blends complicity and 
critique, difference and similarity. 
Rather than situating feminism and postfeminism antithetically, the second 
rhetorical position that Kalbfleisch identifies, 'the rhetoric of inclusion', relies on a 
polarization of a different kind to eradicate the overlap between feminism and 
postfeminism. In this case, (post)feminism is pitted against some 'Other' (for instance, 
postmodernism and poststructuralism) which, although creating presence for the 
presumed commonalities among feminists and postfeminists, effectively erases their 
potential differences (Kalbfleisch 1997: 258). In other words, the rhetoric of inclusion 
contests the dualistic logic of exclusion manifested by the rhetoric of opposition and 
displaces polarizations from within (post)feminism to the relationship of (post)feminism 
and some Other. The critical tension between feminism and postfeminism is defused in 
this way as the two terms are conflated into one and incorporated into another discursive 
project. The radical potential of the coupling is neutralized and the confrontational voices 
within (post)feminism are silenced as a result of this appropriation. 
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The 'Other' discourses that (post)feminism is harnessed to, are exemplified by the 
differently inflected deconstructive critiques mounted by postmodernist, poststructuralist 
and multiculturalist theorists. As Keith Green and Jill LeBihan note, the category of 
postfeminism can be interpreted with regard to 'the involvement of feminism with other 
"post" discourses' and it addresses 'one of the most pressing current concerns for 
academic feminism', 'the question of what to do' with these 'post' movements (Green 
and LeBihan 1996: 253-254). Academic circles have stressed the inherently theoretical 
nature of postfeminism which, in this context, is identified as 'a pluralistic epistemology 
dedicated to disrupting universalising patterns of thought, and thus, capable of being 
aligned with postmodernism. poststructuralism and postcolonial ism' (Gamble 2001: 50). 
Within the feminist academic community, postfeminism is defined as the outcome of 
feminism's intersection with these anti-foundationalist movements/theories and it has 
come to denote postmodern or poststructuralist feminism. In this case, the prefix 'post' 
characterizes a shift in feminist thinking and particularly, in the way in which 'woman' as 
the subject of feminism is conceptualized. Postfeminism is employed as a theoretical or 
philosophical term that implies the problematic search for a unifying cause of and 
common solution to women's subordination and a rejection of the assumption that 
feminism is based on a unified subjectivity, a universal sisterhood. 
There is no shortage of debate on the nature of poststructuralistlpostmodern 
feminism and. admittedly. the interaction of feminism with postmodernism and 
poststructuralism is fraught with fundamental discrepancies. with the problem of 
subjectivity as the point of contention and division.7 There is concern that feminists 
cannot afford the luxury of rejoicing in 'the death of the subject' for 'if woman is a 
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fiction [ ... ] then the very issue of women's oppression would appear to be obsolete and 
feminism itself would have no reason to exist' (de Lauretis 1993: 83). According to this 
view, feminism is pulled in two opposing directions: in order to be effective as an 
emancipatory and political movement designed to increase women's access to equality in 
a male-dominated culture, it is said to rely on an essentialist definition of woman.8 On the 
other hand, feminist theory cannot deny the importance of anti-foundationalist discourses 
that dismiss and decenter the concept of the autonomous subject. In this way, at the 
moment when 'postmodernism is forging its identity through articulating the exhaustion 
of the existential belief in self-presence and self-fulfillment and through the dispersal of 
the universal subject of liberalism', feminism is ostensibly engaged in assembling its 
cultural identity in what appears to be the opposite direction (Waugh 1989: 6). The 
tension between 'the critical negativity of [feminism's] theory' and 'the affirmative 
positivity of its politics' has been interpreted as a conceptual and epistemological 
dilemma that forces feminists to choose sides and adopt their respective positions (de 
Lauretis 1993: 88). According to this logic, the notion of the postmodern 'subject in 
process' cannot be embraced whole-heartedly by feminism as it implies the loss of 
political agency and action. As Linda Nicholson asks, 'does not the adoption of 
postmodernism really entail the destruction of feminism, since does not feminism itself 
depend on a relatively unified notion of the social subject "woman", a notion 
postmodernism would attack?' (Nicholson 1990: 7).9 
Postfeminism, broadly defined within the academic context as poststructuralistl 
postmodern feminism, is the battlefield on which these debates are fought out as it 
attempts to negotiate between the discursive destabilization of the humanist notion of a 
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feminist self and the historic mobilization of a politically engaged feminist we. Critics 
deplore that postfeminism is 'hampered by the need to meet the dual demands of 
theoretical consistency within the terms of poststructuralism and the wider feminist 
project' (Kastelein 1994: 27). As I intend to show, the explosive combination of 
feminism and postmodernism does not have to be conceptualized as a problem as it relies 
on a fallible dualistic view of an apolitical postmodernism and an essentialist feminism. 
In my view, 'the mission of feminism within the postmodern' is not as McLennan argues 
'to politicize it, conceding that postmodernism can in turn assist feminism in the process 
of de-essentializing it' (quoted in Brooks 1997: 37). Rather, one has to heighten the 
complexity and intricacies of both terms in order not to rule out the possibilities of a 
political postmodernism and an anti-essentialist feminism. This implies abandoning a 
model of a transcendent and autonomous political agency and comprehending that 'there 
is no Kantian "view from nowhere", no conceptual space not already implicated in that 
which it seeks to contest' (Waugh 1992: 5). As I will discuss, postfeminism intersects 
with both postmodern and feminist discourses and it locates the notions of agency and 
resistance within hegemonic culture. The postfeminist terrain modifies the 
epistemological limits that would restrict feminism to an essentialist politics while 
confining postmodernism to an apolitical and nihilistic deconstruction. Consequently, 
postfeminism situates itself in an ambivalent and politically ambidextrous space, 
constructing its criticism without recourse to a philosophical realm of transcendence, 
autonomy and rationality. Instead, postfeminist critique is complicitous and 
compromised, building its theory and practice on the political potentialities of 
postmodernism and the anti-essentialist and multiculturalist dimensions of feminism. 
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While I do not deny the vital importance of these 'Other' discourses for the 
development of the postfeminist project, I am concerned that the absorption of the term 
into these theoretical debates will focus the critical attention on the postmodernl 
(post)feminist coupling, thereby simplifying the contradictory and strained relationship 
between feminism and postfeminism. As Amelia Jones notes, 'the incorporation of one 
particular kind of feminism into a broadly conceived [ ... ] project of postmodernist 
cultural critique tends to entail the suppression of other kinds of feminist practices and 
theories' (Jones 1994: 22). In my view, a definition of postfeminism as postmodernist or 
poststructuralist feminism cannot be maintained, although there are many overlaps. The 
conflation of postfeminism and academic poststructuralist feminism reduces the critical 
potential of the feminismlpostfeminism coupling and, additionally, it firmly situates the 
term within theoretical boundaries. By transforming postfeminism into another academic 
movement, one runs the risk of repressing its important place in the public debate on 
feminism and the modem woman. Postfeminism can be portrayed both as a descriptive 
popular category and an academic theoretical tendency. Even within these situated 
contexts, it does not aim for coherence but patently and unapologetically wants to have it 
both ways when it comes up against stumbling blocks. 
Ultimately, postfeminism's inherent contradictions cannot be explained by a 
rhetoric of inclusion, nor by a rhetoric of opposition. As Kalbfleisch concludes, neither 
rhetorical practice allows for feminist pluralism and, therefore, they should be replaced 
by an alternative position, the 'rhetoric of anxiety' that would 'foreground the conflict, 
contradiction and ambiguity both between and within us' (Kalbfleisch 1997: 259). 
Kalbfleisch urges her readers to resist any simple opposition between feminism and some 
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monolithic enemy lurking outside its confines - be it postfeminism, patriarchy or 
postmodernism - and instead reinscribe and reexperience the relationship between 
feminism and postfeminism through a rhetoric of anxiety which would 'allow our 
differences to function as "forces of change'" (Kalbfleisch 1997: 259). The simultaneous 
confidence and uncertainty about what constitutes postfeminism does not have to be 
interpreted as a 'problem' but instead, 'the condition of ambiguity is understood as a 
natural consequence of the proliferation of feminisms' (Siegel 1997a: 53).10 
Thus, one has to take uncertainty on board as 'the state of the world today' and 
replace the logical order of the Enlightenment with contingency and heterogeneity (Ang 
1996: 162). The transformative potential of plurality has been embraced by a 
contemporary postfeminist movement designated the third wave that seeks to combine 
supposedly conflicting elements of popular postfeminism, academic poststructuralist 
postfeminism and earlier feminist waves. According to the third wave agenda, 'there is 
no one right way to be: no role, no model' (Reed 1997: 124). In fact, 'contradiction [ ... J 
marks the desires and strategies of third wave feminists' who 'have trouble formulating 
and perpetuating theories that compartmentalize and divide according to race and gender 
and a11 the other signifiers' (Heywood and Drake 1997: 2; Walker 1995: xxxiii). The 
third wave subject is always in process, accommodating ambiguity and multiple 
positionalities, 'including more than excluding, exploring more than defining, searching 
more than arriving' (Walker 1995: xxxiii). Third wave feminism seeks to make room for 
'the differences and conflicts between people as well as within them' and 'to figure out 
how to use [these] differences dynamically' (Reed 1997: 124). 
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The movement is clearly informed by postmodern theorizing as well as a 
multicuIturalist sensibility and it argues for the political possibilities the postmodern 
present makes available. The third wave welcomes pluralism and contradiction and. 
defining itself as a post-identity movement. it engages with the anxiety created by a 
poststructuralist challenge to a unified subjectivity. As Rebecca Walker suggests in an 
interview entitled 'Feminism Only Seems to Be Fading: It's Changing', 'the next phase 
in feminism's evolution will entail a politics of ambiguity, not identity' (quoted in Siegel 
1997a: 53-54). The third wave refuses a singular liberal-humanist subjectivity and it 
addresses the subject's experience of having fragmented and conflicting selves that do 
not constitute a seamless and coherent whole. In this way, 'with no utopic vision of the 
perfectly egalitarian society or the fully realized individual', third wave feminists 'work 
with the fragmentation of existing identities and institutions', creating a new subjective 
space that 'complicates female identity rather than defining it' (Reed 1997: 124). 
Simultaneously, the third wave is committed to political action. asserting that 
'breaking free of identity politics has not resulted in political apathy' but rather, has 
provided 'an awareness of the complexity and ambiguity of the world we have inherited' 
(Senna 1995: 20). In fact, third wave theory and practice consider anti-essentialism and 
political engagement as indispensably allied. I I The third wave does not dispute the 
postmodern subject's lack of transcendence but it works within the confines of 
power/discourse to posit its own anti-essentialist and pluralistic politics. The movement 
sees itself as 'a political stance and a critical practice', thriving on the contradictions that 
ensue from engagement with challenges to the monolithic subject of feminism and the 
unified self of enlightened modernity (Siegel 1997a: 54; 59). Based on the assumptions 
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that 'discourse is reality' and 'we know we can't escape it', the third wavers play with 
'the notion of constructedness, taking whatever we choose from the bits and pieces at our 
disposal' (Fenton 2001: 114). There are always 'multiple discourses to choose from' and 
in this way, the individual comes to be seen as 'a self-made jigsaw of bits and pieces' 
(Fenton 2001: 115). 
Further to being a theoretically informed movement, the third wave also situates 
itself within popular culture and understands a critical engagement with the latter as the 
key to political struggle. As Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake proclaim, 'it is this edge, 
where critique and participation meet, that third wave activists must work to further 
contentious public dialogue' (Heywood and Drake 1997: 52). The third wave contests a 
politics of purity that separates political activism from cultural production, 'ask[ing] us 
[ ... ] to re-imagine the disparate spaces constructed as "inside" and "outside" the 
academy [ ... ] as mutually informing and intersecting spheres of theory and practice' 
(Siegel 1997a: 70). Heywood and Drake acknowledge the tension between criticism and 
consumption and they pointedly reveal that, as 'pop-culture babies', they 'want some 
pleasure with [their] critical analysis' (Heywood and Drake 1997: 51). Feminism's third 
wave faces the contradiction of 'an often unconscious knowledge of the ways in which 
we are compelled and constructed by the very things that undermine us' (Heywood and 
Drake 1997: 11). Thus, third wave critique positions itself as part of the hegemonic realm 
and admits that it is always implicated in what it seeks to contest and transgress. 
While the third wave subject is formed within a relentlessly consumer-orientated 
culture, it also informed by the second wave's critique of consumption. The very 
invocation of 'third wave feminism' and the mobilization of the adjective 'third' can be 
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interpreted as an act of strategic defiance against scripts that assume that the gains forged 
by the second wave have so completely invaded all tiers of social existence that feminism 
itself has become obsolete. As Deborah L. Siegel notes, one should think of the third 
wave as 'overlapping both temporally and spatially with the waves that preceded it' 
(Siegel 1997a: 60).12 The notion of a third wave becomes a stance of resistance to 
popular pronouncements of a moratorium on feminism and feminists, 'a sound bite to 
counter the now infamous refrain "I'm not a feminist, but'" (Siegel 1997a: 52).13 This 
insistence on a continuation of the feminist movement signals a rejection of beliefs 
perpetuated in the mass media that consider the women's movement no longer relevant. 
As the third wavers Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake make explicit, 'to us the second 
and third waves of feminism are neither incompatible nor opposed' (Heywood and Drake 
1997: 3). Mimicking the nomenclature of its predecessors, third wave feminism 
acknowledges that it stands on the shoulders of other, earlier, feminist movements. Yet, 
at the same time, its agenda does not mirror the preceding waves' theories 
straightforwardly and unquestioningly. Rather, it 'makes things "messier'" by embracing 
second wave critique as a central definitional thread while emphasizing ways that 'desires 
and pleasures subject to critique can be used to rethink and enliven activist work' 
(Heywood and Drake 1997: 7). The third wave wants to bridge the gap between theory 
and practice and be simultaneously an academic discourse and a popular movement, 
firmly located within hegemonic culture while also providing a challenging theoretical 
perspective and a coalition politics that takes account of the multiple subject positions of 
its members. In this way, the twin imperatives of continuity and change are neatly 
entwined, making the third wave a seemingly deserving child of 1970s feminism. 
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Thus, the third wave seems to combine the theoretical maturity of academic 
poststructuralism, a dedication to a feminist agenda with an awareness of the importance 
of consumption. Kalbfleisch's desire for a 'rhetoric of anxiety' seems to have been 
fulfilled with the advent of the third wave but this seemingly all-inclusive stance has been 
achieved at a price, a simplistic construction and definition of the term 'postfeminism'. In 
order to achieve a critical distance from and position themselves in antithesis to the 'post' 
movement, the third wave relies on a falsely dualistic and polarized view that opposes the 
supposedly reductive views of postfeminism to the pluralistic agenda of the third wave. 
Heywood and Drake emphasize that, within the context of the third wave, "'postfeminist" 
characterizes a group of young, conservative feminists who explicitly define themselves 
against and criticize feminists of the second wave' (Heywood 1997: 1).14 According to 
this binary logic, postfeminism is conceptualized in opposition to second and third wave 
feminisms as a conservative/patriarchal ploy to undermine the women's movement. Its 
plurality is denied and neutralized through a rhetoric of antagonism that polarizes 
postfeminism and the third wave. Even though its terminology and epistemology are 
based on an embrace of ambiguity, the third wave ultimately eradicates the conceptual 
anxiety and multiplicity within (post)feminism. Self-defined as a movement that is at 
ease with contradiction and that depends on a coalition-politics activism, the third wave 
still feels the need to differentiate and separate itself from postfeminism and its 
ambivalent, even anti-feminist and conservative connotations. It characterizes itself ali the 
lawful heir, the 'good daughters' of the second wave, while postfeminism is interpreted 
as diametrically opposed to earlier feminist movements. 
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Ultimately, I contend that the term 'postfeminism' cannot be defined by relating it 
to a number of oppositional stances that reduce and distort the 'post' movement's radical 
potential and ambiguity. In the following section, I will situate and locate postfeminism 
contextually in order to avoid the pitfalls of reductive strategies of definition. Rather than 
trying to establish and fix a definitive articulation of postfeminism, this study 
acknowledges the ongoing struggle over its meaning. I agree with len Ang that 'critical 
research' cannot be built around a 'fixed, universal yardstick' and should not 'allow itself 
to rest easily on pre-existent epistemological foundations' (Ang 1996: 37). Consequently, 
I reject an immutable and absolutist understanding of the postfeminist movement and, 
instead, I propose a contextualized analysis that constructs contingent or positioned 
truths. I adopt an open and contextual definition that has to be reassessed continuously 
with regard to postfeminism's interdiscursive surroundings. At the same time, I insist that 
a contextual and discourse-specific reading of postfeminism cannot dissolve into a liberal 
pluralist view that sees its varying conceptions coexisting in a happy plurality of 
meaning. Contrastingly, in my analysis, postfeminist manifestations contradict and 
compete with each other, constituting a terrain of exchange and competition, an ongoing 
battle of signification. 
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2. The Landscape of Postfeminism: Feminism's Intersection 
with Postmodernism and Popular Culture 
2.1 Situating the context 
"'Post-feminism" happened without warning. It seemed to arrive from nowhere', Vicki 
Coppock, Deena Haydon and Ingrid Richter assert in their treatise The Illusions of 'Post-
Feminism' (1995) and in this way, they emphasize the highly elusive nature of the 
postfeminist phenomenon (Coppock 1995: 3). In fact, postfeminism has 'rarely been 
defined' and remains 'a product of assumption', invested with 'a different meaning 
depending on the site of its invocation' (Coppock 1995: 3; 4; Siegel 1997a: 52). Rather 
than trying to offer a precise and specific definition of postfeminism, this section will 
locate the term contextually in order to circumscribe and delimit a postfeminist 
landscape. Following Sara Mills, 'the essence of post-feminist theory' is to be found in an 
'awareness of the complexity and context-specific nature of the meaning of words within 
texts' (Mills 1998: 10; I). Even though Mills' focus on the postfeminist debate stems 
from a linguistic point of view, her conviction that 'a new form of feminist text analysis' 
has to be 'able to see that there are, within the parameters of the textual and discursive 
constraints, multiple interpretations of terms and discourses as a whole', can fruitfully be 
employed for the purpose of this study (Mills 1998: 1; 5). In this way, 
a post-feminist text analysis is one which recognizes that the context in which 
texts are produced and interpreted has been profoundly changed by the impact of 
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feminism and any form of analysis developed must be aware of the context of 
words rather than analyzing words out of context. (Mills 1998: 5) 
Applying Mills' analytical method, the term 'postfeminist' only makes sense and 
acquires a meaning when it is situated and interpreted contextually. In the following, the 
postfeminist context will be discussed as a complex and often contradictory field of 
convergence of feminist practice and theory with a number of intellectual and cultural 
debates emerging from both academia and popular culture. Postfeminism is located in the 
intersection of feminism with different dimensions of cultural theory, broadly 
summarized under the headings of postmodernism and the media. While I am aware that 
postfeminism's definitional plurality may not be fully encompassed and exhausted by this 
positioning, the prevalence given to these critical surroundings is based on a widely 
shared belief that '''postfeminism'' has emerged both as a descriptive popular category 
and as a tentative theoretical movement loosely associated with the postmodern and 
poststructuralist challenge to "identity politics'" (Walters 1991: 105). Some critics argue 
that there are two distinct and easily distinguishable strands of post feminist discourse, the 
popular, mainstream backla<;h one and the one associated with academic 
poststructuralism and postmodernism. As Deborah L. Siegel and Ann R. Cacoullos note, 
'when invoked by the popular press, "postfeminism" smugly refers to an era in which 
feminist movement is no longer necessary' whereas in the context of academic feminist 
writing, 'it refers to the challenging ways poststructuralist, postmodernist and 
multiculturalist modes of analysis have informed feminist theory and practice' (Siegel 
1997a: 53; Cacoullos 2001: 80). Postfeminism is condensed and defined as either popular 
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feminism or postmodern/poststructuralist feminism respectively and it is suggested that 
these two postfeminist contexts should be kept apart and considered separately. 
Accordingly, Ann Brooks points out in her theoretical exploration Postfeminisms (1997) 
that 'popular "post-feminism's" conceptual repertoire provides a useful point of 
distinction from the way postfeminism is framed within the feminist academic 
community' and she centers her discussion on the 'conceptual equivalence in postmodern 
feminism and postfeminism' (Brooks 1997: 4; 6). Amelia Jones, on the other hand, 
focuses on the widespread popular conception of postfeminism as a result of the term's 
appropriation by the media, noting that 'the popular deployment of [ ... ] postfeminism 
[ ... ] involves invidiously redefining femininity, feminism and even masculinity' (Jones 
1994: 21). 
While this study will be concerned at a later stage with the complexities and 
intricacies of postmodern feminism and popular feminism, I want to stress at this point 
that the distinction and opposition between theoreticallpostmodern and popular varieties 
of postfeminism cannot be upheld as there are significant points of overlap. I argue 
against an oversimplifying establishment of two separate postfeminist versions and 
locations (academia and the media) and I want to distance myself from such an 
antithetical and polarized positioning. This dualistic conception relies on the assumption 
that postmodern postfeminism is non-hegemonic and inclusive whereas media 
postfeminism represents a hegemonic negotiation of second-wave ideals. In Brooks' 
theoretical account of postfeminism as postmodernlpoststructuralist feminism, the 'post' 
movement is theorized as 'a position [that] resists closure of definition', a 'non-
hegemonic feminism capable of giving voice to local, indigenous and post-colonial 
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feminisms' (Brooks 1997: 5; 4). Conversely, Fernando de Toro and Bonnie Dow define 
postfeminism as 'the feminism which [ ... J work[sJ with "patriarchal" theory', absorbing 
and appropriating feminist rhetoric and events and misrepresenting them in media 
discourse for public consumption (de Toro 1999: 16; Dow 1996: xvi). 
Thus, it is suggested that feminism's interaction with popular culture has to be 
distinguished from and even opposed to the differently inflected alliance of feminist 
theory with postmodernisrnJacademia. 1 The media postfeminist stance is interpreted as an 
abatement and depoliticization of the feminist movement, implying that women have now 
achieved sufficient independence to dispense with feminism. Feminism's entry into the 
popular and the ensuing postfeminist position are represented as damaging attempts to 
manage and contain the revolutionary potential of the feminist enterprise. In this process 
of co-option, feminism has supposedly been made safe while its more attractive elements 
and terminology of liberation and emancipation have been preserved and accommodated. 
Contrastingly, postmodern postfeminism acts as a movement of feminist pluralization 
whereby it makes room in its own ranks for a more diverse 'we'. It engages with the 
postmodern notion of the dispersed unstable subject and it opens up the feminist realm 
for the articulation of 'other' voices. From this perspective, postfeminism 'is 
fundamentally about, not a depoliticisation of feminism, but a political shift in 
feminism's conceptual and theoretical agenda [ ... J from debates around equality to a 
focus on debates around difference' (Brooks 1997: 4). 
In the following, I resist dichotomous and simplistic definitions of popular 
postfeminism as a retrograde backlash and post modern postfeminism as a pluralistic, 
non-hegemonic feminism and I insist that the postfeminist landscape is made up of 
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conflicting elements that inform one another. Rather than polarizing specific types of 
postfeminism, I retain the idea of a range of post feminist positions in order to emphasize 
and underline postfeminism's multiplicity. I contend that postfeminism constantly 
negotiates between a number of discourses and it is assigned to a critical position within 
hegemony, a critique from the inside. Moreover, I maintain that postfeminism occupies a 
contradictory frontier location that cannot be arrogated into postmodem and media 
frameworks. While there are important conceptual parallels between postfeminism and 
postmodernlpopular feminisms, the 'post' term cannot be interpreted reductively as a 
synonym of either of these movements or theories. These definitional attempts undermine 
and constrict the multidimensionality of the postfeminist phenomenon and furthermore, 
they rely on an erroneous dichotomy that opposes academia to popular media. I argue 
against the separation of an academic 'outside' and the popular realm of representation 
and I assert that postfeminism's heterogeneous stance incorporates and blends elements 
taken from both postmodern academic and popular contexts. In this way, I identify the 
theoretical postmodern debate and the popular cultural realm as two privileged (but, by 
no means, sole and mutually exclusive) sites of occurrence of postfeminism and I 
examine how feminist roots are appropriated and redefined within these surroundings. 
In fact, appropriation or 'the play of inversions' can be discussed as 'a constant 
feature of post-feminism' and a 'postfeminist survival strategy' whereby 'post-feminism 
draws a premise from feminism [ ... ] and then provides the post-feminist twist or punch 
line' (Kastelein 1994: 138, 140; Stacey 1987: 13). In this process of post feminist 
resignification, meaning is dislocated, destabilized and finally altered in an attempt to 
integrate feminist ideas and rhetoric into other discourses and contexts. The reworking of 
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feminism is facilitated by the fact that, like its 'post' offspring, feminism is textually 
mediated and context-specific. Mills' contextual strategy also holds true for feminism as 
'the ways in which we position ourselves in relation to feminism and the identity 
"feminist" will depend on the knowledge we have about feminism' (Hollows 2000: 201). 
Feminism has to be recognized as part of the realm of representation, both drawing on 
and being drawn upon by other discursive formations. Its multifaceted plurality has been 
undermined and misrepresented by the critical settings in which the term has been evoked 
and used. Its positioning in relation to other discourses (including postfeminism, 
postmodernism and the media) has often been damaging as it has been defined 
simplistically within these boundaries as a unanimous and monolithic whole. In this way, 
any evocation of the term 'feminist' is never impartial or neutral and any definition of 
postfeminism is intrinsically linked to the view of feminism that one adopts. Postmodern 
deconstructive theory and the media are both engaged in a rewriting of feminism and 
consequently, the ensuing interpretations of postfeminism draw upon and reflect a limited 
and strategic conceptualization of the feminist movement. As Lynne Alice notes, 'what is 
interesting in this popular criticism and the rather differently located academic response 
is the implication that "postfeminism" in both sites operates as an imperative towards 
defining and containing feminist thinking' (Alice 1995: 7). The intersection of media and 
academic/postmodern manifestations of the postfeminist phenomenon seems to be 
located in one particular spot as both postfeminist locations share a revisionist history of 
feminism. Postmodern and popular postfeminist contexts coincide and 'albeit with 
different intentions, contribute to the dissolution offeminism as theory and practice' 
(Walters 1991: 105). 
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In particular, postfeminism is said to effect a de-collectivization of the feminist 
movement as it translates feminist social goals and political ideas into a matter of 
individual choice or lifestyle. This personalized outlook is at the basis of the postfeminist 
problematic as it allows for a contradictory and pluralistic postfeminist spectrum that is 
not bound by a single and unified set of ideas, politics and practice. The emphasis on the 
postfeminist individual offers competing notions of contemporary womanhood and 
creates areas of contention between and within feminism, postfeminism, postmodernism 
and popular culture. Feminist critics take a unanimously negative view of postfeminism's 
individualistic stance, arguing that 'the political is personal' as 'the distinction between 
feminist politics and feminist identity is in danger of completely disappearing' (Dow 
1996: 210; 209). This ironic reversal of the well-known feminist adage illustrates 
postfeminism's individualistic agenda and it problematizes notions of a collective 
feminist identity or sisterhood.2 In this postfeminist age, 'feminist politics become 
feminist identity' as feminism's political theory and practice are transformed into a set of 
personal attitudes and any emphasis on organized intervention is regarded as misguided 
(Dow 1996: 209). The implicit assumption is that feminism has become anachronistic 
and, therefore, it should be rejected in its state of collectivity. The reasons for this 
dismissal are highly varied, ranging from a theoretical questioning of the concepts of 
unity and coherence, to the argument voiced in popular media that equality has been 
achieved and that, hence, women can relax in their organized struggle and concentrate on 
the real work ahead - individual goals. 
The popular press provides the most explicit portrayal of the postfeminist utopia 
in which women can do whatever they please, provided they have sufficient will and 
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enthusiasm. According to this optimistic formulation, women choose the life they want 
and they inhabit a world centered in, what Elspeth Probyn refers to as, choiceoisie, that 
envisions all major life decisions as individual options rather than culturally determined 
or directed necessities (Probyth 1990). This postfeminist version of the American dream 
(with its celebration of individualism) is seen to be entirely available to those who work 
hard enough and, therefore, it is the justified and well-deserved recompense for 
individual efforts rather than the political outcome of communal activism. 'Being 
empowered' is translated as being synonymous with 'making the most of oneself and 
'pleasing oneself' and, in this way, the second wave's chal1enging col1ective program of 
equal opportunity is transformed into atomized acts and matters of personal choice. As 
Susan J. Douglas notes, 'women's liberation metamorphosed into female narcissism 
unchained as political concepts and goals like liberation and equality were collapsed into 
distinctly personal, private desires' (Douglas 1995: 246). This narcissism as liberation 
equates women's emancipation with their ability to do whatever they want, whenever 
they want, no matter what the expense. This individualist postfeminist strain propagates 
the comforting message that women's col1ective victimization has ended and/or is 
exaggerated by feminist orthodoxy whose emphasis on women's subordinated status is 
viewed as disempowering and even oppressive. Instead, women are presented as having 
freedom of choice actively to pursue their ambitions and take up the opportunities that a 
postfeminist choiceoisie puts at their disposal. Popular postfeminism eschews an 
acknowledgment of women's collective problems and maintains that their choices are 
free from constraints and unobstructed by a patriarchal order. 
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Tellingly, in the best-selling Fire With Fire: The New Female Power And How It 
Will Change the 21 st Century (1993), Naomi Wolf urges her postfeminist reader 'to claim 
her individual voice rather than merging her voice in a collective identity', reminding her 
that 'making social change does not contradict the principle that girls just want to have 
fun' (Wolf 1993: 136; 138). Wolf adopts a feminist surface terminology but discards and 
rejects the political agenda and the more radical aspects of the second wave centered in 
sexual politics and a profound awareness of power differences between the sexes at all 
levels and in all arenas. Feminist commentators deplore that this personalized stance 
results in a postfeminist movement that can 'embrace everyone, since it has no overt 
political tenets' (hooks 1994: 98). This feminism turns the movement away from politics 
back to a version of individual self-help, revealing 'the true limitations of identity 
politics' that do not involve a critique of power imbalance (Senna 1995: 16). The resort to 
individualism produces outstanding models of personal accomplishment but it cannot 
engender a program for change in the position of women as a group.3 
Critics argue that the postfeminist notion of 'narcissism as liberation is liberation 
repackaged, deferred and denied' as the most basic and revolutionary principles of 
feminism are distorted and undermined (Douglas 1995: 265). As Nancy F. Cott notes, as 
much as feminism asserts the female individual, 'pure individualism negates feminism 
because it removes the basis for women's collective self-understanding or action' (Cott 
1987: 6). The threatening outcome of this popular postfeminist emphasis on personal 
choice is an excessively individualist feminism that obliterates the political. The danger 
lies not in postfeminism's celebration of the personal struggles and triumphs of women 
but rather, in mistaking these often quite satisfying images 'for something more than the 
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selective, partial images that they are' (Dow 1996: 214). In favoring individual effort 
rather than group struggle, a token is held up 'not as exception but as proof that 
egalitarianism (the fully functioning American Dream) was present all along' (Helford 
2000: 292).4 This rhetoric of tokenism redefines oppression and structural disadvantage 
as personal suffering while reframing success as an individual accomplishment, faith and 
determination. The ideology of individualism takes the feminist standpoint that 'women's 
freedoms and opportunities should be no less than men's', but offers 'no way to achieve 
the goal except acting as though it had already been obtained' (Cott 1987: 281). The 
implication is that choiceoisie has supposedly always been there, it has always been in 
reach for the right woman who knows how to work within the system for personal 
improvement. In this way, the postfeminist she has always been free from structural and 
economic barriers and she only has herself to blame for failure to thrive. 
According to this viewpoint, postfeminism is driven by representational concerns 
for a more attractive and easily sellable image and it is no longer on the defensive as its 
individualistic credo domesticates feminism's critical stance. Postfeminism is wi1ling to 
sacrifice political objectives and, therefore, it offers little hope of making a material 
difference in the lives of all women. While focusing on the strong individual's will. the 
tokenism inherent in postfeminism displaces the importance of the group nature of the 
adversity as it obscures the collective nature of oppression and the need for organized 
action to remedy social injustice. Moreover, postfeminist individualism and choiceoisie 
can be identified as privileged, distinctly middle-class perspectives, appealing to 'young 
women professionals imbued with confidence, an ethic of self-reliance and the headstart 
of a good education' (Kaminer 1995: 23). However, this brand of feminism does not 
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ensure that all women should receive ample opportunities and choices and, in so doing, it 
guarantees that a power and privilege imbalance persists to exist among them. 
Postfeminism's individualist discourse is 'a lUxury the majority of women can't afford' 
and the postfeminist woman, 'if there is one, is rich' and 'she can afford to consume 
cliches' (Lee 1988: 172). 
Ultimately, it is argued that 'postfeminism takes the sting out of feminism', 
'confusing lifestyle, attitudinal feminism with the hard political and intellectual work that 
feminists have done and continue to do' (Macdonald 1995: 100; Dow 1996: 214). 
Abandoning the structural analysis of patriarchal power, it masks the larger forces that 
continue to oppress many women's lives and reinscribes their marginality by 
undercutting the possible strategic weight of feminist collectivities for change. Assuming 
rather than questioning equal opportunity for women, postfeminist individualism 
depoliticizes feminism and undermines the collective nature of women's liberation while 
directing them to personal goals. The notion of a postfeminist choiceoisie is 'at base, a 
rhetorical fiction' under whose guise the term feminism, as well as the patriarchy it tries 
to combat, become anachronistic, and are 'indeed scorned nowadays as reductive' (Dow 
1996: 194; Thompson 1997: 360). However, this scorn for a perceived anachronism may 
enable the patriarchal order to operate all the more smoothly within postfeminist 
discourse. Thus, Helford concludes that 'postfeminism leaves patriarchy in place, 
denouncing the idea that women are oppressed as a group and that the "personal is 
political" in an attempt to avoid all forms of direct struggle against male domination' 
(Helford 2000: 293). 
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While I do not deny that patriarchal ideology is a component of the postfeminist 
landscape, I object to the critical suggestion that postfeminism is an integral part and 
creation of patriarchy. In my analysis of postfeminist texts, I will problematize the notion 
of an apolitical and reactionary tokenism that underlies the above formulations of 
postfeminism. I assert that postfeminism cannot be defined simplistically as a patriarchal 
scheme that offers gratification on the micro-societal level while perpetuating wider 
social inequalities. The postfeminist token cannot be classified as a secret agent of 
patriarchy as she is equally informed by feminist principles and she endeavors to 
combine these previously antagonistic positions. Instead of conceiving postfeminism 
merely in terms of an exclusionist and exclusive viewpoint, I contend that its 
individualism highlights the plurality and contradictions of contemporary female 
experience. In effect, what postfeminism does is making the theoretical and political 
agenda of the second wave palatable for a postmodern age that has discredited and 
discarded the grands narratives and replaced them with the petits recits of sectional 
interest. The ideas and beliefs conglomerated under the heading of postfeminism are 
characterized by an anti-universalist stance that betrays an awareness of the false unity of 
master narratives and the limitations of identity politics. Postfeminism can be situated 
within a postmodern framework that takes into account 'the instability of contemporary 
times, in which the viability of "real" stable meanings is called into question, all 
judgments are relativized, and notions of transcendent truth are dismissed' (Dow 1996: 
171). The deconstructive tendency inherent in postfeminism takes the appearance of 
individualism in popular postfeminism and of anti-essentialism in academic versions of 
the same phenomenon. In this way, third wave feminism heralds the 'return to the 
95 
personal' whereas Wolfs power feminism and Girl Power embrace a 'theory of self-
worth' and a vision of self-help (Siegel I 997a: 51; hooks 1996: 63). In a similar manner, 
backlash feminism reduces feminist struggles and gains to the issue of personal choices 
while poststructuralist feminism rejects the category of 'woman' altogether by 
challenging and deconstructing the humanist subject who is no longer defined as a fixed 
entity, a manifestation of essence, but as a subject in process, never unitary nor complete. 
Viewed as a whole, the different facets of postfeminism question the possibility 
for a singular female/feminist identity, a common ground from which to construct a 
collective politics and criticism. Postfeminism's anti-essentialist theory and individualist 
practice declare 'women' to be an indeterminate and open category that cannot be 
bounded by oppressive generalizations. Popular postfeminism's return to the "I" and 
academic postfeminism's deconstruction of the universal subject undermine the a priori 
assumption that there is a continuous field of experience shared by all women. As 
Geraldine Harris points out, 'Woman' can be treated as a 'questionable category (no 
graven image) that can never be fully described or defined' (Harris 1999: 183). It cannot 
be discussed as an immutable fact but, instead, it has to be understood as an inescapably 
indeterminate, multiple and ever-shifting classification.s Postfeminism foregrounds the 
differences between women and offers a continuing and paradoxical enquiry into what it 
means to 'be a woman' in both theory and practice. It does not aim for a totalizing 
definition of 'woman' but, rather, submits the term to a double movement of invocation 
and critique in order to recreate it as a permanent site of contest. 
Postfeminism can be discussed in relation to deconstructive theories that 
undermine the concept of an essential female identity from two critical directions. In fact, 
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the postmodern deconstruction of the subject category is reinforced by anti-essentialist 
feminists for whom 'woman' as a monolithic term is unable to address the complexity of 
gender in relation to other alipects of identity, including race, ethnicity, class, sexuality 
and age. Accordingly, Deborah L. Siegel identifies 'two very different modes of 
deconstructive feminist theorizing', 'two different taxonomies [ ... J oversimplified as 
"multiculturalist" (to signify critiques of the representative subject on the grounds of 
material exclusions) and "postmodernist" (to signify the destabilization of a humanist 
conception of sel!)' (Siegel 1997a: 60). While the complexities of a postmodern . 
feminism will be addressed shortly, the question of power within feminism is of equal 
importance and becomes increasingly crucial as feminism is challenged from the inside 
by previously unheard voices of marginalized, colonized and indigenous women who 
object to feminist theories that fail to address their needs. As a social and political 
movement that claims to embrace women's interests beneath the umbrella term of 
'sisterhood', feminism is criticized for developing a methodology that uses as its 
paradigm white, heterosexual and middle-class female experience. Imelda Whelehan 
recognizes a dominant feminist stream of 'white, heterosexual and bourgeois thought' 
that embodies the possible meanings and definitions ascribed to feminism, accompanied 
by a marked reluctance on the part of such 'feminists to address the degrees of social 
acceptance and privilege that they' enjoy 'at the expense of others' (Whelehan 1995: 107; 
108).6 This "'mainstream" feminist analysis offemale oppression' is denounced as 
'flawed and narrow in its focus' as it does not take into account that 'a patriarchal 
ideology also supports a racist and heterosexist one' (Whelehan 1995: 110; 120). Black 
and lesbian feminists actively counter and reject these methodological boundaries of 
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feminist discourse, refusing to be silenced by a '''hegemonic'' feminism with its roots 
clearly located in the Anglo-American influences so powerful in the conceptualization of 
second wave feminism' (Brooks 1997: 4). Their critique of the racist, ethnocentric and 
heterosexist assumptions of a largely white, middle-class and heterosexual feminism is 
seen to result in a breakdown of feminist consensus, a collapse from the inside, and its 
replacement by a pluralistic postfeminist stance. 
In this way, historically speaking, the postfeminist movement can be interpreted 
as a product of the interventions of women of color and lesbian theorists into the feminist 
debate as it takes into account the demands of marginalized and colonized cultures for a 
non-ethnocentric and non-heterosexist feminism. Postfeminism addresses the notion of 
power within feminism and insists that one has to 'rethink the feminist project in ways 
that do not oversimplify either the nature of power in general, or questions of power 
relations among women and among feminists' (Elam 1997: 67; 58). Claims of 
victimization are problematized as concepts such as 'oppression', 'patriarchy', 'identity' 
and 'difference' as used by white middle-class feminists are challenged by black and 
lesbian feminists, fighting for visibility within mainstream feminism. Their demands for a 
diversification of the feminist movement are epitomized and illustrated by Michelene 
Wandor's insistence that 'the political - and personal - struggle now needs a larger, more 
diverse "we", who will combine in resistance to all the overlapping oppressions' (quoted 
in Thornham 2001: 42). In place of a reductive identity politics of feminist solidarity 
against male oppressors, this heterogeneous and pluralistic postfeminist stance puts 
forward the idea of mUltiple oppressed subjectivities rather than privileging anyone site 
of oppression. 
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In fact, one cannot pose a clear distinction between the pressures from inside and 
outside feminism as postmodernismJpoststructuralism are embraced by non-mainstream 
feminists as adequate frames to theorize the multivalent, contradictory and conflicting 
voices and demands of contemporary women.' These marginalized feminist voices 
reinforce the postmodern belief that no singular explanation for relations of power will 
suffice and that no monolithic interpretation or alteration of praxis will in itself effect 
social change. As Linda Nicholson points out, postmodernism 'provides a basis for 
avoiding the tendency to construct theory that generalizes from the experiences of 
Western, white, middle-class women' and it 'offers feminism some useful ideas about 
method, particularly a wariness toward generalizations which transcend the boundaries of 
culture and region' (Nicholson 1990: 5). Postmodern theory explores and undermines the 
foundations that secure the idea of a single womanhood and, in so doing, it points to who 
is excluded. Feminist thought can be brought into a potentially fruitful a11iance with 
postmodernism as the prospect of a postmodern feminism 'insists that we listen to the 
voices of those who dispute the terms of representation and who say "this is not us'" 
(McRobbie 1994: 7). Postmodern feminism al10ws for women's multiple identities and it 
chal1enges a unified conception of the feminist movement. Fol1owing the collapse of a 
totalizing analysis of gendered power structures, the center of feminist analysis does not 
hold and falls apart as the myth of unity is dissolved and replaced by partiality and 
imperfection. 
According to Judith Butler, what is needed is feminist self-criticism which bears 
in mind that 'the effort to identify the enemy as singular in form is a reverse-discourse 
that uncritically mimics the strategy of the oppressor instead of offering a different set of 
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terms' (Butler 1990a: 13). Butler takes into account feminism's own potentially 
dominating and oppressive tendencies and she attacks feminist analyses that adopt 
monolithic notions of male power and control of women. In her view, 'feminist critique 
ought to explore the totalizing claims of a masculinist signifying economy, but also 
remain self-critical with respect to the totalizing gestures of feminism' (Butler 1990a: 
13). Feminism has to occupy a 'similar "critical" position in regard to earlier feminist 
frameworks at the same time as critically engaging with patriarchal and imperialist 
discourses' (Brooks 1997: 2). Its battle cannot purely be fought against an easily 
definable and ubiquitous patriarchy but should encompass its own hegemonic 
assumptions and universalizing positions.8 Feminism has to question the processes of 
power and domination between and within the two sexes, including the dualistic notions 
of a patriarchal/male oppressor and a feminist/female oppressed. Butler notes that the 
feminist movement has strategically upheld the claim of a universal patriarchy in order to 
produce an oppositional and unified feminist identity and misrepresent the complex 
network of power connections. Thus, 'the urgency of feminism to establish a universal 
status for patriarchy' is closely related to the desire 'to strengthen the appearance of 
feminism's own claims to be representative' and, indeed, it has also 'occasionally 
motivated the shortcut to a categorial or fictive universality of the structure of 
domination, held to produce women's common subjugated experience' (Butler 1990a: 3-
4). 
In this way, the feminist movement has to acknowledge the limits of binary 
thinking and dispute the universality and homogeneity of both patriarchy and feminism 
alike. It has to resist and discard the politically effective, stabilizing and unifying fictions 
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of a common oppressor and oppressed and, in so doing, cast doubt on its own 
foundational discourses. Feminism must remain skeptical about its own achievements 
and adopt an interrogative, evaluative mode whereby it accepts the inadequacy of one 
feminist interpretation to account for the complex relations of dominance and gender in 
the modern world. Feminist criticism has to display an awareness of the necessity to let 
'other' women speak and, therefore, it has to problematize its own authoritative position 
and political discourse whereby it claims to represent the silent majority of women. In 
effect, feminism has to relinquish the notion of a politically correct feminist identity that 
does not allow for difference among women/feminists and seeks to construct 'other 
feminine identities as somehow "invalid'" (Brunsdon 1991: 379). As len Ang states, 
'feminism has generally postulated an ideal of the feminist subject, fully committed to the 
cause of social change and "women's liberation'" (Ang 1996: 114). However, as Angela 
McRobbie notes, feminism cannot presume to possess the universal truth about women as 
'to make such a claim is to uncritically overload the potential of the women's movement 
and to underestimate the resources and capacities of "ordinary women" [ ... ] to 
participate in their own struggles as women but quite autonomously' (McRobbie 1982: 
52). The feminist movement has to be an open site that embraces ambiguity and 
multiplicity and acknowledges partiality and imperfection as vital components of 
women's lives. This implies abandoning the idea of an infallible and separate feminist 
self and it also means that the notion of a generally shared conception of 'women', the 
corollary to such a framework, has to be displaced.9 
Judith Butler provides a useful theoretical model to conceptualize the 
fragmentations within feminism as she proposes a feminist movement that no longer 
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relies on the construction of the category of women as a coherent and stable subject. Her 
views expand and theorize the historically specific and focused critical efforts of 
marginalized feminist strands as she calls for a genealogy that might 'free feminist theory 
from the necessity of having to construct a single or abiding ground' (Butler 1990a: 5). 
She disputes the foundationalist assumption that feminist politics must be organized 
around the notion of an essential and unified subjectivity. For Butler, the feminist 'we' is 
a 'phantasmatic construction' that denies 'internal complexity and indeterminacy' and 
'constitutes itself only through the exclusion of some part of the constituency that it 
simultaneously seeks to represent' (Butler 1990a: 142). She wants to redefine feminism 
without having recourse to the compulsory expectation that feminist actions must be 
instituted from some stable, unified, and agreed upon identity and she employs the term 
'postfeminist' to refer to 'this juncture of cultural politics' that demands a reflection 
'from within a feminist perspective on the injunction to construct a subject for feminism' 
(Butler 1990a: 15; 5). Postfeminism attempts to address diverse and contradictory female 
experiences and bridge the 'paradoxical opposition to feminism from "women" whom 
feminism claims to represent' (Butler 1990a: 4). The postfeminist movement rejects 
essentialist and monolithic concepts of 'woman' and espouses the postmodern 
deconstruction of the unified subject along with the notions of difference and plurality. 
At the same time as acknowledging the importance of the multiculturalist and 
anti-essentialist views underlying Butler's theoretical rethinking of the ontological 
constructions of identity, I also want to problematize the notion of a feminist hegemony 
upon which such critical efforts rest. In these accounts, feminism is constructed as a 
monolithic, homogeneous, dogmatic and sometimes tyrannical discourse, one of the 
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flawed metanarratives of modernity, characterized by a foundationalist and racist 
epistemology. Postfeminism on the other hand is seen to denote feminism's 'maturity 
into a confident body of theory and politics, representing pluralism and difference and 
reflecting on its position in relation to other philosophical and political movements 
similarly demanding change' (Brooks 1997: 1). The 'post' movement is alienated from 
its diverse feminist roots and brought into contact with cultural and theoretical 
developments 'outside' feminism that challenge the basis and establishment of a feminist 
epistemology. Postfeminism is likened to postmodernismlpoststructuralism and it is 
distinguished from a hegemonic feminism limited by its own political agenda and 
modernist inclinations. Described as a dynamic and anti-foundationalist movement 
capable of challenging modernist, patriarchal and imperialist frameworks, postfeminism 
moves beyond the feminist microcosm and critically reflects upon earlier feminist 
concepts and strategies as a result of its engagement with other movements. 
The paradigm shift from feminism to postfeminism is conceptualized as an 
opening up of the feminist realm, what Michele Barrett calls feminism's turn to culture 
or its intersection with different dimensions of cultural theory (Barrett 1990). As Barrett 
suggests, 'there has been an increasing tendency in feminism to think about politics 
through the medium of cultural debate' and this move towards a cultural arena 'has come 
at a time when there is quite rightly much less confidence than there once was in the 
standing and methodology of the traditional critical disciplines' (Barrett 1990: 22; 23). 
Barrett argues that this turn to culture has created a more critical and reflexive feminism 
whose initial 'consensus and confidence around issues of "patriarchy", distinctions along 
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sex/gender lines, as well as issues of "subject" positioning and sexuality' are undermined 
by the emphasis on deconstruction and difference (Brooks 1997: 38). 
While I welcome Barrett's convergence of culture and politics for a better 
understanding of feminism and while I agree with her that 'cultural politics are crucial to 
feminism', I object to the suggestion that the feminist stance pre-dating the so-called shift 
towards culture is consensual, naively unaware of its own positioning and, therefore, in 
need of being replaced by postfeminism (Barrett 1990: 23). I maintain that feminism 
cannot be conceptualized reductively as a coherent monolith or a unified collectivity, 
diametrically opposed to a knowing postfeminist stance. The dualistic view of a 
hegemonic feminism and a pluralistic postfeminism is too clear-cut and undermines the 
movements' interactions and overlap. Moreover, feminism is denied an active and 
dynamic role in the discursive exchange as it is immobilized in a static position that 
refuses to enter into a dialogue with other discourses. In the following chapters, I will 
address the intersections of feminism with postmodernism and the media and I will 
discuss the complexities of these convergences and the entailing views and constructions 
of postfeminism. 
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2.2 Postfeminist Locations: Feminism and Postmodernism 
One of the most pressing current concerns for academic feminism is the question 
of what to do with 'post' discourses. 
Keith Green and Jill LeBihan, Critical Theory & Practice: 
A Coursebook (1996) 
'The most important question [ ... ] is whether [ ... ] feminism is co-opted by being 
harnessed to other discourses which neutralize its radical potential', Amelia Jones notes, 
identifying in this way feminism's precarious nature, its tendency to be invaded and 
absorbed by the critical surroundings in which the term is evoked (Jones 1990: 7). In fact, 
the ideas of co-option and appropriation have surfaced in the course of this study and 
they describe the down-side of feminism's entry into dialogue with other contexts and 
movements. Feminism's conjunction with both postmodern theory and the media has 
hardly ever been interpreted as a mutually beneficial exchange of ideas, values and 
theories and, instead, it is conceptualized as a takeover or subsumption whereby 
feminism loses its autonomous status and is incorporated into a popular mainstream or 
into postmodernism. While feminism's dealings with popular culture will be considered 
in the next section, in the following I will focus on the theoretical postmodern debate and 
I will investigate the complex juncture of feminism and postmodernism and the resulting 
views of postmodern feminism and/or postfeminism. As Ann Brooks declares, 'there is 
concern among some feminists that the intersection of feminism and postmodernism 
might result in feminism [ ... ] losing its distinctive character as a body of critical theory 
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and practice' (Brooks 1997: 36).1 The feminist enterprise is said to be undermined by its 
trans-contextualized locations as it is in danger of being deprived of its specific 
theoretical, practical and political agenda. As Mascia-Less deplores, 'feminism los[es] its 
separate, if illusory, singular identity [ ... ] making it both difficult, and often, undesirable 
to distinguish it from endeavors with close affinities: poststructuralism, cultural studies, 
critical theory, and postcolonial or subaltern studies' (Mascia-Lees 2000: 3). 
Postfeminism is heralded as the end result of these discursive encounters whereby 
it denotes 'a context in which the feminism of the 1970s is problematized, splintered, and 
considered suspect, one in which it is no longer easy, fun, empowering, or even possible, 
to take a feminist position' (Mascia-Lees 2000: 3). The postfeminist stance facilitates a 
broad-based, pluralistic conception of feminism as it rejects the ideas of a unified 
feminist monolith and an essential female self. Postfeminism is situated at the point of 
feminism's intersection with other movements and theories and thus, it works and moves 
between discourses, converging a diversity of viewpoints, voices and strategies. The 
postfeminist movement is seen to be 'the result of feminist theory confronting challenges 
from quite different sources' and, particularly, its pluralistic theoretical outlook 'owes 
much to the integration of postmodern and poststructuralist thoughts' (Koenen 1999: 
132). This section addresses the contentions surrounding the problematic meeting of 
feminism and postmodernism and explores the theoretical and practical implications of a 
postmodern feminism. As will be demonstrated, such a conjunctive relationship is fraught 
with complexities as 'it is clear to anyone engaged in these enterprises that neither 
feminism nor postmodernism operates as one big happy family' (Singer 1992: 471). 
There is no unified postmodern theory, or even a coherent set of positions, just as there is 
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no one feminist outlook or critical perspective. Instead, one is struck by the plurality of 
postmodern and feminist positions and the diverse theories lumped together under these 
headings. There is a variety of different links between feminist and postmodern theory, 
with the proposals of conjunction ranging from a strategic corporate merger, to the 
suggestion of various postmodern and feminist versions varying in strength, to the 
downright rejection of a postmodern feminism. These ca11s for (non-) alliance often draw 
upon a reductive conceptualization and simplification of the two entities and they propose 
a facile distinction between feminism's political engagement and postmodernism's 
theoretical self-absorption. In the fo11owing, I resist such dualistic accounts that do not 
account for the wide range of relationships between feminist and postmodern enterprises 
and I maintain that there is no shorthand way to characterize the differences between 
these two multifaceted discourses or movements. 
Postfeminism's definitional uncertainty and inherent doubleness epitomize the 
varied and even conflicting calls for juncture and thus, provide the fitting backdrop or 
battleground on which the postmodern/feminist disputes are fought out. There is a 
significant conceptual overlap between postmodern feminism and postfeminism and, in 
the fo11owing, I will explore postfeminism's dependence on and convergence with 
postmodern and poststructuralist dimensions of cultural theory. Replacing dualism with 
pluralism and consensus with variety, postfeminism clearly participates in the discourse 
of postmodernism as it discredits and eschews the ideas of discursive homogeneity and a 
unified subjectivity. It understands that postmodernism's fracturing of the universal 
subject pertains to feminism's own identity and it rejects the concept of the essential and 
coherent sovereign self in favor of a selfhood that is contradictory and disjunctive. 
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Postfeminism embraces a complexity of vision and gives vent to the multivalent, 
inharmonious and conflicting voices of contemporary women, including the 'other' 
voices of feminists themselves. The postfeminist movement insists that feminism has to 
be viewed pluralistically and in this way, it 'establish[es] a dynamic and vigorous area of 
intellectual debate, shaping the issues and intellectual climate that has characterized the 
move from modernity to postmodernity in the contemporary world' (Brooks 1997: 210). 
Following postmodern/postfeminist advocates, feminism has to abandon the 
claims of consensus and coherence with regard to its representative subject and its own 
discursive identity. The understanding of postfeminism as feminist pluralism highlights 
the fact that, with the advent of the postmodern era, any illusions of a feminist unity or 
sisterhood have to be questioned and ultimately discarded.2 It is argued that feminism can 
no longer rely on the notion of an authentic and unanimous feminist realm or 'outside' 
from which hegemonic culture can be judged and criticized. Instead, the feminist 
movement is seen to be an inherent part of the ideological constructions of reality and, 
therefore, it has to renounce the elitist idea of a detached and untainted feminist identity 
that is beyond the hegemonic.3 In Foucauldian terms, there are no 'spaces of primal 
liberty' in society as power is diffused throughout the social field and it 'is "always 
already there"', so that 'one is never "outside" it' and 'there are no margins for those who 
break with the system to gambol in' (Foucault 1980: 141; 142). Postmodernism 
articulates a self that is always within power structures and subjected to multiple 
discursive formations and, therefore. it cannot be understood as an autonomous agent 
according to the standards of enlightened modernity. The concept of the constituting 
subject of the Cartesian tradition, along with the notions of agency, creativity and 
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resistance, are problematized by poststructuralist and postmodern thought that stresses 
the discursive construction and the constituted nature of the individual. Following Fredric 
Jameson, this deconstructive attack on the Cartesian ego can be referred to as 'the death 
of the subject' or 'the end of the autonomous bourgeois monad' whereby the spontaneous 
and rational self developed by Enlightenment thinkers is radically decentered and 
dismissed (Jameson 1993: 71-72). As Patricia Waugh notes, 
postmodernism situates itself epistemologically at the point where the epistemic 
subject characterized in terms of historical experience, interiority, and 
consciousness has given way to the "decentred" subject identified through the 
public, impersonal signifying practices of other similarly "decentred" subjects. 
(Waugh 1989: 7) 
The postmodern dispersal of the subject has been reinforced by feminist scholars 
as this deconstructive notion seems to further their attempts to open up the subjective 
category to women. The contemporary feminist movement is informed by 
postmodernism's questioning of the major tenets of the subject-centered epistemology of 
modernity as it realizes its potential to advance a cultural politics of diversity. Feminists 
reject the philosophical notion of a transcendent subject, a self thematized as universal 
and free from any contingencies of difference. The feminist critique is based on a distrust 
of modern theory and politics that, it is argued, have devalued their own subject positions 
and neglected their vital concerns. As Best and Kellner maintain, feminists 'have quite 
rightly been suspicious of modernity [ ... ] because the oppression of women has been 
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sustained and legitimated through the phi1osophical underpinnings of modern theory and 
its essentialism, foundationalism and universalism' (Best and Kel1ner 1991: 206). The 
principal thrust of the feminist argument is that the subject has been conceived as 
inherently masculine and, thus, it has been a significant factor in maintaining the inferior 
status of women. In its gendered conceptualization of the subjective category, the 
humanist discourse of 'Man' covertly supports and justifies male domination of women 
as it constructs a binary opposition between the sexes, exemplified by two antithetical 
sets of characteristics that position Man as the voice of reason and objectivity whi1e 
enslaving Woman in domestic activities and excluding her from public life. Accordingly, 
as Susan Hekman points out, 'efforts to open up, reform, or reconstitute the masculine 
subject have been a central aspect of the feminist movement for several decades' and she 
notes that, unless the subject is reconstructed, 'the subjection of women that it fosters wi11 
necessarily continue' (Hekman 1991: 45). 
In this way, there are profound similarities and affinities between postmodern and 
feminist attacks on universalism, foundationalism and dichotomous thinking and 'on this 
level', postmodern theory is 'of use to feminism and other social movements, providing 
new philosophical support and ammunition for feminist critique and programmes' (Best 
and Kellner 1991: 207). As Best and Kel1ner point out, 
the postmodern emphasis on plurality, difference and heterogeneity has had 
immense appeal to those who have found themselves marginalized and excluded 
from the voice of Reason, Truth and Objectivity. (Best and Kellner 1991: 207) 
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As critiques of modernity, feminism and postmodernism are suspicious of the imperial 
claims of Enlightenment philosophy revolving around concepts of knowledge, 
subjectivity and forms of social domination. In fact, 'feminism encourages postmodern 
theory to articulate the critique of the humanist universal "Man" as a discourse of male 
domination', thereby producing a more differentiated analysis of the production of 
subjects in terms of gender identities (Best and Kellner 1991: 207). Postmodernism and 
poststructuralism have assisted feminist debates by providing a conceptual repertoire 
centered on deconstruction, difference and identity. 
Consequently, postmodern theory has been embraced by minority feminists who 
demand a diversification of the feminist movement in order to account for the 
determinants of race, class or sexual preference. Postmodernism's deconstructive and 
anti-essentialist critique highlights feminism's own foundational discourses bounded by 
the concept of 'Woman' and its epistemological entailments. According to postmodern 
logic, the idea of a collective feminist self and single womanhood is perceived as 
totalitarian as it does not allow for hybridity, complexity and individuality. In its attempts 
to posit a unified identity as its foundation, feminism is compelled to exclude fragmented 
or multiple identities from its ranks and, therefore, it has to be opened up for the 
articulation of non-schematic, Other voices. Postmodernism calls on feminists to 
relinquish their foundational goals and focus on the differences between women. For 
feminist theorists, the attraction of the postmodern/poststructuralist critique of 
subjectivity can be found in the promise of an increased freedom for women and 'the 
"free play" of a plurality of differences unhampered by any predetermined gender 
identity' as formulated by either patriarchy or feminism itself (Alcoff 1987-88: 418). The 
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feminist movement faces the challenge to situate itself and its critical social theory in this 
decentered and fragmented realm of the postmodern, defined by Umberto Eco as 'the 
orientation of anyone who has learned the lesson of Foucault, i.e., that power is not 
something unitary that exists outside us' (quoted in Hutcheon 1989a: 3). Feminism has to 
account for its own positioning within a complex network of power structures and to 
integrate diverse female experiences and identities, without losing the impetus that 
derives from an organized movement for social change. Thus, feminists require a new 
understanding of the meaning offeminism and feminist theory and such an understanding 
needs to 'embrace the challenge of moving feminism, as a political movement without the 
fixity of a single feminist agenda in view, into the next millennium' (Siegel 1997a: 57; 
56; my emphasis). 
In the following, I will discuss the implications of this wide-ranging and 
pluralistic account of feminism and I will argue that neither postfeminism nor 
postmodern feminism can adopt such a stance unproblematically. The 
postmodernJpostfeminist politics of complexity harbor a threat of political disablement 
and depoliticization for the feminist movement as, in the attempt to do justice to 
heterogeneity, postmodern feminism and postfeminism are in danger of becoming 
trapped in 'the endless dance of non-commitment' (Brooks 1997: 155). As Brooks 
reveals, feminism's alliance with the postmodern context involves 'the abandonment of 
feminism's ability to retain its status as a theoretical enterprise motivated by critique' 
(Brooks 1997: 155).4 It is argued that 'just as post-modernism depoliticises political 
activity, so post-feminism depoliticises feminism' (Davies 1996: 6). The 'post' 
movements are criticized for their ontological uncertainty and abstract invocation of 
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plurality whereby the notions of a critical politics and activism become inconceivable. I 
investigate this pessimistic view of the postmodern condition of fragmentation and 
difference and I suggest that the prospect of a postmodern feminism does not have to be 
conceptualized as the end of critical production and politics. In this way, I put forward 
the idea of a political postmodernismfpostfeminism whose pluralistic and paradoxical 
critique does not eschew the possibilities of change and resistance. 
Postfeminism seems to answer and fulfill the desire for a 'new feminism' that 
does not aim for theoretical, subjective and discursive purity and instead celebrates 
heterogeneity and pluralism. It is located within a postmodern framework that has 
abandoned the search for unity and coherence and it replaces the notion of a single center 
with a radically decentered space. Postfeminism embraces a politics of multiplicity 
whereby it can combine previously antagonistic positions and draw close connections 
with other discourses. Particularly, as has been discussed in the previous chapter, the 
postfeminist landscape seeks to integrate diverse feminist theories/practices, a critical 
engagement with popular culture and an awareness of academic postmodernism. 
Postfeminism can be discussed as an inherent part of a post-theoretical movement that 
articulates 'the deconstruction of current hegemonic systems, as well as the new 
knowledge being generated from the margins, or rather, from different centres' (de Toro 
1999: 16). Following Nelly Richard, the postmodern critique of unidimensional structures 
of understanding entails a dismantling of the distinction between center and periphery, 
and in so doing, nullifies its significance. As she notes, 'the centre itself has become the 
periphery, since it has become fragmented into dissident micro-territories which fracture 
it into constel1ations of voices and a plurality of meaning' (Richard 1993: 468). This 
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central disintegration implies the deconstruction of the tenets of dominant culture along 
with an attack on universalist, essentialist and foundationalist thinking. The 
destabilization of totalizing and homogenizing systems can be interpreted as a 
democratization of opinion as 'the epistemological space has been pried open, dissected. 
dismembered' and all privileged points of view have become obsolete, along with the 
dominant position which allowed the establishment of hierarchies of interpretation (de 
Toro 1999: 12). It is 'precisely, the de-centring of the West that has made it possible to 
integrate within one simultaneous space apparently diverging epistemologies' (de Toro 
1999: 12). As Fernando de Toro explains. this is a 'post-theoretical' condition 
characterized by 'a new way to conceptualize culture and its objects of knowledge' (de 
Toro 1999: 10). According to de Toro, 
"Post-theory" entails a simultaneous convergence of theories emanating from 
diverse epistemological fields and disciplines with the goal to analyze given 
cultural objects from a plurality of perspectives. (de Toro 1999: 10) 
The post-theoretical state is defined by the dissolution of disciplinary boundaries and the 
synchronous elaboration of theory from conflicting epistemologies. The permeation of 
disciplines is heralded and welcomed as 'experimentation in the combinatory mode', 
exceeding the limits and rigidity of binaristic models and frameworks (Rutland 1999: 74). 
As de Toro notes, what becomes important and significant 'is not so much what divergent 
theories say, but what we can do with them' (de Toro 1999: 12; emphasis in text). 
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Similarly. Christine di Stefano identifies 'a postfeminist tendency' that can be 
defined as 'an inclination fostered by a refusal to systematically document or privilege 
any particular form of difference or identity against the hegemonic mainstream' (di 
Stefano 1990: 73).5 However. rather than rejoicing in the plurality of differences made 
possible by this post-theoretical condition. di Stefano is uncertain about the benefits of 
deconstructive critique and a postmodern skepticism regarding generalizable and 
universal claims of any sort. In fact. post-theory's embrace of diverging perspectives is 
suspected to harbor potential anti-political and anti-feminist implications. As Craig 
Owens notes, 'pluralism [ ... ] reduces us to being an other among others; it is not a 
recognition but a reduction to difference to absolute indifference, equivalence. 
interchangeability' (Owens 1983: 88). Critics are concerned that an abstract celebration 
of difference might encourage cultural relativism and political passivity. It is argued that 
the elimination of all totalizing and essentialist discourses and the ensuing post-
theoretical positions cause a perplexing multitude of differences. none of which can be 
theoretically or politically privileged over the other. As a result of this multi perspectival 
stance, the post-theoretical subject is seen to be stranded in a decentered realm of 
detachment and apathy in which taking a position becomes an almost impossible task. 
Post-theory is criticized for its ambiguous ambidextrousness whereby it adopts the 
epistemological 'fantasy of capturing [ ... ] heterogeneity in [its] "readings" by 
continually seeking difference for its own sake' (Bordo 1993: 39). In particular, 
postmodernism is understood as a theoretical invocation of diversity, far removed from 
practical contexts and pragmatic considerations of how this pluralistic theory can be 
transformed into an effectual and critical politics of change. According to Susan Bordo, 
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the postmodern enactment of plurality and fragmentation is animated by the 'dream of 
everywhere', the ideal of 'attaining an epistemological perspective free of the locatedness 
and limitations of embodied existence' (Bordo 1993: 217). As Bordo explains, this 'new, 
postmodern configuration of detachment', this 'new imagination of disembodiment' slips 
into 'a fantasy of escape from human locatedness', a retreat from an embodied point of 
view (Bordo 1993: 227; 226). The postmodern theorist 'dreams of being everywhere' and 
assumes that slhe 'can become wholly protean, adopting endlessly shifting, seemingly 
inexhaustible vantage points' (Bordo 1993: 226). 
The problem with these supposedly theoretically pure, postmodern readings is 
that 'they often present themselves as having it any way they want' as they 'refuse to 
assume a shape for which they must take responsibility' (Bordo 1993: 228). The 
postmodern deconstructive stance is seen to result in a nominalist ontology that is 
interpreted as the end of organized social criticism and active politics. It is suggested that, 
in its abandonment of all generalizable and universalist patterns of thought, 
postmodernism displays a political naivety and ultimately, is ineffectual as it does not 
posit theoretical stopping points nor does it reserve practical spaces for a generalized 
critique and for attention to nuance.6 Critics argue that, despite its anti-foundational 
claims, postmodernism is motivated by 'the philosopher's fantasy of transcendence' but 
replaces 'the historical specifics of the modernist, Cartesian version' with its own 'dream 
of being everywhere' (Bordo 1993: 227). As di Stefano declares, 'it is as if 
postmodernism has returned us to the falsely innocent indifference of the very humanism 
to which it stands opposed' (di Stefano 1990: 77). 
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While I welcome the post-theoretical/postmodern positions that reject the ideas of 
epistemological purity in favor of a pluralistic conception of theory, I also contend that 
such a mixing of disciplines and evocation of difference cannot be adopted 
unquestioningly. According to the advocates of post-theory, the amalgamation of 
different epistemologies can be imagined as a mutually beneficial coalition, proceeding 
from a recognition of the diversity of the two entities to be combined and without the 
expectation and safeguard of some unifying principle. In this optimistic formulation, 'the 
prospect of a merger [ ... ] is undertaken as a way of intensifying and enhancing the value 
of each entity taken separately' (Singer 1992: 472). Contrastingly, I maintain that the 
intersection of feminism and postmodernism cannot be conceptualized as a romantic and 
uncomplicated communion and blending of diverse epistemological fields but has to be 
described as an open and intense confrontation of two multifaceted and contradictory 
contexts. Feminism and postmodernism operate as forms for social production and 
exchange and, in both contexts, there is little agreement amongst practitioners with regard 
to that which they may be said to have in common. These internal specificities further 
complicate the question of articulating a proposal of convergence that does justice to the 
diversity of feminist and postmodern viewpoints. 
I argue that post-theory's seemingly unproblematic alliance of postmodernism 
and feminism threatens to elide both movements' inherent complexities. Rather than 
embracing epistemological plurality for its own sake, one has to interrogate the nature of 
the linkage and analyze the conceptual use and strategic function of the post-theoretical 
'and'. I will consider various theoretical and practical attempts to define a postmodern 
feminism and/or postfeminism and I assert that a large number of these calls for 
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conjunction rely on a binary structure whereby postmodernism's ontological uncertainty 
is opposed to a feminist politics and working model which depend on a Cartesian notion 
of subjectivity, agency and creativity. The critical juncture of feminism and 
postmodernism has been theorized employing a falsely dualistic formulation whereby 
feminism is based on the notion of an autonomous and self-reflexive female subject 
whereas postmodernism is defined as a theoretical/philosophical perspective, debilitating 
for feminist agency and politics. Following these conceptualizations, postmodern theory 
is seen to undermine women's sense of selfhood and their capacity for criticism and 
resistance. Postmodernism is interpreted as a political threat for feminism as its primary 
motivation is philosophical while feminism's primary motivation is political. I will 
investigate these critical claims and I maintain that the intersections of feminism and 
postmodernism cannot be conceived as a harmonious union, nor can it be mapped onto a 
simplistic dualism that opposes feminist practice to postmodern theory. Instead, 
postmodernism and feminism are engaged in a multivalent and contradictory dialogue, 
forging a postmodern feminism and/or postfeminism that exceeds binary logic. 
In fact, the rift between postmodernism and feminism is seen to be the result of 
two tendencies proceeding from opposite directions toward the same objective: to debunk 
traditional/patriarchal philosophy. Postmodernists and feminists both criticize Western 
concepts of Man, history and metaphysics but their criticisms do not necessarily 
converge. As Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson state, 
postmodernists have focused primarily on the philosophical side of the problem. 
They have begun by elaborating antifoundational and metaphilosophical 
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perspectives and from there have drawn conclusions about the shape and 
character of social criticism. For feminists, on the other hand, the question of 
philosophy has always been subordinated to the interest in social criticism. [ ... ] 
Postmodernists offer sophisticated and persuasive criticisms of foundationalism 
and essentialism, but their conceptions of social criticism tend to be anemic. 
Feminists offer robust conceptions of social criticism, but they tend at times to 
lapse into foundationalism and essentialism. (Fraser and Nicholson 1990: 19-20) 
In this way, feminism is described as 'a call to action' that 'can never be simply a belief 
system' as 'without action, feminism is merely empty rhetoric which cancels itself out' 
(Alice 1995: 12). Diametrically opposed to this active stance, the postmodern discourse is 
characterized by an inherent relativism and declares itself concerned not with the 
question of establishing meanings, but with the challenging of any monological or 
univalent structure and concept. As Nancy Hartsock deplores, 'postmodcrnism [ ... ] at 
best manages to criticize these theories [of enlightened modernity] without putting 
anything in their place', concluding that 'for those of us who want to understand the 
world systematically in order to change it, postmodern theories at their best give little 
guidance' (Hartsock 1990: 159).7 
According to these views, the effect of postmodernismlpoststructuralism has been 
a limitation of political and critical intervention as its introspective and deconstructive 
sensitivity turns into tongue-tying anxiety and quietism. Postmodernism's rejection of the 
autonomous and rational agent of the Enlightenment has been a point of contention and 
the focus of debate whereby the postmodern position is seen to lack an adequate theory of 
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an active creative self capable of authorial intention. Within postmodernism, the category 
of intention is seen to be overdetermined by social forces, so that subjecti vity is little 
more than a construct grounded on discourse, beyond individual control. Myra 
Macdonald reveals that women in particular are questioning whether 'we have the right 
to offer criticism as "women", when "women" may be an essentialist, patriarchal 
category that denies difference within it' (Macdonald 1995: 38). Applied to feminism's 
own identity as representing the interests of women, postmodernism's fracturing of the 
subject and its undermining of the critical position pose a potential threat to feminist 
theory and politics as they foreclose the possibility of a sovereign feminist selfhood. 
Postmodernism represents a political liability for feminism, insofar as it challenges a 
unified conception of the feminist movement. The encounter of feminism and 
postmodernism is fraught with conceptual and practical dilemmas for, as Nancy Fraser 
and Linda Nicholson ask, 'how can we combine a postmodernist incredulity toward 
metanarratives with the social-critical power of feminism?' (Fraser and Nicholson 1990: 
34). 
The central questions raised by feminist critics revolve around the issues of 
agency and subjectivity and they are concerned with the specific nature of the political 
action that feminists can design and pursue in the absence of a systematic, general and 
theoretical account of the condition of women. Thus, Delmar is skeptical about a 
postmodern/feminist synthesis, noting that to deconstruct the subject 'woman' raises 
doubts about the feminist project at a very fundamental level as 'to question whether 
"woman" is a coherent identity is also to imply the question of whether "woman" is a 
coherent political identity' (Delmar 1986: 28). Feminist critics maintain that postmodernl 
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poststructuralist deconstructionism gives little sense of how to justify generalizations 
about women and ultimately, it dissolves the foundations of the feminist movement. 8 
Consequently, fears mount up that the postmodern critique 'may not only eliminate the 
specificity of feminist theory but place in question the very emancipatory ideals of the 
women's movement' (Benhabib 1997: 78). As Moi asserts, 'the price for giving in to 
[this] powerful discourse is nothing less than the depoliticisation of feminism [as] it wiII 
be quite impossible to argue that women under patriarchy constitute an oppressed group, 
let alone develop a theory of their liberation' (Moi 1985: 95). It is suggested that, for 
feminism, postmodernism's invocation of difference and its dismissal of the constituting 
agent of modernity translate into a self-destructive pluralism and an ontology of abstract 
individualism. Diversified beyond the possibility of union, the feminist movement is 
fractured and fragmented to such an extent that it cannot be said to represent and 
politically advance the interests of women, as a structural1y disadvantaged category 
relative to men. The outcome is a depoliticized and personalized feminism that makes 
individuation of its members a principal goal but cannot be employed as a politics of 
resistance or a program for change. 
In fact, thought through to its logical conclusion, postmodern/poststructuralist 
theory may even result in a nihilistic stance that dismantles and dismisses the subject 
category altogether as a fiction or construct. Fredric Jameson suggests that 
postmodernism's most radical insight is the view that the bourgeois individual self is not 
only a thing of the past but also a myth. Jameson reveals that the subject has never been 
endowed with the Enlightenment ideal of personal autonomy and, therefore, it should be 
seen as 'merely a philosophical and cultural mystification which sought to persuade 
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people that they "had" individual subjects and possessed this unique personal identity' 
(quoted in Waugh 1992: 193). As Patricia Waugh notes, 
[postmodernism] may even situate itself at a point where there is no "subject" and 
no history in the old sense at all. [ ... ] "Identity" is simply the illusion produced 
through the manipulation of irreconcilable and contradictory language games. 
(Waugh 1989: 7) 
This view is encapsulated by Jean Baudrillard's pessimistic position that assumes that 
'the postmodern world is devoid of meaning; it is a universe of nihilism where theories 
float in a void, unanchored in any secure harbour' (Best and Kellner 1991: 127).9 
According to Baudrillard, 
[the postmodern is] characteristic of a universe where there are no more 
definitions possible. [ ... ] It has all been done. The extreme limit of these 
possibilities has been reached. It has destroyed itself. It has deconstructed its 
entire universe. (Baudrillard 1984: 24) 
Postmodernists' theoretical deconstructionism can turn into stagnation and 
quietism as they refuse to offer any declarations of faith or meaning. By deconstructing 
subjectivity, postmodernism is seen to abolish those ideals of autonomy and 
accountability that are necessary to the idea of historical change. Seyla Benhabib voices 
her concerns that a complete rejection of the concepts of selfhood and agency debilitates 
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the possibility of critical theory. Benhabib notes that postmodern/poststructuralist views 
of subjectivity are incompatible with feminist politics as they 'undermine the very 
possibility of feminism as the theoretical articulation of the emancipatory aspirations of 
women' (Benhabib 1995: 29). Postmodernism has produced a '''retreat from utopia" 
within feminism' that has taken the form of 'debunking as essentialist any attempt to 
formulate a feminist ethic, a feminist politics, a feminist concept of autonomy, and even a 
feminist aesthetic' (Benhabib 1995: 29; 30). Benhabib is adamant that such utopian 
thinking is 'a practical-moral imperative' as 'without such a regulative principle of hope, 
not only morality but also radical transformation is unthinkable' (Benhabib 1995: 29). 
According to Benhabib, feminism's theoretical and political stance requires distinctively 
philosophical presuppositions that are negated by many formulations of postmodernism. 
As she notes, 
social criticism without some form of philosophy is not possible, and without 
social criticism the project of a feminist theory which is at once committed to 
knowledge and to the emancipatory interests of women is inconceivable. 
(Benhabib 1994: 90) 
Consequently, in conjunction with postmodern theory, feminism is in danger of 
being transformed from an emancipatory global movement to a philosophical specialism 
that legitimates a political pluralism leading to fragmentation. Following 
poststructuralistlpostmodern theorists, feminist efforts must be directed toward 
dismantling all totalizing and essentialist patterns of thought, including its own unifying 
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myths and grounding assumptions. 10 The category 'Woman' can no longer be embraced 
as a collective identity whereby women can bond and express their relative lack of power 
vis-a-vis men in society. The feminist movement has to interrogate its own foundation, 
forged as an inclusive, women-centered basis for social thought and political action. In 
this way, 'nominalism threatens to wipe out feminism itself for 'if the concept of woman 
is a fiction, then the very concept of women's oppression is obsolete and feminism's 
raison d'etre disappears' (Alcoff 1987-88: 419; Brooks 1997: 23). The dilemma facing 
feminist theorists is that their very self-definition is grounded in a concept that they must 
also de-essentialize in all of its aspects, which ultimately leads to the 'nagging question 
[of] whether the uncertain promise of a political linkage between feminism and 
postmodernism is worth the attendant potential risks' (di Stefano 1990: 77). 
In the most pessimistic formulations of the postmodern/feminist synthesis, 
feminism is absorbed by postmodern theory and its specificity and politics are negated. 
Postmodernism is denounced for its assimilating strategy whereby it 'defends itself 
against the destabilizing threat of the "other" by integrating it back into a framework 
which absorbs all differences and contradictions' (Richard 1993: 468). Paradoxically, 
while the decentered space of the postmodern is adorned with ciphers of heterogeneity 
and perspectival multiplicity, it can also be seen as a neutralizing realm, subsuming 
differences into the metacategory of the 'undifferentiated' where all singularities become 
indistinguishable and interchangeable in a new economy of 'sameness'. As Nancy 
Hartsock notes, despite postmodernists' 'desire to avoid universal claims and despite 
their stated opposition to these claims, some universalistic assumptions creep back into 
their work' (Hartsock 1990: 159). Postmodernism is criticized for harboring an 
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alternative foundationalism whereby it incorporates other discursive formations and 
epistemologies in a supposedly genderless and universalist postmodernist project. 
Feminist theorists have been wary of this gesture of inclusion that arrogates 
feminism into postmodernism, suggesting that the postmodern condition should not be 
mistaken for a structural fait accompli, a homogenized and one-dimensional phenomenon 
that impacts upon everyone in the same way. As len Ang reveals, such totalizing 
accounts assume that there is 'a linear, universal and radical historical transformation of 
the world from "modernity" to "postmodernity'" (Ang 1996: 2). Ang asserts that one has 
to go beyond the many sweeping generalizations and platitudes enunciated about 
postmodernism and concentrate on its signification as a break with modernity, 'the very 
dispersal of taken for granted universalist and progressivist assumptions of the modern' 
(Ang 1996: 2). The postmodern does not signal a wholesale supersession and negation of 
the modern era by an alternative set of beliefs but rather, it offers an awareness and 
recognition ofthe epistemological limits of those principles. The underlying thread of 
these remarks is that postmodernism must question its own globalizing narratives and 
reject a description of itself as embodying a set of timeless ideals. As Nicholson points 
out, postmodernism 'must insist on being recognized as a set of viewpoints of a time, 
justifiable only within its own time' (Nicholson 1990: 11). Postmodern theorizing and its 
invocation of difference must be historical, following from the demands of specific 
contexts and attuned to the cultural specificity of different societies and periods. 
In particular, the crisis of the postmodern subject should not be interpreted as 
ubiquitous and universal, but rather, it is the bourgeois white male subject whose illusion 
of authority, control and unity is deconstructed. Feminist theorists raise the possibility 
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that since men have had their Enlightenment, they can embrace a postmodernl 
poststructuralist stance of interrogation that questions their conceptions of subjectivity, 
truth and knowledge. On the other hand, women cannot yet afford a decentered sense of 
self and a humbleness regarding the coherence and truth of their claims.!! As Patricia 
Waugh notes, women can only 'begin to problematize and to deconstruct the socially 
constructed subject positions available to them', once they have 'experienced themselves 
as "subjects'" (Waugh 1989: 25). Starting from the position of fragmented subjectivity, 
women's 'dreams of becoming "whole'" cannot be dismissed and rejected as 'the 
reactionary move it might constitute in the writings of a representative of hegemony', 
since they are 'far less likely to mistake themselves for the universal "man" anyway' 
(Koenen 1999: 134). 
While feminist and postmodern theories are both committed to the project of 
deconstructing the subject and the master narratives of history, feminism's and 
postmodernism's stances to modernity proceed from different assumptions and with 
different intentions in view. Feminism has provided its own critique of essentialist and 
foundationalist assumptions that is not interchangeable or synonymous with the 
postmodern deconstructive position. Postmodernism is criticized for its gender-blindness 
whereby it assumes or even rejects relationships that women have never experienced as 
subjects in their own right. Furthermore, even if women were to adopt a postmodern 
deconstructionism, 'the luxury of female anti-essentialism' could still only be accorded to 
the privileged as 'non-white, non-heterosexual, non-bourgeois women are still finding 
political impetus in summoning up womanhood as identity and femininity as a construct 
which excludes and punishes them most painfully of all' (Whelehan 1995: 211). The 
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majority of women are not in a position to make choices and reject the politically 
enabling category of Woman and thus, they are not willing to yield the ground on which 
to make a stand against their oppression. 
Consequently, suspicions arise in some feminist circles that postmodernism is a 
'remasculinizing' strategy and an antifeminist appropriative scheme whereby feminism is 
subsumed 'into the postmodernist critique of "the tyranny of the signifier'" and it is 
reduced to 'simply another of the "voices of the conquered" [ ... ] that challenge the 
West's desire for ever-greater domination and control' (Jones 1990: 9; 14). According to 
this view, feminism is negated and its political theory is appropriated and defused as 
merely one postmodernist strategy among many to criticize modernist ideologues. As 
Nancy Hartsock asks, 
why is it just at the moment when so many of us who have been silenced begin to 
demand the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather than objects of 
history, that just then the concept of subjecthood becomes problematic? (Hartsock 
1990: 163) 
Postmodernism's questioning of subjectivity and its skepticism regarding the possibilities 
of a general theory are interpreted as patriarchal ploys to silence the confrontational 
voices of feminism and to divert feminists from 'tasks more pressing than deciding about 
the appropriateness of the label "feminist'" (Modleski 1991: 6). In this way, feminism is 
arrogated into 'the larger (masculine) projects of "universal" humanism or critical 
postmodernism' and it is argued that 'it is this incorporation that has facilitated the 
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declaration of the end of feminism with "postfeminism" rising from its ashes' (Jones 
1990: 8; 15). In this context, postfeminism appears as a Trojan horse pretending to 
expand the feminist debate but in effect, allowing male critics to enter and take over 
feminism. 
Tania Modleski is one of the key proponents of this pessimistic and defensive 
appraisal of the postmodernlfeminist synthesis whereby 'men ultimately deal with the 
threat of female power by incorporating it' (Modleski 1991: 7). She entitles her book 
Feminism Without Women (1991) and she employs this tournure to suggest either the 
triumph of a male feminist perspective that excludes women or of a feminist anti-
essentialism so radical that every use of the term 'woman', however provisional, is 
disallowed. As Modleski reveals, 
the once exhilarating proposition that there is no "essential" female nature has 
been elaborated to the point where it is now often used to scare "women" away 
from making any generalizations about or political claims on behalf of a group 
called "women". (Modleski 1991: 15) 
She is concerned that, in its extreme interpretations, anti-essentialism has inaugurated a 
postfeminist stance that is not only without 'woman' but also without the possibility of 
'women'. Modleski concludes that the postmodern and postfeminist 'play with gender in 
which differences are elided can easily lead us back into our "pregendered" past where 
there was only the universal subject - man' (Modleski 1991: 163). 
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Accordingly, it is suggested that 'if feminism can learn from postmodernism it 
has finally to resist the logic of its arguments' and reject 'its more extreme nihilistic' 
implications (Waugh 1992: 189; 190). By deconstructing and undermining the idea of a 
controlling and autonomous agent, poststructuralism and postmodernism are said to come 
dangerously close to deriding logic and rationality. It is argued that feminism must posit 
some belief in 'the notion of effective human agency, the necessity for historical 
continuity in formulating identity and a belief in historical progress' (Waugh 1992: 195). 
The feminist movement has to uphold the idea of a thinking agent or author who has . 
intentions, purposes and goals and who is not reducible to a position in language. The 
underlying assumption is that feminism has to articulate a core belief in a self that, 
despite being produced through discursive and ideological formations, nevertheless has a 
material existence and history in human relationships. This view presupposes that, no 
matter how constituted by discourse, the subject retains a certain ability and agency as 
without such a regulative ideal, the very project of female emancipation becomes 
unimaginable. As Macdonald asserts, 'if we want to argue for changing, rather than 
deconstructing' the inadequacies of current constructions of femaleness, 'we need to 
admit to holding a rational position from which to argue this' (Macdonald 1995: 39).12 
Feminist critics are adamant that, in order to be effective as a politics of liberation, the 
feminist movement must maintain a distance and autonomy from postmodern theories 
that valorize free play of meaning, even as it sees the potential that these theoretical 
positions offer in disrupting hierarchies of power once taken for granted. 
In other words, feminist politics and action can only be formulated if they 
maintain the modern idea of a creative and autonomous self. Feminism has to take into 
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account its own epistemological anchorage in the theories and ideas of enlightened 
modernity. The very discourse of emancipation is 'a modem discourse' as 'modem 
categories such as human rights, equality, and democratic freedoms and power are used 
by feminists to criticize and fight against gender domination' (Best and Kellner 1991: 
208). Feminist theorists employ and mobilize categories of the Enlightenment in their 
political struggles and their theories 'clearly arise out of and are made possible by those 
of [ ... ] modernity and its models of reason, justice and autonomous subjectivity as 
universal categories' (Waugh 1992: 189). Consequently, Patricia Waugh argues that 
'feminism cannot sustain itself as an emancipatory movement unless it acknowledges its 
foundations in the discourses of modernity' (Waugh 1992: 190).13 Moreover, feminist 
critics maintain that, even if feminism draws upon postmodern forms of disruption, it 
cannot repudiate entirely the framework of enlightened modernity without perhaps fatally 
undermining itself as an emancipatory politics. 
Yet, as I have already discussed, feminists are also involved in a critical project 
designed to attack the totalizing claims of modern philosophy, to expose its limitations 
and highlight their own exclusion from the humanist discourse of Man. In this sense at 
least, feminism can be seen to be an intrinsically 'postmodern' discourse. In this way, I 
contend that feminism has to be cognizant regarding its own ambiguous positioning 
between modernity and postmodernity as it tries to advance the idea of a self that 
eschews the sexism of the Cartesian subject while simultaneously retaining the notion of 
agency and autonomy. The feminist movement cannot embrace an unreconstructed 
modem subject nor postmodernism's decentered self as it is engaged in a struggle to 
reconcile context-specific difference with universal political claims. Feminism has to 
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negotiate its position in the problem space between essentialism and anti-essentialism in 
which neither interminable deconstruction nor uncritical reification of the category 
"women" is adequate to its demands. Thus, I maintain that the feminist movement has to 
recognize a central contradiction in its attempt to define an epistemological base as 
women seek equality and recognition of a gendered identity that has been constructed by 
cultural formations that feminism simultaneously seeks to challenge and dismantle. By 
conjuring up the category 'woman' as their common, political denominator, feminists are 
in danger of reproducing the essential constructions of gender that they have set out to 
contest. Feminism is suspended between its desire to posit an autonomous 
female/feminist self and the necessity of having to deconstruct the modern discourse of 
subjectivity. The feminist movement is torn between its politics of emancipation and its 
anti-humanist theory that rejects the notion of a natural self outside, or prior to, the social. 
The feminist debate over subjectivity is structured by the strained relation 
between the constituting self of the humanist/modern tradition and the constituted subject 
of postmodernity. As Susan Hekman points out, there is a sharp opposition between these 
two conceptions as the dichotomy between constituting and constituted is clear-cut. The 
constituting subject is 'transcendent, rational, and autonomous' whereas 'that which is 
constituted (which cannot be labeled a "subject" at all) is determined and unfree - a 
social dupe' (Hekman 1991: 47). Rooted in the modern as well as in the postmodern, 
feminism's critical position cannot be translated into a simple replacement of the 
constituting subject with the constituted self of social constructivism. Feminists' critiques 
of the Cartesian self cannot be limited to a postmodern deconstructionist stance as their 
attempts to open up the subjective category for women also have to involve an effort to 
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reconstruct and reconstitute it. Feminist theorists have to reformulate the postmodern 
dismissal and decentering of subjectivity and articulate a new approach to the subject. 
They have to alter the parameters of the controversy surrounding the concept of 
subjectivity and redefine the relationship between the constituted and constituting selves. 
Specifically, they need to pose the question of how agency can be defined and attributed 
to a non-Cartesian subject and how resistance can be posited for this subject. 14 
Various critical attempts have been made to reconcile feminism's modem and 
postmodem, essentialist and anti-essentialist components as feminist theorists are 
engaged in the process of forging a postmodem feminism that integrates both contexts' 
'respective strengths while eliminating their respective weaknesses' (Fraser and 
Nicholson 1990: 20). This 'postmodem, unbounded feminism' unifies 'coalitionally 
rather than foundationally' in such a way that postmodemism and feminism operate like 
'those fictive entities known as corporations, under whose auspices a wide range of 
enterprises are organized and collected' without assuming any essential relationship 
between them (Schwichtenberg 1993: 132; Singer 1992: 472). As Linda Singer suggests, 
the postmodernlfeminist meeting should be interpreted as a 'corporate merger' that is not 
undertaken as 'a romantic project of desire nor out of the need for some form of mystical 
communion' but as a strategic union 'born out of an interest in consolidating competition, 
diversifying one's assets, or operating from a greater position of strength and viability' 
(Singer 1992: 472). This model of conjunction assumes and proceeds from a recognition 
of the diversity and difference of the two entities to be combined without the expectation 
of unification or resolution. 
132 
Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson provide a description of this 
postmodernlfeminist synthesis that recognizes women's diversity without capitulating to 
a complete deconstruction of the self. They reconcile their political (feminist) 
commitments with their theoretical (postmodern) sympathies by substituting pragmatism 
for the hyper-theoretical claims of postmodernism. In this way, 
postmodern-feminist theory would be pragmatic and fallibilistic. It would tailor 
its methods and categories to the specific task at hand, using multiple categories 
when appropriate and forswearing the metaphysical comfort of a single feminist 
method of feminist epistemology. In short, this theory would look more like a 
tapestry composed of threads of many different hues than one woven in a single 
color. [ ... ] One might best speak of it in the plural as the practice of feminisms. 
(Fraser and Nicholson 1990: 35) 
In order to mediate between philosophical adequacy and political efficacy, feminism has 
to adopt a pragmatic approach that does not shift concerns about difference to theoretical 
questions but remains focused on practical considerations. Feminist critics argue that 'we 
need to be pragmatic, not theoretically pure' if we want to preserve the possibility of 
'project[ing] utopian hopes, envision[ing] emancipatory alternatives, and infus[ing] all 
our work with a normative critique of domination and injustice' (Bordo 1993: 242; Fraser 
1995: 159). 
Seyla Benhabib provides an example of this pragmatic union of feminism and 
postmodernism in her conceptualization of a postmodern scale that offers variously 
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intense versions of postmodern theses that are distinguished in terms of their 
compatibility with feminism. Benhabib notes that the complex interaction between 
postmodem and feminist contexts around the notions of identity 'cannot be captured by 
bombastic proclamations of the "Death of the Subject''' (Benhabib 1994: 83). She 
suggests a way out of the subject-centered dilemma by advocating a 'weak' version of 
this theory that situates the subject in relation to social, cultural, and discursive 
surroundings. Contrastingly, a 'strong' version of the same thesis undermines all 
concepts of intentionality, accountability, self-reflexivity and autonomy. Benhabib 
maintains that only the 'weak' version is compatible with feminism as it stresses 
variability and diversity while the strong/radical version is counterproductive for feminist 
theory, politics and practice, reducing the subject to an endless state of flux. IS Any 
attempt to link feminism with a 'strong' postmodemism can only engender incoherence 
and self-contradictoriness, undermining all efforts at effective theorizing and leading 
feminism to a passive stance from which it is reticent to formulate a feminist concept of 
autonomy for fear of lapsing into essentialism. 
Benhabib's proposition relies on a rejection of an extreme postmodern theory that 
provides no basis for a politics of alliance as it is one-sided, excessively prohibitive and 
politically disabling. Instead, she draws on a weak postmodemism as a method of 
feminist pluralization and a strategy of disruption that 'can teach us the theoretical and 
political traps of why utopias and foundational thinking can go wrong' (Benhabib 1995: 
30). In this mediating attempt, 'pure' postmodern theory is injected with a dose of 
feminism's political concreteness while feminism is diversified in its exchange with 
postmodem anti-essentialism. Benhabib endeavors to criticize 'the metaphysical 
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presuppositions of identity politics' and challenge 'the supremacy of heterosexist 
positions in the women's movement', without completely debunking the notions of 
selfhood and agency (Benhabib 1994: 81). I argue that this delineation of the 
postmodernlfeminist junction retains the idea of a modern agent who drives towards 
autonomy in order to avoid a conception of the subject as wholly determined. Benhabib 
does not ascribe to a complete deconstruction of the Cartesian self, but rather, she seeks 
to incorporate some of its key elements. Her analysis rests on a modern definition of 
agency imported from the Cartesian subject and is rooted in a dichotomized 
understanding of the constituting self of modernity and its constituted postmodern 
counterpart. Benhabib's account of the postmodern/feminist meeting results in a 
predominantly modern feminism infused with a postmodern strain to create a more 
diverse politics for the contemporary age. 
Contrastingly, I maintain that feminism's intersection with postmodem theory and 
the emergence of postfeminism cannot be comprehended by having recourse to a modern 
epistemology of subjectivity. I believe that the postmodernlfeminist link has to displace 
the opposition between the constituted and constituting selves and formulate concepts of 
agency from within the constructivist constraints. In this way, liberal fantasies of a 
rational agent have to be abandoned in favor of a subject who is firmly located within a 
network of power/discourse. This entails a contentious redefinition of agency and 
intentionality as the products of discourse, implicated in and conditioned by the very 
relations of power they seek to rival. 16 Political action and selfhood cannot be presented 
as emanating from an untainted inner space that is opposed to the outer world of external 
determination but they are part of an inherently multiple, dynamic and contradictory 
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discursive field that depolarizes and blurs the binary distinctions between the Cartesian 
self and the postmodern non-self. Thus, I question the notion of a neutral realm of 
feminist politics and I assert that there is no outside position from which feminism's 
connection with postmodernism can be evaluated. I adopt a view of postmodernism as a 
politically ambivalent, but nonetheless political, discourse whose directionality is not 
fixed as it provides a double movement of subversion and reinforcement. I resist 
contemporary critiques that assume that postmodernism is disqualified from political 
involvement and I postulate that the postmodern discourse offers a paradoxical critique 
that works within the very systems it attempts to undermine. Moreover, I dispute a rigid 
and dualistic contextualization that dichotomizes feminism and postmodernism and I 
insist that postmodern feminism represents a multivalent and pluralistic site of exchange 
that transcends monological classifications. 
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2.3 Postfeminist Locations: Feminism and Popular Culture 
'It is, in practice, impossible to discuss feminism without discussing the image of 
feminism and feminists', Rosalind Delmar notes in her attempt to settle the question of 
'what is feminism?' (Delmar 1986: 8). Delmar's comment points to the practical 
impossibility of experiencing and identifying an authentic feminism, unadulterated by the 
hegemonic and often conservative forces of cultural representation. As Rachel Moseley 
and Jacinda Read assert, 'feminism is never available in some pure or unmediated form' 
(Moseley and Read 2002: 234). Instead, 'we are operating in the realm of stereotypes' 
and 'our understanding of feminism is filtered through the media', forming and shaping 
our ideas of what it means to be a feminist (Cox et al. 1997: 179). Feminism is engaged 
in and constructed by battles of representation and in this way, it cannot be 
comprehended as an unallied and independent 'outside' of popular culture. This is not to 
say that feminism is devoid of any critical power or agency to make interventions into the 
public cultural terrain but it is to assert that the feminist movement cannot position itself 
outside or against the popular realm. Rather, as Moseley and Read suggest, 'popular 
culture [ ... ] functions as one of the sites on, through, and against which the meanings of 
feminism are produced and understood' (Moseley and Read 2002: 235). The 
interconnections between feminism and the media are multidirectional and fluid, 
signifying in a number of conflicting ways that cannot be interpreted dualistically 
according to an either/or logic. Feminist and popular contexts are locked together in an 
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ambivalent and antithetical relationship that combines complicity and critique, 
consumption and activity, empowerment and subordination. 
This chapter considers the complex intersections of feminism and popular culture 
and it discusses the contradictory phenomena of popular feminism and/or postfeminism. I 
argue that feminism cannot dissociate itself from popular culture as it is always formed in 
relation to it. I resist what len Ang designates 'the crude hypodermic needle model of 
media effects' that has been employed by some feminist critics (Ang 1996: 111). Such 
accounts rely on the misconception that 'mass-media imagery consists of transparent, 
unrealistic messages about women whose meanings are clearcut and straightforward' 
while also assuming that 'girls and women passively and indiscriminately absorb these 
messages and meanings as (wrong) lessons about "real life'" (Ang 1996: 111). I reject 
this monolithic view of women as unconditional and passive victims of an inexorably 
sexist media and I contend that popular culture is a site of struggle, shot through with 
contradictions that provide women with the paradoxical possibility of active 
consumption. This implies a view of popular culture as a fundamentally ambiguous and 
incongruous landscape and of the popular consumer as a creative and productive agent. 
However, at the same time as affirming and validating consumer agency and popular 
resistance, I also want to steer clear of a naIve and uncritical kind of populism that 
celebrates popular culture as a paradise of free choice and consumptive activity as a form 
of opposition. On the contrary, in my definition, the popular domain is not an 
autonomous space in which creativity and independence prevail but it is always 
implicated in the hegemonic field of force that establishes the parameters of popular 
choices and significations. The concept of choice has to be problematized as an 
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ideological discourse in which 'the rhetoric of the liberatory benefits of personal 
autonomy and individual self-determination has become hegemonic' (Ang 1996: 13). Far 
from being an attestation of limitless freedom and possibility, choice is always 
determined and conditioned by a matrix of power relations that demarcate and narrow the 
range of choices available within the hegemonic structure. 
This has important reverberations for popular feminism and/or postfeminism as 
these movements deploy and rely on the consumerist notion of choiceoisie in order to 
promote and propagate the individualist ideas of empowerment and agency. 
Postfeminism is heralded as a compromise and negotiation between feminism and 
popular culture as it responds to feminist demands for action and freedom of choice while 
simultaneously relating these egalitarian pursuits to the processes of consumption. Thus, 
the postfeminist self is a consumer who is endowed with a contradictory form of 
subjectivity that allows for personal choice while at the same time constructing this 
emancipatory ideal within hegemonic regulations. Some commentators fear that, at its 
worst, this could result in a thoroughly subjugated and co-opted subjecthood that equates 
agency with self-objectification and regards consumption tout court as an avenue to 
control and autonomy. In this case, postfeminism is interpreted as a depoliticized and 
conservative backlash that recuperates and commodifies feminist principles in order to 
undermine and distort feminism's collective politics. Contrastingly, I argue that the most 
challenging representations of postfeminist subjectivity depict the double bind of 
consumption and the struggle of a 'free-yet-bounded' self who is both subject and object, 
active and passive, complicit and defiant (Ang 1996: 170). Moreover, I suggest that 
popular commodity culture is a site of conflicting and heterogeneous meanings where 
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resistance co-exists with subordination. I believe that feminist ideas are negotiated within 
the popular realm with contradictory effects and results that signify a shift from dualistic 
to pluralistic regimes of representation. Postfeminism, then, does not depict a 
monological takeover and straightforward incorporation of feminist ideas into a 
unanimously hostile popular terrain. Conversely, postfeminism represents the complex 
interchanges of feminist and popular contexts as it strives to combine previously 
incompatible opposites in an effort to 'have it all'. 
However, critics have discussed popular culture's implication in hegemony in 
simplistic and homogeneous ways and they have used this 'compromised' positioning as 
a pretext to condemn and repudiate the popular at large as 'merely serving the 
complementary systems of capitalism and patriarchy, peddling "false consciousness" to 
the duped masses' (Gamman and Marshment 1988: 1). In particular, feminist theorists 
have conceptualized the relationship between feminism and the media as a meeting of 
two separate entities that is potentially harmful to the feminist side of the interaction. 
This not only presupposes a reductive and uniform definition of hegemony as a sweeping 
and all-absorbing coercive force but it also implies that feminism is exempt from this 
form of imposition and remains in a non-hegemonic outside. Furthermore, the popular 
consumer is demeaned as a cultural dupe and s/he is conceived in terms of his/her 
victimization and passivity in the process of meaning production. In a similar manner, 
consumption is described as an updated form of the opium 01 tile people, a calculating 
scheme designed to deceive and lull its unwitting participants into a false sense of 
empowerment. Popular culture is criticized and rejected as 'a sort of ideological machine 
which more or less effortlessly reproduces the dominant ideology' and, therefore, it can 
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be characterized as 'little more than a degraded landscape of commercial and ideological 
manipulation' (Storey 1997: 12; 129). The media's influence is seen to be particularly 
damaging and insidious in its effects on the feminist movement as the popular invader 
simultaneously uses and abuses, co-opts and sabotages feminist rhetoric in order to 
misrepresent and exploit feminism while promoting its own popular/patriarchal version 
of it. In other words, the media's manipulative plotting occurs on two seemingly different 
but related fronts as, on the one hand, the popular propaganda machine is said to be 
responsible for a defamation campaign that denigrates the image of the feminist 
movement while, on the other hand, it popularises and perpetuates feminist notions of 
freedom and egalitarianism. Feminist critics argue that this superficially pro-feminist 
development is nothing more than a selective and co-optive gesture that transforms the 
movement's revolutionary and collective principles into individual consumer choices. 
The media is condemned for launching an assault on feminism and invading the 
body of the women's movement in an attempt to empty out the feminist message of 
sisterhood and foster 'debilitating caricatures, allowing the culture at large to dismiss and 
discount it' (Mascia-Lees 2000: 191). These popular constructions of feminism rely on 
the fantasy of a feminist monolith and a set of fictional images that revolve around the 
notion of a politically correct feminist identity. In particular, the media is credited with 
the invention and circulation of 'the mythical, and most persistent, icon of second-wave 
feminism: the bra-burner' (Hinds and Stacey 2001: 156). The figure of the bra-burning, 
mannish and fanatic feminist has dominated popular representations of feminism 'so long 
as to have become one of the most familiar symbols in the contemporary political 
landscape and cultural imagination' (Hinds and Stacey 2001: 153): This negative 
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stereotype has been propagated as a metonym for the Women's Liberation Movement 
with the result that 'we all know what feminists are' (Douglas 1995: 7). As Susan 
Douglas summarizes, 'they are shrill, overly aggressive, man-hating, ball-busting, selfish, 
hairy, extremist, deliberately unattractive women with absolutely no sense of humor who 
see sexism at every turn' (Douglas 1995: 7). This mythologizing or demonizing of 
feminism depends on and performs an apparently definitive rupture between feminism 
and femininity in its construction of two polarized and incompatible c1assifications. The 
iconic figure of the humourless and drab bra-burner acquires meaning in its opposition to 
cultural stereotypes of femininity and its rejection of feminine trappings. Press coverage 
of the early 1970s reflects this media tendency to depict 'the women's libber' as an 
unfeminine, ugly woman with no make-up who seeks to 'stir up ferment amongst her 
more attractive and contented sisters' (Hinds and Stacey 2001: 161).2 Feminists are 
characterized as 'enemies of the stiletto heel and the beauty parlor - in a word, as 
enemies of glamour' (Bartky 1990: 4 t). As Hinds and Stacey dec1are, 
there is no doubt that the persistent media characterisation of the feminist, from 
the bra-burner onwards, condenses a range of characteristics antithetical to 
conventional definitions of desirable femininity. (Hinds and Stacey 2001: 161) 
This popular argument against feminism insistently proclaims that women who 
collectively adopt a feminist outlook and engage in feminist activist politics will 
effectively be de sexed as this display of public action and assertiveness is incompatible 
with their feminine selves. Feminism is depicted as the preserve of 'only the unstable, 
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mannish, unattractive woman who has a naturally difficult relationship to her own 
femininity' (Whelehan 2000: 18).3 In this way, feminism is positioned as a form of 
violence to femininity, a misguided and unwise attempt at masculinization that 
transforms the prospective feminist into an asexual and unpopular figure. 
Contrastingly, femininity is played off against this negative stereotype of 
feminism and 'appears not only as more rewarding but also as a lot more fun' (Budgeon 
1994: 60). The feminist movement is seen to threaten women with desexualization and 
social annihilation, undermining their sense of identity and blocking an important source 
of gratification and self-esteem. Popular advocates insist that femininity is not the terrain 
of female submission and containment but an empowering and active position that allows 
the female/feminine subject to express her self in confident and autonomous ways. 
Femininity is depicted in individualistic terms as a conscious choice, a personal right 
rather than a patriarchal law that is imposed authoritatively. As I will discuss, this 
conjunction of conventional modes of femininity with notions of power and agency is an 
important feature of postfeminist rhetoric that no longer understands the relationship 
between feminism and femininity as necessarily antagonistic. 
While the view of feminism as a defeminizing force can clearly be identified as a 
distorted media refraction, it is important to realize that the sense of incongruity between 
feminism and femininity is not only publicized in media discourses but also mirrored in 
feminist writing that constitutes feminine values as a 'problem' and a major cause of 
women's oppression. Joanne Hollows explores how the notion of a feminist movement 
and the assertion of a feminist identity are predicated on a rejection of femininity. She 
reveals that 'feminist critiques [ ... ] are often dependent on creating an opposition 
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between "bad" feminine identities and "good" feminist identities' (Hol1ows 2000: 9). In 
feminist thinking, from Mary Wollstonecraft in the late eighteen century to Naomi Wolf 
in the late twentieth, women's quest for femininity and beauty has been associated with 
their traditional powerlessness and suffering.4 Women are presented as the victims of an 
ideological manipulation that conceals the cultural constructedness of gender 
socializations and stereotyping. By internalizing their culturally produced gender role, 
women's minds and bodies are said to be colonized by patriarchy as they become 
involved in their own oppression and normalization. Engaging in a never-ending chase of 
an ever-changing and elusive ideal of femininity, women spend their lives adapting and 
changing their selves to attain and fulfil these ideologically constructed markers of 
womanhood. They undergo a process of self-alienation and objectification in the course 
of which they channel their energies inward, toward self-modification rather than 
outward, toward social change. In this way, any feelings of control and mastery that a 
woman might gain from the adoption of a feminine demeanour and appearance can only 
be illusory as they are based on 'repressive narcissistic satisfactions' and 'false needs' 
produced through indoctrination, manipulation and the denial of autonomy (Bartky 1990: 
42).5 Ultimately, it is argued that the possession and fulfillment of these needs do not 
benefit the female subject but a social order whose interests lie in women's subjugation 
and disempowerment on the macro-societal level. 
In fact, fostered by a continuous involvement in the practices of femininity, 
women's self-estrangement can be described as a psychological oppression that separates 
them from certain attributes and capacities considered essential to a fully human 
existence. As Sandra Lee Bartky suggests, 'to be denied an autonomous choice of self, 
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forbidden cultural expression, and condemned to the immanence of mere bodily being is 
to be cut off from the sorts of activities that define what it is to be human' (Bartky 1990: 
31). This sexualized form of dehumanisation is institutionalized and systematic, serving 
to 'make the work of domination easier by breaking the spirit of the dominated' who are 
faced with the sheer impossible task of living up to the 'imaginary feminine', the ideal 
body-subject of femininity (Bartky 1990: 23; Brook 1999: 67). Women take up the 
technologies of femininity against the background of a pervasive sense of deficiency 
and, in so doing, they produce a practiced and subjected body, a docile body on which an 
inferior status is inscribed and whose energies are habituated to perpetual and exhaustive 
policing.6 This self-surveillance is 'a form of obedience to patriarchy' and it is 
constructed by disciplinary micro-practices of everyday life - 'a regulation of the body's 
size and contours, its appetite, posture, gestures, and general comportment in space and 
the appearance of each of its visible parts' (Bartky 1990: 80; 148). Femininity, then, can 
be described as a strategy of social control whose purpose is to preserve and defend the 
status quo and define the norms of feminine acceptability and deviance. It is a 
disciplinary project that works through the internalization of inferiority, placing 'a 
panoptical male connoisseur [ ... ] within the consciousness of most women' who 
experience their selveslbodies as seen and judged by this anonymous patriarchal Other 
(Bartky 1990: 72). Following this reasoning, it is suggested that women have lost control 
over the cultural production of their own image and they are defined by phallocentric 
imperatives that are neither benevolent nor innocent. 
Feminist critics are intent on deconstructing these normalizing representations of 
femininity that objectify the female subject and tie her to the notions of passivity, 
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submissiveness and docility. They argue that the dismissal of femininity is crucial in 
liberating women from their feminine shackles and producing a feminist awareness. In 
Susan Bordo's words, this solution encapsulates 'the feminist "anti-thesis'" that 
subsumes patriarchal institutions and practices under the oppressor/oppressed model and 
insists that 'women are the done to, not the doers' (Bordo 1993: 22). The underlying 
belief is that feminism and femininity are mutually exclusive and one cannot be feminine 
and feminist at the same time. The adoption of one of these identities is achieved at the 
expense of the other, insofar as any articulation of femininity (behavioral or visual) is 
inextricably linked to a lack of feminist credentials. As Joanne Hollows notes, these 
claims are founded on the assumption that 'women's investments in "femininity" [ ... ] 
block the development of a feminist consciousness' (Hollows 2000; 17). According to 
this logic, the optimal feminist resolution would be to refuse the patriarchal objectifying 
gaze and reject all feminine attributes and modes of self-presentation. In this way, 
Carolyn Heilbrun urges her female reader to 'dissociate her personhood from her 
feminine appeal', declaring that women who 'have done with the business of being 
women, and can let loose their strength must be the most powerful creatures in the world' 
(Heilbrun 1988: 54; 128).7 
Consequently, it is the feminist critic's duty to assume the social function of 
demystifier in the attempt to enlighten the 'ordinary' feminine woman who obviously 
suffers from a false consciousness and has to be guided to throw off the mask of 
femininity. As Imelda Whelehan suggests, the only way out of this media absorption and 
patriarchal assimilation will be to separate fact from fiction and thus, she declares that 
'the role of the feminist of the 90' s is to prove herself equal to demythologising the 
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powerful and ever-changing myths about the female self and nature perpetuated in the 
mass media and other state apparatuses' (Whelehan 1995: 229). A contrast is set up 
between the 'real' feminism ofthe women's movement and the 'fictional feminism' of 
popular culture, 'made up' and 'grow[ingJ out of [ ... J fictional narratives - films, 
television shows, magazine fiction and [ ... J best-selling novels' (Loudermilk 1997: 2). 
As Bonnie Dow suggests, there is a distinction between an authentic feminist realm and 
its compromised and distorted popular simulation, noting that 'it is [ ... J vital to know 
"what really happened'" while 'it is also illuminating to know what popular media told us 
was happening' (Dow 1996: xvi). In effect, this line of thought presumes that it is 
possible to differentiate historical facts that truthfully and accurately record the feminist 
movement's events, rhetoric and actions from the media interpretations that translate the 
meaning of feminism into public discourses and, in the process, absorb, dilute and 
redefine its original messages. In the course of this popular attack on feminist authenticity 
and authority, feminism is said to lose its radicalism and become attached to more 
conservative agendas as its images of 'liberation', 'freedom' and 'independence' are 
detached from their feminist roots and 'now postulate many media forms because they 
sell' (Hollows 2000: 194). 
While I will shortly return to this recuperative and co-optive tendency in the 
media's constructions of feminism, I want to distance myself from the notion of an elitist 
feminist club of a chosen few who can illuminate the obfuscated and silent majority of 
women. I stress that feminist criticism should not, and importantly cannot, position itself 
outside of popular culture as it is always within and part of the society that it strives to 
criticize. Feminism has to consider women's ambiguous and contradictory practices that 
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do not fall into rigid and immutable categories of feminist resistance and feminine 
conformity but, instead, blur the binary opposition between them. As I will discuss, 
feminist critics have oversimplified the problematic surrounding femininity as they have 
not taken into account the multiplicity and contradictoriness of gender definitions. I 
propose that the feminist protest against the damaging effects of feminine myths does not 
have to culminate in a counterproductive anti-feminine stance that opposes the value of 
femininity in itself and tout court. In fact, femininity is adopted as a paradoxical and 
multivalent subject position that enables the female individual to gain feelings of 
empowerment and control while simultaneously subjecting her to cultural norms of 
appearance and behavior. Instead of being unwitting dupes mystified by a manipulative 
ideology, women take an active part in the production of their femininity as they 
negotiate their bodies and their lives within the structural constraints of a gendered social 
order. 
Hence, I do not believe that feminism can provide a blueprint for women's 
conduct, reiterating the correct line on their involvement in popular culture and 
encouraging them to rise above this contaminated domain. I reject the binary rationale 
that posits the popular realm as a repository of retrograde and oppressive representations 
and the feminist movement as the habitat of the enlightened and liberated critic. I am 
deeply suspicious of the possibility of discovering an authentic feminist self who is able 
to lift her consciousness beyond the hegemonic gender constraints into a transcendent 
realm of immunity to cultural images. I dispute a rigid and dualistic contextualization that 
locates femininity within the popular landscape while feminism is situated outside the 
popular in a non-feminine realm. I believe that the polarization of feminist critic and 
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feminine victim relies on an undifferentiated definition of popular culture as a site of 
uniformity and homogeneity, presenting a priori, monolithic images of sexism and 
patriarchy. In order to create a fictional dichotomy between the popular femme and the 
anti-popular feminist, popular culture is misrepresented as a patriarchal apparatus that 
perpetuates passivity and conformity through the powerful rhetoric ofthefeminine 
mystique, with the ultimate goal to reproduce the status quo.8 In a similar manner, 
femininity is described as a monosemic and oppressive cultural identity that operates as a 
non-contradictory and unvarying Other, 'a necessary fiction' that produces 'an 
oppositional feminist identity' (Hollows 2000: 17).9 This either/or logic is also 
employed on the rival side of the debate, exemplified by popular fabrications and 
misconceptions of feminists as unfeminine man-haters. 
In the following, I want to problematize uniform definitions of popular culture 
and, thereby, undermine the accompanying polarity between feminism and femininity. I 
contend that, within any historical moment, the meanings of femininity and feminism are 
not fixed and static but they are contingent on transformation, contestation and change. I 
emphasize the heterogeneity and contradictoriness of feminine/feminist subject positions 
and I propose that these apparently oppositional identities are placed in a relation of 
tension and struggle rather than mutual exclusivity. Accordingly, I resist insufficiently 
textured and undiscerningly dualistic theories that do not allow for flexible and pluralistic 
modes of feminine and feminist subjectivities and I maintain that popular culture opens 
up the impasse of thinking of feminism and femininity as antitheses. The popular 
landscape represents the negotiating terrain where the feminist/feminine opposition is 
questioned and the meanings of both categories are reworked. Rather than promoting a 
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simplistic binarism. popular culture puts forward multiple layers of signification that 
enable a reconsideration of the shifting and historically specific relationship between 
feminism and femininity. I assert that the intersection of feminism and popular culture 
and the configurations of popular feminism and/or postfeminism cannot be mapped on to 
a feminine/feminist dichotomy that has structured both feminist and popular debates. 
Instead. the popular provides a contradictory and creative context where feminism and 
femininity. critique and complicity are brought together in an effort to 'have it both 
ways" to espouse notions of female liberation and choice while promoting the 
feminization of women's bodies. 
Thus. the popular cannot be discussed as a domain of unassailable oppression and 
domination where hegemonic power is imposed from above. Instead. it can be seen as a 
site of exchange where power meets resistance and transgression is always within 
hegemonic limits. In John Fiske's words. 
popular culture is contradictory: It is shot through with contradictions that escape 
control. Those who accuse it of being simplistic. of reducing everything to its 
most obvious points. of denying all the subtle complexity. all the dense texture of 
human sentiment and of social existence. are applying inappropriate criteria and 
blinding themselves to where the complexities of popular culture are actually to 
be found. (Fiske 1989: 120) 
Following Fiske. popular culture cannot be conceptualized with recourse to pre-existing 
agendas and dualistic models that foreclose the possibility of a pluralistic both/and. As he 
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notes, the popular realm is full of 'gaps, contradictions and inadequacies' and it always 
entails 'the expression of both domination and subordination, of both power and 
resistance' (Fiske 1989: 126; 5). Popular culture displays the struggle between these 
competing forces and it establishes a space where the popular consumer can actively and 
producerly negotiate the potentially oppressive effects of power structures. IO Fiske rejects 
the notion of the cultural dupe who is 'the victim of the system' and, instead, he focuses 
on the subject's productive capacity as an agent/consumer, stressing 'how people cope 
with the system' and how they employ their resourcefulness and creativity to 'make do 
with what is available' (Fiske 1989: 162; 105; 5). 
Drawing on Michel de Certeau's theory of everyday life as a site of subversive 
tactics, Fiske seeks to unpack the term consumer and reveal the productivity involved in 
the act of consumption (de Certeau 1984).11 He advocates 'an entirely different kind of 
production called "consumption'" that uses 'the products of capitalism [as] the raw 
materials, the primary resources of popular culture' (Fiske 1989: 142). Fiske makes a 
case for the 'active consumption' or the 'semiotic activity' of the consumer who acts as a 
'poacher, encroaching on the terrain of the cultural landowner [ ... ] and stealing what he 
or she wants without being caught and subjected to the laws of the land' (Fiske 1989: 
142; 143). It is in this process of br;colage, of recombining and reusing the established 
cultural products that the possibilities of resignification and subversion occur. Rather than 
absorbing a number of pre-fabricated meanings, consumers rearticulate and appropriate 
the commodities at their disposal in ways that are suitable to and even liberating for their 
situated practices of living. Accordingly, consumption cannot be understood as 
conformist and conservative inaction that reproduces the status quo. On the contrary, the 
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consumers' raids or guerrilla tactics can point to the progressive political potential of 
popular culture that finds its expression on the micro-political level and is concerned with 
redistributing power within the network of social relations. 12 The politics of popular 
culture takes as its object the individual's resistances and evasions in the minutiae of 
everyday life through which slhe constructs meanings and creates a sense of identity. 
This consumer power may not cause a radically revolutionary effect but it taps into the 
popular domain as a 'social resource that can fuel [ ... ] the motor of social change' (Fiske 
1989: 193). 
Fiske's insistence on consumer agency and active consumption has been criticized 
by some commentators as promoting an uncritical and unqualified 'cultural populism' 
that hails the consumer as a cultural hero and 'fails to connect consumption with 
production' (Storey 1997: 204).13 Fiske is accused of a romantic celebration of popular 
culture that adopts the term 'resistance' tout court to save the consumers from their mute 
status as passive and helpless dupes. In the course of this rescue mission, the themes of 
popular pleasure and empowerment are pursued 'to a point at which anything which is 
consumed and is popular is also seen as oppositional' (McRobbie 1994: 39). As John 
Storey notes, 'it is at best an uncritical echo of liberal claims about the "sovereignty of 
the consumer", and at worst it is uncritically complicit with prevailing "free market" 
ideology' (Storey 1997: 206).14 By pinpointing the consumer's ability to construct and 
acquire plural identities through commodities, insufficient attention is given to the forces 
of domination and ideological manipulation that continue to structure and determine 
personal experiences and practices. In Joanne Hollows' words, 'the emphasis on the 
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freedom to play with lifestyles often neglects very basic questions about access to 
opportunities to consume' (Hollows 2000: 133). 
I agree that Fiske builds his theory on a distinction between popular and 
hegemonic pleasures, asserting that popular consumers can enter 'a supermarket of 
meanings' from which they make their own selection, which in turn 'they cook up into 
their own culture' (Fiske 1989: 132). Slhe 'enter[s] the represented world [ ... ] at wi11 and 
bring[s] back from it the meanings and pleasures that [slhe] choose[s]' (Fiske 1989: 133). 
The problem with this argument is that it presents the hegemonic and popular realms in 
terms of mutual exteriority and antithesis, presuming an autonomous space of liberal 
pluralism in which people can arguably stay outside hegemony. As Fiske notes, popular 
culture is formed 'in reaction to [but] never as part of the forces of domination' and he 
clearly distinguishes between 'popular pleasures' that 'contain elements of the 
oppositional, the evasive, the scandalous [ ... ] the resistant' and their opposite, the 
'muted' 'hegemonic' pleasures 'offered by ideological conformity' (Fiske 1989: 43; 
127). These hegemonic pleasures are the means by which 'power and its disciplinary 
thrust are internalised' and they are at odds with the 'bottom-up', popular pleasures that 
'exist in some relationship of opposition to power' (Fiske 1989: 49). In his exploration of 
popular culture, Fiske focuses on 'those moments where hegemony jails, where ideology 
is weaker than resistance, where social control is met by indiscipline' (Fiske 1989: 177; 
my emphasis). 
To be fair to Fiske, his writings on active consumption and consumer agency are 
more complex than simplistic reiterations of a cultural popUlist stance. He is clearly 
aware that 'popular experience is always formed within structures of dominance' and that 
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'popular meanings and pleasure are never free of the forces that produce subordination' 
(Fiske 1989: 134). Fiske also captures the tension between the subject's experiences of 
autonomy and oppression, noting that 
the people are not the helpless subjects of an irresistible ideological system, but 
neither are they free-willed [ ... ] individuals; they are a shifting set of social 
allegiances formed by social agents within a social terrain that is theirs only by 
virtue of their constant refusal to cede it to the imperialism of the powerful. (Fiske 
1989: 45-46) 
Fiske is astute in his analysis of the struggle inherent in popular culture but he tends to 
adhere to dualistic notions of an imperialistic power structure that comes under attack by 
everyday popular resistances 'that make that ideology work so hard and insistently to 
maintain itself and its values' (Fiske 1989: 21). He overestimates this popular threat and 
exaggerates the strength of the semiotic democracy by likening the popular battle to a 
two-way force in which the partners are implicitly considered separate but equal. In this 
way, Fiske readily adopts the notions of popular choice and resistance without 
problematizing and situating these liberatory ideals within hegemonic constraints. This 
can amount to an apologetic "'yes, but ... " discourse' that does not relate the popular to 
a thoroughly social and political context and downplays the structural oppressions in 
favor of the representation of 'a rosy world "where there's always a way to redemption'" 
(Ang 1996: 139). 
154 
I contend that Fiske's notion of a failure of hegemonic rule relies on a one-
dimensional conception of power as a uniform and homogeneous bloc that is undermined 
by the tactical raids of popular culture. Following the theorist Martin-Barbero, I am wary 
of an identification of the popular with 'an intrinsic, spontaneous, resistance with which 
the subordinate oppose the hegemonic' and I am resolute that the hegemonic is located 
within the texture of the popular, and vice-versa (Martin-Barbero 1988: 448). As I 
maintain throughout this study, hegemony cannot be explained by a dualistic logic that 
sees the spheres of domination and resistance as incompatible and antagonistic. I have 
tried to move beyond this closed circuit in my theorization of power as an inherently 
contradictory field of force that interlaces complicity and critique, subordination and 
creation. In this ambiguous and changing matrix, power is not exerted through brute force 
but through strategies of incorporation and interpellation and the resulting forms of 
resistance are not just 'ways to find redemption, but also a matter of capitulation -
invested in them is not just pleasure, but also pain, anger, frustration - or sheer despair' 
(Ang 1996: 141). 
The popular, then, occupies a theoretically and politically unstable position as it is 
both a repository of agency and confinement, conformity and evasion. It is a battlefield 
on which a conflict is fought out between competing interests and values, displaying a 
shifting balance of forces whose ideological direction is not definitive or stable. It cannot 
be conceptualized in static terms or through recourse to generalized absolutes that do not 
do justice to its changeability and incoherence. The popular involves 'an ever-
proliferating set of heterogeneous and dispersed, intersecting and contradicting cultural 
practices' whose meanings are not historically fixed but 'always the result of an act of 
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"articulation'" (Ang 1996: 125; Storey 1997: 128).15 As Storey remarks, 'popular culture 
is a concept of ideological contestation and variability, to be filled and emptied, to be 
articulated and disarticulated, in a range of different and competing ways' (Storey 1997: 
202). Popular articulations are never total or final but they are subject to continual 
rearticulations and relocations of the signifying links. The unfinished nature of the 
articulatory process helps to explain popular culture's inherent contradictions and its 
complicitous critique symptomatic of a postmodern age of confusion in which 
uncertainty and ambiguity are built-in features. 
Thus, popular culture is caught in a dialectic between the processes of production 
and incorporation and the activities of consumption and subversion. It is a terrain of 
exchange that refuses to be contained within an either/or logic that categorizes it as a site 
of cultural democracy or a structure of cultural oppression. These antithetical depictions 
of popular culture are unnecessarily narrow, too preoccupied with finding a correct 
critical position that would be either a romantic celebration of the popular or a 
recognition of the ideological power that underlies popular operations. I propose that, 
while it is clearly important to situate popular culture within oppressive relations of 
power, this line ofthought is insufficient to analyse questions of consumer appropriation 
and use. In the same way, to assert the vitality and activity of consumption is not to deny 
that consumption can be passive, while trying to save the popular consumers from their 
mute and duped status is not to deny that popular culture may seek to manipulate them. 
Within the popular realm, dominant ideologies can be disturbed and meanings can be 
contested but this act of criticism is always vulnerable to recuperation and resignification. 
In other words, I believe that questions of agency and active consumption have to be 
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related to questions of social structure and production. It is only in the ambivalent and 
paradoxical blur of the binary that the double bind of consumption/production can be 
contingently located and discussed. 
This sense of the popular as a place of contradiction carries the potential to 
explode the dichotomies that have structured the debates surrounding the intersection of 
feminism and popular culture. The popular domain's involvement in the processes of 
articulation opens up a space for the renegotiation and realignment of the polarity 
between feminist and popular contexts, between the images of the feminist critic and the 
popular femme. The poles of feminism and femininity are brought into contact on the 
contentious sites of popular feminism and/or postfeminism on which they no longer exist 
as fiercely opposed alternatives. Postfeminism establishes a link between previously 
incompatible antitheses as it depicts the coming together of feminist themes and issues 
with feminine values and appearances. In this way, women can be both feminine and 
feminist at the same time, without losing their integrity and being relegated to the 
position of passive dupes. Femininity is no longer described as feminism's 'other' but it 
actively contributes to the feminist goal of emancipation and self-determination. This 
involves a redefinition and re-evaluation of both categories, in the course of which 
pluralistic and contradictory subjectivities emerge in the postfeminist space between 
feminism and femininity. 
Postferninism does not adhere to monosemic and irreconcilable definitions of 
feminist and feminine identities but breaks down their opposition and carves out a new 
subjective space for women. The postfeminist self stages a re-sexualization and 
feminization of the feminist body and it constructs a new femininity (or, new 
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femininities) around the notions of autonomy and agency. These sexualized 
representations are not meant to portray women as victimized objects but as knowing and 
active sexual subjects. Rosalind Gill aptly describes this process as 'a shift from sexual 
objectification to sexual subjectification' in the constructions of feminism and femininity 
in popular culture (Gill 2003: 103). The central mechanism of this postfeminist re-
inscription involves a resignification of the language and meanings of femininity. 
Feminine signifiers are reclaimed for a postfeminist make-over and transformation 
whereby they are distanced from their patriarchal connotations of female exploitation and 
they are redefined in feminist terms of self-gratification and liberation. These acts of 
rearticulation and re-contextualization establish a new signifying relation between 
feminism and femininity that no longer understands female power as compromised by 
feminine identity. On the contrary, feminine subjectivities and bodies become the 
locations of choice and creativity, enabling feminist action and female autonomy. 
In the following, I argue that the postfeminist link between feminism and 
femininity is highly contentious and variable as it signifies in a number of contradictory 
ways. The postfeminist nirvana of 'having it all' and combining feminist and feminine 
ideals has to be problematized as a field of tension and struggle rather unity and 
reconciliation. While I welcome the deployment and resignification of femininity as an 
active and potentially emancipatory site, I contend that the notion of sexual subjecthood 
always entails a simultaneous objectification. The movement from patriarchal object to 
postfeminist subject does not cancel previous significations of subordination but it 
implies that subject formation or assujetissement becomes inseparable from subjection. 
Thus, I believe that the postfeminist self occupies a paradoxical position of being both 
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subject and object, concomitantly empowered and disempowered. The ambivalence and 
contradictoriness inherent in postfeminist subjectivities give rise to mUltiple definitions of 
popular feminism and/or postfeminism, ranging from Girl Power's celebration of 
femininity to its rejection as a form of retrosexism. The postfeminist movement is caught 
in a continual fluctuation between these various standpoints and its positioning largely 
depends on the meanings and significations attributed to femininity. While some 
commentators embrace the fluidity and plurality offeminine identities, others find fault 
with the narrowness and limitations of femininity. The resignification of feminine myths 
is understood both as a form of resistance and critique from within hegemonic 
constructions as well as an ineffectual intertextual sophistication that will not lead to 
change. The presence of these interpretative possibilities points to the varied voices and 
positions that co-exist and conflict on the postfeminist landscape. 
Postfeminism's multiplicity is also reinforced by its emphasis on 'choice', a 
notion that has been used in consumerist and feminist discourses alike but with seemingly 
incongruous effects. Postfeminism draws on an ideology of choice in order to promote 
femininity as an opportunity for and an instance of a feminist standpoint within 
consumerism. This postfeminist choice is hailed as a compromise between feminism and 
popular culture, between feminist demands and feminine standards. However, the 
movement's detractors maintain that a distinction ha'i to be made between feminism's 
endorsement of choice as a sign of freedom and independence from structural inequalities 
and the choice of popular culture, designed to reduce feminist social goals to individual 
lifestyle. Popular culture is said to employ the rhetoric of choice in order to substitute 
individual endeavor for feminism's collective campaigning to change the balance of 
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power, thereby recuperating and distorting this revolutionary principle for antifeminist 
purposes. I will explore these claims of pluralistic/limited femininity and the notion of 
feminist/popular choices and I suggest that postfeminism's controversy proceeds from the 
friction between the contexts of femininity, feminism and popular culture. 
Postfeminism's conflicting characterizations as an overly optimistic Girl Power and an 
unanimously pessimistic retrosexism represent two polar perspectives in a multi-focal 
postfeminist spectrum that eschews binary categories. I assert that the most challenging 
and provocative representations of postfeminism can be found in the struggle to hold 
together its competing components in a flexible structure that displays a both/and logic. 
On the Girl Power side of the dialogue, the contradictions between femininity, 
feminism and popular culture have been resolved in an unproblematic unity with the 
purpose to create a new, popular brand of feminism in which a 'grab-what-you-want 
attitude combines entrepreneurial individualism with a confident display of high 
femininity' (Hinds and Stacey 2001: 154). This 'Girlie' feminism performs a glamorous 
make-over of the drab and unfashionable women's liberationists of the past as it effects a 
'shift from the monstrous outsiders of the 1960s and 1970s to the incorporated Ms of the 
1990s' (Hinds and Stacey 2001: 155; emphasis in text). Ratherthan affirming women's 
mature sense of capability and resisting their denigration as childish, Girl Power 
redefines the complexities of female subjectivity by reclaiming once disparaged elements 
of femininity and girlishness. The feminine Girlie is both a response to the bra-burner 
epithet that has haunted media representations of feminists as well as 'a subversion of the 
pin-up image' (Whelehan 2000: 37). The Girlie stance discards the notions of an anti-
feminine and anti-popular feminism and a sexist femininity as it strives to construct a 
160 
middle ground between feminism and popular culture by blending feminist and feminine 
characteristics in a new, improved mix. As Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards 
proclaim in their Girlie manifesto: 
Girlie culture is a rebellion against the false impression that since women don't 
want to be sexually exploited, they don't want to be sexual; against the necessity 
of brass-buttoned, red-suited seriousness to infiltrate a man's world; against the 
anachronistic belief that [ ... ] girls and power don't mix. (Baumgardner and 
Richards 2000: 137) 
Girlies are adamant that they can emulate feminine standards and yet be confident and 
active. They can compete successfully alongside their male counterparts and attain 
equality without sacrificing all forms of 'pink-packaged femininity' (Baumgardner and 
Richards 2000: 137). In fact, their empowerment and assertiveness are directly linked to 
their feminine identities and their ability to resignify the language of femininity. 
Girlies insist that they are not trapped by their femininity but they can gain control 
by acknowledging and using their insider position within consumer culture. Girl Power 
combines cultural confidence with feminist awareness and it emphasizes that the 
traditional/patriarchal connotations of girlishness can be interrupted by alternative modes 
of production/consumption. As Baumgardner and Richards explain, the term 'Girlie' 
depicts the 'intersection of culture and feminism' and it 'encompasses the tabooed 
symbols of women's feminine enculturation - Barbie dolls, make-up, fashion magazines' 
(Baumgardner and Richards 2000: 136). Girlies reject the status of victimized dupes and 
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declare that they can wield these popular/patriarchal instruments for their own purposes. 
They maintain that they have achieved an empowering and productive balance between 
the previously competing forces of feminism, femininity and popular culture. In this way, 
Using makeup isn't a sign of our sway to the marketplace and the male gaze; it 
can be sexy, campy, ironic, or simply decorating ourselves without the loaded 
issues. [ ... ] What we loved as girls was good and, because of feminism, we know 
how to make girl stuffworkfor us. (Baumgardner and Richards 2000: 136; my 
emphasis) 
Girlie feminism embraces 'the pink things of stereotypical girlhood' and it 
reconstructs them as confident expressions of choice and self-differentiation 
(Baumgardner and Richards 2000: 136). The myths of femininity that have historically 
been imprinted on the female body as signs of docility and subordination are revitalized 
in Girlie rhetoric that establishes a distance between image and identity and, in this new 
signifying gap, redefines feminine modes and subjectivities. The central tenet of Girl 
Power is that femininity is powerful and empowering, endowing the female subject with 
the agency to create her self and negotiate the possibilities of her gender role. Women can 
use their femininity to compliment and even further the qualities of subjecthood and 
independence endorsed by the feminist movement. One can argue that Girlie feminism 
offers a way out of the one-sided attention to the restrictions of feminine conventions that 
has obscured women's engagement in the constructions of femininity. The claim of a new 
meaning for old symbols establishes a space for the inventive and potentially subversive 
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use of cultural signs and a refashioning of feminine identities. Rather than focusing on 
the dehumanising aspects of gender socializations, Girlies expose and exploit their 
constructed nature in order to reveal the creativity and fluidity of feminine traditions and 
subjectivities. This implies a radical reconsideration of cultural practices and forms such 
as make-up, high heels and cosmetic surgery as vehicles for autonomy and self-
determination rather than symbols of discipline and oppression. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the Girlie feminist stance makes a case for 
femininity politics or 'femmenism' that forges its political theory from the re-
appropriation of feminist discourses into the readings of femininity. As Jeannine 
Delombard describes this feminine politics by al1uding to Audre Lorde's famous precept, 
'femmenism is using the master's tools to dismantle the master's house' (Delombard 
1995: 22).16 'Femmenism' implies using the signs and accoutrements of femininity to 
challenge and resignify the stable notions of gender formations. Gender is understood as 
an analytical category, to be questioned and reworked from within its own conventions. 
Girlie feminism relies on feminist theory's deconstructive strain to conceptualize 
femininity as a construct and artifice but, instead of dismissing the feminine tout court, it 
argues for its reconstruction and resignification. Displacing essentialist and patriarchal 
versions of an authentic feminine identity, Girlies try to integrate feminist opposition and 
postfeminist appropriation in their re-inscription of femininity as liberating and 
empowering. The simplistic identification of feminine norms as unequivocal1y repressive 
is problematized in favor of a diversified definition of multiple femininities. As Ang 
notes, 'being a woman [ ... ] can now mean the adoption of many different identities, 
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composed of a whole range of subject positions, not predetermined by immutable 
definitions of femininity' (Ang 1996: 94). 
There are different and even contradictory ways to inhabit a feminine subject 
position (ways of being a woman) and the adoption of a feminine subjectivity is not 
definitive and total but always involves constant self-(re)construction and self-
representation. The norms of femininity are not eternal or innate qualities but they are 
cultural constructs whose meanings are made up and remade in specific historical and 
social conditions. There is no single feminine identity but diverse and manifold feminine 
identities, cross-cut by class, sexual, racial and generational considerations. Moreover, a 
woman is not permanently fixed on the scale of femininity but occupies transitory 
positions as a change in her body shape and the natural progression of age can alter her 
feminine appeal. In this way, gender identity is both 'multiple and partial, ambiguous and 
incoherent, permanently in process of being articulated, disarticulated and rearticulated' 
(Ang 1996: 125). In Girlie rhetoric, the changeability of this never-ending operation of 
becoming a woman is not conceptualized in relation to the tyranny of thefeminine 
mystique that marks out the boundaries between the feminine and the unfeminine, the 
beautiful and the ugly, the ordinary and the deviant. On the contrary, the mobility and 
fluidity of gender constructions allow the female subject to actively and creatively 
reinvent and redefine her femininity. 
While I welcome Girlie feminism's conjunction of feminism and popular culture 
and its diversification of the feminine construct, I emphasize that this redefinition and 
resignification of femininity is always contradictory as it continually threatens to 
reinscribe and reinforce phallocentricity. As I have argued, the resignificatory practice is 
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always positioned ambiguously as an appropriation of the center's logos and a 
deconstruction from within, vacillating between complicity and critique, agency and 
confinement. Accordingly, the Girlie's assertion of dynamic self-fulfillment and feminine 
self-expression is not unanimously liberating but it can also appear as a trap of 
conformity and disempowerment. As Susan Bordo declares, 'employing the language of 
femininity to protest the conditions of the female world will always involve ambiguities' 
(Bordo 1993: 177). Paradoxically, Girl Power functions within and is animated by the 
same cultural imagery that transfers onto women the labels of inferiority and 
powerlessness. Girlie's resignification of femininity in relation to feminist ideas of 
agency and control can simultaneously be described as 'a move towards independence' 
and 'a repetition of traditional dependence [ ... ] and subordination' (Stacey 1994: 186). 
Girlie feminism operates within a set of paradoxes that construct the feminine self as both 
a feminist subject and an object of patriarchal consumption/production. Girlie's in-
between position implies that it can be recuperated by its patriarchal significations and 
associations and thus, 'Girlie is both "progress" and the "selling of feminism lite'" 
(Baumgardner and Richards 2000: 139; emphasis in text). 
The movement's critics deplore that the Girlies' celebrated energies and powers 
are channelled, in their opinion, towards a confined and limited goal, the adoption and 
creation of femininity. Although Girlies are convinced that they are free to construct their 
own appearances and identities through their personal power of self-determination, their 
range of choices is suspiciously narrow as their empowerment is restricted to the level of 
feminine attractiveness. According to these critical viewpoints, the notion that women are 
confident and assertive agents cannot fully account for the fact that the Girlie look is 
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similar to, if not synonymous with, patriarchal ideals of feminine beauty. As Shelley 
Budgeon points out, this form of agency is contingent upon 'self-objectification and 
dependence upon the approving gaze of others' (Budgeon 1994: 66). In this model of 
social power, women are offered the promise of autonomy and they are endowed with the 
status of active subjecthood by voluntarily objectifying themselves and actively choosing 
to employ their capacities in the pursuit of a feminine appearance and a sexualized image. 
Rosalind Gi11laments that in this way, 'sexual objectification can be presented not as 
something done to women by some men, but as the freely chosen wish of active [ ... ] 
female subjects' (Gill 2003: 104). It is argued that the focus on femininity as an avenue to 
self-determination covers up and obscures a deeper exploitation than objectification -
'one in which the objectifying male gaze is internalised to form a new disciplinary 
regime' (Gil12003: 104). In effect, Girl Power's assertion of a feminine subjectivity is a 
postfeminist guise for, but nonetheless a pernicious return to, the narcissistic acts of self-
policing and discipline that have structured disempowering and subjugating versions of 
femininity. The feelings of control that Girlies gain through the construction of a 
feminine identity are achieved at the cost of self-alienation and self-objectification and 
ultimately, they undermine the feminist movement's indispensable critique of oppressive 
cultural images. 
At the core of this critical attack on Girlie feminism, femininity firmly remains 
located within a dominant ideology that seeks to constitute it in narrow and monosemic 
ways. It is suggested that the mode of femininity has not been resignified or even 
modified in the course of its postfeminist re-appropriation and it has only been tinkered 
with but not redrafted. Girlie's critics are resolute that the feminine conventions and 
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signifiers cannot successfully be reconstructed and weaned off their patriarchal meanings 
and they insist that femininity continues to be inscribed on the female body by a 
particularly insidious and manipulative disciplinary power that is both everywhere and 
nowhere, 'the disciplinarian is everyone and yet no one in particular' (Bartky 1990: 74). 
This absence of a formal structure or authority designed to carry out the feminine 
directive creates the impression that the production of femininity is entirely self-willed 
and voluntary and, therefore, there is no need for social change. In fact, Girlie proponents 
assuredly proclaim that 'Girl culture assumes that women are free agents in the world, 
that they start out strong and that the odds are in their favour' (Baumgardner and 
Richards 2000: 134). This vision of Girl Power plays on the illusion that women are no 
longer constrained by inequalities or power imbalances and they inhabit a new and 
enlightened era of choiceoisie in which they can choose to use femininity as a means to 
fulfillment and empowerment Consequently, Girlie feminism is criticized for abstracting 
women's self-representations from an understanding of the complex power relations that 
frame them and substituting this political awareness with an uncritically positive and 
liberatory message that women are in control of their lives. 
Girl Power celebrates an individualistic agency that personalises the political and 
collective agendas of feminism and pretends that 'the power of self-definition is all about 
[ ... ] "making choices", regardless, it seems, of who controls the "choices" available' 
(Whelehan 2000: 4). Girlie's intersection of feminist and popular contexts represents 
politics as a function of personality, transforming feminism's demands for independence 
and equality into an ideology of choice. As Elspeth Probyn reveals, 'the question of 
"what do women want" (Was will das Weib?) has been answered. The answer is that they 
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want "choice'" (Probyn 1990: 156). This is reinforced by the feminist writer Gloria 
Steinem who declares that 'the greatest gift we can give one another is the power to make 
a choice. The power to choose is even more important than the choices we make' 
(Steinem 1995: xxvi). Girlie culture has incorporated this feminist insight into its own 
popular rhetoric while simultaneously refracting the notions of self-determination and 
autonomy through the lenses of consumerism and femininity. These values are 
appropriated from feminism's political agenda and they are placed in the context of a 
consumerist individualism that redefines feminism with reference to femininity and 
reduces it to a matter oflifestyle. The Girlie movement addresses women as individuals 
and popular consumers who are encouraged to produce their personality through the work 
of femininity, through the consumption of clothes and make-up. Rather than focusing on 
broader areas of social oppression, Girlie feminism understands its primary role as 
promoting the individual woman's independence and liberty to make choices. Freedom 
comes to be seen as the personal freedom to define one's self through consumption. The 
emphasis is displaced from collective needs and abstract ideas of justice onto the 
individual consumer's pursuit of happiness and self-fulfillment. The attainment and 
experience of personal choice are depicted as feminist achievements and the answer to 
the movement's Iiberatory aspirations. 
Critics are highly suspicious of this solipsistic trend within Girl Power as it 
depoJiticizes feminist themes while also advancing an individualized solution that 
revolves around the adoption of a seemingly conventional femininity. As Myra 
Macdonald notes, what is disturbing about this feminine ruse is the tenaciousness and the 
alacrity with which the myths of femininity have been 'defensively reinvented, against 
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the cultural and social changes in women's lives' (Macdonald 1995: 220). The images of 
femininity have, chameleon-like, displayed the capacity to both change hue and yet to 
survive, to adopt a feminist meaning of confident and autonomous self-determination and 
yet be recuperated by patriarchal relations. Commentators claim that Girl Power's array 
of feminine choices masks the difference between the social goals of the feminist 
movement and its own sexualized and objectifying femininity. They uphold a dualistic 
distinction between feminism's collective choice of independence and Girl Power's 
populist choice of feminine individualism. Accordingly, it is argued that Girlie culture 
does not depict a positive move away from passive objectification to an embrace of an 
autonomous and liberated subject. On the contrary, at its worst, Girl Power acts as a 
patriarchal and popular defence mechanism that relies on the rhetoric of feminine choice 
to continually remake itself in order to contain and co-opt feminist ideas. In Imelda 
Whelehan's words, Girl Power is a 'rhetorical device' that is 'all too prone to 
appropriation for essentially patriarchal ends' (Whelehan 2000: 45). 
In effect, it is suggested that Girl Power's ideology of cllOiceoisie does not 
operate on freedom of choice but it 'reproduces the solid nature of the status quo' by 
urging women to 'get on the bandwagon, to buy into the old as the new' (Probyn 1990: 
152). The celebrated choice of femininity is not an instance of feminist empowerment but 
a cunning ploy of popular culture to reaffirm patriarchal conventions while repackaging 
them as distinctly personal and even feminist desires.17 Girlie feminism's dismissal of a 
collective struggle in favor of personal problems and solutions may block change as it 
transforms active politics into a passive narcissism. By co-opting the language of choice 
and opportunity, Girl Power's populist stance manages to sustain a symbolic attachment 
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to the feminist idea of equality but, at the same time, it depoliticizes and redefines this 
revolutionary principle. This creates a semblance of advancement and progress without 
necessarily furthering or reinforcing this egalitarian right on the structurallevel.18 
Moreover, critics argue that this manipulation of feminist ideas and terminology 
can be described as a key hegemonic strategy, fundamental to the political management 
of conflict and opposition. As has been noted, the discourse of choice and opportunity has 
'nothing to do with "resistance", but everything to do with incorporation' as the 
imperative of choice interpellates the subject as active and empowered while drawing 
himlher into the seductions of consumption (Ang 1996: 12). Individuals are impelled to 
constantly reconstruct and reinvent themselves and, in this pursuit, life is defined as the 
ability to make an ever-increasing number of choices. Choice is promoted as the ultimate 
realization of freedom and sovereignty and its ideological function as a prime discursive 
mechanism is concealed. The feminist ideals of autonomy and independence are hijacked 
by a supposedly hostile and patriarchal popular culture that bases its politics on the 
promotion of personal achievement while implementing practices and policies that 
reaffirm the conditions of male dominance and female subordination. Vicki Coppock 
describes this process of appropriation whereby the 'established order' is able to 
'maintain its centres of power' and simultaneously provide 'the illusion of negotiation' 
that 'accommodate[s], even incorporate[s]' forms of opposition 'through what appears to 
be a more progressive discourse' (Coppock 1995: 183).19 In this way, feminism falls 
prey to a conservative manoeuvre of recuperation and incorporation that pretends to 
respond to feminist principles and tenets but ignores the movement's ideological 
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challenge by simply adopting the surface terminology, without taking on board the 
ideology that underlies it. 
From this perspective, Girl Power, or any other postfeminist convergence of 
feminism and popular culture, can only be interpreted as a media attempt to capitalize on 
feminism's liberatory appeal while containing and neutralizing its radical politics. 
Feminism's entry into the mainstream and the emergence of popular feminism and/or 
postfeminism are identified as powerful capitalist and patriarchal tactics to manage 
feminism's revolutionary, social movement by accommodating its liberal discourses for 
antifeminist purposes. This line of thought propagates the idea that postfeminism is 
nothing more than 'a knee-jerk reaction on the part of the mainstream in defence of the 
status quo' (Gamble 2001: 46).1° This pseudo-feminism urges women to literally buy into 
the images of freedom and liberation while warping the ideals of feminism to conform to 
the cultural stereotypes that tie the female subject directly to her feminine appearance. 
Accordingly, Imelda Whelehan suggests that this reconciliation of feminine and feminist 
ideologies marks a postfeminist era of 'retrosexism' that recasts gender polarities in 
pseudo-Darwinian terms. Whelehan explores the nostalgic quality of popular images and 
contemporary television that hark back to a time and place 'peopled by "rear' women and 
humorous cheeky chappies' (Whelehan 2000: 11). She argues that, on the level of 
popular culture, one can witness a flourishing of 'nostalgia for the "old order" of babes, 
breasts and uncomplicated relationships' (Whelehan 2000: 178). These media 
representations of women are characterized by a 'complexly expressed, more 
sophisticated' form of sexism that makes 'women's oppression seem sexy' and promotes 
the idea that 'we inhabit a world [ ... ] where we can play at sexy vamp with no ill effect 
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because we are "in control" ofthe look we create' (Whelehan 2000: 7; 179). This 
lifestyle politics denies the existence of a victim culture and, thereby, it undermines 
feminism's political consciousness of the oppressive and limited nature of hegemonic 
choices. 
While Whelehan's argument is clearly compelling as it highlights the dangers of 
an individualistic stance that dismisses the need for a collective politics, it does not 
provide an understanding of the complex and pluralistic relations between feminism, 
femininity and popular culture. Whelehan's focus on 'harking back' to a bygone and 
mythical age is in danger of missing what is new and potentially subversive about these 
sexualized depictions of women that are organized around the notions of autonomy and 
power. Portrayed as responses to feminism that acknowledge the positive gains of the 
women's liberation movement, these postfeminist forms of feminine subjectivity operate 
from different premises than backlash suppositions that simplistica11y imply a wholesale 
rejection offeminist ideals. I maintain that the intersection of feminism and popular 
culture cannot be conceptualized as an insidious and continuous death knell on feminism 
as it exhibits the possibility of postfeminist resignification. At the same time, I insist that 
this resignification is always paradoxical and it cannot be seen as an unproblematic union 
of feminism and femininity. In this way, feminism and popular culture can 
simultaneously be discussed as both the worst enemies and the best allies in women's 
ongoing struggle for equality and power. Importantly, contradictoriness remains an 
inherent feature of the postfeminist discourse that incorporates both retrosexist and Girl 
Power interpretations in an effort to elude their either/or distinction. Popular feminism 
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and/or postfeminism represent problematical sites of exchange that hold together 
polarized antagonists in a non-dualistic and pluralistic space. 
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3. The Postfeminist Woman: Singletons, Cinderellas and 
Supergirls 
3.1 The Postfeminist Singleton and the Dilemma of Havillg it All 
All I ever wanted was to be rich and to be successful and to have three kids and a 
husband who was waiting home for me at night to tickle my feet. [ ... ] And look 
at me! I don't even like my hair. 
Ally McBeal 
'The term "new woman" seems to reappear with nearly every generation', Janet Lee 
remarks in her discussion of postmodern theory and female/feminine representations (Lee 
1988: 168). From the "'new woman" in the late nineteenth century, who so shocked 
society with her "independence", to that of the present day, who so preoccupies the 
theorists of "post-feminism"', women have been presented with a regularly updated and 
evolving range of subject positions that celebrate assorted female roles and practices as 
improved and emancipatory versions of womanhood (Lee 1988: 168). The media has 
been instrumental in the construction and marketing of female subjectivities and it has 
urged women to leave behind their 'old' self and change into the 'new woman' of the 
moment. Popular culture reflects the transient and changing definitions of modernity and 
liberation as it propagates a number of diverse and even paradoxical forms of in vogue 
femaleness and femininity.l The differing incarnations of the 'new woman' are bound up 
with the socially and historically specific politics of identity that circumscribe and 
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delineate the conditions of female subjectivity and agency. In this way, the concept of the 
'new woman' serves as 'a recurrent sales technique' that promotes and sells a protean but 
durable image of female selfhood (Lee 1988: 168). 
The cultural climate of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century has 
produced a particularly ambivalent and contradictory embodiment of the 'new woman' as 
the millennium female model is defined in terms of her relation to a highly contentious 
postfeminist context and times. The new 'postfeminist woman' or 'PFW' has been the 
subject of considerable debate and she has variously been described as an anti-feminist 
backlasher, a sexualIy assertive 'do-me feminist', a prowoman pseudo-feminist and a 
feminine Girlie feminist (Neustatter 1989; Shalit 1998; Kim 2001; Brunsdon 1997). As I 
intend to show, these interpretative possibilities point to the precariousness and 
equivocation in postfeminist examinations of female/feminine identity, showing it both as 
a source of confident autonomy and of disempowerment in its unstable oscillations. The 
postfeminist landscape generates complex and ambiguous portrayals of femaleness, 
femininity and feminism, exploring the contingent and unresolvable tension between 
these subject positions. In particular, the postfeminist woman (PFW) navigates the 
conflicts between her feminist values and her feminine body, between individual and 
collective achievement, between professional career and personal relationship. She 
inhabits a non-dualistic space that holds together these varied and often oppositional 
stances and thus, she provides multiple opportunities for female identification. The PFW 
wants to 'have it all' as she refuses to dichotomize and choose between her public and 
private, feminist and feminine identities. She rearticulates and blurs the binary 
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distinctions between feminism and femininity, between professionalism and domesticity, 
refuting monolithic and homogeneous definitions of post feminist subjectivity. 
In the following, I suggest that the most challenging and controversial depictions 
of postfeminism's project to 'have it all' consider the postfeminist woman's struggle to 
integrate 'it all' into her life and combine her job aspirations and material success with 
her desire for a rewarding home life, her feminist beliefs in agency and independence 
with the pleasures of feminine adornment and heterosexual romance. In these provocative 
representations, the PFW lacks a harmonious inner wholeness or balance and she is 
bewildered by her messy and chaotic self that she is unable to control or gain happiness 
from. She faces the dilemma of 'having it all' as she strives to reconcile her experiences 
of being female, feminine and feminist without falling apart or having to abandon one 
integral part of her existence. The PFW is troubled by her fate as a 'Superwoman' and 
she sees herself burdened by her choices and unable to accept her pluralistic ambiguity 
(Walters 1995: 121). She is anxious about her blurry and depolarized postfeminist 
position and she continues to judge her self according to rigid dichotomies that oppose 
her careerism to her need for hearth and husband, her heterosexual femininity to her 
potentially desexualizing feminist agenda. She is simultaneously frustrated and elated by 
her contradictoriness and hybridity, wrestling with self-doubt and despair as well as 
celebrating hope and confidence. 
This chapter focuses on the figure of the postfeminist singleton, the young, 
unattached and mostly city-dwelling woman who is caught between the enjoyment of her 
independent urban life and her desperate yearning to find 'Mr. Right' with whom to settle 
down. The singleton'S predicament centers on her recognition that 'having it all' implies 
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walking a tightrope between professional success and personal failure, between feminist 
and feminine empowerment. Her single status is both glorified as a glamorous and 
fashionable lifestyle alternative as well as pathologized as a deviant and deficient social 
problem. Paradoxically, the singleton is touted as 'bold', 'ambitious', 'witty' and 'sexy' 
while concomitantly being bemoaned as 'shallow', 'overly compulsive', 'neurotic' and 
'insecure' (Chick Lit USA: 1). She is 'savvy yet vulnerable, fallible yet likable, feminist 
yet not' as she crosses the borderline between passive and active, subject and object, 
feminine and feminist, private and public spaces (Shalit 1998: 27). Thus, she occupies an 
ambivalent postfeminist in-betweenness that transcends dualities and refutes their mutual 
exclusivity. The postfeminist singleton moves across binary distinctions and she is 
unwilling to compromise on her joint desires for job and romance, her feminist and 
feminine values. Instead, she is determined to be a 'marvellous career woman/girlfriend 
hybrid', simultaneously fulfilling her public and private ambitions (Fielding t 999: t 8). 
As I will discuss, the postfeminist singleton has been the subject of a wide range 
of print, broadcast and film texts that have emerged in the 1990s, fictionalizing the 
experiences of single, professional women in an urban environment. Serial dramas such 
as Ally McBeal (1997-2002. Fox) and Sex and the City (1998-2004. HBO), based on 
Candace Bushnell's 1996 novel, depict the ups and downs of 'sexy, hip, smart and sassy' 
singletons and their 'quest to find the one thing that eludes them all- a real, satisfying 
and lasting relationship' (Sex and the City, season 1). While I will allude to these 
televisual embodiments, this chapter pays particular attention to 'the singleton par 
excellence', Helen Fielding's literary creation Bridget Jones whose fictional diary 
recounts the mishaps of a British thirty-something in her attempt to negotiate the tensions 
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between heterosexual courtship and unwed freedom, between female emancipation and 
self-abnegation, between feminism and femininity (Whelehan 2000: 136). Bridget 
Jones's Diary, both in its printed and filmic manifestation (1996 and 2001 respectively), 
has been credited with catching the mood of the period or summoning the zeitgeist as 
Bridget is hailed as 'no mere fictional character, she's the Spirit of the Age' (Melanie 
McDonagh quoted in Fielding 1999: inside cover). Bridget rejects the pejorative label 
'spinster' and its negative connotations of unattractiveness, loneliness and social 
ineptitude and, instead, she redefines her status by coining the term 'singleton', a new, 
rebel identity with its own language and attitudes, forging an unconventional and self-
selected urban family of friends. While Bridget is trying to throw off the stigma attached 
to her single state and resignify it as a novel and rewarding subjectivity, she also remains 
ensnared and persecuted by her recurring fear and 'existential angst' of 'dying alone and 
being found three weeks later half-eaten by an Alsatian' (Fielding 1996: 20). Bridget's 
inherent contradictoriness and deep-seated ambiguity about her lifestyle cast her as the 
'original Singleton' and 'the patron saint of single women', 'captur[ing] what [ ... ] it is 
like to be female' (Virginia Blackburn and Sally Emerson quoted in Fielding 1999: inside 
cover). In fact, she is 'a kind of "everywoman" of the 1990s' insofar ali 'the current era of 
the single woman might as well be described as post-BJ' (Whelehan 2002: 12; Zeisler 
1999: 2). In this way, 'the Bridget Jones persona' enters the cultural consciousness and 
becomes 'an identifiable character in modern life' (Whelehan 2002: 80). 
In this 'Bildungsroman of the [ ... ] single girl', Bridget struggles to make sense of 
her chaotic life as she searches for her place in the postfeminist landscape and 'career[s] 
rudderless and boyfriendless through dysfunctional relationships and professional 
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stagnation' (Skurnick 2003: 1; Fielding 1996: 78). Fielding identifies her character's 
disorientation and disintegration as a symptom of a postmodern era of uncertainty, noting 
that 'Bridget is groping through the complexities of dealing with relationships in a 
morass of shifting roles, and a bombardment of idealized images of modern womanhood' 
(quoted in Whelehan 2002: 17). In these complicated times, women seem to have lost 
their sense of direction as they are in the process of experimenting with a new set of 
identities, simultaneously revolving around feminist notions of empowerment and agency 
as well as patriarchal ideas of feminine beauty and heterosexual coupledom. Bridget 
neatly expresses the tensions between the lure of feminist politics that enables her to 
fulfill her public ambitions and a romantic fantasy that sees her swept off her feet by a 
mysterious and passionate Byronic hero. As Imelda Whelehan points out, Bridget can be 
described as 'a woman who recognizes the rhetoric of feminism [ ... J but isn't always 
able to relate this to her fulsome desire for a hero from a Jane Austen novel' (Whelehan 
2000: 136). These apparently conflicting impulses leave the postfeminist singleton in a 
state of constant emotional turmoil and ambivalence. Bridget's lack of control causes a 
perpetual fluctuation between the promise of a utopian and undivided wholeness and the 
disappointment following the recognition that 'having it all' is a demanding and complex 
undertaking. 
Importantly, Bridget internalizes and individualizes this postfeminist problematic 
as she turns her confusion inward and interprets it as her personal, psychological 
dilemma. Offering an intimate engagement with and promising a closer insight into 
Bridget's 'real' self, Fielding's novel employs the diary format and a confessional tone to 
provide the fiction of an authentic female voice, bewildered by the contradictory 
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demands and mixed messages of heterosexual romance and feminist emancipation. In this 
way, Bridget Jones's Diary exemplifies and epitomizes postfeminism's 'return to the 1', 
the 'implosion of personal styles and narratives' in the postfeminist 'rhetoric of 
autobiography' (Daniele 1997: 83; 81; 89). Postfeminism's personalism is translated into 
a visualized interior monologue in the case of Ally McBeal (Calista Flockhart) who often 
retreats into the imaginary world of her mind to deal with sexist putdowns, express her 
sexual desires and unearth her subconscious fears? As Rachel Moseley and Jacinda Read 
assert, the textually rich articulation of Ally's interiority is not signaled as 'manifestly 
unreal, but instead as emotionally real', literalizing the character's inner landscape for the 
viewer (Moseley and Read 2002: 243; emphasis in text). Ally McBeal refuses to 
distinguish between reality and fantasy in its multi-layered representation of Ally's 
subjectivity, making the heroine's emotional presence 'concrete, immediate, and all 
pervasive' (Moseley and Read 2002: 244). This reliance upon the subjective voice has 
been discussed as a postfeminist re-enactment of the consciousness raising experiences of 
second wave feminism. However, while fruitfully exploring the complexities of twenty-
first century femaleness, femininity and feminism, postfeminism's 'personal expression 
nevertheless differs from the personalizing of the political effected through consciousness 
raising' (Siegel 1997a: 51). It is argued that postfeminist writing/film fails to move out of 
the protagonists' personal sphere and relate the process of confession to a wider context 
of female discrimination and social inequality. Postfeminism's return to the personal does 
not provide an access to feminist politics and, thus, it risks sliding into a lifestyle 
feminism, confined to navel-gazing introspection rather than life-changing analysis and 
interrogation. 
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In fact, Ally McBeal is impervious to the feminist movement's political claims 
and, instead, she prefers to 'cultivate her own garden' and maintains the primacy of her 
personal problems, proclaiming that she plans to change society but she 'just want[s] to 
get married first' (quoted in Shalit 1998: 29). Bridget Jones has also been portrayed as the 
poster child of this self-absorbed postfeminism in her individual quest to combine her 
feminist ideals of egalitarianism with her 'pre-feminist concerns' and overarching desire 
to get married (Baumgardner and Richards 2000: 36).3 Accordingly, Germaine Greer 
denounces Bridget Jones's Diary as 'an updated version of the old Mills & Boon 
scenario' while Ruth Shalit describes Ally McBeal as 'a slap in the face of the real-life 
working girl, a weekly insult to the woman who wants sexual freedom and gender 
equality' (quoted in Whelehan 2002: 59; Shalit 1998: 32). Similarly, the novelist Beryl 
Bainbridge has famously distanced herself from this literary 'froth sort of thing' while the 
feminist writer Erica Jong laments that today's young women 'are looking for the 
opposite of what their mothers looked for. Their mothers sought freedom; they seek 
slavery' (quoted in Ward 2003: 1; quoted in Jacobson 2004: 3). 
These commentators criticize the lack of feminist politics and collectivity in 
postfeminist depictions of the singleton and they focus on her nostalgic and retrogressive 
pursuit of romance/marriage. Postfeminist texts are decried as 'nothing more than the 
contemporary version of the "How to Get Married Novel''', a 'retro form that details the 
search for and nabbing of a husband, any husband' (Jacobson 2004: 3). The postfeminist 
singleton is said to embrace a passive and disempowered image of womanhood that has 
simply been revamped for the postfeminist era but, in effect, rejects the feminist 
movement and its principles of collective social action. In this way, postfeminism's 
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'''new woman" is almost identical to the old', firmly demarcated and determined by her 
quintessential femininity and her heterosexual appeal (Whelehan 1995: 144). Underlying 
these various critiques of postfeminist fiction is a belief that feminism and femininity are 
antithetical and incompatible, undermining one another through their oppositional goals 
and values. Ultimately, Bridget and Co. are seen to be too feminine to be truly feminist, 
too preoccupied with their appearance and their desire to land a mate and neglectful of 
feminism's group struggle and political agenda. 
In the following, I oppose unanimously dismissive accounts of the postfeminist 
singleton that define her as an egocentric 'composite of frivolous neuroses' and a pre-
feminist nostalgist obsessed with male approval (Bellafante 1998: 56). Refusing the 
'narrow-minded description of the genre' as a reprisal of some well-worn cliches, 
postfeminist proponents insist that 'these books don't trivialize women's problems' and 
can be designated as 'coming-of-age stories, finding out who you are, where you want to 
go' (Jacobson 2004: 3). Rather than locking the heroine in a vicious and immobilizing 
circle of introspection. postfeminism's personalized narratives depict the struggles of 
contemporary womanhood to blend and integrate her contradictory aspirations. The 
postfeminist singleton endeavors to find a subject position that permits her to hang onto 
the material and social gains achieved by the women's movement as well as indulge in 
her romantic longings. As Bridget Jones proudly proclaims, 'we are a pioneer generation 
daring to refuse to compromise in love and relying on our own economic power' 
(Fielding 1996: 21). Instead of readily rejecting Bridget and her televised doppelgangers 
as spoiled princesses disrespectful of their mothers' feminist achievements or as aspiring 
wives nostalgically searching for a role akin to that of a romance character, I discuss the 
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postfeminist singleton as a brave and yet vulnerable contemporary heroine, 
simultaneously bewildered and confident in her quest to 'have it all'. 
Starting each diary entry with a calorie/alcohol/cigarette count for the day, 
Bridget clearly intends to manage and take charge of her confusing existence but she 
remains obsessed with the twin specters of marriage and physical insecurity. As Alison 
Case notes, 'the fact that Bridget keeps a diary [ ... ] is an important aspect of her 
character - an indicator of her desire to take control of her life, get some perspective on 
her more obsessive behaviours' (Case 2001: 178). Perceiving herself as wanting and 
unable to resolve her inner struggle, Bridget turns to self-help manuals to find 
relationship guidance and discover a code of behavior that will anow her to overcome her 
feelings of inadequacy and perplexity. She focuses on self-discipline and self-
improvement as the key to remodel her body and, on a larger scale, as the way to gain 
mastery over her destiny and find a boyfriend. Bridget's diary sets out her goals in the 
form of a lengthy list of New Year's resolutions but her persistent failure to carry out her 
plans marks the singleton's inconclusiveness about her position and her constant 
weighing of the costs and benefits of living in a postfeminist culture. Bridget's fallibility 
and haplessness generate a number of humorously narrated incidents and eventually, 
come to be seen as the character's passport to fulfillment and happiness, securing her an 
economically and socially powerful partner. In other words, Bridget realizes that her 
'natural', chaotic self is infinitely preferable to the fictitious one she aspires to and that 
being 'real' and out of control is what makes her loveable and attractive (Fielding 1999: 
376). 
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This ultimately positive assertion of the postfeminist singleton's incongruous 
multiplicity can be distinguished from previous backlash representations of the single, 
working woman that deny the overlap of female desirability and careerism and, instead, 
reinstate the division between the professional world and the private world of the 
domestic sphere that prevents women from 'having it all'. Curiously echoing and 
inverting feminist critics' assertions of the incompatibility of feminism and femininity, 
the backlash assumes that working women are too feminist to be feminine and, in their 
search for professional success on male terms, they are bound to end up single, unloved 
and fraught with neuroses. Proclaiming the dichotomy between partnerless 
businesswoman and homemaking wife, the backlash insists that women 'must choose 
between a womanly existence and an independent one' (Faludi 1992: 490). On the 
opposite end of the spectrum, Girlie, 'do-me' feminism rejects the notion of conflict and 
strife and assuredly declares that the utopian 'having it a1\' has become an achievable 
reality and a distinct possibility in the postfeminist cllOiceoisie. The singleton'S 
seemingly incongruous characteristics have been magically reconciled as she welcomes 
and celebrates her pluralistic status. As will be discussed, these heroines of 'chick lit' and 
'chick flick' embrace 'their own lives in all the messy detail' and firmly believe that 
'nothing is standing in [their] way' (Chick Lit USA: 1; Legally Blonde 200 1. MGM). 
While critics have tried to theorize and categorize the figure of the postfeminist 
singleton in relation to either backlash or Girlie feminist rhetoric, I maintain that she 
problematizes and depolarizes the above standpoints in her open-ended negotiation of her 
femaleness, femininity and feminism. Vacillating between dissatisfaction and optimism, 
anxiety and determination, she is simultaneously haunted by backlash images of the 
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deviant and abject singleton as well as elated by Girlie feminism's successful chick/chic 
achiever. The postfeminist singleton recognizes the difficulty and tension involved in her 
chaotic heterogeneity and, although she avoids reinforcing binary distinctions, she is 
unable to deny the existence of friction and struggle to hold together her feminist and 
feminine, public and private desires. In this way, she is both hopeful and disillusioned, 
enjoying and loathing her single life at once. The postfeminist singleton's non-
dichotomous and contradictory subjectivity causes her to be in a state of confusion and 
self-doubt. In tragic-comic depictions such as Ally MeBeal, the main character spends 
much of her time contemplating her fate as an unmarried and childless career woman and 
hallucinating a dancing baby. Similarly, despite her happy ending in the arms of Mr. 
Darcy, Bridget Jones provides a 'terrifying picture [ ... ] of a person at war with herself, 
'wracked with chronic body dysmorphia' and building her life around a set of imaginary 
rules and rituals (Whelehan 2002: 63; 45). Yet, at the same time, Bridget also celebrates 
the 'joy of single life' that allows her to 'seize power' in her job, spend 'delicious 
night[s] of drunken feminist ranting' and forge 'extended families in the form of 
networks of friends connected by telephone' (Fielding 1996: 244; 133; 125; 245). Thus, 
postfeminism's innovative portrayals of the singleton dramatize the complexity of her 
blurry, in-between position and articulate a paradoxical space that refuses to impose the 
idea of an appropriate and monolithic feminine/feminist identity. Rather than asserting 
the sheer impossibility or the effortless realization of a postfeminist nirvana where 
women can 'have it all', the postfeminist singleton expresses the pains and pleasures of 
her problematical quest for balance in a world where personal and professional, feminist 
and feminine positions are mutually pervasive. 
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On the one hand, postfeminist representations of single womanhood have been 
discussed as manifestations of a cultural backlash that blames feminism for women's 
apparent lack of control over their lives and encourages them to abandon an overly 
ambitious and ultimately destructive project of 'having it all'. Susan Faludi outlines the 
backlash tenets that have been propagated in a range of media texts in the 1980s and 
1990s and that are based on the assumption that contemporary female identity is troubled 
and tormented. In fact, the popular press perpetuates claims that 
professional women are suffering "burnout" and succumbing to an "infertility 
epidemic". Single women are grieving from a "man shortage". [ ... ] Childless 
women are "depressed and confused" and their ranks are swelling. [ ... ] Unwed 
women are "hysterical" and crumbling under a "profound crisis of confidence". 
[ ... ] High powered career women are stricken with unprecedented outbreaks of 
"stress-induced disorders". [ ... ] Independent women's loneliness represents "a 
major mental health problem today". (Faludi 1992: 1-2) 
As Faludi explains, these so-called female crises have been laid at the door of the 
feminist movement that has supposedly 'gone too far', providing women with more 
independence and choice than they can handle and thereby wrecking their relationships 
with men (Faludi 1992: xiii). Feminism is said to be responsible for 'the sad plight of 
millions of unhappy and unsatisfied women' who, thinking they could combine career 
and family, have jeopardized an essential part of their femaleness (Walters 1995: 119). 
Suzanna Danuta Walters summarizes the backlash argument whereby feminism 
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'promised more than it put out', 'we thought we wanted equality, but realize instead that 
we cannot have it all' (Walters 1995: 121). Attempting to live up to an ambitious 
'Superwoman' image, working women have been positioned in a no-win situation as they 
are either condemned to a 'double-day/second-shift' existence or they recognize that their 
professional success has come at the cost of relationships and marriage (Walters 1995: 
122). Backlash propaganda aims to dichotomize and create a dissonance between 
women's private and public, feminine and feminist aspirations, splitting their 'lives into 
half-lives' (Faludi 1992: 491). Moreover, the backlash not only warns women that they 
cannot have it both ways and must choose between home and career but it also makes the 
choice for them by promoting wedded life and domesticity as a full and fulfilled 
existence. In other words, women are told that 'if they gave up the unnatural struggle for 
self-determination, they could regain their natural femininity' (Faludi 1992: 490). 
Faludi is adamant that the backlash can be attributed to an entirely hostile media 
that acts as an anti-feminist force to sabotage and undermine the women's movement and 
slander it as 'women's own worst enemy' (Faludi 1992: 2). In particular, single 
professional women are targeted by the popular press and pilloried for their unmarried 
state and the error of their independent ways. Working singletons are cautioned that, 
unless they hurry and change their overly liberated lives, they are going to end up 
loveless and manless as 'single women are "more likely to be killed by a terrorist" than 
marry' (Faludi 1992: 124). In fact, 'to be unwed and female' comes to be seen as an 
'illness with only one known cure: marriage' (Faludi 1992: 122). Unattached career 
women are pathologized and defined as abject and deficient, selfish and emotionally 
stunted, and ultimately regretful about neglecting their essential roles as wives and 
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mothers. The backlash seeks to segregate single working women and represent them as 
'defective units', 'alone and isolated only by their own aberrant behaviour' (Faludi 1992: 
376). Singlehood is described as a woman's personal psychosis, self-inflicted and curable 
only through an extensive 'feminist-taming therapy' and self-transformation (Faludi 
1992: 372). As Faludi notes, single women are taught to see that 'what they think is a 
problem with the man is really something inside them', and therefore, it can only be dealt 
with through individual, rather than collective, responsibility (Faludi 1992: 376). 
Particularly, the singleton'S feminist convictions have become a trap as the focus on 
career has engendered a negligent and misguided attitude towards her heterosexual 
relationships. This personalizing and individualistic trend results in the fragmentation of 
any sense of commonality between women and the depoliticization of their anxieties that 
are portrayed as purely personal ills, unrelated to patriarchal pressures and confining 
social structures. 
In this way, the backlash endeavors to convince women of their need to scale 
back their professionalism and rekindle their interest in romance and marriage. The 
denigration of single womanhood is reversely accompanied by an enhancement and 
resignification of domesticity that packages women's retreat to home and husband in 
activist rhetoric. As Elspeth Probyn reveals, this marks 'the new traditionalism' that 
articulates and naturalizes a 'vision of the home to which women have "freely" chosen to 
return' as they have acknowledged its superior and preferable status as a site of 
fulfillment (Probyn 1990: 149). The new traditionalist narrative centralizes and idealizes 
a woman's apparently fully knowledgeable choice to abstain from paid work in favor of 
family values. The domestic sphere is rebranded as a domain of female autonomy and 
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independence, far removed from its previous connotations of drudgery and confinement. 
According to Faludi, this 'back-to-the-home movement' is the creation of the advertising 
industry and, in turn, 'a recycled version of the Victorian fantasy that a new "cult of 
domesticity" was bringing droves of women home' (Faludi 1992: 77). Couched in the 
language of women's liberation, the return to the domestic realm veils and conceals the 
political assault on women's rights, their re-imprisonment in the horne and regression to a 
stance of feminine passivity. This 'linguistic strategy' is an inherent part of the backla"h's 
conservative agenda that seeks to re-Iabel the terms of the feminist debate, control the 
definition of 'equality' and ultimately, 'switch the lines of power through a sort of 
semantic reversal' (Faludi 1992: 269). The backla"h employs resignificatory techniques 
to work against the gains of the feminist movement, individualize women's problems and 
splinter their collective struggle for emancipation while promoting its own stereotypical 
values and reasserting the primacy of traditional gender roles. 
Backlash texts try to convince their female readers/viewers of the impossibility 
and undesirability of being Superwomen as, in the attempt to juggle job and family, 
boardroom and babies, they jeopardize their feminine appeal and sign up to an exhausting 
existence filled with pain and guilt. The stigmatization of working womanhood is 
particularly castigatory and deprecatory in the case of single women who dare to diverge 
from homely femininity in search of a career. In the most one-dimensional backlash 
scenarios, the unattached and childless professional woman is portrayed as a figure of 
evil and a neurotic psychopath, designed to deter women from seeking public success and 
neglecting their feminine duties. She is the epitome of Otherness and insanity, standing in 
direct antithesis to the virtuous housewife and threatening the traditional family unit. The 
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dichotomy between the liberated and unmarried businesswoman and her apparent 
opposite, the homemaking wife, has famously been battled out in the now classic film 
Fatal Attraction (1987. Paramount) that reaffirms the family through patriarchal violence 
and eliminates the single woman in order to restore the peace and primacy of the 
domestic sphere. The film's villain, Alex Forrest (Glenn Close), embodies all that 
counters the dominant patriarchal structure as she is an independent career woman and an 
autonomous free spirit, maintaining a large apartment in Manhattan's meat district and 
living out her sexuality and her emotions aggressively and excessively. Alex knowingly 
enters into a weekend affair with the married lawyer Dan Gallagher (Michael Douglas) 
but then refuses to obey 'the rules' as she oversteps her assigned patriarchal position as 
the temptress/mistress and attempts to 'have it all'. Pregnant with Dan's child, she is 
resolute that she will not be 'ignored' or treated 'like some slut' and, as a potential 
mother figure, she demands 'a little respect'. Insisting that she is not Dan's 'enemy', 
Alex wants her lover to 'face up to' his responsibilities as a father and 'play fair with 
[her]' . 
However, Fatal Attraction forcefully and unequivocally undercuts the single 
woman's social position by depicting Alex's joint desires to succeed in her career and 
have a family as equivalent to madness. Rather than exploring the problems her yearnings 
pose (Le. changing gender relations), the film trivializes Alex's anger by focusing on her 
increasingly psychotic behavior and it obscures Dan's paternal duties by siding 
overwhelmingly with him and favoring his life inside the established familial entity.4 Dan 
rejects any form of liability or blame for his actions, declaring that having his baby is 
Alex's ill-considered and wrongful 'choice' and 'has nothing to do with him'. He can be 
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discussed as the epitome of male anxiety over the breakdown of differences between 
women, the disappearing line between businesswoman and housewife, following 
women's advancements in and encroachments upon the male sphere of work. Dan is 
determined to maintain the separation between his eccentric and self-reliant mistress and 
his loving and homemaking wife and thus, he disputes Alex's efforts to cross the border 
between the two archetypes and inhabit an impure in-between position. As an 
extramarital partner, Alex does not have any rights or deserve his support as he has 'a 
whole relationship with someone else'. Her calls for fairness are presented as completely 
'irrational' and unreasonable, a symptom of her escalating psychological disintegration 
and loss of control. 
Increasingly, the plot evolves to alienate Alex from both Dan and the audience by 
concentrating on her metamorphosis from competent and attractive professional to an 
allegorical emblem of the insane, Other woman and the 'working woman from hell' who 
pours acid onto Dan's car, kidnaps his daughter and, most disturbingly, boils the child's 
pet rabbit (Walters 1995: 123). Any overlap or similarity between Alex and Beth 
Gallagher (Anne Archer) is denied as the two female characters are polarized and 
categorized as the demonic singleton versus the dutiful wife, the lonely professional 
woman versus the good mother.5 Women's private and public, domestic and professional 
lives are seen to be incompatible and dichotomous and, in this way, it is the wife's 
responsibility to be the final arbiter of familial justice and destroy her unmarried nemesis. 
Confirming Bromley and Hewitt's assertion that 'in the 1980s the single career woman 
must be killed in order to preserve the sanctity of the family' , Beth defeats her arch-
enemy in a bloody finale and shoots the she-monster Alex has become in her intrusive 
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and violent quest to find an avenue into Dan's life (Bromley and Hewitt 1992: 23). The 
brutal killing is depicted as ajustified act of self-defense and an overdue punishment for 
the mad seductress who unlawfully tries to enter the family unit.6 Moreover, by 
eliminating the film's primary antagonist, Beth also ensures that Alex's baby, a 
potentially perverse progeny, has no chance of survival and dies in order to preserve the 
patriarchal family. 
The backlash firmly relegates women to their conventional gender roles of 
wife/mother and instructs them that their desire for a place outside the home leads to a 
variety of dire personal consequences and may even result in death. While the backlash's 
demonization of the professional single woman into a neurotic psychopath continues to 
have a powerful deterring impact upon subsequent generations, there have been concerted 
efforts to deconstruct and subvert this negative and one-dimensional image. The 
postfeminist singleton is still traumatized by Alex Forrest's cautionary tale but at the 
same time, she clearly distances herself from this monstrous stereotype. The film 
adaptation of Bridget Jones's Diary (2001) opens with Bridget's realization that she is 
'about to tum into Glenn Close in Fatal Attraction' and her proactive decision 'to take 
control of my life and start a diary to tell the truth about Bridget Jones'. Similarly, 
Candace Bushnell emphasizes that 'there is nothing wrong' with the 'smart, attractive, 
successful' single women in New York, insisting that 'they're not crazy or neurotic. 
They're not Fatal Attraction' (Bushnell 1997: 25). In the same way, Ally McBeal refuses 
to enact the feminine role of passively wooed maiden, complaining that 'when guys are 
persistent, it's romantic, they make movies about it. If it's a woman, then they cast Glenn 
Close' (Memorable Quotes from "Ally McBeal": 1). 
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At the same time as providing unanimously pessimistic and unfavorable 
descriptions of working womanhood, it is important to realize that the backlash also 
offers its own version of the career woman that contain her most threatening and 
autonomous characteristics and re-appropriate her feminist ideas. Backla<;h narratives try 
to recuperate and capitalize on the liberatory appeal of female agency and independence 
as they redefine 'having it all' in the safety of the marital structure in order to make it 
compatible with its own conservative agenda. In the aptly entitled Having It All (1991), 
Maeve Haran describes the married woman's dilemma to reconcile the conflicting 
demands of public and private life, 'reveal[ing] everything we won't admit about being a 
working woman' (Haran 1991, cover page). Haran's main character, 'high-flying 
executive' Liz Ward, finds herself 'torn in two' and 'pulled two ways' in her effort to 
personify 'the classic nineties woman' who has 'a glittering career and kids', a 'brilliant 
degree', a 'job in TV' and a 'handsome husband' (Haran 1991: 1; 176; 70; 3; 96; 
emphasis in text). Having been appointed 'the most powerful woman in television', the 
'first woman Programme Controller of any major TV company in the UK', Liz is 
determined 'to show not simply that a woman could do it, but that a woman could do it 
brilliantly' (Haran 1991: 79; 31). However, in the pursuit of her professional ambition, 
she realizes that she has lost touch with 'the things that really matter' ali her 'obsession 
with work' causes her to neglect her domestic responsibilities and duty to care for her 
husband and children (Haran 1991: 118; 32). Moreover, Liz has also been remiss about 
her femininity and physical attractiveness and, by 'playing men's rules' to advance her 
career, she has effectively 'become like them' and 'taken on their aggressiveness and 
their competitiveness' (Haran 1991: 225). While fighting 'tooth and nail to be treated the 
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same as men' and join their 'club', Liz has deviated from her natural path as a wife and 
mother, denying that she 'belong[s] to another species' and is essentially and 
fundamentally different from men (Haran 1991: 75; 6). 
Confronted with her husband's unfaithfulness and her own feminine failure, Liz 
has to reassess her priorities and admit that she cannot 'Have It All' but has to make a 
choice between 'success and happiness' (Haran 1991: 80). In true backla~h manner, Liz 
decides that 
it was time to tell the truth. That women had been sold a pup. Having It All was a 
myth, a con, a dangerous lie. Of course you could have a career and a family. But 
there was one little detail the gurus of feminism forgot to mention: the cost to you 
if you did. (Haran 1991: 53) 
Thus, the liberal feminist argument that 'women are capable of participating in male 
culture and of living up to male values' has been taken to an extreme as, in order to 
compete with men, women have been required to clone the male competitive model 
(Jaggar 1983: 250). Feminism has 'swung too far' by promoting work as 'the Holy Grail, 
Paradise Regained and Club Med rolled into one' and, instead of liberating women, it has 
put them 'more in chains than [their] mothers were' (Haran 1991: 82). Rather than 
improving and alleviating women's personal and social station, the feminist movement 
has placed them on double duty at home and work, saddling them with both female and 
male burdens. As Liz reflects on her previous pity for the preceding female generations 
who had been 'condemned to a dull life without achievement', 
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who had more quality of life? Her mother who could choose what to do with her 
time [ ... ] or herself: high-powered and hard-pressed, always earning a fortune 
with never any time to spend it? (Haran 1991: 117) 
In this way, Liz has become a victim of her own success as the freedom and 
choice provided by the women's movement have turned out to be a trap that prevents her 
from 'being the woman she wanted to be' (Haran 1991: 538). In fact, 'now' that women 
'could be anything they wanted', their 'choices made it harder to be happy' (Haran 1991: 
538). In a nostalgic search for a simpler life, Liz chooses to become a 'mommy-tracker', 
leave her urban surroundings, 'the whole melting pot of crime and dirt, greed and 
tension' and settle in a 'lovely, peaceful' rural idyll, 'almost chocolate box in its beauty' 
(Haran 1991: 73; 195; 197). Haran is intent on depicting her character's 'return home' as 
a quasi-feminist act as Liz 'dares to be a housewife', despite her husband's assertion that 
he does not 'want a wife at home', he 'want[s] an equal [ ... ] a woman who's her own 
person with her own life' (Haran 1991: 224; 177). After leaving her doubtful husband, 
the newly single Liz surrenders to 'the joys of home-making [ ... ] guiltily, as though she 
were taking a lover' (Haran 1991: 213). In this backlash scenario, the domestic realm is 
resignified as an 'enjoyable' environment, far removed from 'the drudgery she'd gone to 
any lengths to avoid' (Haran 199]: 212). As a conscious and supposedly empowering 
lifestyle choice, domesticity is distanced from its previous 'bleak' connotations of 
'suffocation and sacrifice' and it is redefined as a modern haven of 'security and 
comfort', a 'real home' that ends up seducing Liz's husband and luring him back to his 
wife and children (Haran 1991: 241; 240). 
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Ultimately, Haran pays lip service to women's desire or need to work as Liz 
decides to re-enter the career path on a part-time basis and alongside her husband as the 
Managing Directors of the employment agency 'WomanPower' that claims that 'half a 
woman is the best man for the job' (Haran 1991: 431). Thus, the dichotomy between 
women's private and public desires has been resolved as these extremes have been made 
compatible as part-time associates that allow Liz to have the best of both worlds and 
enjoy 'a life in balance' (Haran 1991: 539). 'BALANCE' is heralded as 'THE 
BUZZWORD OF THE NINETIES', connoting a space where 'one finds harmony 
between competing forces, demands and circumstances' (Haran 1991: 444; emphasis in 
text; Douglas Vavrus 2000: 414). As Liz notes, 'being at home part of the time gave a 
spice to working, and working made the time off seem all the more precious' (Haran 
1991: 417; emphasis in text). In other words, family and job are described not only as 
congruous and reconcilable life components but also, they complement and complete one 
another in a symbiotic and harmonious alliance. Reunited with her husband, Liz 
idealistically proclaims that 'perhaps together anything would be possible': she could 
'have it al1' and fulfill her dream of 'a life where I had enough work to keep my brain 
alive, and enough space to enjoy my children, and fun, and sex, and food, and love [ ... ] 
and gardening' (Haran 1991: 559; 453; emphasis in text). 
In this utopian vision, modern woman has achieved a compromise between her 
feminine and feminist values, between professional and personal happiness. This 
standpoint relies on a romantic egalitarian fantasy where men and women jointly abandon 
their excessive career ambitions in favor of an all-embracing partnership. Liz's short-
lived spel1 of singlehood is portrayed as a necessary period of confusion during which 
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wife and husband renegotiate the boundaries between work and family and then, re-enter 
their stable and newly equilibrated relationship. Although Haran advocates the extension 
of women's qualities from the private to the public sphere, she also naturalizes their 
domestic role and reifies traditional notions that women's most important work is at 
home. As Liz notes, she 'needed to work' but 'never again would she put her career 
before her family' (Haran 1991: 347). Thus, the 'dream of balance' idealizes motherhood 
and relies on a retreat from sexual politics, eschewing any acknowledgement of women's 
collective problems or their need for collective action to solve them (Haran 1991: 553). 
Haran's endorsement of a part-time settlement of the feminist/feminine, public/private 
dualism understates women's economic and social pressures that might prohibit such an 
equilibrium and thus, it can be discussed as an individual lifestyle choice rather than a 
universal panacea. 'Having it all' is qualified and downgraded to 'having it part-time', 
allowing the privileged woman to avoid the conflicts between professional and private 
fulfillment by providing a personalized solution that might not be relevant or achievable 
for the vast majority of working women. 
While the ideal of a balanced life comes under attack by the postfeminist 
singleton's chaotic heterogeneity, the notion of a unification of feminist and feminine, 
public and private desires has also been propagated by Girlie feminism that promotes 
femininity as the path to female empowerment. Girlie feminism unproblematically 
proclaims that women can 'have it all' and embrace a wholeness that harmonizes 
feminism and femininity, career and home. Moreover, these previously incompatible 
opposites have not just been reconciled but they are also presented as being 
interconnected and dependent on one another. Feminism comes to be seen as women's 
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'freedom' to adopt a sexualized image and exploit her feminine wiles. The feminist 
message of female agency and independence is negotiated and restyled by the Girlie 
stance that conceptualizes a new woman who is self-assured and comfortable with her 
femininity and her sexual difference. This contemporary embodiment of modern 
womanhood has 'made it by being successful and highly paid in her career', 'look[ing] 
good, lov[ing] men and sex' (Neustatter 1989: 238). Ruth Shalit refers to this 'new breed 
of feminist heroine' as 'do-me feminists', 'untrammeled, assertive, exuberantly pro-sex, 
yet determined to hold her own in a man's world' (Shalit 1998: 27). According to ShaJit, 
the do-me feminist is plucky, confident, upwardly mobile, and extremely horny. 
She is alert to the wounds of race and class and gender, but she knows that 
feminism is safe for women who love men and bubble baths and kittenish outfits; 
that the right ideology and the best sex are not mutually exclusive. She knows that 
she is as smart and as ambitious as a guy, but she's proud to be a girl and girlish. 
(Shalit 1998: 28) 
The do-me feminist expresses her individual activism primarily through the 
articulation of her feminine identity and she is reluctant to politicize her relationships and 
her sexualized femininity. Mirroring the backlash's part-time compromise between 
feminist and feminine, public and private ambitions, do-me/Girlie feminism places 
women's desires firmly within a phallocentric matrix of feminine achievement and 
heterosexual attractiveness. As Angela Neustatter reveals, the Girlie 'new woman' no 
longer requires 'any of that nasty bra-burning, butch, strident nonsense' and she has 
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learnt to make it for herself 'feminine-style' (Neustatter 1989: 137). She sees feminism as 
'old hat, a bore, and above all, something she does not need' (Neustatter 1989: 238). 
Instead, she consciously employs her physical appearance in order to achieve personal 
and professional objectives and gain control over her life. In this way, the Girlie feminist 
has 'a different relation to femininity than either the pre-feminist or the feminist woman' 
as 'she is neither trapped in femininity (pre-feminist), nor rejecting of it (feminist), she 
can use it' (Brunsdon 1997: 85). This new woman is both feminine and feminist at the 
same time, merging notions of personal agency with the visual display of sexuality. She 
inhabits a contradictory postfeminist terrain that unites patriarchal notions of feminine 
beauty with feminist expressions of female empowerment. Importantly, this 
feminine/feminist 'brainy babe' has to be distinguished from 'all other versions of the 
New Woman' as her adoption of femininity is framed by 'a cultural climate in which 
women can now be traditionally "feminine" and sexual in a manner utterly different in 
meaning from either pre-feminist or non-feminist versions demanded by phallocentrically 
defined female heterosexuality' (Shalit 1998: 27; Sonnet 1999: 170; my emphasis). As 
Esther Sonnet reveals, the current 'return to feminine pleasures [ ... ] is "different" 
because, it is suggested, it takes place within a social context fundamentally altered by 
the achievement of feminist goals' (Sonnet 1999: 170). The do-me feminist 'wants it all' 
and she does not manipulate her appearance 'to get a man on the old terms' but she 'has 
ideas about her life and being in control which clearly come from feminism' (Brunsdon 
1997: 86). Thus, femininity is resignified and it comes to be associated with feminist 
ideas of female power and agency rather than its previous meanings of patriarchal 
oppression and female subordination. 
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The Girlie/do-me feminist stance has been translated in literature and film into 
what has corne to be designated as chick lit/flick. As Imelda Whelehan points out, chick 
lit/flick 'is a very 1990s phenomenon' that reappropriates the term 'chick' (along with 
'babe') 'to new and ironic connotations' (Whelehan 2002: 67). Chick lit/flick wants to 
distance itself from feminist positions that have been deemed 'anti-sex' and 'anti-
glamour' and instead, it celebrates the pleasures of feminine adornment and sexuality 
(Whelehan 2002: 68). Chicks are encouraged to get in touch with their femininity and use 
it as a statement of empowerment. Accordingly, AlIy McBeal coquettishly asserts her 
feminine/feminist rights as a 'sexual object' when a prospective boyfriend fails to kiss 
her good night, raging that 'most men would have asked to sleep with me. [ ... ] Why 
can't he be a man and just paw me a little' (quoted in Shalit 1998: 31). In a similar 
manner, Elle Woods (Reese Witherspoon) is determined to be a 'one girl revolution' and 
'begin the toughest fight of her life - for love, honor, justice and respect for blondes 
everywhere'. The heroine of Legally Blonde (2001. MOM) follows in Ally's footsteps as 
she decides to enter law school and 'do something more with [her] life than just become a 
Victoria's Secret Model'. This 'Miss Perfect Ten' 'declarers] her independence from the 
critics' and she is convinced that she can 'handle anything' and that 'nothing can go 
wrong'. She refuses to be categorized by her 'blonde hair and big boobs' as she embarks 
on a journey to resignify her blondness in the heads of the Harvard students and 
professors who understand her Californian fairheadedness as a limitation. In this way, 
Elle manages to win her first law case and release her former aerobics instructor and 
fellow blonde Brooke Taylor from her murder charges by blending her newly acquired 
legal skills with her extensive knowledge of fashion and cosmetics. Elle discovers that 
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she 'hold[s] more cards' than she thinks she does as 'being blonde is actually a pretty 
powerful thing' that can be channeled 'towards a greater good'. This 'Cosmo girl' 
successfully exploits her blonde power and asserts her 'courage of conviction' and 
'strong sense of self' that enable her to redefine her restrictive and demeaning label of 
'Malibu Barbie', 'a dumb blonde with Daddy's plastic' as a 'valuable' and empowering 
asset. 
Ene's resignification of her feminine image and her decision to become a lawyer 
do not derive from her public ambitions but are entirely founded on her desire to 'hold on 
to a man' and 'get the love of [her] life back'. After being jilted by her boyfriend Warner 
(Matthew Davis) for being 'too blonde', Elle is resolute that 'becoming a serious law 
student' and following him to Harvard is the only way to win him back. As Warner tells 
her, he needs to 'marry a Jackie' and 'not a Marilyn' if he is going to live up to his East 
Coast potential and become a senator. Newly single Ene soon relinquishes her attempts at 
non-blonde 'seriousness' and discards Warner in favor of her professor who appreciates 
the true value and superiority of her blondness. Rather than trying to repress and deny her 
blonde strength, she embraces a sexy form of empowerment that projects her femininity 
as an enjoyable path to both emancipation and romance. Elle repudiates feminist 
concerns over sexual objectification and instead, declares that women do not have to be 
'boring and ugly and serious' to fulfill their professional and private aspirations. Elle's 
career success is positioned within a heterosexual framework that constructs women in 
tenns of their feminine and sexual appeal. As Ruth Shalit comments, 'the new working 
women [ ... ] wear their careers as lightly as their [ ... ] accessories. To them, a job is a 
lifestyle accoutrement, a crisp stratagem to make themselves more attractive' (Shalit 
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1998: 30). Women are advised that their feminist quests for agency and control can be 
combined with the search for a partner as their sexual power is automatically appealing to 
and aimed directly at men, to attract their attention and ultimately gain their approval. 
The notion of sexual projection as a means to feminist/feminine empowerment 
has been criticized as 'a new arrangement of an old song' that mobilizes women's 
sexuality and femininity in service of a patriarchal agenda and status quo (Helford 2000: 
297). The do-me feminist draws a sense of power and liberation from her sexual 
difference and, thus, she can be said to propagate the 'old-fashioned' idea that 'women 
get what they want by getting men through their feminine wiles' (Kim 2001: 325). 
Moreover, she can be discussed as an individualistic figure who 'tips her hat to past 
feminist gains but now considers them unnecessary and excessive' (Helford 2000: 299). 
The do-me feminist rejects the concept of group oppression and subjugation and instead, 
she favors and valorizes individual effort and choice. Constituted by and through a desire 
to gain personal advancement without the support of a feminist collectivity, she can be 
'accommodated within familiar [ ... ] western narratives of individual success' (Brunsdon 
1997: 86). In supplanting the analysis of sexual politics with the notion of personal 
choice, do-me feminist discourse focuses on women's feminine powers and eschews the 
notion of an external battle with patriarchal forces. As Neustatter reveals, the new 
feminine woman is a media persona constructed to be in unison with patriarchy and to 
'satisfy the yearning [ ... ] for a woman who does not appear to be in opposition' to men 
(Neustatter 1989: 239). 'If she will look good, act sexy, be on their side, then she can go 
out and be successful at work and drive a flash car' (Neustatter 1989: 239). In Janet Lee's 
words, 
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bored by feminism and its unglamorous connotations [ ... ] the media [ ... ] [has] 
decided that we've done feminism and it's time to move on. We can call 
ourselves "girls", wear sexy underwear and short skirts; because feminism taught 
us that we're equal to men, we don't need to prove it anymore. (Lee 1988: 168; 
emphasis in text) 
According to this glamorized, an-achieving, stress- and problem-free media 
invention, women's economic progress and social position are dependent on personal 
initiative and do not require continued feminist action and solidarity. Thus, the do-me 
feminist acts as a token opportunist whose progress and choices are no longer obstructed 
by structural oppressions but they result from her own will and self-determination. Critics 
are adamant that the do-me feminist's emphasis on feminine and individualist 
achievement undermines and denies feminism's ongoing fight for greater change on the 
macro-societal level. The 'me' based feminism of the twenty-first century flattens the 
dynamics of the feminist movement into one-dimensional characters that are nothing 
more than cartoons, 'Gilliganesque caricature[s], and 'brilliant 'iteration[s] of Jessica 
Rabbit' (Shalit 1998: 32). As Neustatter declares, 'the design is not about making women 
happy or looking at their needs' and it should be interpreted as 'the most cleverly 
marketed idea yet for attempting to put a full stop at the end of women's liberation' 
(Neustatter 1989: 239; 238). 
The do-me feminist discourse has been characterized as a 'pro-woman' but 'anti-
feminist' rhetoric that takes women's right to education, career and wealth for granted but 
repackages these feminist principles into feminine issues (Kim 1991). As L. S. Kim 
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notes, the do-me feminist depictions of 'the working girl (or single girl in the city) seem 
to proffer a feminist tone or objective but it ultimately seems to be a false feminism' that 
sets up 'pro-woman' values and expressions in opposition to feminist goals (Kim 2001: 
323). Kim suggests that Ally McBeal illustrates this pro-womanlanti-feminist stance as 
the program offers female protagonists in roles that are categorically strong and 
empowering but then deflates and feminizes their feminist capacities. In fact, Ally and 
her colleagues are Harvard Law School graduates, working in an up-and-coming Boston 
law firm and enjoying financial independence and social equality. As Ally notes, 'I've 
got it great, really, good job, good friends, loving family, total freedom and long 
bubblebaths. What else could there be?' (quoted in Ally McBeal quotes: 3). In Kim's 
framework, Ally's position as a liberated woman is sabotaged by her constant search for 
the missing element in her life, a man and a heterosexual partnership. Ally admits that, 
even though she is 'a strong working woman', her existence 'feels empty without a man' 
and, unlike her 1970s precedent Mary Tyler Moore, she 'doesn't want to make it on her 
own' (Kim 2001: 331; Chambers 1998: 58). This postfeminist singleton clings to a 
fairy tale notion of love and she often retreats into her private fantasy world to reflect on 
the deficits in her personal relationships. Kim objects that Ally remains trapped in 'a state 
of pseudoliberation' as her high education and professional credentials have not gained 
her personal fulfillment or self-understanding and her main strategy for success and 
happiness is 'through sexuality' (Kim 2001: 321; 332). In this way, Kim identifies Ally's 
joint desires for career and home, feminism and femininity but she categorizes and 
dichotomizes these expectations as 'pro-woman' and 'anti-feminist'. Following Kim's 
logic, Ally emerges as a 'self-objectifying, schizophrenic woman' and a 'falsely 
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empowered image', too self-diminishing and indecisive to bear the feminist label (Kim 
2001: 332; 323). 
Rather than establishing a dualistic and antithetical relationship between Ally's 
feminine and feminist, private and public traits, I argue that her status as an imperfect and 
contradictory feminist role model makes her an embodiment of postfeminist in-
betweenness and heterogeneity. Ally refuses to choose between her professional and 
personal, feminist and feminine aspirations and she unashamedly declares that she wants 
to 'have it all' - marriage, children and partnership in the law firm. As she states, 
I had a plan. When I was 28, I was gonna be taking my little maternity leave. but I 
would still be on the partnership track. I would be home, at night, cuddled up with 
my husband reading "What to Expect When You're Nursing" and trying cases. 
Big home life, big professional life, and instead, I am going to bed with an 
inflatable doll, and I represent clients who suck toes. This was not the plan. 
(quoted in Moseley and Read 2002: 247). 
The postfeminist singleton is unwilling to compromise on her job and relationship 
ambitions and, despite discouraging setbacks, she perseveres in her attempt to realize her 
utopian project. Unlike the backlash's negotiated or 'do-me' feminism's sexy 
counterparts, she does not view her empowerment primarily within a heterosexual matrix 
that defines women in terms of their femininity/domesticity. Armed with a feminist 
consciousness, she is alert to the tyranny of femininity that constructs the female subject 
as a passive object of male desire. Yet, simultaneously, she is also aware of her feminine 
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power and its potential to be deployed in new and liberating ways. Similarly, she rejects 
backlash representations of the abject and psychotic singleton but, at the same time, she 
continues to be traumatized and haunted by the ghost of Alex Forrest. 
Thus, the postfeminist singleton inhabits an ambiguous and equivocal landscape 
that renegotiates feminist, anti-feminist, feminine and patriarchal descriptions of 
womanhood. Importantly, she does not achieve an equilibrium between these competing 
forces but she is engaged in a persistent struggle to hold together her various components 
in a strenuous and tense relationship that does not privilege one over the other. As Ally 
McBeal asserts, 'balance is overrated' and she pridefully proclaims that 'I don't want to 
be balanced', 'I like being a mess. It's who I am' (quoted in Shalit 1998: 32). Ally's 
imbalance comes to be seen as her 'badge of honor', enabling her to surpass a 'black and 
white' worldview and 'forever see grays' (quoted in Shalit 1998: 32). In a similar 
manner, Bridget Jones reveals that 'confusion [ ... ] is the price I must pay for becoming a 
modern woman' as she tries to combine her progressivist feminist beliefs with her deeply 
entrenched patriarchal views about gender and relationships (Fielding 1996: 119). 
Bridget wants to promote 'the Urban Singleton Family' as a 'state [ ... ] every bit as 
worthy of respect as Holy Wedlock' while, simultaneously she is also determined to 
leave behind her 'freakish' single life laden with 'fearsome unattractiveness hang-up[s]', 
'an aching loneliness' and 'a gaping emotional hole' (Fielding 1999: 402; Fielding 1996: 
27; 244). Bridget's paradoxical outlook is encapsulated and summed up by her New 
Year's resolution to not 'sulk about having no boyfriend, but develop inner poise and 
authority and sense of self as woman of substance, complete without boyfriend, as best 
way to obtain boyfriend' (Fielding 1996: 2). In this way, the postfeminist singleton is 
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characterized by a chaotic and incongruous multiplicity as she is concomitantly located 
within the conflicting discourses of feminism, patriarchy, backlash and Girlie rhetoric. 
She emerges with a number of contradictory associations and beliefs as she takes up her 
pluralistic postfeminist position in her refusal to homogenize these diverse standpoints 
according to an either/or logic. Instead, she epitomizes a both/and dynamic that 
i11ustrates the incoherence and inconsistencies of being feminist, feminine and female in 
the early twenty-first century. 
In fact, postfeminist portrayals of the singleton still feature backlash myths that 
record the perceived neuroses of the single, childless, thirty-something, career woman. In 
Sex and the City, a fashionable urbanite laments that 'the issue of unmarried, older 
women is conceivably the biggest problem in New York City' while Ally McBeal is 
reminded by her male colleague that, after the age of thirty, she is statistically more likely 
to be 'struck by lightning' than get married (Bushnell 1997: 28; Only the Lonely, Season 
2). Faced with this 'men shortage', Ally decides to intensify her efforts to find a partner, 
wailing that 'there are no good men. I read this article, and on average, there are two [ ... ] 
per state' (Only the Lonely, Season 2). The successful lawyer traces her childless and 
boyfriendless condition back to her previous lack of focus on her personal life and her 
rejection of her true love Billy in favor of her professional goals. As she reflects on her 
current unhappiness, 'so here I am, the victim of my own choices' (Pilot, Season I). The 
suggestion is that feminism in the shape of a career and independence has not brought 
Ally the desired fulfillment, and she might be far happier if she had stayed on the 
'natural' path to motherhood and marital bliss. 
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In the same way, Bridget Jones wonders what her life would be like if she had 
'follow[ed] the course nature intended by marrying Abnor Rimmington [ ... ] when [she] 
was eighteen' (Fielding 1996: 119). Bridget is acutely aware of her status as an 
'unmarried freak' and 'love pariah' and she is whipped into high marital panic by the 
constant prompting and patronizing of her 'Smug Married' friends that her 'time's 
running out' and her biological clock is ticking away (Fielding 1996: 132,41; Fielding 
1999: 3). As 'an old girl' who has not 'snapped up' a decent partner, Bridget feels like a 
'failed human being' and a 'social outcast' (Fielding 1996: 40, 41, 290). The urgency and 
hopelessness of her position are made explicit by her realization that 'dating in your 
thirties is not the happy-go-lucky free-for-all it was when you were twenty-two' (Fielding 
1996: 11). Bridget reveals that 'finding a relationship seems a dazzling, almost 
insurmountable goal' as she has reached her 'female sell-by date' that determines her 
reproductive capacity and her visibility on the attractiveness scale (Fielding 1996: 144; 
213). In fact, 
the trouble with trying to go out with people when you get older is that everything 
[ ... ] gets infused with the paranoid notion that the reason you are not in a 
relationship is your age [ ... J and it is all your fault for being too wild or willful to 
settle down in the first bloom of youth. (Fielding 1996: 143-144) 
Bridget's mother condenses and summarizes the novel's backlash element by stating that 
the modern woman is 'just so picky' and has 'simply got too much choice' (Fielding 
1996: 195). Rather than 'pretending to be superdooper whizz-kids' who will not 
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compromise on 'anybody unless he's James Bond', Bridget is instructed by her mother to 
embrace the old-fashioned feminine doctrine 'to "expect little, forgive much'" (Fielding 
1999: 373; Fielding 1996: 196). Moreover, the maternal counsel stresses that women are 
iII-advised to follow the feminist route to emancipation that is seen as antagonistic to 
women's heterosexual appeal and instead, they should concentrate on their natural 
femininity to dupe men into courtship and then 'train them' (Fielding 1999: 375). As 
Mrs. Jones tells her daughter, 'that's what's so silly about feminism [ ... J anyone with an 
ounce of sense knows we're the superior race', admonishing Bridget that 'if you don't do 
something about your appearance you'll never get a new job, never mind another 
boyfriend' (Fielding 1999: 375; Fielding 1996: 192; emphasis in text). 
Bridget is aware of the 'irresistible' feminine power that women have over men 
but she is reluctant to obey and conform to Jerry Hall's famous adage that 'a woman must 
be a cook in the kitchen and a whore in the sitting room' (Fielding 1996: 67; Fielding 
1999: 18). Even though she sometimes wishes to be like her mother and she is envious of 
the preceding generation'S 'confidence in self, Bridget is unable to shed her doubts about 
the feminine trajectory to female empowerment and she acknowledges the unnaturalness 
and artificiality of the feminine ideal that is constructed through sheer hard work 
(Fielding 1999: 371; Fielding 1996: 66). In this way, Bridget notes that 
being a woman is worse than being a farmer - there is so much harvesting and 
crop spraying to be done: legs to be waxed, underarms shaved, eyebrows plucked, 
feet pumiced, skin exfoliated and moisturized. [ ... ] The whole performance is so 
highly tuned you only need to neglect it for a few days for the whole thing to go 
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to seed. Sometimes I wonder what I would be like if left to revert to nature - with 
a full beard [ ... ] spots erupting, long curly fingernails like Struwelpeter. [ ... ] Is 
it any wonder girls have no confidence? 7 (Fielding 1996: 30) 
Bridget is clearly familiar with feminist analyses that investigate the disciplinary 
practices of femininity that are part of an oppressive and inegalitarian system of sexual 
subordination and that women take up against the background of a pervasive notion of 
female deficiency and inadequacy. Yet, she also admits that the feminine discipline and 
performance provide her with a contradictory sense of identity as a desirable and self-
objectifying subject, endowed with a sexual power that 'everyone is sensing' and 
'wanting a bit of (Fielding 1996: 66). As a 'child of Cosmopolitan', she has been 
'traumatized by supermodels and too many quizzes' and she knows that 'neither my 
personality nor my body is up to it if left to its own devices' (Fielding 1996: 59). Bridget 
embodies a paradoxical position as she crosses the binary distinction between complicity 
and critique, denouncing as well as endorsing feminist and feminine values.s She is 
involved in the discourses of feminism and femininity and she adopts an ambiguous and 
multivalent perspective that combines censure and participation. The postfeminist 
singleton's pluralistic and heterogeneous stance has not only been condemned by critics 
as a 'joke' at the expense of the feminist movement but Bridget's own love interest Mark 
Darcy also finds fault with, what he considers to be, her indecisiveness (quoted in 
Whelehan 2002: 62). As he notes, 'a woman must know what she believes in, otherwise 
how can you believe in her yourself?' (Fielding 1999: 253). 
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In fact, Bridget's predicament is not related to her insecurity or inconclusiveness 
about her beliefs but it stems from her "'Having It All" syndrome' and her unwillingness 
to sacrifice either her feminist or feminine, her public or private aspirations (Fielding 
1996: 71). Bridget is informed by both feminist and feminine rhetoric and she struggles 
to reconcile her multifarious convictions and desires. She remains caught in a tension 
between her romantic longings, her feminist awareness, her feminine performance and 
her professional objectives. She is anxious that her feminist beliefs in equality and 
independence are incompatible with her femininity or, quite simply, that feminism has 
undermined and ruined her chances of having a meaningful heterosexual relationship. As 
she provocatively declares, 'after all, there is nothing so unattractive to a man as strident 
feminism' (Fielding 1996: 20). This statement's self-evident 'truth' is reinforced by 
Bridget's later realization that her happy ending with Mark Darcy has been delayed by 
his misperception of her as a 'radical feminist' and 'literary whizz-woman' (Fielding 
1996: 236). While Mark's first impression of her relies on a flawed description by her 
smug married friends, Bridget herself has helped to create this image as, in her first 
meeting with her future lover, she claims to be reading Susan Faludi's Backlash (1992) in 
order to give herself an aura of intellectual credibility. 
Bridget and her singleton friends have clearly inherited feminism's language of 
empowerment and agency that enables them to progress in their careers and renounce 
male 'emotional fuckwittage' as 'SHITTY, SMUG, SELF-INDULGENT BEHAVIOUR' 
(Fielding 1996: 20; 127; emphasis in text).9 Bridget's feminist awareness gives her the 
strength and power to turn down Daniel Cleaver's initial attempts to draw her into a 
sexual relationship without 'getting involved' or committed (Fielding 1996: 33). Bridget 
211 
indignantly rejects and dismisses his overtures as 'fraudulently flirtatious, cowardly and 
dysfunctional', reinforcing the singleton principle that 'men won't get any sex or any 
women unless they learn how to behave properly' (Fielding 1996: 33; 127). She seeks to 
advance the single woman's right to an earnest and lasting partnership and she refuses to 
be demeaned to a casual sexual liaison, not worthy of commitment and faithfulness. 
Bridget wants to champion the unmarried state as a valuable identity and she aims to 
counter the mythologies of abject single femininity that proliferate among smug married 
people. In what amounts to a singleton manifesto, Bridget's friend Shazzer proclaims that 
there's more than one bloody way to live: one in four households are single, most 
of the royal family are single, the nation's young men have been proved by 
surveys to be completely un marriageable, and as a result there's a whole 
generation of single girls like me with their own incomes and homes who have 
lots of fun and don't need to wash anyone else's socks. (Fielding 1996: 42; 
emphasis in text) 
Thus, 'singletondom' asserts itself against 'Middle-England propaganda' as 'a 
normal state in the modern world', deserving of respect and forging the 'Urban Singleton 
Family', a new set of relations that are 'just as strong and supportive [ ... ] as anyone's 
blood family' (Fielding 1999: 402; 38). In a similar act of female/feminist confidence, 
Bridget refuses to undermine her 'sense of personal dignity and self-esteem' and sabotage 
her position as 'a serious professional journalist' in order to act out her employer's 
'demeaning scheme' that sees her 'prostituting' herself on television by satirizing and 
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feigning female/feminine incompetence (Fielding 1999: 83; 32). As she notes, 'I need [a 
job] that will allow me to make serious use of my talents and abilities' (Fielding 1999: 
83). The film adaptation provides a visually powerful example of female assertiveness by 
depicting Bridget's departure from her job as a quasi-feminist statement. After being 
cheated on by her boss and now boyfriend Daniel, Bridget (Renee Zellweger) decides not 
to 'be defeated by a bad man' or accept the 'permanent state of spinsterhood'. Instead, 
she walks out of her publishing job by publicly humiliating Daniel, to the collective 
approval of her workmates and supported by the background musicof Aretha Franklin's 
hymn of female empowerment, Respect. Moreover, Bridget rejects Daniel's later 
attempts to rekindle their relationship because she is not prepared to settle for his 
unromantic and pragmatic vow that 'if 1 can't make it with you, I can't make it with 
anyone'. As she tells him, 'that's not a good enough offer for me. I'm not willing to 
gamble my whole life on someone who is not quite sure. [ ... ] I'm still looking for 
something more extraordinary than that'. Bridget is resolute that she will not abandon her 
joint desires for heterosexual courtship and feminist emancipation and she continues her 
perplexing and complex quest to 'have it all'. 
Bridget Jones's Diary emphasizes the difficulties of this almost quixotic project, 
centering on the singleton'S persistent failure to live up to her own ideals and her 
endeavor to combine her diverse longings. Critics have polarized Bridget's inherent 
tension between the confident paragon she aspires to be and her imperfect and striving 
'natural' self as a feminist/feminine, public/personal dichotomy. Accordingly, the novel's 
'key contradiction' can be found in the gap between 'the autonomous career women' who 
populate singleton narratives and 'the rather pathetic romantic idiots' they become in 
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their relationships (Whelehan 2002: 42). As Imelda Whelehan notes, 'while the success 
of professional women is trumpeted [ ... ] intimate heterosexual relationships remain 
unreconstructed, and people have no means of transforming their personal life to match 
their professional life' (Whelehan 2002: 42-43). This line of criticism relies on a 
perception of feminism/career as incompatible with femininity/romance and it presents 
Bridget as a divided individual, torn between her image as an assertive and public 
feminist and a self-deprecating and private femme. 
Contrastingly, I contend that Bridget's struggle is not to choose between feminism 
and femininity, job and relationship, but it is associated with her determination to 'have it 
all', at the same time. The novel sets up a friction between Bridget's ideal, balanced 
persona and her chaotic, genuine self, depicting the singleton's journey through self-
doubt to the understanding that 'realness' is the only guarantee for happiness. Bridget is 
destined never to achieve her goals of perfection and thus, at the point when she reaches 
her dream weight of 8 stone 7 pounds, her friends assume she is ill and Bridget is left to 
lament eighteen years of wasted dieting. As she reveals, 'I feel like a scientist who 
discovers that his life's work has been a total mistake' (Fielding 1996: 107). Bridget's 
path to self-realization and fulfillment is lined with self-help manuals, designed to 
reconcile the mixed messages that Bridget receives from her feminist/feminine sources. 
Steeped in the language and principles of both feminism and femininity, Backlash and 
Cosmopolitan, Bridget is aware that neither Faludi's feminist manifesto nor a women's 
glossy magazine will deliver the much-needed personal advice on how to negotiate the 
contradictory and confusing associations of single womanhood in contemporary society. 
In this way, the singleton'S real reading consists of John Gray's now classic self-help 
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book Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus (1992).10 As Bridget notes, she is loyal 
to 'the-Mars-and-Venus-concept' that, merged with 'Zen' and 'Inner Poise', is meant to 
consolidate her identity as an 'assured, receptive, responsive woman of substance' whose 
'sense of self comes from 'within' (Fielding 1999: 242; 10; Fielding 1996: 95). Self-help 
books are heralded as 'a new form of religion' for 'where else is one to turn for spiritual 
guidance to deal with [the] problems of modern age' (Fielding 1999: 75; 264; emphasis 
in text). Bridget hopes that, by 'centr[ing]' on herself, she will learn the rules of the 
dating game and the necessary techniques to manage the 'delicate' 'blending of man and 
woman' (Fielding 1996: 27; Fielding 1999: to). 
Yet, paradoxically, by concentrating on her 'Venusian' self in order to enhance 
her chances of capturing 'Mr. Right', Bridget adopts a separatist stance that aggravates 
rather than alIeviates her anxieties about relationships and promotes a view of men as 
'unattainable strategic adversary aliens' (Fielding 1999: 384). Gray's self-help manual 
depicts men and women's lives as moving along in different trajectories (and even 
different planets) with diverse and conflicting priorities and needs. Men are from Mars. 
Women are from Venus moves away from feminist ideas of gender construction and, 
instead, advances an essentialist notion that the sexes are characterized by intrinsic and 
unalterable differences that they have to learn 'to respect and accept' in order to give love 
'a chance to blossom' (Gray 1992: 3). Bridget and her friends relate this knowledge of 
unbridgeable and innate gender distinctions to their own lives and partnerships that are 
discussed in terms of a sex war. As Bridget declares, 
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[the] whole dating world is like [a] hideous game of bluff and double bluff with 
men and women firing at each other from opposite lines of sandbags. [It] is as if 
there is a set of rules that you are supposed to be sticking to, but no one knows 
what they are so everyone just makes up their own. (Fielding 1999: 114-115) 
In these circumstances, courtship becomes 'a matter of strategy and subterfuge', a 
'controlled conflict' where friends are regularly consulted and books ransacked for a 
grain of truth (Whelehan 2002: 27). Accordingly, Bridget seeks to win Daniel Cleaver's 
attention and heart by pretending to be an 'aloof. unavailable ice-queen' 'combined with 
Men arefrom Mars, Women are from Venus approach' but her attempt ends 
unsuccessfulIy with her being drawn into another instance of 'emotional fuckwiuage' 
(Fielding 1996: 73, 75; 76). Bridget is so exasperated by the rituals and conventions that 
mystify the relations between men and women that she proposes an institutionalized and 
governmentally operated 'code of Dating Practice for Singletons' at a brainstorming 
session at work (Fielding 1999: 195). Similarly, Mark Darcy also reflects on the 'danger' 
of this sex segregation and 'these mythical rules of conduct', noting that 'it hardly leaves 
room for a man' as the 'first point of reference' is 'self-help book nonsense' and 'some 
breathtakingly arbitrary code' (Fielding 1999: 252; 253). Commenting on this constant 
process of self-evaluation and scrutiny, he reveals that 'you end up feeling like some 
laboratory mouse with an ear on its back' (Fielding 1999: 253). 
Ultimately, it is Mark Darcy's admiration for Bridget's genuineness that makes 
her appreciate her natural, messy identity in favor of the ideal and book learned self she 
aspires to incarnate. It is Bridget's 'realness' and gaucheness that apparently win Mark's 
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heart, the fact that she is not 'lacquered over' like 'all the other girls' and that she will 
'fasten a bunny tail to [her] pants' (Fielding 1996: 237). Bridget is wanted and desired, 
not despite but because of her imperfections and her persistent failure to remake herself 
in another image, as thinner, more poised, more intellectual- in short, more like the 
'lacquered over' women Mark rejects. The film adaptation translates this celebration of 
Bridget's imbalanced self into Mark's revelation that he likes her 'just as [she is]'. 
Bridget's singleton friends react to this statement with utter astonishment as it exposes 
their elaborate self-improvement schemes as futile and even reactionary. Bridget's lack of 
control proves to be her most loveable trait and thus, she is rewarded for being chaotic, 
for being 'no good at anything. Not men. Not social skills. Not work. Nothing' (Fielding 
1996: 224). Importantly, the last entry to her diary is stripped of any weight and calorie 
updates and it confidently declares that she has 'finally realized the secret of happiness 
with men' (Fielding 1996: 307). Ironically, Bridget finds wisdom in the maternal advice 
to 'do as your mother tells you', a point that is reinforced in Fielding's 1999 sequel when 
Mrs. Jones meaningfully proclaims that 'it doesn't make any difference what you look 
like [ ... ] You just have to be real. [ ... ] You have to be brave and let the other person 
know who you are and what you feel' (Fielding 1996: 307; Fielding 1999: 376,377). 
Thus, Bridget Jones's Diary discards the notion of a perfect feminine or feminist 
identity and it embraces a postfeminist in-betweeness and incoherence as the space of 
'real' fulfillment. This optimistic and humorous assertion of postfeminist chaos stands in 
marked contrast to more open-ended and inconclusive singleton narratives that eschew 
the politics of the happy ending. In this way, Ally McBeallingers on the unresolvable 
tension between the singleton'S contradictory aspirations, frequently closing an episode 
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in a bitter-sweet mode that sees the character walking home alone from work, 
accompanied only by Vonda Shepherd's melancholy background music. In the following, 
I contend that ambivalence rather than resolution remains the main focus of postfeminist 
explorations of femaleness, feminism and femjninity. It is in the struggle and dilemma 
between autonomy and disempowerment, subjectification and objectification, that 
postfeminism's frontier discourse finds its most challenging and complex expressions. 
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3.2 The Postfeminist Cinderella and the Paradox of Choice 
Everybody's plastic - but I love plastic. I want to be plastic. 
Andy Warhol 
There are no ugly women, just lazy ones. 
Zsa Zsa Gabor 
'The postmodern body is no body at all', Susan Bordo notes in her study on the body in 
Western culture and in this way, she emphasizes the effacement of bodily materiality in 
postmodern theory (Bordo 1993: 229). Following postmodernism's deconstruction of the 
humanist subject, the status of the body has been transformed from a fixed, unitary and 
natural given, the 'only constant in a rapidly changing world', to a malleable construct, a 
historically and socially specific medium of culture (Davis 1997b: 172). As Bordo 
reveals, the body is a powerful symbolic configuration that is 'trained, shaped, and 
impressed with the stamp of prevailing historical forms of selfhood, desire, masculinity, 
femininity' (Bordo 1993: 165-166). It is the surface on which the central tenets, 
hierarchies and ideologies of a cultural context are inscribed and incarnated and, thus, it 
is never innocent or impartial, allowing direct and unmitigated access or knowledge, but 
it is always understood and read through various interpretive schemes. The body is the 
location where the law or logos of a society is made flesh, 'where the social is most 
convincingly represented as the individual' and 'where the power-bearing definitions of 
social and sexual normality are, literally, embodied' (Fiske 1989: 70; 90). In Foucauldian 
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terms, it comes to be discussed as a 'docile' body, the primary site for the operation of 
modern structures of power that are not top-down and repressive but rather, subtle, 
elusive and productive (Foucault 1977). The body can be seen as the agent and object of 
processes of discipline and normalization, a cultural text about gender and power 
relations as well as a practical and direct locus of social control. As Anne Balsamo 
proposes, the body can be interpreted both as a 'product' and a 'process', the embodiment 
of norms and deviations and a way of knowing and marking the world (Balsamo 1996: 
3). It is located in the material and symbolic realms of representation and in this way, it 
can simultaneously be discussed in terms of a metaphor as well as an everyday, lived 
experience or social practice embedded in concrete contextual surroundings. 
Some scholars have argued that the postmodern notion of social constructionism 
can be extended to a radical suggestion that thoroughly 'textualizes' the body and 
thereby, eradicates its historicity and materiality. The body is considered 'meaningless' 
until the law 'writes it into a text, and thus inserts it into the social order' (Fiske 1989: 
91). Michel de Certeau characterizes this process as an 'intextuation' whereby the body is 
made into a signifier of these rules and becomes denaturalised and dissociated from its 
physical groundings. l The' biological body becomes a fiction, nothing more than an 
empty shell to be filled with meaning and moulded into a social discourse. It is a 
separable and pliable asset that is no longer tied to a physiological reality but it is open to 
(re)signification and transformation. The postmodern body is described as an object of 
work to be fixed or improved, an alienated product and a 'text of our own creative 
making' from which we maintain a 'strange and ironic detachment' (Bordo 1993: 288). 
Accordingly, Susan Bordo invokes 'plasticity' as a postmodern paradigm, celebrating a 
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new imagination of human freedom from bodily determination (Bordo 1993). The belief 
in the body's plastic promise has furthered a disembodied ideal and a credo of limitless 
change that treats the body as pure text in order to emphasize the possibilities of re-
arrangement and agency. In effect, postmodernism's suspicion of the category of 'nature' 
has not only produced an understanding of the body as a culturally mediated form but it 
has also advanced a fantasy of liberation from these constraints, promoting the body as 
the instrument of self-expression and choice. As Bordo points out, 'in place of God the 
watchmaker, we now have ourselves, the master sculptors of that plastic' (Bordo 1993: 
246). The body comes to be seen as the vehicle par excellence for individuals to realize 
their dreams of autonomy and independence to choose their own appearance. In Kathy 
Davis's words, the body is 'just one more feature in a person's "identity project"', 'the 
ultimate cultural metaphor for controlling what is within our grasp' (Davis 1997a: 2).The 
malleable postmodern body enacts a protean vision of heterogeneity and multiple 
embodiments, allowing the subject to transcend hislher located ness and indulge in the 
epistemological fantasy of becoming multiplicity, of 'having it any way' slhe wants 
(Bordo 1993: 228). 
In the following, I explore how this erasure of bodily materiality is played out 
concretely in forms of body regulation and transformation that eschew the notion of a 
natural or essential body and instead, highlight its flexibility and alterability. Modem 
subjects are engaged in a variety of corporal routines, ranging from dietary management, 
cosmetic rituals, building and maintenance as well as complete reshaping and sculpting 
of the body. This chapter pays specific attention to the contemporary reconstruction 
practice of cosmetic surgery whose technological advancements could be employed to 
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literalise the ideal of plastic pluralism, shaping the body to the meanings that the 
individual chooses. However, I suggest that this ostensibly and potentially liberating 
medical procedure is inherently contradictory as it can be viewed as a source of 
oppression and freedom, complicity and critique. On the one hand, one can argue that 
cosmetic surgery is used by the patients as a resource to protest against the constraints of 
the "given" in their embodied existence and to seek release from these restrictions. 
Advocates of this surgical alteration present such bodily remoulding as being about 
agency and choice. As Kathy Davis notes, 'cosmetic surgery may be, first and foremost 
about [ ... ] taking one's life into one's hands, and determining how much suffering is 
fair' (Davis 1991: 23). Similarly, in his historical overview of aesthetic surgery, Sander 
L. Gilman emphasizes that 'the patient's perception of autonomy is central to the 
popularity' of body remodelling exercises (Gilman 1999: 17). The modern culture of 
chirurgia decoratoria is said to be born out of an Enlightenment ideology of autonomous 
self-making that instructs the individual to remake him- or herself in the pursuit of 
happiness.2 In this way, physical appearance is no longer a predetermined and irreversible 
biological fact but it is a plastic potentiality - to be arranged, re-arranged, constructed and 
re-constructed. 
Yet, the much heralded freedom of action takes place within structural limits that 
firmly demarcate the concept of choice within restrictive patterns of attractiveness and 
normality. While 'choice' appears to be egalitarian, it is ideologically determined and 
enmeshed in social and cultural norms that impose strict parameters on these choices. The 
body that the individual experiences is always negotiated through and constrained by a 
proliferation of homogenizing and normalizing images whose 'content is far from 
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arbitrary, but is instead suffused with the dominance of gendered, racial, class, and other 
cultural iconography' (Bordo 1993: 250). The pursuit of freedom and happiness through 
a bodily transformation presupposes decisive categories of inclusion/exclusion and it is 
rooted in the necessary creation of random demarcations between the perceived 
inadequacy or deviance of the self and the ideal sphere into which one aspires to move. 
Thus, the cosmetic surgeon enables the patient to 'pass' as a member of the coveted 
group characterized in terms of a standardized appeal and desirability.3 Gilman points out 
that 'the heart of the matter in aesthetic surgery is the common human desire to "pass'" in 
order to 'regain control of ourselves and to efface that which is seen (we believe) as 
different' (Gilman 1999: 330; 331 ).4 Kathy Davis and Anne Balsamo express similar 
views, stating that 'cosmetic surgery is, first and foremost, about [ ... ] wanting to be 
ordinary' as '''difference'' is made over into sameness' and the material body is translated 
into a sign of culture (Davis 1995: 12; Balsamo 1996: 58). In this way, subjects do not 
freely choose their reconstructed appearances as their plastic potential is pressed into the 
service of dominant norms and models of physicality that are strongly racially, ethnically 
and heterosexually inflected. 
In fact, I argue against notions of complete disembodiment and I maintain that 
this abstract and unsituated celebration of heterogeneity cannot escape the body's 
concrete locatedness that delimits its shape, size and general configuration and 
establishes the range of choices available in modem body cultures. I contend that the 
individual's agency to interact with hislher body is always situated within and part of 
systematic and pervasive processes of discipline and regulation that homogenize bodily 
images. As Susan Bordo points out, the idea that 'what the body does is immaterial, so 
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long as the imagination is free' glorifies itself only through 'the effacement of the 
material praxis of people's lives, the normalizing power of cultural images, and the 
continuing social realities of dominance and subordination' (Bordo 1993: 275). Instead of 
plastic multiplicity, the body operates in a highly restricted realm of cultural plasticity 
that reconstructs the bodily frame according to eminently ideological standards of 
physical appearance. In other words, while I do not dispute that 'everything we know 
about the body [ ... ] exists in some form of discourse', I assert that the body's 
discursiveness cannot be understood in terms of a disembodied freedom that is entirely 
detached from its physicality within a given culture (Suleiman 1985: 2). The body can be 
comprehended as an interaction between the material manifestation of a 'flesh and blood' 
entity and the symbolic construction that is embedded in a cultural context and is never 
unmediated, never free of interpretation. 
At the same time, I propose that the body's status as a plastic construct of culture 
offers possibilities of a transgressive and empowering body politics that works within 
confines in order to destabilize bodily norms. Body discipline can be understood as a 
paradoxical practice that makes use of the body's constructedness to promote feelings of 
emancipation and liberation while perpetuating a densely institutionalised system of 
values. I argue that body-related exercises such as plastic surgery produce tensions 
between empowerment and disempowerment as they put forward a complicitous critique 
that simultaneously endorses as well as undermines cultural constraints and directives. 
This both/and logic exemplifies the paradox of choice as the decision to undergo a bodily 
modification involves personal deliberation and agency, yet the context within which 
such 'choices' are made is inextricably linked to ideological conventions. Thus, the 
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notion of 'choice' represents a complex and ambivalent concept that is socially and 
culturally determined and, therefore, it cannot wholly be divorced from the body's lived 
and practical materiality marked by economic, ethnic and other differences. The 
individual involved in these body-shaping regimes can concomitantly be depicted ali an 
active and creative subject as well as a passive and victimized object, inhabiting an 
ambiguous and non-dualistic landscape where subjectification entails subjection and 
docility may be experienced as liberating. 
I assert that the postmodern body can be conceived at once as a socially and 
historically colonized territory and the location for effective action and self-
determination. It blurs binary distinctions as it is both the instrument of processes of 
domination and control and the site of subversive struggles for emancipation and 
resistance. In particular, I explore the paradoxical aspects of female embodiment 
i11ustrated by the postfeminist body that adopts the disciplinary practices of femininity to 
achieve self-definition and autonomy. Postfeminism embraces the conventionally 
feminine body, proclaiming that it can be perceived as a means to broaden female 
prospects and further women's empowerment. The postfeminist body is embedded in a 
socialIy and culturally charged terrain of signification that reconstructs the female body 
as a signifier of ideal feminine beauty, a billboard for the dominant denotations of 
Western femininity. Historically, women have been addressed by a number of cultural 
discourses and images that urge them to construct an imaginary body revolving around 
the adoption of a normative femininity. Following Arthur Kroker, one can suggest that 
women have always been postmodern bodies in the sense that the female body has 
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perpetually functioned as a sign of culture and the central location through which 
patriarchal power relations are sustained. As Kroker asserts, 
women's bodies have always been postmodern because they have always been 
targets of a power which, inscribing the text of the flesh, seeks to make of 
feminine identity something interpellated by ideology, constituted by language, 
and the site of a "dissociated ego". (Kroker 1987: 24) 
Kroker identifies the special status of the female body in postmodernity, describing it as a 
social construct and a scene of inscription that reproduces the cultural meanings that 
circulate about feminine qualities and demeanour. The female body comes to be seen ali 
'the vehicle of confession' through which women internalize the discourse of femininity 
and assume an alienated stance vis-a-vis their own bodily material (Balsamo 1996: 78). 
Within postfeminism, the body's sexualized physique becomes the primary locus 
of femininity, the visible site upon and through which gender identity is conceived and 
completed. As Sandra Lee Bartky notes, this focus on feminine incarnation marks a trend 
that sees femininity 'coming more and more to be centred on [a] woman's body- not its 
duties and obligations or even its capacity to bear children, but its sexuality, more 
precisely, its presumed heterosexuality and its appearance' (Bartky 1997: 148-149).5 The 
postfeminist body is moulded according to firmly demarcated standards of heterosexual 
desirability that delineate the dimensions and outward form of feminine normality and 
attractiveness. Postfeminist plasticity is shaped in the service of a beauty system that 
objectifies and sexualizes women and enrols them in a strict body discipline.6 In this way, 
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postfeminism upholds and reinforces women's traditional preoccupation with beauty 
practices, encouraging them to create a feminine body out of a female one and enter into 
a highly regulated realm of gender conventions that surface as styles of the flesh. 
Feminist critics have condemned this feminine directive as an instance of 
patriarchal colonization and they adopt an unanimously negative view of femininity as 'a 
tradition of imposed limitations' that heavily polices women's choices about their 
appearance and produces subjected bodies on which a distinct and narrow range of 
cultural meanings are imprinted (Brownmiller 1984: 14). According to this logic, a 
dichotomy is set up between feminism and femininity, between the feminist demystifier 
and the feminine dupe who blindly submits to restrictive beauty regimes and suffers from 
a false consciousness, a perpetual misperception of both self and world. Anti-
pornography writer Andrea Dworkin describes the female body's beautification as a 
subjugation and confinement, declaring that 
standards of beauty describe in precise terms the relationship that an individual 
will have to her body. They prescribe her motility, spontaneity, posture, gait, the 
uses to which she can put her body. They define precisely the dimensions of her 
physical freedom. (Dworkin 1974: 113; empha<;is in text) 
The female subject's material imprisonment is mirrored on the internal level ali she 
assimilates the dogma of feminine beauty and becomes a self-policing subject, bent on 
replicating and embodying the standards of bodily acceptability. The feminine ideal is 
internalized as an inherent component of female nature as women are prompted to 
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channel their energies in the hopeless quest for an elusive and perfect femininity. In this 
way, the feminized body is portrayed as being in the grip of systematic relations of social 
control that delineate the physical and psychological reality of being a woman. Following 
this line of criticism, postfeminism's feminine body can be understood as a patriarchal 
construct used to perpetuate female subordination and contribute to the reproduction of 
uniform images that serve to negate women's diversity under the homogenizing banner of 
femininity. 
However, postfeminist advocates insist that the quest for a feminine body can be 
undertaken for self-gratifying and even feminist reallons as the postfeminist woman is in 
a position to exercise her femininity as an empowering and subversive tool. In 
postfeminist rhetoric, femininity's inauthentic status as a textually-mediated discourse 
comes to be theorized as a realm of possibility and resignification. The absence of an 
original or essential feminine nature provides the necessary semiotic gap for the re-
deployment of femininity in new and emancipatory ways. By exploiting the cracks and 
fissures in the construction of gender identities, women can escape their presumed over-
identification with or absorption in their own femininity and create an ironic distance that 
allows them to read against the grain and dissociate their feminine image from its 
demeaning and oppressive connotations. The postfeminist woman performs a 
destabilization and denaturalization of the feminine norm and thus, espouses a distanced 
and parodic form of gendering that exposes its inauthenticity and fabrication. This gender 
parody takes as its object not the image of the woman but the idea that an essential 
feminine identity exists prior to that image. As Judith Butler observes, 'the parody is of 
the very notion of an original' (Butler 1990a: 138; emphasis in text). The prospect of 
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assuming femininity in order to re-interpret it has been heralded as a postfeminist strategy 
to blend feminist principles and aspirations with feminine physicality and conventions. 
Femininity is stripped of its deceptive naturalness and it comes to be seen as a complex 
and diverse discursive construct that is no longer immediately and irreversibly linked to 
female subjection but presents deconstructive opportunities for an enabling re-
appropriation. Postfeminism asserts the compatibility of feminism and femininity and 
declares that these previously antagonistic opposites have been reconciled in the 
understanding and re-definition of femininity as a gesture of feminist agency and 
defiance. 
While I do not deny the important role that femininity plays in bringing the 
woman-as-agent into existence, I also declare that this postfeminist potential for 
empowerment and resistance cannot be found outside of the systematic constraints of 
power and gender hierarchies. I maintain that the notion of gender rearticulation and 
disruption cannot dissolve into an abstract possibility and critical stance that negates the 
materiality of oppression. Postfeminism's ostensibly liberated subject is constantly in 
danger of being reabsorbed into the dominant patriarchal expressions and significations 
of femininity. In fact, I propose that the postfeminist body remains caught in a struggle 
over the meaning of the feminine construct, exhibiting a curious blend of activity and 
passivity, affirmation and subversion, complicity and critique. The postfeminist body 
eludes either/or categories in its adoption and creation of a feminine physique that can 
simultaneously be construed as the location for feminist emancipation and the site of 
patriarchal possession and consumption. In her act of bodily remoulding, the postfeminist 
woman is victim and perpetrator, subject and object all in one as her feminized self 
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enhances as well as diminishes her power, producing as well as erasing her sense of 
identity. Within postfeminism, femininity is characterized by a paradoxical two-sidedness 
whereby it can effect both a defamiliarization and normalization of female iconography 
and it can concomitantly be described as a product of patriarchal enslavement and a 
means of feminine/feminist agency. Postfeminism reclaims the female body as an 
ideological battlefield, a locus of ongoing controversy where women/feminists grapple 
with opposing cultural constructions of femininity. The postfeminist body's most 
compelling characteristic and critical capacity lies in its representation of femininity ao; 
undecidability, a 'slippery subject to grapple with, for its contradictions are elusive, 
ephemeral and ultimately impressive' (Brownmiller 1984: 19). 
This chapter focuses on the figure of the postfeminist Cinderella who exemplifies 
postfeminism's multivalent and pluralistic ambiguity in her concurrent search for 
feminine attractiveness and feminist empowerment. This postfeminist heroine 
concentrates on her body as the site for transformation and she seeks to improve her 
social status and increase her self-esteem by constructing an artificial femininity and re-
creating herself as an object of male desire. As critics have repeatedly noted, Cinderella 
can be identified as a classic tale of female enculturation and socialization, dealing 'most 
explicitly with the discovery of beauty, as a woman may experience it' (Zetzel Lambert 
1995: 78). It is 'the very fairy tale most often cited by feminists as an example of a 
patriarchal culture's schooling of girl children for a life of subservience to men' (Zetzel 
Lambert 1995: 78). In this story of rivalry, female success is described in terms of victory 
in a beauty contest as Cinderella wins the Prince by appearing as the most beautiful 
woman at the ball and by proving that she has the smallest foot of any woman in the 
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kingdom. Her own bodily material is shown to be inadequate and deficient and thus, she 
needs the external help and magic of a fairy godmother to change her into an epitome of 
femininity. This supposedly benign and benevolent helper turns out to be an agent of 
patriarchy, reconstructing the female body as a signifier of a restrictive ideal of feminine 
beauty. In this way, the female reader is instructed to define her identity as a being-for-
others rather than a being-for-herself and to re-invent her body in a feminine mould in 
order to compete for male attention. Through consistent dedication and loyalty to 
feminine conventions, she aspires to embody the socially and culturally determined 
beauty construct and transform herself into a patriarchally defined but nonetheless 
admired object of reverence. 
The Cinderella tale highlights the fact that beauty is a female identity claim, a 
route to success in Western culture and a legitimate strategy for women to access a 
number of social privileges. As Rita Freedman notes, 'there is no denying the power of 
beauty to influence others' and thus, women 'pursue beauty in their search for self-
esteem' and happiness (Freedman 1986: 230). By remodelling herself into an 
embodiment of feminine attractiveness, Cinderella achieves an awareness of her own 
womanliness as a desirable and attractive being who can wield her sexual power. The 
seductiveness or lure of femininity is that it provides the abiding individual with a secure 
sense of self as well as a sense of mastery. By following the rules of the beauty system, 
the female subject acquires social acceptability and admiration whereas a rejection of 
feminine appearance may be akin to 'a kind of death', to a renunciation of the only kind 
of life-conferring choices that are available to her in patriarchy (Morgan 1991: 43). 
Accordingly, Sandra Lee Bartky declares that 
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to have a body felt to be "feminine" [ ... ] is in most cases crucial to a woman's 
sense of herself as female [ ... ]. To possess such a body may also be essential to 
her sense of herself as a sexually desiring and desirable subject. (Bartky 1997: 
145 -146) 
Women obtain a feeling of control within the structural limits of their social order by 
investing in their physical capital and changing their bodies to conform to the cultural 
beauty norms. They draw a sense of freedom from their sexual difference by reclaiming 
their power over men in order to be recognized and valued as an idolized subject. In this 
way, a woman can experience femininity as rewarding and empowering, allowing her to 
gain regard and success through her feminine wiles. Hence, any political project that 
questions the patriarchal construction and feminization of the female body may be 
apprehended as 'something that threatens her with desexualization, if not outright 
annihilation' (Bartky 1997: 146). In particular, the feminist critique of femininity may 
pose a threat not only to the female individual's 'sense of her own identity and 
desirability but to the very structure of her social universe', her understanding of her 
positioning within society (Bartky 1997: 146). 
Feminist commentators have been reluctant to take into account the gender-
constituting and identity-confirming aspects of femininity/beauty and they reject 
women's sexual empowerment as a patriarchal survival strategy that masks as an 
imaginary and fraudulent freedom through self-objectification. They foreground the 
victimizing and repressive aspects of the Cinderella story, emphasizing that even 'the 
idealisation of female appearance camouflages the underlying belief in female inferiority' 
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as 'the sexy woman [ ... ] is sexy, but as object, not as subject. She expresses not so much 
her desire as her pleasure in being desired' (Coppock 1995: 24; Coward 1997: 361). This 
line of criticism perceives women to be in a state of false consciousness that puts forward 
the promise of social power and heterosexual romance while exploiting and manipulating 
their fears of physical imperfections.7 The female subjects internalize the feminine 
doctrine as 'common sense' and they adopt a perception of reality that involves them in a 
series of unreflective actions that preserve patriarchal forms of female self-normalization. 
In Rita Freedman's words, this mandate for beauty transformations can be referred to as 
'the Cinderella Complex' that works to 'further increase dependency by diverting a 
woman's energy, depleting her resources, and diminishing her self-esteem' (Freedman 
1986: 70; 71). Accordingly, women act as deluded and indoctrinated participants in their 
subordination as they establish an alienated and almost pathological relationship with 
their own bodies. By assimilating the fantasy model of beauty, women commit 
themselves to a relentless self-surveillance and self-doubt as they endeavor to incarnate 
the imaginary feminine ideal and stigmatize their unadorned and unimproved body as a 
source of shame. The un-feminine body is interpreted as flawed in its difference and, 
therefore, it has to be refashioned through the maintenance work of femininity, including 
such diverse practices as make-up, dieting and cosmetic surgery. 
Contrastingly, I argue that postfeminism offers a thematic variation on the 
Cinderella motif as it portrays the character's pursuit of femininity and beauty in terms of 
self-expression and autonomy. In the following, I want to move away from the idea that 
women are deceived and coerced dupes and I dismiss the notion of false consciousness 
that relies on a fictitious and oversimplified dichotomy between feminism and femininity, 
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between the enlightened feminist critic and the victimizedJemme. I aim to explore the 
postfeminist paradox that allows for tensions and contradictions between Cinderella's 
social constraints and her personal liberation of increased social power. The postfeminist 
Cinderella takes an active and subjective role in her bodily construction as she decides to 
become her own Pygmalion and refuses to be categorized as the passive object of cultural 
signification. As Efrat Tseelon points out, 'for women it is about shaping a new identity, 
about coming out of the closet, about transforming themselves with a magic wand' 
(Tseelon 1995: 81). Postfeminism does not depict femininity/beauty as thoroughly 
objectifying patriarchal schemes and it makes room in its ranks for those women who 
experience emancipation and freedom through feminine discipline. Instead of classifying 
the postfeminist Cinderella as a 'chauvinized woman' who is 'ashamed, eager to please, 
worried about her weight', the postfeminist landscape endows and empowers her with the 
qualities of agency and subjectivity (Bartky 1990: 8). The Cinderella characters discussed 
in this chapter feminize their bodies in order to combat appearance anxiety and achieve 
personal and professional success, sometimes involving technology that would astound a 
fairy godmother. Confined to a state of feminine deviance and social invisibility, the 
postfeminist Cinderella is either too old, too big or generally too anomalous to conform 
to the standards of feminine attractiveness. Yet, refusing to be branded as a freak, she 
attempts to cross into the realm of feminine beauty through enacting a disciplinary 
regime and a transformational practice on her own body. She consciously and actively 
chooses to embody and recreate the feminine construct in order to alter her standing from 
a colonized and oppressed victim of patriarchy to a self-determined and powerful agent. 
In the course of this remodelling, femininity is reconstructed by a resignificatory 
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operation that generates the potential for a gender parody, a denaturalization and 
subversion from within the feminine norm. 
Yet, while seeking to establish her individuality and moulding herself into a new 
image, the postfeminist Cinderella is also engaged in a de-individualizing and 
normalizing process that limits her cultural choices to an idealized vision of feminine 
beauty. The character's celebration of a multiple and malleable identity takes place in a 
cultural context in which 'the standards by which women are judged and critically judge 
themselves alter little' and the meta-message of femininity remains tied to heterosexual 
desirability (Coppock 1995: 29). In this way, the postfeminist Cinderella occupies a 
paradoxical in-betweenness that simultaneously situates her as a sexual being and an 
empowered agent, a patriarchal object and an autonomous subject. She inhabits an 
ambiguous and multivalent borderland as she struggles to achieve a sense of balance 
between these conflicting positions. The postfeminist Cinderella vaci11ates between her 
subjective and objectified status, between her wish to achieve an active selfhood and her 
temptation to hold back and passively assume a patriarchal meaning of femininity. In 
fact, I argue against a dualistic logic that posits the feminine construct within a 
framework of binary oppositions that juxtapose complicity and critique, feminism and 
femininity. I maintain that femininity'S complex contradictoriness cannot be summed up 
by a one-sided attention to its restrictive and oppressive characteristics but it is to be 
found in the overlapping features of activity and passivity, affirmation and resistance, 
alienation and absorption. I resist simplistic deductions based on a monological reasoning 
that defines woman through a masculinist rationale as 'what turns man on' as 'socially, 
femaleness means femininity, which means attractiveness, which means sexual 
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availability on male terms' (MacKinnon 1982: 530-531). Conversely, I contend that 
femininity blurs the binary as it works to bring the woman-as-subject into existence while 
concomitantly creating her as a patriarchally determined object. In the following, I 
propose that this pluralistic paradox is encapsulated in the understanding of femininity as 
a masquerade that can be discussed both as a defensive mechanism resulting from social 
powerlessness and a potentially subversive critical tool that initiates change in gender 
roles. 
The novels analyzed in this chapter engage with postfeminism's frontier 
discourse and they examine the boundaries between subjectivity and objectification in 
their depictions of a postfeminist Cinderella who remakes and recreates her body in a 
feminine mould. In Faustine (1995), Emma Tennant describes the subject/object dilemma 
in terms of a personality split and she adopts a pessimistic view of the beauty culture as a 
devilish ambush or curse that lures women into losing their soul and voice. Tennant 
rewrites the Faust theme in her depiction of a 'sad menopausee' who falls prey to the 
devil in his modern incarnation of a TV salesman who sells the cult of eternal youth and 
beauty (Tennant 1995: 407). This postfeminist Cinderella is robbed of her identity in the 
course of her feminizing endeavors and she is transformed into a dc-individualized cult 
object, a media star of Marilyn Monroe proportions. Contrastingly, in her 'fairy tale for 
feminists' Jemima J. (1998), Jane Green explores how the tyranny of slenderness can be 
turned into a fertile ground for female action and control (Wells 2000: 1). The 
eponymous Jemima embarks on a mission to shed her overweight body and re-invent 
herself as a feminist/feminine role model that 'is an inspiration to us all' (Green 1998: 
334). Green emphasizes the life-enhancing qualities of femininity that, in the right hands 
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and with the help and guidance of a feminist-minded fairy godmother, can be used as a 
means of self-expression and choice. Yet, in her most controversial and problematical 
personification, the postfeminist Cinderella obscures and confuses dualistic distinctions 
as she exhibits a contradictory mix of active and passive, complicit and critical facets. 
This postfeminist ambivalence is exemplified in The Life and Loves of a She Devil 
(1983) by Fay Weldon's protagonist Ruth who remoulds and surgically alters her 
grotesquely large body to mirror the physical image of her husband's lover. She 
forcefulIy and painfulIy enforces her feminine rights and she is both oppressed and 
liberated by the beauty system, simultaneously undermining and upholding it. 
Critics have tried to classify this paradoxical form of postfeminist subjectivity in 
terms of a micro-/macro-societal division that considers postfeminism's creation of a 
feminine plastic as an empowering and even rational gesture for the individual woman 
who wants to raise her social status and value through constructing an 'improved' 
physical self. Yet, at the macro-societal level, women may be seen to collaborate with the 
dominant discourses and ideologies that disadvantage them and sustain wider social 
inequalities. Rosemary Gillespie applies this micro/macro differentiation to the 
medicalization of appearance through cosmetic surgery that reinforces limited and 
restrictive models of femininity while allowing the female subject to experience positive 
feelings of control and choice. As Gillespie reveals, 
changing women's bodies through cosmetic surgery may on the one hand be seen 
to perpetuate female subordination. [ ... ] Paradoxically, however, at the same 
time it may be empowering for women. Through reinventing and investing in 
237 
their bodies, individual women may raise their social value through creating an 
appearance that conforms to dominant images of beauty. (Gillespie 1996: 81) 
Women's day-to-day partaking in a body image discipline (whether it be through 
cosmetic surgery, dieting, obsessive exercise or make-up) can increase their self-esteem 
and empowerment on the micro-societal level while such practices can also contribute to 
the reproduction of social structures that construct oppressive images of female beauty. In 
this way, cosmetic surgery simultaneously exhibits enabling and constraining features 
and it can be embraced as an individual lifestyle choice that seeks to make life as 
enjoyable as possible within the context of structural limitations. Kathy Davis 
summarizes the inherently ambivalent nature of this transformational exercise, noting that 
'cosmetic surgery might be both a problem and a solution' (Davis 1991: 22) . 
. This distinction between women's personal and collective spheres relies on an 
interpretation of the postfeminist Cinderella as a token achiever who affirms female 
oppression while neutralizing that affirmation in an individualistic rhetoric. The 
macro/micro contrast establishes oppositional criteria of female success that depict the 
postfeminist woman advancing through feminine accomplishments whereas women gain 
greater freedom through a politicized feminist critique that counteracts the patriarchal 
system of feminine enculturation.8 According to this logic, any feminine victory will be 
at best temporary as the individual's creative force and autonomy remain constrained on 
the micro level of practical achievement and they are directed towards the gain of instant 
pleasure and social reward rather than a generalized change in the hegemonic structures.9 
Women are no longer encouraged to think of themselves as a disadvantaged gendcred 
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group but rather as atomized subjects claiming their right to be desired and successful in 
a sexist society. This focus on the postfeminist token is seen to be disempowering for the 
majority of women as it mystifies their unequal social position and presents them as no 
longer needing a collective politics. 
I want to problematize this notion of postfeminist tokenism that advances an 
oversimplified classification and dichotomy between feminism and femininity, between 
individual and communal success. I maintain that femininity is an inherently and 
internally contradictory construct that enhances as well as diminishes women's power. I 
propose that the spectrum of feminine power/powerlessness is contained within the 
double-edged concept of masquerade that can serve as a placatory display of feminine 
receptivity and passivity while also implying an active and subversive destabilization of 
the feminine position. Psychoanalyst Joan Riviere pioneered the idea of 'womanliness as 
a masquerade' in her 1929 essay where she examines femininity as a charade of power, a 
reaction-formation that compensates for the female subject's theft of masculine 
subjectivity by disguising herself as an object of male desire and 'masquerading as 
guiltless and innocent', as 'merely a castrated woman' (Riviere 1986: 38).10 The feminine 
masquerade comes to be seen as a disarming impersonation and a defence mechanism, 
defusing patriarchal anger and deflecting attention from women's pursuit of male control 
and authority through the construction of a non-threateninglnon-phallic and sexualized 
image. As Riviere famously declares, 
womanliness therefore could be assumed and worn as a mask, both to hide the 
possession of masculinity and to avert the reprisals expected if she was found to 
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possess it - much as a thief will turn out his pockets and ask to be searched to 
prove that he has not the stolen goods. (Riviere 1986: 38) 
Riviere identifies the masquerade as a sign of disempowerment and the result of 
the female subject's social subjugation, a 'compulsive reversal of her intellectual 
performance' (Riviere 1986: 38). In a similar manner, Mary Ann Doane reveals that the 
masquerade is not employed to illuminate female autonomy and creativity 'but to 
designate a mode of being for the other - the sheer objectification or reification of 
representation' (Doane 1991: 33). Riviere's patient renounces her subjective status and 
adopts the feminine mask in order to conceal her lapse into the realm of power and her 
illicit assumption of masculinity. In this description, the masquerade is theorized ali a 
joyless compensatory gesture, 'a device for avoiding anxiety' and 'the very antithesis of 
spectatorship/subjectivity', specifying a norm of femininity but 'not a way out' (Riviere 
1986: 38; Doane 1991: 33). The concept of masquerade upholds a gender hierarchy that 
makes femininity dependent on masculinity as a frame of reference for its very definition. 
The masquerade presupposes a system dictated by a dualistic logic that subordinates 
feminine passivity to masculine activity and thus, it remains tied to a set of binary 
oppositions that masculinize female agency and desire. 
While, on the face of it, the masquerade facilitates an understanding of the 
woman's position as a passive spectacle rather than an active subject, it has also been 
heralded as an empowering strategy capable of undermining the phallocratic dichotomy. 
In fact, Riviere's theory can be reconceived in more subversive and challenging terms as 
it harbors the possibility for a reinterpretation of the myths of femininity. This critical 
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potential is lodged within the notion of masquerade and it is to be found in the 
deconstruction of an authentic feminine essence and its representation as a resignifiable 
social construct. Riviere emphasizes that she does not make a distinction between 
'genuine womanliness and the masquerade', proclaiming that 'whether radical or 
superficial, they are the same thing' (Riviere 1986: 38). Mary Ann Doane develops and 
expands this psychoanalytic account of femininity, proposing that the masquerade's 
resistance to patriarchal positioning lies in its denial of the feminine construction as 
'immediacy, or proximity-to-self, as precisely 'imagistic' (Doane 1991: 37; Doane 1992: 
235). As she notes, the patriarchal conception of femininity is one of nearness and over-
presence, hence lacking the distance between 'oneself and one's image' (Doane 1992: 
235). For a woman to embrace this stance of feminine closeness is to accept her place 
within patriarchy and to affirm her own disempowerment in the cultural arena. In 
flaunting womanliness as a mask that can be worn or removed, the masquerade 
challenges this patriarchal notion as it delineates femininity as a culturally assigned site. 
Thus, it provides an internal contradiction that attributes to the woman the necessary gap 
and alienation for redeploying femininity and reading it differently. In Doane's words, 
to claim that femininity is a function of the mask is to dismantle the question of 
essentialism before it can even be posed. In a theory which stipulates a 
claustrophobic closeness of the woman in relation to her own body, the concept of 
masquerade suggests a "glitch" in the system. (Doane 1991: 37) 
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Consequently, Doane concludes that 'the effectivity of masquerade lies precisely in its 
potential to manufacture a distance from the image, to generate a problematic within 
which the image is manipulable, producible, and readable by the woman' (Doane 1992: 
240). 
Riviere's and Doane's insights have been reworked in contemporary theories of 
gender parody that take up the idea that there is no authentic or essential femininity in 
order to advance the notion of the performative status and the imitative structure of the 
feminine construct. Judith Butler has been instrumental in the formulation and 
theorization of gender peiformativity whereby femininity and masculinity come into 
being when a body performs or 'does gender' in a stylized reiteration of conventions that 
eventually become naturalized and consolidated. As Butler notes, gender is 'an identity 
tenuously constituted in time' and 'instituted through the stylisation of the body' (Butler 
1997c: 402). The gendered body is performative in the sense that it has 'no ontological 
status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality' and thus, gender 'can be 
neither true nor false, neither real nor apparent, neither original nor derived' (Butler 
1990a: 136; 141). Instead, 'gender is always a doing', a 'performance that relies on a 
certain practice of repetition' that retroactively produces the effect of identity and the 
illusion that there is an inner gender core (Butler 1990a: 25; Butler 1990c: 2). Hence, 'all 
gendering is a kind of impersonation and approximation', an 'imitation for which there is 
no original' but rather the idea of an imaginary or fantasized origin (Butler 1993b: 313).11 
While the everyday performativity of gender resides in unacknowledged acts of 
citation that produce the female body as feminine, Butler's particular interest lies in 
disrupting this appearance of natural continuity and making 'gender trouble'. By 
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exposing gender as a reiterative mechanism and a performative achievement, Butler 
explores the potential of an unfaithful and critical repetition that might displace the very 
constructs by which it is mobilized. As she notes, 
if the ground of gender is the stylised repetition of acts through time, and not a 
seemingly seamless identity, then the possibilities of gender transformation are to 
be found in the arbitrary relation between such acts, in the possibility of a 
different sort of repeating, in the breaking or subversive repetition of that style. 
(Butler 1997c: 402) 
In other words, femininity becomes available for a deconstructive practice and/or politics 
that use and resignify simulation in ways that challenge the stable notion of gender as the 
edifice of sexual difference. Instead of a monological and homogenous structure, the 
gender template is opened up to a more complex and fragmented set of signposts that 
refashion the body and a110w the subject to disengage from the roles of an apparently 
naturalized femininity/masculinity. Yet, at the same time as proclaiming that gender can 
'be rendered thoroughly and radically incredible', Butler is also aware that this form of 
parodic imitation cannot be confused with a voluntarist stance whereby subjects choose 
their various identities much as they would select their clothes (Butler 1990a: 141). 
Butler is adamant that 'gender performativity is not a question of instrumentally 
deploying a "masquerade'" for such a construal of performativity presupposes an 
intentional subject behind the deed (Butler 1995: 136).12 On the contrary, gender is an 
involuntary and imposed production within a culturally restricted space and it is always 
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put on under constraint as a compulsory performance that acts in line with heterosexual 
conventionsY In this way, femininity is 'not the product of a choice, but the forcible 
citation of a norm, one whose complex historicity is indissociable from relations of 
discipline, regulation, punishment' (Butler 1993a: 232). 
Thus, performativity is simultaneously theorized in terms of transgressivity and 
normativity whereby it both empowers and constrains the subject. As Butler admits, 
'there is no guarantee that exposing the naturalized status of heterosexuality wil1lead to 
its subversion' as the gender meanings taken up in these parodic styles remain 'part of 
hegemonic, misogynist culture' (Butler 1993a: 231; Butler 1990a: 138). Like the 
masquerade, Butler's notion of gender parody is characterized by an undeterminable 
disruptive and revolutionary potential that cannot be summed up by a dichotomous logic 
as either a powerful and self-conscious protest or a disempowering and unconscious 
placation. As Veronique Machelidon concludes, 
the subversiveness of masquerade [and gender parody] can probably never be 
calculated, for its actors a<; weB as its spectators [ ... ] are themselves located 
within the power they are hoping to expose. But neither should the possibility of 
subversion ever be underestimated because power always generates contradictions 
and because "subjects" will respond idiosyncratically to its multiple. complex. 
and at times inconsistent cultural imperatives. (Machelidon 2000: 116) 
Ultimately. the importance of the concepts of masquerade and gender parody is that they 
constitute a transgressive doubleness. an inscription of alternative wishes that both 
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undermine and reinforce patriarchal representations of womanliness, blurring the 
opposition between activity and passivity, subject and object. 
Emma Tennant explores the postfeminist spectrum of feminine significations in 
her novel Faustine (1992), centered around the sufferings of a grandmother who refuses 
the invisibility of 'the no woman's land of old age' and makes a pact with the devil in 
order to regain her youthful looks and beauty (Tennant 1995: 372). Tennant's text is a 
female-orientated re-writing and variation on the Faust theme that portrays a Cinderella 
figure invading the God-Man-Devil trinity and siding with the darker forces to obtain 
sexual power. The narrative focuses on the granddaughter Ella who embarks on a quest 
for her roots as she tries to come to terms with both her mother and her grandmother, the 
feminist theorist Anna and Muriel Twyman, the eponymous Faustine. Tennant examines 
the interconnections and contradictions between patriarchal, feminist and postfeminist 
conceptions of female power in her portrayal of two mother-daughter relationships that 
are disrupted by the older woman's beautification and rejuvenation. 14 Importantly, Muriel 
is never given the opportunity to disclose her motives and clarify her own view of the 
events as the book is divided between four different narrators who provide outside and 
subjective perspectives on Faustine. These external voices include Ella who only has her 
childhood recollections to rely on, Muriel's daughter Anna and Jasmine, Muriel's best 
friend who turns out to be the tale's Frau Marthe, 'a natural witch' in league with the 
devil!Mephisto (Tennant 1995: 408). The latter provides the final comment on Muriel's 
life and her metamorphosis, revealing the devilish origin of the beauty myth that holds 
out the promise of 'an impossible, artificial present' in exchange for women's souls 
(Tennant 1995: 361). In his pursuit of 'Satanic chaos', the devil seeks his prey among 
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middle-aged women and enrols them in a vicious and unrelenting circle of self-
objectification and de-individualization (Tennant 1995: 407). After her transformation, 
Muriel becomes a walking advertisement and she is reborn as 'the ultimate symbol' of 
'the meaninglessness and uniqueness of beauty', the cult persona Lisa Crane (Tennant 
1995: 305). Ultimately, beauty becomes a curse and the protagonist is driven 'pretty well 
insane' by her diabolical make-over (Tennant 1995: 397). 
Muriel/Lisa/Faustine remains a void at the center of the novel as she never 
appears in person but is remembered by the various narrators. These different 
reconstructions are dissonant and even contradictory, creating the image of an utterly 
self-divided person, unable to cohere or hold together her paradoxical facets and 
characteristics. Ella's memories of 'the simple, loving Muriel' stand in stark contrast to 
the 'heartless' 'Snow Queen' Lisa Crane who has 'a new, ruthless attitude [ ... J to anyone 
[ •.. J who crossed her path' (Tennant 1995: 344; 408; 380; 378). Ella idealizes her 
grandmother as her 'one sacred thing', 'the dream of my childhood' and 'the only secure 
thing I have' (Tennant 1995: 342; 373). The young woman's search is for an imaginary 
childhood idol and in this way, she compares herself to 'a heroine in a romantic novel', 
except that 'my quest wasn't for a dashing young man [ ... J it was for an old woman' 
(Tennant 1995: 294). 'I have her in a place no one can ever touch', Ella declares and she 
reacts sulkily to Jasmine's suggestion that Muriel was bored with caring for her 
granddaughter which, according to EIla, should have made her 'blissfully happy' 
(Tennant 1995: 343). She constructs her own vision of Muriel and clearly misreads her 
grandmother who 'was like a magician to me, for she could do anything. [ ... J She could 
get me what 1 wanted just as soon as 1 asked for it' (Tennant 1995: 327). 
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Ella fails to comprehend that her grandmother is a sexual being with needs and 
desires and thus, she cannot conceive of Muriel as 'a woman [ ... ] with a future when 
what was expected of her and her contemporaries was the acceptance that nothing lay 
ahead but memories of the past' (Tennant 1995: 386). Significantly, Ella cannot 
understand the connection between the media star Lisa Crane and the grandmotherly 
Muriel except in terms of a working relation between employer and employee. 'It seems 
highly unlikely that someone like my grandma would be invited to eat off gold plates', 
Ella notes when she sees a sumptuous dinner being prepared and she concludes that 'of 
course, Muriel had been a cook and housekeeper here for Lisa Crane' (Tennant 1995: 
340; 311). She only gradually accepts that the 'wealthy image queen' with the 'exquisite 
features of Helen of Troy' and the unsophisticated and loving Muriel are the same 
person, realizing 'how deeply embedded in a pre-adolescent state' she has been (Tennant 
1995: 336; 353; 385). Ella's growing up experience leads her on the same Satanic path to 
beauty as she increasingly becomes influenced by the 'Empress of the Air' or 'the ruler 
of the world' and she internalizes her iconic vision of femininity (Tennant 1995: 392; 
355). As she explains, 'the core of me drained out, as if the fame of Lisa Crane has taken 
away any picture of myself I might ever have had' (Tennant 1995: 374). In the end, Ella 
is enlisted in 'the endless duplication of that image' as her mirrored reflection merges 
with that of Muriel/Lisa, becoming indistinguishable, 'like two halves of an apple' 
(Tennant 1995: 305; 398). 
Tennant emphasizes the deeply embedded beauty myths that span over female 
generations and equally effect grandmother and granddaughter. Importantly, Ella displays 
no interest in her mother's feminist commitments that are 'something frightening and far 
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away from me' (Tennant 1995: 323). She rejects 'the books on the sufferings and 
triumphs of women' that Anna buys for her in favor of Muriel's 'pink celluloid dolls 
[ ... ] with hair so impossibly blonde it made ordinary hair seem as dull as ditch water - or 
as my mother's hair' (Tennant 1995: 323). Tennant makes an implicit statement about the 
pre-feminist/patriarchal component of postfeminism while also problematizing 
oppositional feminist discourse that simplistica11y dismisses and denounces beauty as a 
monological cultural restriction. The novelist discredits the idea that women's obsession 
and enchantment with the imaginary feminine can be shed with feminist rhetoric that fails 
to account for the 'exquisite power' that beauty affords them (Tennant 1995: 408). She 
recognizes the lure of the feminine construct that bewitches ordinary women and poses as 
a 'source of salvation', transforming them into 'visible' and desirable social subjects 
(Freedman 1986: 47). 
In this way, Ella follows in her grandmother's footsteps as she becomes the 
devil's latest convert to the cult of eternal youth. She takes up Muriel's viewpoint as she 
simulates and reiterates her fear of old age, noting that 'I never want to grow old' as 
aging implies 'going into a lifetime's confinement - a dark place where I would be 
neither heard nor seen' (Tennant 1995: 341; 398). This is reinforced by the devil's 
handmaiden Jasmine who provides an accurate description of tormented womanhood 
fighting back the years, revealing that 'growing old [ ... ] was probably the worst thing 
that could happen to a woman in a free, consumerist society' (Tennant 1995: 325). 'The 
great explosion of youth' comes to be experienced as an involuntary exile for, 'if one was 
older, with legs that didn't look so good when exposed right up to the thigh, you were 
really excluded from the world' (Tennant 1995: 345). The nurse's tale constructs Muriel 
248 
as a desperate woman 'well and truly trapped', reduced to performing the domestic roles 
of housekeeper and nanny while suffering 'invisible day[s]' at the office of 'New Image' 
where she contributes to the worship of youth and helps to perpetuate 'all the lies' 
(Tennant 1995: 345; 328; 322), Jasmine recollects Muriel's anguished statement that 
'once you get to a certain age [, .. ] you simply cease to exist' and become 'anonymous in 
the disintegration of personality that comes with old age' (Tennant 1995: 328; 321). In 
this reconstruction, Muriel's rejuvenating pact with the devil is represented as an 
empowering release from her given, biological constraints, putting 'all within [her] grasp' 
(Tennant 1995: 348). 
Tennant critically examines the protagonist's attempt to improve her social status 
and her quality of life by portraying it as a process of de-individualization and 
nullification that reconstructs the Cinderella figure as a beautiful object whose only 
power lies in the attraction of the male gaze. Muriel's satanic metamorphosis transforms 
her into a 'Marilyn Monroe' persona who 'lives on her sexuality alone' and emanates 
'some magic quality' (Tennant 1995: 390). Lisa Crane's physical 'perfection' and sexual 
power render her inhuman and even grotesque so that Anna and Ella can only refer to her 
as a 'hybrid' or 'freak' who is 'both sultana and concubine' at the same time (Tennant 
1995: 353; 387; 352),15 As Ella comments on Lisa's paradoxical being, 'her position of 
power and her teasing beauty seem to contradict each other to the point of making her an 
impossible anomaly - a monster' (Tennant 1995: 352). Fittingly, this imaginary construct 
inhabits a mausoleum and shrine given over to her photographic and filmic mementoes, 
where a video of Lisa Crane plays day and night and tapes are 'succeeding each other 
unendingly, in a terrible travesty of life' (Tennant 1995: 374). It is a fairy tale place, 
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'slumbering', 'sheltered' and 'hidden', giving 'the illusion of time standing still' 
(Tennant 1995: 308; 319; 310; 320). In this 'arranged' and 'false' environment, Lisa 
Crane never appears in flesh but she is portrayed as an immaculate object, caught on 
celluloid and devoid of any human feelings or connections (Tennant 1995: 309). 
Muriel's physical transformation into the cult star is described in terms of a self-
alienation and self-negation whereby her old caring identity is annihilated and made 
soullesslheartless in the repudiation of her emotional ties with her daughter and 
grandchild. As the devil's tale reveals, Muriel has to learn to 'enjoy the body of a young 
and sexually forceful woman again' and wipe out 'her memories and experiences [that] 
are those of a woman whose cycle is done - in short, a hag' (Tennant 1995: 407). Muriel 
has to reject 'the hag within' and become the devil's creation who selfishly 'dream[s] 
only of herself' and has no time 'for anyone other than herself' (Daly 1979; Tennant 
1995: 369; 380). Muriel's rejuvenation separates her from her friends and family as it 
reverses 'the natural order of things' and 'the natural progression of generations' 
(Tennant 1995: 387). In this way, Muriel and Anna become rivals for male approval and 
compete for the same man Harry/Mephisto, leaving the daughter with the feeling that her 
own existence has been invalidated by her mother's actions (Tennant 1995: 389). In a 
similar manner, Ella realizes that her quest for her grandmother inverts the mythical 
mother-daughter relationship between Demeter and Persephone and 'it is the wrong way 
round' as she is 'the maiden who is bound to go under the earth in the autumn and return 
in spring' (Tennant 1995: 387). In the end, Muriel/Lisa's satanic pact becomes a curse 
that plagues her with 'terrible dreams' and forces her to embody an ever young and 
unchanged image of beauty (Tennant 1995: 397). As Jasmine describes, she 'suddenly 
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looked haggard - not a day older [ ... ] but drained [ ... ] and haunted' (Tennant 1995: 
397). Ultimately, Tennant's bleak cautionary tale offers no salvation for any of her 
female characters, leaving the final word to 'the prince of all mingling and ambiguity' 
(Tennant 1995: 407). The devil is seen to be responsible for the perpetuation of the 
beauty myth, 'cover[ing] the surface of the dying world' with shops, magazines and TV 
stores that persuade women to exchange their selves and give up their individuality in 
return for a sexy and youthful appearance (Tennant 1995: 406). As he concludes, 'souls 
cannot co-exist with consumerism', warning the reader that 'next time you see those 
young women anywhere, remember one of them could be Muriel [ ... ] or Ella [ ... ] or it 
could be you!' (Tennant 1995: 409). 
Contrastingly, Jane Green offers a more optimistic and less supernatural account 
of women's preoccupation with femininity and beauty in her 'novel about ugly ducklings 
and swans', Jemima J. (1998) (Wells 2000: 2). Green depicts the struggles of the 
overweight, talented but undervalued journalist Jemima Jones who re-moulds herself as a 
slim, beautiful and gym-obsessed glamour girl, only to find out that 'swans have their 
problems too' (Wells 2000: 2). Jemima J. combines an intimate, first-person narrative 
that details the protagonist's involvement in and victimization by the tyranny of diet and 
exercise with a third-person, fairy godmother perspective that omnisciently guides 
Jemima on the middle path to happiness and well-being. Green espouses and promotes a 
balanced ideal whereby Jemima rejects the more compulsive and oppressive facets of 
body discipline in favor of a maxim of self-love and choice. The character fulfils her 
Cinderella potential and she is united with her prince after she completes her empowering 
journey to self-realization and emancipation. Jemima discovers the affirmative and 
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identity-confirming aspects of bodily routines as she actively decides to take charge of 
her life, lose weight and gain professional success (Green 1998: 166). Green adopts a 
postfeminist stance that merges feminist and feminine principles and proclaims the 
compatibility of beauty practices with notions of agency and self-determination.16 
Jemima begins her quest towards self-fulfiHment from the position of a docile and 
compliant inmate of the beauty Panopticon whose life revolves around her physical 
appearance and her own deviance from the normative body of femininity. Starting her 
confessional tale with an axiomatic 'I wish 1 were thin, gorgeous, and could get any man 
1 want', Jemima reveals herself to be a devoted foHower and admirer of feminine beauty 
who judges women according to the standards of female materiality depicted in fashion 
magazines (Green 1998: 1). The protagonist has interiorized patriarchal injunctions 
concerning body shape and she assumes a male consciousness and gaze as she 'drink[s] 
in the models' long, lithe limbs, their tiny waists, their glowing golden skin' (Green 
1995: 1). As Jemima acknowledges her almost erotic obsession with these images of 
beauty: 
I have a routine: I start with their faces, eyeing each sculpted cheekbone, heart-
shaped chin, and I move slowly down their bodies, careful not to miss a muscle. 
I have a few favourites. In the top drawer of my chest of drawers in my bedroom 
at home is a stack of cut-out pictures of my top super models, preferred poses. 
Linda's there for her sex appeal, Christy'S there for her lips and nose, and Cindy's 
there for the body. (Green 1998: 1-2) 
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In this way, even though Jemima does not initially live up to the imaginary feminine 
ideal, she has clearly internalized its sexual associations and she participates in its 
perpetuation, 'always judg[ing] books by their cover' (Green 1998: 65). 
Jemima is given the opportunity to transform her un-feminine and bulky self into 
a beauty construct when she re-invents herself over the internet and adopts the persona of 
JJ, a successful and stunning television presenter. As Jemima reveals, this electronic 
landscape is a realm of possibility and resignification, 'another world, where people can 
be anyone they want' (Green 1998: 33). In fact, she muses that 'this could open up a 
whole new life for me, a new life that doesn't care about looks, about weight, about 
expanses of flesh' (Green 1998: 60). Underrated in her job and ill-fated in her passion for 
her unobtainable colleague Ben, Jemima decides that 'Jiving on the internet seems a far 
easier option than giving up chocolate' and she embarks on a chat room romance with 
Californian dream man Brad (Green 1998: 60). However, when her long-distance 
boyfriend demands that they meet, Jemima is forced to embody her fictional creation and 
conquer her food addiction in order to physically remodel herself in the image of the thin 
'hard body' of her e-mails (Green 1998: 174). Jemima launches into a rigorous regime of 
diet and exercise that sees JJ 'emerging from the fat of Jemima Jones' until her old self 
exists 'in name alone' (Green 1998: 175; 204). Jemima's new desirable appearance 
proves to be an instant and empowering success, helping her to further her career and 
attracting the male gaze. As the third-person narrator comments on Jemima becoming a 
visible subject on the patriarchal gage of female attractiveness, 'that look finally 
confirmed [ ... ] [that] Jemima Jones is beautiful. She is slim, she is blonde, she is 
beautiful' (Green 1998: 215). Jemima realizes that she finally has 'a choice' and she can 
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employ her sexual power to accomplish what was unachievable to her in her previous 
body (Green 1998: 234). 
However, rather than heralding a sexualized performance of femininity as a 
strategy for female empowerment and happiness, Green makes her heroine undergo a 
psychological change that provides her with the spiritual strength to embrace her own 
identity and disengage herself from the cult of slimness. Jemima's physical 
transformation does not engender a reformed and altered psyche as the dieter suffers from 
a distorted self-image. As she explains, 'it feels like it can't be real, that I'm playing at 
being thin', 'if anything 1 feel a bit of a fraud' as 'I look like a completely different 
person, [but] underneath 1 still feel the same, 1 still feel fat' (Green 1998: 235; 220). 
Jemima is anxious that Brad will 'see through the illusion and see the fat unhappy girl 
lurking beneath' (Green 1998: 234). Thus, when she final1y meets this 'ultimate specimen 
of the perfect man', Jemima attempts to tum into JJ and personify the beauty construct 
she has invented (Green 1998: 245). As the narrative voice of the al1-knowing fairy 
godmother sceptically remarks, 'Jemima and Brad look like the perfect couple, like 
they've just stepped out of a romantic love story' but 'looks [ ... ] aren't everything' 
(Green 1998: 268; 245). The narrator reassuringly declares that 'fate will sort out' 
Jemima's happiness 'once and for al1' but first, she has to achieve self-awareness and 
'learn to love herself (Green 1998: 366; Wells 2000: 3). 
Jemima comes to realize that she is 'playing a role' and parodying the persona of 
the skinny and blonde 'trophy girlfriend' that Brad needs in the image-obsessed Los 
Angeles 'to prove that he'd made it' (Green 1998: 379; 384). As she notes, 
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I've become so immersed in being Brad's girlfriend I've forgotten who I really 
am. [ ... ] If I'm totally honest about it, I haven't felt myself since I lost weight 
and I never understood before how much I used the excess weight to protect 
myself. (Green 1998: 379) 
Jemima demystifies her own stereotypes of feminine success and beauty, admitting that 
'this is about me [ ... ] it's about thinking that being blonde and slim and perfect will 
automatically bring you happiness, and then discovering that life is full of as many 
disappointments as there were before' (Green 1998: 388). Jemima decides to abandon her 
embodied feminine construction and no longer use her size and her flesh as a safety 
protection 'to hide away from the world, to hide my sexuality, to hide who I [am]' (Green 
1998: 399). She ultimately emerges as a triumphant and self-aware 'survivor', an 
'amazing woman' who has 'control' and who knows 'as an absolute certainty, that deep 
down [she has] an amazing reserve of strength' (Green 1998: 447; 428; 426; 477). As 
Jemima proclaims her credo of affirmative action and personal power, 
you have to make things happen [ ... ]. You can change your life if you're willing 
to let go of the old and actively look for the new [ ... ] fairy tales can come true 
[ ... ] if we trust in ourselves, embrace our faults, and brazen it out with courage, 
strength, bravery and truth. (Green 1998: 333; 449) 
Fay Weldon's satire The Life and Loves of a She Devil (1983) echoes both 
Tennant's and Green's novels as it focuses on the struggles and triumphs of a 
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postfeminist Cinderella who undergoes extensive cosmetic surgery in order to re-invent 
herself as a diabolical and feminine subject, bent on revenge against her unfaithful 
husband. Weldon's work leaves the reader with several puzzles as on the one hand, it is a 
feminist critique of female oppression and unequal power relations between the sexes. 
Yet, it is also a tale with a surprising twist as the female protagonist uses and resignifies 
her feminine position to regain control over her life and achieve self-determination. 
Weldon's text offers a scathing portrayal of feminine beauty norms that encourage 
women to alter their bodies and submit themselves to the excruciating pain and 
staggering expense of cosmetic surgery, without reducing the female subjects to the 
position of deluded victims and cultural dupes. The novelist explores the contradictory 
dimensions of bodily transformations as she repudiates monolithic notions of the docile 
female, trapped by the constraints of beauty regimes and blinded by social forces beyond 
her comprehension, in favor of a complex vision of a knowledgeable agent who assesses 
her situation and makes her choices within her contextual surroundings and structural 
limits. Weldon examines the postfeminist paradox and tensions between empowerment 
and disempowerment, subjectivity and objectification, deliberately refusing to endorse an 
either/or logic that relies on diametrically opposed stereotypes of the liberated feminist 
and the subordinated femme. Instead, the Cinderella/she devil figure is positioned 
between these two poles, displaying a strong will and agency while employing this 
'feminist' energy to embody a highly restrictive norm of feminine appearance. 
In particular, the heroine's body is surgically remoulded to mirror the physical 
image of her hated arch-rival, Mary Fisher, a successful writer of popular romances and 
her husband's lover. Weldon depicts the journey of her protagonist Ruth in several 
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stages, from being a social freak, to becoming an entrepreneur and the epitome of a 
feminist success story, to finally transforming herself into a 'blonde, simpering doll on 
stilts', 'an impossible male fantasy made flesh' (Weldon 1983: 241; quoted in Haffenden 
1985: 306). Importantly, the author does not represent Ruth's feminist and feminine 
achievements as irreconcilable or conflicting and she undermines dualistic frameworks 
that do not allow for interpretative open-endedness and contradiction. Weldon criticizes 
simplistic and monological ideologies of appropriate female behavior as her heroine's 
postfeminist metamorphosis can be understood as a combination of a feminist desire for 
autonomy with a patriarchally enforced urge to be beautiful and seductive. It is precisely 
at this 'point of discomfort', this frontier between feminist and patriarchal discourses, that 
'Weldon shows how ambivalences can be embraced rather than dismissed or avoided' 
(Davis 1995: 67). 
Weldon draws attention to and reworks a number of fairy tales and romance 
stories in order to deflate the notion of ideality that underlies patriarchal myths of 
feminine beauty. Ruth can be identified as a born Cinderella with a neglectful mother and 
favored half-sisters (Weldon 1983: 13). At the beginning of the novel, she is confined to 
the realm of sexual and physical unattractiveness, the category of the personae non grata 
who lack 'the compulsion of the erotic' (Weldon 1983: 11). Being six foot two inches 
tall, overweight and clumsy, Ruth is 'fixed here and now, trapped in [her] body' and she 
is described as 'a vast obliging mountain', a 'giantess' and 'an affront to the natural order 
of things' (Weldon 1983: 9; 34; 42). Her bodily extraordinariness and deviance make her 
a social outcast, a 'dog', so far removed from the norms of desirability that she cannot 
aspire to approximate the cultural beauty ideal through the everyday maintenance work of 
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femininity (Weldon 1983: 12). Make-up and dieting will not be sufficient to transform 
her differences into sameness and to achieve her overall goal 'to be like other women' 
and like Mary Fisher in particular (Weldon 1983: 234). In fairy tale terms, Ruth can be 
compared to the ugly stepsister who is determined to take over Cinderella's role, even to 
the extent of cutting off parts of herself to make the glass slipper fit. Devoid of 
supernatural guidance and help, she cannot hope for an instant and painless 
metamorphosis but she has to become her own fairy godmother, employing the modern 
magic of cosmetic surgery and spending years and millions to change her appearance. 
Ruth has an even better blueprint for her eventual condition as she repeatedly invokes 
Hans Christian Anderson's little mermaid who acquired legs instead of a tail and, with 
every step, felt that she was stepping on knives.17 Ruth exhibits a similar willingness to 
endure pain, noting that Oil faut souffrir [ ... ] in order to get what you want. The more you 
want the more you suffer' and 'if you want everything you must suffer everything' 
(Weldon 1983: 170). In the course of her time- and money-consuming surgical 
reconstruction, she even welcomes pain as 'the healing agent', marking 'the transition 
from her old life to her new one' (Weldon 1983: 247; 248). 
Ruth's journey also incorporates a popular romance formula as the protagonist's 
progress can be interpreted as a quest to regain the love of prince charming. her husband 
Bobbo. However, in Weldon's version, the state of desperation, loss and separation that 
the heroine has to go through before the reunion with her beloved, is situated after the 
traditional happy ending, marriage. Besides, Bobbo is far from being a stereotypical 
romance hero, being not only selfish, childish and irresponsible but also outwardly silly, 
his name supposedly being an intentional pun on the Spanish word meaning 'stupid'. In 
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this way, Weldon provides the reader with the rough outline or silhouette of a Cinderel1a 
transformation and a romance happy ending as, after all, the ugly duckling turns into a 
swan and the princess is reunited with her prince, but she removes the elements of ideal 
love and magic from her story. The novelist demystifies a number of popular patriarchal 
texts that define female success in terms of feminine beauty and desirability. Ruth 
ostensibly follows in Cinderel1a's footsteps and achieves the same goals through the same 
means but her victory has come at a high price, years of torture and millions of pounds, 
while it is also no longer axiomatic that the prince is worth fighting and suffering for. 
Thus, Weldon's reworking of the romance and fairy tale scenario exposes the artificiality 
of these myths and represents a critique from within the norm. 
In a similar manner, Weldon also subverts feminist ideals of female comportment 
according to which women have to opt out of the patriarchal beauty contest. Initial1y, 
after Bobbo abandons her for Mary Fisher, Ruth appears to comply with the feminist call 
for political rejection of femininity as she sheds her dependent and passive nature and 
divests herself of all her motherly and wifely obligations by giving away her children and 
framing her husband to get him imprisoned. Moreover, she enters into a lesbian 
relationship with Nurse Hopkins, builds up a flourishing employment agency and even 
finds refuge in a separatist feminist commune. Fol1owing the feminist writer Mary Daly, 
Ruth can be discussed as a 'natural witch' or a 'wild woman' who privileges 'real' 
femaleness over 'false' femininity (Daly 1979). Weldon uses a similar image to describe 
Ruth's psychological change into a she devil who rejects patriarchal laws and 
conventions. As Ruth notes, instantly, 'there is no shame, no guilt, no dreary striving to 
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be good. There is only, in the end, what you want. And I can take what I want. I am a she 
devil' (Weldon 1983: 49). 
Ruth's personal and professional success takes place while she is still visually 
represented by her unfeminine body and in some ways, her final transformation into a 
plastic construct of femininity and 'the show-girl type' seems redundant and 
contradictory (Weldon 1983: 241). The protagonist's physical metamorphosis into 'an 
insult to womanhood' has been interpreted as a denial and sabotage of her she devil 
persona and it has been criticized by a number of commentators as a 'violent derailing of 
our expectations' and a 'Sadean assault' on our beliefs (Weldon 1983: 239; Wilde 1988: 
406; 414). The character's self-inflicted 'humiliation' and the reductive 
conventionalization of her body are denounced as 'petty [ ... ] and trivial goals' as she 
'should have done what she ought, faced up to things, not what she wanted' (Wilde 1988: 
414; quoted in Newman 1993: 199). The critics' objections relate to the fact that Ruth's 
evolution into an economically independent and supposedly disenthralled feminist role 
model does not engender a 'raised' consciousness that might lead to the espousal of a 
political perspective and the rejection of beauty norms. Ruth's adventures in the world of 
the working woman and her various sexual encounters do not lead to a feminist liberation 
or a political viewpoint. Tellingly, the 'Wimmin's commune' that Ruth temporarily joins 
ultimately seems 'too denim-coloured and serviceable', lacking 'glitter at the edges'. and 
it cannot tempt her to give up her dream to 'live in the giddy mainstream of the world' 
(Weldon 1983: 213; 214). 
Weldon refuses to locate her protagonist's diabolical conversion within the larger 
framework of an organized and regulated feminist struggle for collective liberation and 
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emancipation. She problematizes Ruth's satanic change from the outset by depicting it as 
a matter of obedience to her husband rather than a self-willed feminist awakening. One 
can argue that Bobbo initiates his wife's black baptism by continually and strategically 
renouncing her feminine identity. Throughout their marriage, he denies Ruth access to 
'that other erotic world, of choice and desire and lust' in which women can have 'power 
over the hearts and pockets of men' (Weldon 1983: 28). As Ruth reveals, 'it is all the 
power we can have, down here in Eden Grove, in paradise. and even that' is withheld 
from her (Weldon 1983: 28). Bobbo considers Ruth to be 'essentially unlovable' and he 
reduces her self to her unshapely body, revealing that 'he had married it perforce and in 
error and would do his essential duties by it but he would never be reconciled to its 
enormity, and Ruth knew it' (Weldon 1983: 46; 37; my emphasis). He refuses to grant his 
wife the traditionally feminine role and patriarchal status of a sexual being. even telling 
her that she is not 'a natural rape victim' (Weldon 1983: 38). Confined by her physical 
shape and the ensuing social position, Ruth is driven by a desire to fit in or 'pass" if not 
as the epitome of beauty, than at least as a good housewife and mother. Yet, these 
remaining pillars of traditional femininity are taken away from her in the course of her 
redefinition as a she devil. According to Bobbo, Ruth is a 'third-rate person', 'a bad 
mother', 'a worse wife' and 'a dreadful cook' (Weldon 1983: 47). Furthermore, he 
declares that 'I don't think you are a woman at all. 1 think what you are is a she devil' 
(Weldon 1983: 47). Ruth unquestioningly accepts this new identity as proof of Bobbo's 
superior knowledge, noting that 'since he does so well in the world and I do so badly, I 
really must assume that he is right. 1 am a she devil' (Weldon 1983: 49). 
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In this way, Weldon eschews predetermined and monolithic conceptualizations of 
femaleness, feminism and femininity and, instead, she puts forward an unresolved stance 
that favors ambiguity and contradiction. The novelist rejects the assumption that inside 
every woman, there is an authentic female or rather feminist self who is unconstrained by 
the pressures of the beauty system.18 Throughout her psychological and material 
transformations, Ruth remains situated within and part of a gendered social order that 
defines the standards of feminine acceptability and desirability. As she admits, 'I am 
jealous of every little, pretty woman who ever lived and looked up since the world began' 
(Weldon 1983: 29). Yet, at the same time as depicting the protagonist's contextual 
dependency, Weldon also refuses to portray Ruth as a feminist failure who is unable to 
find the 'real me', the autonomous feminist subject who is positioned outside cultural 
restrictions. Acknowledging that 'this is a slightly frivolous novel', Weldon sets out to 
undermine a pre-packaged and totalizing feminist agenda that takes a uniformly negative 
view of beauty practices and cosmetic surgery (quoted in Kenyon 1988: 123). Instead, 
she makes room for a much more ambivalent interpretation that does not rob the feminine 
subject of her agency and determination but considers the paradoxical possibility 
whereby she is simultaneously a victim of the discourse of feminine beauty as well as one 
of its most devastating critics. 
Accordingly, it is vital to take into account Ruth's power and agency in her 
cultural signification and in the material reproduction of beauty ideals. The protagonist 
takes an active part in her Cinderella transformation as she becomes the driving force 
behind her self-correction and feminization. She is the agent who negotiates her body, 
using its cultural constructedness to reinscribe the bodily text with her chosen writing. As 
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her disheartened surgeon Mr. Ghengis points out, 'he was her Pygmalion, but she would 
not depend upon him, or admire him or be grateful' (Weldon 1983: 230). Ruth employs 
cosmetic surgery as a source of empowerment, denying her doctors the position of 
godlike creators and, in Victor Frankenstein fashion, demanding this role for herself. 
Being completely in charge of her 'extensive renovation', she is both monster and 
Frankenstein, creature and creator at the same time (Weldon 1983: 234). As she 
proclaims, 
anyone can do anything [ ... ] if they have the will and they have the money. [ .•. ] 
We are here in this world to improve upon [God's] original idea. To create justice, 
truth and beauty where He so obviously and lamentably failed. [ ... ] I will be 
what I want, not what He ordained. I will mould a new image for myself out of 
the earth of my creation. I will defy my Maker, and remake myself. (Weldon 
1983: 124; 170) 
Ruth's reconstructive endeavor is conceived within particularly narrow 
parameters of femininity as her perception of the imaginary feminine ideal takes the 
specific shape of Bobbo's lover, Mary Fisher or rather, the publicity image featured on 
the dust jacket of her romantic books. Ruth clearly 'thinks and talks in cliches' and she 
designs her new self according to patriarchal norms and in particular, her husband's 
criteria of feminine attractiveness (Weldon 1983: 26). By selecting the conventional 
prettiness of Mary Fisher as her ultimate goal, Ruth reveals her involvement in and 
collusion with the stereotypes of feminine beauty and she contributes to the perpetuation 
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of these bodily restrictions. She recreates herself as Mary's clone, a repetition of the 
fantasy image that the writer presents to the world. 19 Living in the High Tower far 
removed from the realities and injustices of the world, Ruth's nemesis is not a f1esh-and-
blood being but a symbolic construct, the personification of her own mass-produced, 
fictional heroines. The cosmetic surgeon Mr. Ghengis objects to his patient's self-
reduction and transformation into this caricature, the 'feeble' and 'absurd' incarnation of 
'the balding businessman's dream' (Weldon 1983: 241; 249). He fails to realize that Ruth 
is motivated by a yearning for success and achievement within her cultural and structural 
context. The protagonist's transformation into an artifice enables her to enter the erotic 
world from which she has been excluded and fulfil her aspirations 'to take everything and 
return nothing', 'to be loved and not love in return' (Weldon 1983: 29; 49). Once Ruth 
becomes the object of Bobbo's sexual desires, the sado-masochistic power relations 
between them are reversed. As she proclaims her Schadenfreude, 'I have all and he has 
none. As I was, so he is now. [ ... ] Somehow it is not a matter of male and female, after 
all; it never was, merely of power' (Weldon 1983: 256). 
Ultimately, Ruth takes over Mary Fisher's life and body and she becomes a copy 
or reiteration of femininity. The character's erasure and re-inscription of her own bodily 
material can be discussed as an act of masquerade and gender parody, undermining the 
idea of an essential female or feminine identity. Ruth's metamorphosis emphasizes the 
possibility of 'putting on' femininity, suggesting that it is also possible to remove it. In 
this way, she seizes the mask of ideal womanhood from Mary Fisher and, in so doing, she 
exposes its inauthenticity and artificiality. As Mr. Ghengis declares, 'there is no such 
thing as the essential self. 'it is all inessential, and al11iable to change and flux' (Weldon 
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1983: 234; 235). Yet, Weldon refuses to advance a straightforward espousal of parodic 
gender performances or present her protagonist as a consciously masquerading critic of 
Western beauty culture. Ruth notes that her 'exceptionally adaptable personality' is not 
moulded by critical and/or political aspirations but by a desire for conformity and 
integration, revealing that 
I have tried many ways of fitting myself to my original body, and the world into 
which I was born, and have failed. I am no revolutionary. Since I cannot change 
them, I will change myself. I am quite sure I will settle happily enough into my 
new body. (Weldon 1983: 217) 
Ruth knows the rules of the game and she will play by them, following Mrs. Black's 
advice that 'if you can't beat them, join them' (Weldon 1983: 239). Paradoxically. her 
agency and transformational powers are generated by the same ideological framework 
that defines and constrains her social position. Eluding an either/or logic. she is neither 
an innocent victim paralysed by her structural confines nor the triumphant creator of a 
more authentic self, a volitional subject who adopts and elects a new identity at will. 
Catching her reader off guard by a literary ploy, 'a comic turn. turned serious', Weldon 
examines the contradictory and multivalent aspects of embodiment that are skipped over 
in monolithic discourses of feminism and femininity (Weldon 1983: 256). The novelist 
puts forward both the reactionary and subversive potential of beauty practices, without 
privileging or committing herself to one side of the dualism. She portrays the complex 
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intermingling of resistance and subordination as she explores the dilemmatic situation of 
a 'free-yet-bounded' female subject who is simultaneously oppressed and liberated. 
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3.3 The Postfeminist Supergirl and Living in the In-Between 
'Action heroines are a new breed of [ ... ] female protagonists', Elizabeth Hills notes, 
emphasizing the transgressive and transformative nature of female characters who 
confound the binary logic of the masculine/feminine dualism (Hills 1999: 38). The 
modern day active heroine does not adhere to the stereotypical 'men act and women 
appear' polarization but she problematizes the critical framework that constructs the 
notions of a passive, feminine woman and an active, masculine man in terms of a 
diametrical opposition and mutual exclusivity (Berger 1972: 46). As Yvonne Tasker 
reveals, at the most fundamental level, images of the active heroine disrupt 'any clear set 
of critical distinctions between passivity, femininity and women on the one hand and 
activity, masculinity and men on the other' (Tasker 1993: 77). This new type of heroine 
is far from being immobile and passive: she fights. she shoots, she kills, solves crimes 
and rescues herself and others from dangerous situations. She has been described as a 
'sheroe' who is 'in full command of the narrative, carrying the action in ways that have 
normally been reserved for male protagonists' (Matrix: 1; Brown 1996: 56). In effect. she 
adopts a number of characteristics and attitudes that have been deemed masculine or male 
and, thus, she challenges the essentialist dichotomy that denies women the recourse to 
action and strength, both physical and mental, as a means to empowerment. As has been 
observed, for that reason alone, 'the very presence of the female action-adventure hero 
[ ... ] is noteworthy' and it can be discussed as a symptom of and a response to a feminist 
critique that seeks to undermine the bipolar systems of gendered identity (Helford 2000: 
293). Elyce Rae Helford maintains that 'we would not have female action-adventure 
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heroes without a feminist [ ... ] consciousness' and she defines the active heroine as 
'composed equally of hers tory, affirmative action, equal opportunity, and repudiation of 
gender essentialism and traditional feminine roles' (Helford 2000: 293). 
Yet, at the same time as representing female strength and activity, the sheroe has 
also been the target of critique and she is seen as a compromised and even conservative 
figure whose 'limitations [ ... ] are equally (or more) important to attend' (Helford 2000: 
294). The action heroine is criticized for her heroic/individualistic status that ultimately 
turns her into a 'token', an isolated symbol of empowered womanhood, far 'stronger and 
faster than a typical woman' and displaying 'new varieties of toughness that few real 
women can obtain' (Helford 2000: 292; Inness 1999: 8; 179). While her individual 
greatness offers an alluring fantasy of transcendence and power 'in a society where 
women are too commonly raped, assaulted, and murdered', her tokenism also works to 
secure the status quo as it glorifies the exception in order to 'obscure the limits of 
mobility' and 'the rules of the game of success' within the hegemonic system (Inness 
1999: 8; Cloud 1996: 122; 123). The tough and active heroine promotes an illusion of 
freedom and power but simultaneously and conversely, she operates to support 
oppressive social forces and gender inequalities. Moreover, the female action-adventure 
hero is also censured for her inability to shed and denounce alI signifiers of feminine 
subordination as 'the toughness of even the toughest women is limited, confined, 
reduced, and regulated' (Inness 1999: 178). Feminist critics take issue with the fact that 
femininity remains an unavoidable component of the active heroine. as a visible sign of 
gender conformity or as a polar opposite that the sheroe wants to distance herself from by 
embracing a masculinized image. In this way, she is depicted as a 'schizophrenic 
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character', 'split between traditionally feminine and masculine traits and sometimes 
strongly ambivalent about this division, suggesting that being tough is not "normal" for 
women' (Inness 1999: 144; 149). 
In the following, I want to problematize this notion of self-division and I argue 
that the postfeminist action heroine inhabits a non-dualistic space where seemingly 
irreconcilable opposites interact. The action heroine's conflicting identifications involve a 
continuous play between passivity and activity, vulnerability and strength, feminism and 
femininity, individualism and communality. Each sheroe has diverse ways of bringing 
together these various components and her negotiations can take the form of an 
unproblematical alliance of opposites (advanced by a choiceoisie ideology) or a painful 
and alienating struggle between binaries. I maintain that the female action heroine has to 
be conceptualized from the outset as an inherently ambiguous persona who walks a 
tightrope as she attempts to achieve an impossible balance. She is situated between the 
either/or categories of a repressive binary structure, occupying a problematical social and 
emotional space defined by a both/and logic. In fact, no portrayal of the action-adventure 
heroine is ever straightforward and unequivocal, allowing a definitive and final resolution 
of the contradictions surrounding this multifaceted persona. As Sherrie Inness notes, 
'ambiguity' is 'an essential element of tough women in the popular mcdia' as 'we are 
always confronted with a messy and contradictory message about women's toughness' 
(Inness 1999: 49). Inness reveals that female action heroes can 'offer women new role 
models, but their toughness may also bind women more tightly to traditional feminine 
roles' (Inness 1999: 5). The action-adventure heroine is either portrayed as a semi-tough 
pretender to male power who is ultimately too feminine to be as effectual as her male 
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counterpart or she is depicted as a de-feminized male impersonator, reinforcing the link 
between masculinity and toughness. She performs a paradoxical cultural function as she 
both contests and reaffirms normative absolutes and stereotypes, simultaneously helping 
'to change how people perceive women's gender roles and to support mainstream notions 
about how women should act and look' (Inness 1999: 49).1 The sheroe embodies and 
projects contradictory values and meanings. She is both a feminist icon and a patriarchal 
token, comprising feminine and masculine, passive and active elements and paradoxically 
encouraging women to adhere to traditional roles and also to challenge them. 
Consequently, as Elizabeth Hi11s declares, 'action heroines represent something of 
a methodological crisis': she 'cannot easily be contained, or productively explained, 
within a theoretical model which denies the possibility of female subjectivity as active or 
full' (Hills 1999: 39). Hills is adamant that the transgressive potential of these female 
characters cannot be appreciated via binaristic frameworks and conventional theoretical 
modes that try to 'impose a rigid and habituated explanation onto a new and alternative 
figure' and 'claim to know in advance what female bodies are capable of doing' (Hills 
1999: 39; 44). She reveals that 'the assemblage of the terms "action" and "heroinc" alters 
the nature of both structures' to 'become something beyond both' (Hills 1999: 46). In this 
way, the sheroe epitomizes the multiple female subjectivities that become availablc in a 
postmodern age of confusion. The concepts of subject and object, man and woman 
(among others) are deconstructed and reinterpreted and it is this resignification of 
accepted terms and identities that can be witnessed through the figure of the action 
heroine. The male warrior-hero material is reconstituted in an attempt to fracture and 
reinvent the gendered identity ofthe action hero, 're-examine the past' and find 'there 
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images whose meanings are less simple than they might once have appeared' (Tasker 
1993: 11 0). Accordingly, the female action hero has to be theorized outside a binary 
rationale that produces an overly simplistic and dualistic interpretation and cannot 
account for the changing representations of active women. The critical discussion cannot 
restrict itself to the polarized oppositions that have framed images of female strength and 
activity but has to examine the action heroine as a multivalent and complex figure that 
can be decoded in numerous ways and that is positioned between and across different 
understandings. 
I contend that postfeminism represents this new mode of conceptualizing the 
action-adventure heroine as a composite character that exceeds the logic of non-
contradiction in order to affirm the plurality of signification and identity. As I have 
argued, the postfeminist frontier discourse is characterized by a double gesture whereby it 
eschews the either/or binary in favor of a paradoxical both at once. Postfeminism 
exploits the in-between spaces as it undermines totalizing dichotomies and absolute 
oppositions in order to establish a pluralistic landscape that compiles incongruous and 
contradictory theories and ideas. By operating in the middle ground between polarities, 
postfeminism provides an alternative way of comprehending the figure of the female 
action heroine as an 'open image' that can be 'interpreted, read and to an extent 
repopulated' (Macdonald 1987: 22-23).2 Within the postfeminist realm, the action-
adventure heroine can be discussed as a polysemic character who is engaged in a 
perpetual struggle that generates multiple meanings, readings and uses. Postfeminism 
does not attempt to resolve the sheroe's inherent contradictions but, instead, creates an 
ambiguous and inharmonious space where differences co-exist. 
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Moreover, I assert that the new breed of action-adventure heroines finds its 
postfeminist expression in the 'supergirl' who not only destabilizes the hierarchal 
structure of dualistic constraints but crosses and transcends these binary formulations 
altogether. In particular, I argue that the postfeminist supergirl reshapes and transforms 
the either/or distinctions between masculinity and femininity, human and monster, good 
and evil, feminism and femininity, singularity and collectivity, conformity and resistance. 
The supergirl displays a feminine body along with a feminist consciousness and a 
masculine assertiveness and power. She is set up and set apart as different by her 
superhuman/supernatural abilities but, at the same time, she longs to be part of a 
community and be normal. She fights the forces of evil and darkness (variously 
manifested by crime, terrorism, vampires and beauty queens) by internalizing them, 
understanding and tasting what she is supposed to battle and destroy. Paradoxically, she 
'protects the line which separates good from evil by crossing it, by becoming more and 
more other' (Petrova 2003: 10-11). The postfeminist supergirl can be understood as a 
liminal or marginal character who evades categorization through her hybridization of 
conventional gender roles and human norms, her moral and ethical ambiguity and her 
ambivalent interpretative potential. She combines qualities associated with masculinity 
and femininity and she exists across supposedly opposed categories, revealing the artifice 
of that opposition and undermining the boundaries that safeguard dualistic theories. The 
supergirl refuses to be contained within these simplistic and totalizing classifications as 
she sabotages and collapses the barrier between them, moving across binaries in order to 
establish an impure and ambiguous 'in-betweenness'. 
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This multifaceted and heterogeneous persona has been translated in popular 
culture both in cinematic and literary works and she is exemplified by the figures of 
Stephanie Plum, a lingerie shop assistant come bounty hunter, Olivia Joules, a beauty 
journalist come spy and Gracie Hart, a tough and tomboyish FBI agent who turns into a 
beauty queen.3 These supergirls proudly and confidently proclaim their intention to 
embrace and construct a contradictory and pluralistic subjectivity that cannot be 
explained by a monological framework. As Olivia Joules declares, 
I'm all I've got. [ ... ] I'm going to be complete in myself. I'm not going to give a 
shit about anything anymore. I'm going to work out my own good and bad. [ ... ] 
I'm going to search this shitty world for some beauty and excitement and I'm 
going to have a bloody good time. (Fielding 2003: 14; emphasis in text) 
In this way, she sheds her old self and body, Rachel Pixley, and reinvents and renames 
herself as the glamorous Olivia Joules who has her own 'Rules for Living' (Fielding 
2003: 93). As Olivia, she arms herself with 'a great body ali a useful tool in life' and 
changes her 'old plump self into her 'new thin self (Fielding 2003: 36). Olivia 
consciously manipulates her new image in order to achieve professionally and socially 
what may not have been accessible to her in her previous embodiment. At the same time, 
she insists that she has transgressed the traditional binary gender codes that equate 
femininity with helplessness and passivity. In fact, 
273 
she had painstakingly erased all womanly urges to question her shape, looks, role 
in life, or effect upon other people. She would watch, analyse and conform to 
codes as she observed them, without allowing them to affect or compromise her 
own identity. (Fielding 2003: 12) 
Olivia regards femininity as a means to empowerment and she deliberately 'users] tears 
to get her own way' and extract information from the suspected al-Qaeda terrorist Pierre 
Feramo (Fielding 2003: 215). In a similar manner, she decides that, on her secret mission 
to track Osama Bin Laden, a 'hairdryer is a more important tool than the nerve-agent 
dispenser' (Fielding 2003: 263). Olivia's unashamed mix of femininity and power make 
her a 'natural spy' and ultimately help her to avert a bomb attack that threatens the annual 
Oscar ceremony (Fielding 2003: 249). 
This supergirl expresses and lives by the popular postfeminist belief that women 
can "'control" and celebrate their own objectification' and they 'can handle the tools of 
patriarchy and don't need to be shielded from them' (Harris 1999: 166; Baumgardner and 
Richards 2000: 141). The postfeminist action heroine insists that the cultural and social 
weapons that have been identified by second wave feminists as instruments of 
subordination are no longer being exclusively wielded against women but are sometimes 
wielded by them. Her ability to be both beautiful and strong, a 'perfectly accessorized 
and feminine killing machine', make the supergirl an embodiment of what Baumgardner 
and Richards call 'Girlie' feminism, the 'intersection of culture and feminism' that claims 
femininity as a source for power (Karras 2002: 7,4; Baumgardner and Richards 2000: 
136). Accordingly, women can be successful and strong on their own terms, by 'holding 
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tight to that which once symbolized their oppression' and infusing the old and vilified 
signifiers of helpless femininity with a new meaning of strength and agency 
(Baumgardner and Richards 2000: 137). This appropriation of traditional feminine 
stereotypes represents a deliberate choice and a feminist statement to grasp the 'pink 
things' from the clutches of patriarchal enculturation and regain the textual and social 
power to signify and use them (Baumgardner and Richards 2000: 136). Thus, 
postfeminist supergirls 'are not just convinced [that] they can act out their "choices" 
through individual (heroic) effort', they also want to 'recuperate the "choice" of wearing 
high heels [ ... ] and makeup to achieve their success' (Helford 2000: 296). 
In the Hollywood blockbuster Miss Congeniality (2000. Warner Bros), the tough 
and masculinized FBI agent Gracie Hart (Sandra Bullock) is forced to re-evaluate her 
dismissal of beauty queens as 'air-head bimbos' and 'performing monkeys in heels' who 
are 'catering for some misogynistic Neanderthal mentality' when she is forced to go 
undercover at the Miss United States pageant and save it from a bomb attack. The film's 
central plot device resides in Gracie's Pygmalion-like transformation from 'Dirty 
Harriet', 'a woman without a discernible smidgeon of oestrogen' into a 'unique' 'lady' 
and 'the nicest, sweetest, coolest girl at the pageant'. Her initial rugged uncouthness and 
aggressiveness mark her as a 'make-a-man of yourself action heroine who believes that 
in order to function effectively within the threatening macho world of the action scenario 
(or, in this case, the FBI), she must be masculinized (Stables 2001: 20). In this way, 
Gracie believes that her inability or refusal to 'dress' and 'brush' is part of being a 'real 
agent' who works '24n' and, in effect, '[is] the job'. However, she gradually comes to 
realize that her complete dedication to her masculine federal agent persona makes her an 
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'incomplete' person who, 'in place of friends and relationships', has 'sarcasm and a gun'. 
Her introduction to the world of feminine beauty proves to be an educational and 
psychological journey, 'one of the most rewarding and liberating experiences of [her] 
life'. In Baumgardner and Richards' terms, Gracie learns to accept and embrace her 
newly discovered Girlie-ness as a source of personal fulfillment and power and she 
recognizes that 
believing that feminine things are weak means that we're believing our own bad 
press. Girlies say, through actions and attitudes, that you don't have to make the 
feminine powerful by making it masculine. [ ... ] It is a feminist statement to 
proudly claim things that are feminine, and the alternative can mean to deny what 
we are. (Baumgardner and Richards 2000: 135) 
Girlies' feminine/feminist stance is seen to react against an 'antifeminine, antijoy 
emphasis' that has alienated women from their own femininity and that is perceived as 
the legacy of 'second wave seriousness' and elitism (Baumgardner and Richards 2000: 
80). The previous feminist wave is said to have created 'a whole-hearted condemnation 
of every aspect of culture that reproduced sexist ideas and images of women and 
femininity, all of which came to seem in some sense "violent" and "pornographic'" 
(Wilson 1995: 230). By contrast, Girlie postfeminism strives to resignify these once 
slandered and defamed objects, stereotypes and conventions and utilize them for its own 
purposes. In this way, sexualization remains a central element of postfeminism's 
definition of womanhood and is heralded as an important component of female heroic 
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representation. As Helford notes, postfeminism's image of the empowered woman 
displays an 'increased emphasis on traditional femininity in looks and behaviour (in 
various combinations and to various degrees)' (Helford 2000: 296). Yet, within the 
postfeminist framework, the sheroe's sexualized depiction is not portrayed as a 
disempowering denigration as it is always combined with a demonstration of her agency, 
strength and self-reliance. 
The postfeminist supergirl does not assume a masculine identity in her 
activelheroic role but she remains garbed in the signifiers of stereotypical feminine 
attractiveness. In Jeffrey Brown's words, the notion of a 'petite, pretty woman in a dress 
kicking ass' denies the narrative logic that 'allows viewers to deride the heroine as a 
butch or as a woman trying to be a man' (Brown 1996: 63). The feminine supergirl is a 
reaction against the prevalence of the 'hardbody, hardware, hard-as-nails heroine' who 
dominates the action scenario in the late 1980s and early 1990s and who is positioned as 
'phallic' or 'figuratively male' (Brown 1996: 52; Hills 1999: 40). Famously personified 
by the characters of Ripley in Aliens (1986. Fox) and Sarah Connor in Terminator 2: 
Judgement Day (1991. Universal), the hardbodied heroine has been perceived as a man in 
a woman's body or a woman trying to be a man, as she rejects all her feminine attributes 
to build up a muscular/masculine body and a macho posturing. The postfeminist supergirl 
confuses the dualistic gender codes that assume that, since the action role has always 
been male, to put a woman into it, she too is really or wants to be a man. She undermines 
the reasoning of a gendered binary that locks together the terms 'masculine' and 'strong', 
'feminine' and 'weak'. Importantly, the supergirl unites femininity and strength and she 
revises both concepts by creating a new signifying link between them. The traditional 
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stereotypes and tropes of gender persist but they become dissociated from their previous 
significations and correlations to physical sex, so that they interrogate rather than support 
gender conventions. 
The postfeminist logic rejects previous conceptualizations of the action heroine as 
either too tough or not tough enough, as butch 'pseudo-males' who refuse and expunge 
femininity as a female weakness, or as 'battling, lip-glossed Barbies' whose femininity 
ultimately compromises their feminist potential and active heroine status (Stables 2001: 
20). Postfeminism's supergirl resists dualistic formulations that seek to define her as 
either feminist or non-feminist/feminine, subversive or conservative, female or male. She 
is conceived outside the terms of gender hierarchies and the rhetorics of transgression! 
containment as she opens up new, alternative ways to construct and depict female 
subjectivity. However, the supergirl's contradictory in-between status also ensures that, 
to a varying degree, she is engaged in a social and emotional struggle as she tries to 
accommodate her own ambiguity and complexity. In her most challenging incarnations, 
the supergirl does not inhabit a harmonious space of plurality and pure difference, a 
fictional choiceoisie in which women can achieve whatever they want. Rather than 
celebrating an unproblematical alliance of opposites, the supergirI endeavors to find a 
way to negotiate between binaries and balance her inherent paradoxes. She seeks to come 
to terms with her own heterogeneity that ultimately leaves her ostracized from the very 
community she protects and without the security of fixed boundaries and standards. 
The presence of this troubled and tormented supergirl points to the more 
ambiguous aspects of postfeminist discourse that ultimately does not dissolve 
conventional gender positions but rather hybridizes and resignifies them. This re-
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appropriation technique has to account for the fact that 'the images that the [action] form 
has generated are very far from being the transparent signifiers of a simplistic [ ... ] 
hierarchy' and do not operate on 'some blank page but within cultural contexts which are 
crowded with competing images and stereotypes' (Tasker 1993: 165; 152). Thus, the 
signifiers of strength and power that have traditionally been associated with masculinity 
cannot simply be written over onto the female/feminine body. As Sara Buttsworth 
suggests, the 'tensions between exploring new character constructions and societal norms 
continue - even, or perhaps especially, in the figure of the female warrior hero' 
(Buttsworth 2002: 190). Critics as well as characters are caught in a dilemma to apply 
postfeminism's both/and logic and they remain perplexed by the slippage between the 
action heroine as a self-reliant character and a sexual object, an empowered feminist role 
model and an agent employed by patriarchy. The postfeminist supergirl contains and 
advances both readings/meanings and in her most daring and provocative 
personifications, she battles on the boundary between feminist transgression and 
patriarchal containment. She can be discussed as a site of intense cultural negotiations 
where competing definitions are tested and juxtaposed. The sheroe occupies and 
epitomizes the postfeminist frontier as she disrupts dualities and wrestles with her own 
'monstrous' impurities and ambivalence. In the following, I examine this postfeminist 
blur of the binary in relation to L. K. Hamilton's Anita Blake. Vampire Hunter novels as 
well as the television series Buffy the Vampire Slayer (1997-2003. Fox) and I argue that 
both supergirls, although starting their journeys from different positions within the 
polarized gender structure, end up in a contested middle space between dualities. 
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In fact, Buffy the Vampire Slayer enacts in its title the foundational myth and the 
premise of the entire series as it reflects on this microcosmic scale the chiastic 
relationship between the twin components, 'Buffy' and 'Vampire Slayer'. As the show's 
creator Joss Whedon reveals, 'I made the title very specifically to say, "This is what it 
is". It wears itself on its sleeve. [ ... ] It's all there in the title' (quoted in Siemann 2002: 
] 29). The '''joke'' of the cheerleading demon hunter' is not a 'one-line throwaway gag' 
but encapsulates Buffy's ongoing struggle with her composite character and fragmented 
identity as the 'Chosen One' who 'alone will stand against the vampires, the demons and 
the forces of darkness' and as a sixteen-year-old teenager who wants to do 'girlie stuff 
(Pender 2002: 42; Welcome to the Hellmouth, 1001; Faith, Hope and Trick. 3(03).4 
Whedon sets up a deliberate contrast between Buffy's girlhood and her heroism and 
superhuman strength as he consciously (re)employs a number of preconceptions and 
cliches. As has been noted, 'the name "Buffy" suggests the lightest of lightweight girls of 
stereotypical limitation - thoughtless, materialistic. superficial' (Wilcox and Lavery 
2002: xvii-xviii). Yet, this is the name of the heroine who will repeatedly risk and even 
give her life in her fight against evil demons and inhuman monsters. The show relies on 
the horror movie convention that sees a 'bubblehead blonde' wandering into a dark alley 
and getting killed but it reverses and resignifies this scenario whereby the blonde 'takes 
back the night', 'takes care of herself and deploys her powers' (quoted in Bel1afante 
1997: 83; Chandler: 1). Whedon points out that 'the idea of Burry was to [ ... ] create 
someone who was a hero where she had always been a victim. That element of surprise. 
that element of genre busting is very much at the heart of [ ... ] the series' (quoted in 
Thompson 2003: 4).5 He admits that the image of the blonde victim has always been 
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'more interesting to [him] than the other women. She was fun, she had sex, she was 
vivacious. But then she would get punished for it' (quoted in Vint: 2). In effect, the 
blonde girl 'keeps dying in horror movies' because 'she has no skills' and 'isn't expected 
to be anything but a bimbo' (quoted in Lippert 1997: 24). 
Whedon is determined to 'take that character and expect more from her' as he 
deconstructs the labels of blondness/femininity and establishes a signifying link that 
connects them to the notions of power and strength (quoted in Lippert 1997: 25). As he 
suggestively declares, 'there are a lot of ways to break new ground without having 
original thoughts' (quoted in Lippert 1997: 25). Buffy the Vampire Slayer relies on the 
resignification and re-visioning of a given script through a reinterpretation of established 
concepts and identities. With her long blonde hair and thin, petite frame, Buffy is visibly 
coded with the conventional signifiers of helpless and vulnerable femininity. She is 'the 
ultimate femme', 'never disturbing the delicate definition of physical femininity' and 'a 
girly girl through and through' (Fudge 1999: 3). On her first days in High School and 
University, Buffy is described by onlookers as 'a major league hottie' as she projects a 
first impression of feminine prettiness rather than toughness and power (The Initiative, 
4007). Buffy herself repeatedly declares that she is 'just a girl' but at the same time, she 
constantly confounds and re-imagines what 'a girl' is capable of (The Gift, 5022). The 
series foils both viewers' and characters' expectations as it portrays this cute cheerleader 
as far from being anyone's victim but a 'supremely confident kicker of evil butt' (quoted 
in Krimmer and Raval 2002: 157). According to Whedon, Buffy is intended both to be a 
feminist role model and to subvert the non-feminine image of the 'ironclad hero - "I am 
woman, hear me constantly roar'" (Harts 2001: 88}.6 He constructs Buffy as a feminine 
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warrior whose girlhood is compatible with and even engenders notions of empowerment 
and activity. Yet, Whedon is also cautious to avoid an optimistic and unproblematical 
alliance of femininity and heroism propagated by Girlie postfeminism which sees both 
terms as almost synonymous. He wants to portray 'the weakness and the vanity and the 
foibles' of the action heroine in order to create a multiple subjectivity that resists 
categorization (quoted in Harts 2001: 88). 
Faced with her fate as the 'Chosen One', 'the one girl in all the world [ ... ] born 
with the strength and skill to hunt the vampires', Buffy reluctantly accepts the demands 
of her civic role that forces her out of her natural terrain and community into her 
predestined place in a long tradition of vampire Slayers (Welcome to the lIellmouth, 
1001). She is the temporary occupant of a firmly established position and the present 
embodiment of a preternatural power that is automatically transferred onto the next 
Slayer in line after Buffy's death(s). In her slaying function, Buffy is working for and 
supervised by the Watchers' Council, a hierarchical and patriarchal command structure 
that regards the Slayer as 'the instrument by which we fight' (Checkpoint, 5012). Buffy is 
told that 'the Council remains, the Slayers change. It's been that way from the beginning' 
(Checkpoint, 5012). In this way, the figure of the Slayer is ever-changing, ever-singular 
and forever incarnated in a teenage girl who is supposed to follow blindly the Council's 
rules and accept her 'sacred duty' (What's My Line, Part 1,2009). Central to the law of 
the Council is the proposition 'kill vampires and demons', a rule that Buffy is unable to 
obey from the start when she realizes that the vampire Angel has a soul and will never 
hurt her (Angel, 1007). She refuses to be moulded into the Council's image of the perfect 
Slayer as a regimental soldier and she decides to disregard their orders and 'do things my 
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way' (What's My Line, Part 2,2010). Buffy is determined to maintain 'a normal social 
life as a Slayer' and thus, she does not want her 'night' job to interfere with her girly 
existence (Never Kill a Boy on the First Date, 1005). 
In effect, Buffy's girlhood and 'emotions' are depicted as inherent and 
empowering elements of her personality, as 'total assets' (What's My Line. Part 2, 2010). 
This supergirl's strength is not only related to her supernatural and otherworldly self but 
it also resides to a large degree in her being-in-the-world as a middle-class, teenaged 
American girl who is able to id~ntify vampires by their lack of fashion sense (Welcome to 
Hellmouth, 1001). Buffy's Watcher Giles has to admit that she does not fit the Slayer 
profile and that 'the Slayer handbook' is of no use in her case (What's My Line, Part 2, 
2010). Buffy's successful but unconventional approach to her slaying profession is due to 
her very 'Buffy-ness', her involvement in adolescent life and girlie activities and her 
disregard for tradition and stereotypes. Being 'girlie' is as much part of her character as 
being the Slayer is and she is simultaneously young and pretty as well as empowered and 
strong. This supergirl combines a delicate feminine and sexualized physicality with an 
uncompromising demonstration of her power and strength. She fights as a girl in high-
heeled boots and fashionable clothes, without ever assuming that this display of 
femininity jeopardizes her role as the Slayer and her ability as a warrior. Burry never 
denigrates herself, nor is her girlhood ever depicted as a debilitating detraction or 
vulnerability. On the contrary, it is the very source of her empowerment, what 
differentiates her from other Slayers and helps her to survive and win where others failed 
and died. Without any doubt, as Sherryl Vint notes, she is 'more than a sex object, but 
she doesn't have to deny being sexy in order to be a strong woman' (Vi nt, 2). 
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Moreover, Buffy rejects her lonely and isolated Slayer position as she fights evil 
on her own terms and with the help of her teenage friends and her Watcher Giles. Her 
enormous and lasting success as a Slayer is directly attributable to her relationships with 
the 'Scooby gang' or 'Slayerettes', Willow and Xander (The Witch, 1003). As Joelle 
Renstrom notes, 'one of the clearest lessons imparted on' Buffy the Vampire Slayer is 
that 'emotional connections [ ... ] are necessary - not just for Buffy the person, but also 
for Buffy the Slayer' (Renstrom: 1). Most problems and challenges are evaluated and 
solved through shared responsibility and cooperation, literally exemplified by the figure 
ofthe 'Superslayer' who conjoins Buffy, Giles, Xander and Willow into a "we" in order 
to defeat the 'kinematically redundant, biomechanical demonoid', Adam (Primeval, 
4021; Goodbye Iowa, 4014). The group becomes a tightly knit and self-declared family 
that makes use of each member's special talents in their combined fight against the 
adversities of the Hellmouth (Family, 5006). Buffy's extraordinary status as 'a Slayer 
with family and friends' establishes 'narrative momentum toward collectivity and away 
from the individualist quest narrative' typical of the action-adventure genre (School 
Hard, 2003; Owen 1999: 27). Buffy's attachments to a home and family re-imagine and 
reconstruct the stereotype of the individual action-adventure hero who is a 'tragic figure', 
'an outsider, often a lounger, a drifter'. characterized by 'loneliness, rootlessness, and 
homelessness' (Marchetti 1989: 194; 195). Buffy's friends represent an important 
emotional anchor that binds the Slayer to her humanity and life itself. As the vampire 
Spike tells her, 'the only reason you've lasted as long as you have is you've got ties to the 
world' (Fool for Love, 5007). 
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Initially, Buffy displays a Girlie optimism and confidence that she can juggle her 
multiple subjectivities and balance her personal and professional personae, her slaying 
mission and her desire to 'have a life' and 'do something normal', 'something safe' (The 
Witch, 1003). Buffy conceptualizes her Slayerdom as something akin to a career choice. a 
'night' job, and she maintains an ironic distance from her warrior role and duties. 
'Destructo Girl, that's me', she declares and flippantly concludes that 'I kill vampires, 
that's my job' (Teacher's Pet, 1004; Ted, 2011). Buffy believes that she can live up to 
her 'superhero' identity while also pursuing teenage pastimes like shopping. cheerleading 
and dating (The Harvest, 1002; The Witch, 1003). As she tells Giles, 'this is the 90s [ ... ] 
and I can do both. Clark Kent has a job. 1 just wanna go on a date' (Never Kill a Boy on 
the First Date, 1005). Buffy attempts to deal with her dual position as Buffy Summers, 
the archetypal California girl, and Buffy the Vampire Slayer by keeping these disparate 
elements of her character separate. Giles warns her not to 'let your life interfere with your 
slaying' and in this way, Buffy has 'at least three lives to contend with, none of which 
really mesh' (School Hard, 2003). She is 'sixteen, and a girl, and the Slayer' and she 
struggles to resolve the chiastic tensions between these various parts of her self (Rt'ptile 
Boy, 2005). 
However, Buffy has to realize that she cannot 'take the Slayer out of the girl' as 
'the two halves can't exist without each other' (Pender 2002: 43; The Rt'placemellt, 
5003). Throughout seven seasons, her fight is not only directed against an external threat 
that seeks to corrupt the order of the world but becomes more internalized when she is 
forced to admit the complex interaction between her heroic and girly components, the 
erosion of a 'black and white space' and its replacement with ambiguity (New Moon 
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Rising, 4019). She has to accept that, although she tries hard to be just like other girls, she 
sometimes is 'just one of the troops', 'a real soldier' who thinks about 'ambush tactics' 
and 'beheading' instead of 'dates' like 'normal girls' (Enemies 3017; Halloween 2006). 
Buffy is unable to unite and combine her ostensibly split selves and instead, she thinks 
that she has to choose between them. She cannot comprehend that she is both the Slayer 
and a girl and she is convinced that she has to sacrifice one for the other. Even though 
Buffy exists across binary distinctions between masculine toughness and feminine 
weakness, human collectivity and supernatural singularity, she does not embrace her 
position between dualities. On the contrary, she is overwhelmed by her own 
contradictoriness as she strains to find a balance, deploring that 'I don't have to be the 
Slayer. I could be dead' (What's My Line, Part J, 2009). 
Buffy's internal struggle between her Slayer and girly selves initially takes the 
form of a social crisis as the former cheerleader and 'Prom Princess' has to relinquish her 
popUlarity and become the quintessential outsider in the High School scene 
(Homecoming, 3005). As Buffy tells the consummate High School social queen, 
Cordelia, all she ever wanted was 'to be Homecoming Queen' (Homecoming, 3(05). 
Instead, Buffy is stigmatized as a 'crazed' 'psycho loony' with whom 'nobody cool wants 
to hang out' (The Harvest, 1002; The Pack, 1006). Buffy expresses her disillusionment 
with her 'unique condition', moaning that her Slayer identity turns her into a 'hideous 
dateless monster'. a 'freak' who will never have 'a happy, normal relationship' (N£'\'er 
Kill a Boy on the First Date, 1005; What's My Line, Part2. 2010; I. Robot - You, Jane. 
1008). Buffy is 'stuck in this deal' and her 'future is pretty much a non-issue' as it is 
'sealed in fate' that she is 'never going to get the chance to find out' what she could have 
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become and achieved outside the dark alleys and graveyards (What's My Line, Part I, 
2009). 
In this way, Buffy wants to escape her calling and she constantly looks for 
opportunities to rid herself of her Slayer persona andlor play out the fantasy of being a 
damsel in distress. During Halloween, she becomes trapped in the image of helpless 
femininity when she is transformed by her costume into an eighteenth-century 
noblewoman (Halloween, 2006). As she tells her vampiric boyfriend Angel, 'I just 
wanted to be a real girl for once' (Halloween, 2006). In similar acts of evasion. Buffy 
leaves Sunnydale and assumes a new identity after her Slayer self is forced to kill Angel 
while, during a brief spell of invisibility, Buffy happily 'tak[es] a vacation from me', 
noting that 'for the first time', she is 'free of rules and reports', 'free of this life' (Anne, 
3001; Gone, 6011). Moreover, Buffy deliberately wants to date a 'nice, solid guy' in 
order to 'get [her] life back' and 'do normal stuff (Homecoming. 3005). While in the 
third season, Buffy is briefly involved with ordinary high school student Scott Hope, by 
the time Buffy enters university, she has a relationship with fellow demon hunter Riley 
who is 'supposed to be Mr. Joe Guy', a 'dependable' and 'boring boyfriend' who 
'wouldn't cause [her] heartache' (Goodbye Iowa. 4014; Into the Woods, 5010; IIl1sh; 
4010). Buffy's dividedness is almost literalized when she faces a demon who can 'split 
one person in half, distilling personality traits into two separate bodies' (The 
Replacement, 5003). While Buffy does not experience the actual identity split (Xander is 
hit instead), she nonetheless reflects on her own internal disunity, noting that there could 
be 'two Buffys', 'one with all the qualities inherent in Buffy Summers, and the other one 
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with everything that belongs to the Slayer alone, the strength, the speed, the heritage' 
(The Replacement, 5003). 
Buffy's identity crisis reaches an existential turning point after her encounters 
with the First Slayer and Dracula who change and broaden her understanding of the 
Slayer's nature. When the First Slayer speaks to her through Tara, she presents a stark 
contrast to Buffy's own conception of Slayerdom: 
I have no speech. No name. I live in the action of death, the blood cry, the 
penetrating wound. I am destruction. Absolute. Alone. [ ... ] No friends. Just the 
kill. We are alone. (Restless, 4022) 
Buffy learns that her Slayer component, her 'truest strength', is in part demonic and has 
been created at the expense of her humanity (Get It Done, 7015). Both Dracula and Spike 
confirm the Slayer's inherent ambiguity, revealing that 'every Slayer has a death wish' as 
her 'power is rooted in darkness' (Foolfor Love, 5007; Buftv vs. Dracula, 5001). The 
Slayer is depicted as an isolated warrior and a suicidal loner who 'breeds' and 'lives' 
'death' and for whom 'the mission is what matters' (Potential, 7012; Lies My Parents 
Told Me, 7017). Buffy is confronted with her own irrational, dangerous and inhuman side 
as she recognizes that evil is an integral part of fighting evil. Her dark and supernatural 
roots make it impossible for her to connect and 'be with someone who can take [her] into 
the light' (The Prom, 3020). Buffy is attracted to 'wicked energy' and she needs 'some 
monster in her man' (First Date, 7014; Into the Woods, 5010). She admits that, for her, a 
'safe relationship' cannot be 'that intense' as 'real love and passion have to go hand in 
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hand with pain and fighting' (Hush, 4010). More disturbingly, her Slayer selfis also 
pulling her away from human contact and emotion and 'is turning [her] into a stone' 
(Intervention, 5018). Buffy reveals that 'being the perfect Slayer means being too hard to 
love at all', 'being the Slayer ma[kes] [her] different' as it drives her to 'cut [herself] ofr 
and 'just slip away' (Intervention, 5018; Touched, 7020). 
Yet, at the same time, Buffy's human ties, her friends and family, cause her to 
battle against her self-destructive personality trait and she continues to long for a stable 
and secure relationship. Importantly, Buffy's later affair with the vampire Spike leaves 
her unfulfilled and incomplete as she does not wholly 'belong in the shadows' and she 
cannot be 'at peace, in the dark' (Dead Things, 6013; Normal Again, 6017). As she tells 
her demon lover, 'I could never be your girl. [ ... ] There is nothing good or clean in you. 
You are dead inside' (Dead Things, 6013). Being with Spike is 'the most perverse, 
degrading experience of [her] life', 'it's wrong. I'm wrong', Buffy reveals as 'he's 
everything I hate. He's everything that I'm supposed to be against' (Wrecked, 6010; 
Dead Things, 6013). By the time Buffy finds the strength to break up with him. she is not 
exaggerating by saying that the relationship is 'killing' her, destroying her sense of who 
she is (As You Were, 6015). 
Buffy cannot comprehend her own liminality and multiplicity as she is sitmlted on 
the edge between light and dark, human and supernatural. girl and Slayer. As she 
declares, 'nothing's ever simple anymore. I'm constantly trying to work it out. Who to 
love, or hate, who to trust. It's just like the more I know the more confused I get' (Lie 10 
Me, 2007). Buffy has to come to terms with the complexity of her role that positions her 
as not quite ordinary nor strictly human as well as the moral uncertainty of her world in 
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which vampires are not necessarily evil and vampire slayers inhabit an ambiguous space 
between binaries. Her discoveries lead her on a path of psychological and emotional 
isolation as she realizes the Slayer's burden and rejects the notion that she could have a 
normal life and be 'a regular kid' (What's My Line, Part 1,2009). Buffy laments that 
once she 'knew what was right. I don't have that anymore. [ ... ] I don't know how to live 
in this world if these are the choices' (The Gift, 5022). This sense of loss and devastation 
culminates in Buffy's most desperate escape from her clashing selves and the ultimate 
accomplishment of her Slayer duty as she kills herself in order to avoid the apocalypse. 
'The hardest thing in this world is to live in it', Buffy proclaims as she jumps to her death 
and surrenders her fight against her warring personae (The Gift, 5022). 
However, Whedon is not content with this capitulated and beaten heroine and he 
resurrects her by tearing her out of 'heaven' where she was 'finished', 'complete' and 'at 
peace' and bringing her back to everyday 'helJ' where 'everything [ ... ] is hard, and 
bright, and violent' (After Life, 6003). Unable to resume the endless struggle of life, 
Buffy can only deal with her regained identity crisis by turning into the Slayer, a 
'reckless' 'general' who wants to win the final battle against the First Evil (Lit'S My 
Parents Told Me, 7017). In order to shield herself from the pain of losing her friends, 
Buffy distances herself emotionally from those around her. She 'sleepwalk[s] through 
[her] life's endeavor', 'walk[s] through the part' and 'gores] through the motions' 
without letting anything 'penetrate [her] heart' (Once More, With Fel'ling, 6(07). To 
Buffy, 'making the hard decisions' means giving up part of her humanity and sacrificing 
the life of others to safeguard the mission (Empty Places, 7019). Increasingly, Buffy 
claims a peremptory right to 'draw the line' as she decides that 'human rules don't 
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apply', 'there's only me. I am the law' (Selfless, 7005). In so doing, Buffy alienates her 
friends/family and in the end, she is expelled from her house and finds herself without her 
social support group (Empty Spaces, 7019). 
Ultimately, Buffy comes to realize that she cannot continue to disallow her 
inherent contradictions if she wants to win her last fight. She acknowledges that she is the 
most effective Slayer only because she is simultaneously a girl who is connected to 
people with unique gifts and strengths. Buffy decides to 'make some changes from the 
inside' and create her own choiceoisie that will accommodate her ambiguous and 
pluralistic wholeness (This Year's Girl, 4015). She is determined to 'find a way' and 
thus, she 'redefin[es] the job' and forces herself 'to do what can't be done' (Showrime, 
7011; Get It Done, 7015). Buffy questions the heroic conventions that structure her 
universe and resignifies the Slayer position by creating a very different environment for 
her superhero persona. With the help of her friend and witch Willow, she 'change[s] the 
rule' that was made by 'a bunch of men who died thousands of years ago' and prescribes 
that 'in every generation, one slayer is born' (Chosen, 7022). Buffy's Slayer strength is 
magically diffused and displaced onto 'every girl who could have the power', so that 
'from now on, every girl in the world who might be a Slayer, will be a Slayer' (Chosen, 
7022). Thus, Buffy actively manufactures a choice and future for herself that will no 
longer leave her isolated and alone. She accepts her heterogeneous subjectivity that is in a 
constant state of flux and change. As she describes herself metaphorically to Angel, 
I'm cookie dough. I'm not done baking. I am not finished becoming to wherever 
[ ... ] it is I'm gonna turn out to be. [ ... ] Maybe one day I'll turn around and 
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realize I am ready. I am cookies. [ ... ] I am not really thinking that far ahead. 
(Chosen, 7022) 
Commentators have criticized this magic creation of a choiceoisie in which 
contradictions can be resolved and opposites can be combined and united. They take 
issue with Whedon's optimistic both/and utopia and instead, they adopt an either/or logic 
to analyse Buffy's split selves. Critics are engaged in a search for the 'real Buffy' as they 
try to unravel 'the ambivalent position Buffy occupies between authentic adolescent and 
supernatural Slayer' (Pender 2002: 36). They describe the series' 'mixed messages about 
feminism and femininity' and they uphold a dualistic rationale that defines 'Buffy's form 
and Buffy's content' as 'distinct and incompatible categories' (Fudge 1999: 1: Pender 
2002: 43). In this way, Anne Millard Daughtery condemns the Slayer's feminine exterior, 
.. , stating that 'for all the efforts taken to negate the traditional male gaze, Buffy's physical 
attractiveness is, in itself, objectifying' (Daughtery 2002: 151). Buffy's 'girl power' is 
said to represent 'a diluted imitation of female empowerment' that promotes 'style over 
substance' and ultimately lacks a political agenda (Fudge 1999: 3). Buffy is censured for 
being a 'hard candy-coated feminist heroine for the girl-power era' whose 'pastel veneer' 
and 'over-the-top girliness in the end compromise her feminist potential' (Fudge 1999: 
3).7 Sarah CurtiS-Fawley concludes that 'replacing Barbie with Buffy is clcarly not the 
victory that feminism hoped for' (quoted in Karras 2002: 6). Ultimately, 'the series plays 
at transgression' but 'it remains to be seen whether transgressive play can challcnge 
institutional relations of power' (Owen 1999: 31). 
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This form of criticism relies on a binary framework that opposes feminine 
powerlessness/oppression to feminist powerlcritique. This polarized viewpoint defines 
action heroines by either their adoption or their refusal of femininity and it is forced to 
conclude that 'Buffy cannot be a feminist because she has a cleavage' (Pender 2002: 43). 
Buffy the Vampire Slayer has been discussed as a contemporary version of the 1970s 
'pseudo-tough', 'wanna be' action heroines exemplified by Wonder Woman and 
Charlie's Angels (Inness 1999: 27). As Sherrie Inness has convincingly argued, 
femininity was used in this context as a way to allay the heroine's toughness. tone down 
and compensate for her assertiveness and display of strength (Inness 1999). The threat 
that the tough woman poses to the hegemonic order is reduced by this connection 
between women, sexuality and femininity and by the suggestion that a woman's sexual 
availability and physical attractiveness are in no way diminished by her power. The 
heroine's actions are explained away and her toughness is undercut in an attempt to 
mitigate, if not resolve. the uncertainties posed by the strong and self-reliant woman. 
This mode of understanding depends on a dichotomy that constructs femininity as 
both antifeminist and non-tough and thus, it reaffirms essentialist stereotypes of female 
vulnerability and inaction. Toughness and strength remain associated with masculinity 
and a strong woman ultimately has to be seen as masculine. In effect. the figure of the 
hardbodied, butch action heroine of the 1980s and early 1990s represents the flip side of 
the same coin that depicts the feminine heroine as a masquerader who plays at being 
tough. This polarized logic can only conceive of physically strong and powerful female 
protagonists as 'pseudo males' who are really '''boys'' in "girls" clothing', rather than a 
legitimate role for women (Brown 1996: 53). Femininity and masculinity are constructed 
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through a process of mutual exclusion that upholds the connection between maleness and 
toughness and, thus, works to ensure male privilege and authority. The critical suggestion 
that action heroines are female 'men in drag' or 'Femboes' represents an attempt to 
secure the masculine/feminine binary in a way that facilitates the dominance of gender 
absolutism and retains the notions of appropriate behavior and appearance for men and 
women. As Jeffrey Brown states, 'rather than aggressiveness being deemed legitimate for 
women', the non-feminine hardbody is suspected of 'transvestism' which reinforces 
rather than destabilizes the idea of mutually exclusive gender categories (Brown 1996: 
60). Moreover, 'if a female character seen as kicking ass must be read as masculine, then 
women are systematically denied as a gender capable of behaving in any way other than 
passive' (Brown 1996: 63). Ultimately, the action heroine's masculine coding leads to a 
reification of masculine power and feminine weakness, thereby negating the transgressive 
potential of placing a woman in an empowered and heroic position in the first place. 
Contrastingly, I assert that the postfeminist supergirl transcends these binary formulations 
as she subverts the gender framework that underlies the conceptualization of masculine 
activity and feminine passivity. Postfeminism creates a site of interaction between 
previously antagonistic elements and establishes a paradoxical space between masculinity 
and femininity. 
Laurell K. Hamilton's protagonist Anita Blake starts her journey towards a 
postfeminist in-betweenness from the masculinized end of the spectrum as a 'tough-as-
nails vampire slayer' and 'a coldhearted bitch' in her own words (Hamilton 2000a: 149; 
Hamilton 2000b: 33). Dividing her professional life between her jobs as an animator and 
a special advisor to the police and later a federal marshal, Anita wants to be 'a female one 
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of the guys' and she admits that being 'macho [is] the only way I got this far' (Hamilton 
2001 a: 335; Hamilton 2000c: 189). According to Anita, there is only one 'rule for playing 
with the big boys': you have to beat them at their own game and 'be tougher than the 
men, stronger, better, or they held it against you. Or they treated you like a girl' 
(Hamilton 2000b: 116; Hamilton 2000d: 46). Consequently, Anita tries to rid her life of 
what she considers to be feminine weaknesses, dismissing shopping as 'one of life's 
necessary evils' along with 'high-heeled shoes' and refusing to let a man open the door 
for her or let him pay for her meal (Hamilton 2oo0a: 125; Hamilton 1995: 33). This 
rejection of stereotypical femininity is not the result of a feminist consciousness ac; Anita 
does not believe in 'the universal sisterhood appeal' but she adopts a patriarchal and 
dualistic view of female inferiority/powerlessness and male activity/strength (Hamilton 
2000f: 173). In fact, she even notes that she is 'a female chauvinist piglet' as she 
underestimates one of her attackers because she is small and pretty (Hamilton 2000c: 
174). Anita assumes the so-called masculine privilege of active subjectivity and there is a 
general consensus among her friends and enemies that she 'would have made a good 
man' (Hamilton 2001a: 565). 
Yet, at the same time, Anita has to recognize that, even though she is not 
'comfortable with [her] feminine side', femininity is an inherent but repressed part of her 
(Hamilton 2000f: 216). Anita reveals that she can look 'downright cute', 'delicate, 
dainty' and 'petite' and that she is 'after all a girl, whether [she] Iike[s] to admit it or not' 
(Hamilton 20ooa: 178; Hamilton 2000b: 15; Hamilton 2000c: 14). lIer feminine exterior 
and 'china doll' looks often mislead her opponents to belittle and misjudge her fighting 
ability (Hamilton 2oooa: 9). Anita is not considered 'big enough to be The Executioner' 
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as 'this little bit of a girl' could not have 'over a dozen vampire kills under her belt' 
(Hamilton 200a: 73; Hamilton 20ooc: 52). She decides not to let her 'packaging' hinder 
her fight against monsters and demons, declaring that women 'can be great warriors', 
'we've just got to pack the equipment a little differently' (Hamilton 1995: 145; Hamilton 
2003: 266). Occasionally, Anita even uses her femininity as a masquerade when she 
manipulates her frail and helpless image to gain advantage of a situation. In this way, she 
successfully escapes death by stimulating a sexual interest in her aggressor, noting that 
'the trick is to get the man thinking more about sex than violence, so he's a little 
confused' (Hamilton 2001 a: 497). Anita does not question the binary gender codes that 
equate femininity with vulnerability and passivity but she exploits cultural perceptions of 
gender. Describing an unchangeable status quo, she points out that 
no matter how many times you saved their lives, and they saved yours, no matter 
how much you could bench-press, no matter how tall, or strong, or competent -
you were still a girl. And the fact that you were a girl overshadowed everything 
else for most men. It wasn't good or bad, it just was. [. 0 0] Most of the time it 
bugged [ ... ] me, but today we'd use it against the bad guys, because they'd see 
all that hair, those breasts, and they'd underestimate [me], because [I] was a girl. 
(Hamilton 2003: 272-273) 
Anita confirms the vampire Jean-Claude's belief that she 'think[s] [. 0 0] like a man' as 
she adopts an essentialist view of womanliness as harmlessness while simultaneously 
abusing this stereotype for her own purposes (Hamilton 2003: 338). 
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Initially, Anita's repressed femininity does not emerge as an adult and mature 
womanhood but as a nostalgic return to an almost childlike girlhood. She virtuously 
reveals that she has always been 'a good girl' who never slept around, always said her 
prayers before bed and grace over her food (Hamilton 2000c: 142; Hamilton 2000b: 153; 
Hamilton 2000a: 106). 'I was pink once', she tells bounty hunter Edward, explaining that, 
when she was a little girl, she would 'have given a small body part to have a pink canopy 
bed and bal1erina wal1paper' (Hamilton 2001 a: 442). However, Anita has had to give up 
this 'softer more romanticized view' of life and, in Edward's words, turn herself into 'one 
of the least pink women [he has] ever met' (Hamilton 2003: 195; Hamilton 200 1 a: 442). 
In particular, she has become cautious of the 'happy-ever-after' when her college fiance 
dumped her because of her Mexican ancestry and she promised to let herself never 'get 
hurt like that again' (Hamilton 20OOc: 16; 142). In this way, she has abandoned the 
fantasy 'to live in some Ozzie and Harriet world' and be rescued by a 'white knight' 
(Hamilton 2000e: 71; Hamilton 2oo0c: 197). The only remnant of her innocent and 
'naIve' past is her stuffed toy penguin Sigmund that shares her bed after a troublesome 
and dangerous experience and that Anita reluctantly admits to being her 'weakness' 
(Hamilton 2000g: 80; Hamilton 2oo0a: 85). The other 'comfort ohject' that Anita relics 
on and sometimes even sleeps with, is her gun, a 9 mm Browning (Hamilton 2000g: 167). 
She constantly touches and uses her weapon in order to secure and protect her identity as 
the Executioner and repel any feelings that might compromise her role. As she 
comments, 'the tightness of the shoulder holster, the digging of the [gun] in its inner-
pants holster made me feel more like myself as 'guns, this particular brand of violence, 
was all mine' (Hamilton 2000g: 383). Thus, Anita's personality is split between the girly 
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child and the macho heroine as she admits that 'I wasn't sure which was more 
comforting, the penguin or the gun. I guess both were equally comforting. for very 
different reasons' (Hamilton 2000b: 153). 
Anita has divided her own being into a secret and largely unacknowledged 
feminine self (or rather Other) and a tough public and professional persona through 
which she wants to define herself. As she proclaims, 'I raised the dead and laid the 
undead to rest. It was what I did. Who I was' (Hamilton 2000a: 79). At the beginning, her 
emotions towards the monsters are clear-cut and straightforward and she declares that 'I 
know who and what I am. I am the Executioner, and I don't date vampires. I kill them' 
(Hamilton 2000a: 266). Anita resists her feelings towards the rna liter vampire Jean-
Claude, insisting that 'a girl's got to have some standards' and not date anything non-
human or dead (Hamilton 1995: 292). However, as her life gets more entangled with the 
world of the undead and as Anita develops her own supernatural abilities as a 
necromancer, she comes to realize that she is not 'lily-human', not sufficiently human to 
be fully accepted among the civilians she protects and the policemen she works with 
(Hamilton 2003: 155). Anita has to admit that she is an outcast, 'a triple threat if ever 
there was one. I was a civvie, a woman, and a freak' (Hamilton 2001 a: 71). The prejudice 
and even hatred she exhibits towards the monsters in the early novels are frequently 
questioned as her relationships with both human and non-human creatures cause her to 
re-examine the validity and mutual exclusivity of the two categories. Anita has to rethink 
'exactly what made you human, and what made you one of the monsters. Once)' d been 
very sure of myself, and everyone else. I wasn't so sure anymore' (Hamilton 2000d: 
145). 
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However, Anita does not welcome this erosion of her once stringent morality and 
worldview, maintaining that 'life had been simpler when I believed in black-and-white 
absolutes' (Hamilton 2001 b: 41). She sees her immersion into the non-human realm and 
her surrender to Jean-Claude as a devastating and almost fatal 'fall' into 'the well of 
moral decay', revealing that 'the monsters had finally gotten me. Seducing me was 
almost as good as ki11ing me, and nearly as crippling' (Hamilton 2003: 37, 195; Hamilton 
2000e: 128). As the shapeshifter Nathaniel tells her, Anita hates 'being different' and the 
reason she is finally seduced by the monsters is that they too are outside the human norm 
(Hamilton 2001 b: 121). Anita cannot comply with what her human friends and 
colleagues ask of her: 'choose whether you're one of them, or one of us' (Hamilton 2003: 
306). Sergeant Storr does not recognize that Anita's freakishness, her inhabiting of both 
human and supernatural worlds, is part of her ambiguous being, and instead, he blames 
her in-betweenness on the monsters. As he tens her, 'you've played by their rules so long, 
sometimes you forget what it's like to be normal' (Hamilton 2000f: 40). 
In order to accommodate her non-human self, Anita is forced to live and find love 
among those who are outcasts. As she reflects, 'Jean-Claude and I deserve each other' as 
they both 'live in the same world' (Hamilton 2000e: 26). Anita's introduction to the 
monsters' way of life also triggers the awakening of a mature and highly sexual 
womanhood. She gives in to her own desires as she comes to terms with the fact that 
'maybe' she is not and has never been 'a good girl' (Hamilton 2000d: 277). In the course 
of eleven novels, Anita not only enters into a sexual relationship with Jean-Claude but 
she is simultaneously involved with the werewolves Richard and Jason, the wcrclcopard 
Micah and the vampire Asher. In fact, sex becomes an important source of Anita's power 
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as she forms a triumvirate with master vampire Jean-Claude and Richard, the head of the 
werewolf pack. In the later novels, Anita's life is almost completely ruled by a non-
human sexual need, entitled the ardeur, which forces her to feed her lust and have sex 
every twelve hours (Hamilton 2003: 49; 182). Sex comes to be seen as a melting pot of 
human, supernatural and monstrous selves from which all participants taste and share. 
'We all drew power from it', Anita declares, 'the light and the dark. The cold and the hot. 
Life and Death. As the marks drew us closer, the lines between life and death would blur' 
(Hamilton 2000g: 293). Anita's sexual relations firmly establish her within the world of 
the monsters as she becomes Jean-Claude's human servant, Richard's human lupa and 
Micah's Nimir-Ra, the queen of the werewolves and wereleopards respectively. She even 
gains a 'pet vampire' through her own abilities as a necromancer and, thus, she forges an 
emotional if not sexual bond with nearly all the non-humans she encounters (Hamilton 
2003: 51). Anita accepts her responsibilities and develops an almost maternal 
protectiveness to defend the creatures who depend on her. As she ironically declares, 
'sav[ing] everyone' is her 'hobby' and she is 'accustomed to riding in on [her) white 
steed and saving the day' (Hamilton 2000f: 154; Hamilton 2000g: 129). 
At the same time as befriending and even loving the monsters, Anita stitt has to 
fulfil her public role as the Executioner, 'the scourge of vampire kind' (liamilton 2000c: 
387). Rather than embracing the monstrous world and its ambiguous morality, Anita 
prefers to hide her feelings for Jean-Claude 'like some guilty secret' and she is 
'embarrassed [ ... ] that anyone would think [she] might actually date him. That [she] 
might actually care for a walking dead man' (Hamilton 2000e: 135; 134). She struggles 
with the fear that her growing attachment to the non-human realm and its inhabitants 
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endangers and undermines her own humanity and soul. Anita's alienation from her 
human and moral standards results in an increased toughness and in her ability to kill 
without remorse. As she realizes in disbelief, 'killing didn't bother me', it 'meant nothing 
to me. Just good business' (Hamilton 2000f: 81). Anita can 'kill people and not blink. No 
att_ack of conscience, no nightmares, nothing. It was like some part of me had turned off 
(Hamilton 2000e: 72). She has to face up to 'some dark part of her' that transfonns her 
into a 'sociopath' who 'want[s] to kill. Not for revenge, or safety, or even my word. but 
just because I [can]' (Hamilton 2000f: 381; 19). Thus, Anita's relationship with the self-
loathing werewolf Richard ends because she is not 'human enough for him' (Hamilton 
2003: 195). As she tells him, she is never going to 'soften up and become [a] good little 
girl' and she sees herself for who she is, 'something that would kill you before it would 
kiss you' (Hamilton 2000e: 271; 311). 
In this way, Anita combines a stereotypical feminine exterior with a ruthless 
assassin persona, a supernatural affinity with the dead and a moral commitment to defend 
those under her protection. As Edward declares, underneath 'the surface'. 'the small 
attractive packaging' 'is someone who thinks like a killer, and a cop, and a monster. I 
don't know anyone else who bridges all three worlds as well as she docs' (Hamilton 
2001a: 157). While admitting that she 'can't unmake' her multiple and contradictory self, 
Anita does not fully accept or embrace her position between hi naries (Hamilton 200 I a: 
444). Instead, she prefers to view her own monstrosity as a self-sacrifice to secure the 
status quo and protect the human community that has exiled her. As she states, 'I was 
always willing to compromise my soul if it would take out a great evil' (liamilton 200 I a: 
380). She cannot 'let the monsters win, not even if it mean[s] becoming one of them' and 
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thus, she becomes 'a monster, but it's for a good cause' (Hamilton 2001a: 381; Hamilton 
2000g: 400). Paradoxically, Anita tries to maintain the boundary between human and 
monster, good and evil, self and Other by crossing the line that separates them and 
becoming more 'other' herself. Importantly, Anita has not abandoned her own dualistic, 
black-and-white worldview and she considers her own ambiguity and promiscuity as 
abnormal and monstrous. She is 'embarrassed' by her conduct and describes herself ali an 
'inhuman' 'freak' and a 'whore' (Hamilton 2oo0g: 269; 193). She feels 'guilty' not only 
because she has 'turned into coffin bait' but also because she might 'be in love with four 
men at once' (Hamilton 2003: 69; 191; Hamilton 2000f: 177). Anita believes that she has 
'lost it big time. From celibacy to fucking the undead. If I'd still been Catholic, it would 
have been enough to get me excommunicated' (Hamilton 2000f: 247). 
In fact, Anita is 'deeply moral' and she has 'problems with premarital sex' 
(Hamilton 2001 b: 338; Hamilton 2000g: 268). After she starts dating and having 
intercourse with more people, she laments that 
my one comfort had been that I was monogamous. Now I didn't even have that. 
Whoredom had finally arrived just as my Grandmother Blake had always warned. 
[ ... ] Once you have sex with anyone, sex becomes more of a possibility with 
others. (Hamilton 20oog: 268) 
Anita's sexual behavior does not undermine her belief in the rightness of religious rules 
and commandments but it means that, in her own mind, she is a 'fallen Catholic' who has 
lost her virtue and fails to live up to her 'own moral code' (Hamilton 2001a: 445; 
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Hamilton 2001 b: 339). 'My faith was still pure', she notes, 'I never doubted God. I 
doubted me' (Hamilton 2000g: 411). Similarly, she tells the remorseless killer Edward 
that 'I do believe in marriage, but not for people like us' (Hamilton 200 I a: 258). Anita is 
convinced that she does not 'make [a] good significant other' and that her future does not 
hold the possibility of marriage and domestic bliss, 'not in this lifetime' (Hamilton 1995: 
281; Hamilton 2000c: 254). 
Ultimately, Anita straddles both human and monstrous worlds, without ever fully 
committing to either. Jason rebukes her for having 'divided [her] world up into different 
parts' without ever giving herself over 'heart and soul to anybody' (Hamilton 2003: 192; 
191). This is reinforced by Asher who tells her that 'something will not allow you to give 
yourself completely [ ... ] to that shining thing called love. You hold yourself back, and 
you hold back those who love you' (Hamilton 2003: 263). Anita admits that she does not 
want to 'belong to just one person' and always withholds 'a piece of myself for myself 
(Hamilton 2003: 192). As she states, 'if 1 belong to anybody, I belong to me' and 'no one 
gets all of me [ ... ] no one, except me' (Hamilton 2000f: 315; Hamilton 2003: 193). 
Thus, she does not want to be 'Mrs. Jean-Claude' and insists that he only gets her 'libido' 
but not her 'heart' (Hamilton 2000e: 176; Hamilton 2ooof: 392). As she proclaims, 'a 
girl's got to have some standards. 1 don't let the vamps fuck with my mind, they just get 
my body' (Hamilton 2003: 264). Anita cannot resolve her own internal paradoxes and 
struggle between her highly sexual supernatural self, her cold-hearted and tough 
professional identity and her 'good girl' upbringing. Even though she is lives bt'.wmJ the 
binary, Anita is not able to combine these different parts, concluding that she is 'a mess 
of contradictions' (Hamilton 2003: 342). 
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Anita's pluralistic in-betweenness does not conflate into a harmonious unity in 
diversity. She cannot 'love' and accept herself 'just as [she] [is]', 'small, dark, hard, 
bloody, thick with metaphysical shit' (Hamilton 2003: 196). Instead, she divides and 
splits her self between her conflicting characteristics in an attempt to keep them separate 
and confined. Her tough killer persona is in stark contrast to the mother-like protector and 
saviour who passionately cares for the monsters that she has taken into custody. 
Importantly, in the last novel Cerulean Sins, Anita rejects all her lovers for her favorite 
toy Sigmund because he 'never told me I was being silly, or bloodthirsty' (Hamilton 
2003: 466). She does not believe that anyone, either monstrous or human, can accept the 
paradoxical complexity of her character and love her for who she is: 'a kindhearted [ ... ] 
powerful, ruthless and pretty [ ... ] sociopath who happens to have magical abilities', 'a 
mind and a heart' (Hamilton 2001b: 214). 
Unlike Whedon, Hamilton does not release her heroine from her problematical 
heterogeneity as Anita does not reconcile her life's contradictions by deterritorializing 
her constraints and transcending into a realm of self-creation and choice. Yet, Whedon 
and Hamilton alike present their slayers as inherently pluralistic and paradoxical figures 
who battle with their existence across essentialized concepts of Woman and Man, human 
and monster. Anita and Buffy have to recognize the complexity of their roles as they are 
confronted with a world in which ambiguity is inevitable, 'good' and 'evil' are slippery 
concepts while 'right' and 'wrong' are equally obscure. Their existence on the 
postfeminist frontier is not depicted as a harmonious dispersion of dualistic restrictions 
and linear thinking. On the contrary, their position between polarities is a contested site 
of permanent struggle rather than an embrace of plurality and an alliance of oppositions. 
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These pioneer active heroines experience that blurring the binary is a lonely and 
alienating task, a burden that they have to carry and a stroke of fate that they have to 
endure. Thus, the postfeminist supergirl illustrates postfeminism's contentious 
intersection and exploitation of the in-between space as she endeavors to carve out a new 
subjective stance between previously antagonistic categories of identification. This 
postfeminist landscape crosses either/or distinctions and offers a model of negotiation to 
account for the overlap between activity and passivity. It is in this gap between dualities 
that a new context can be opened up that resignifies and reinscribes the norms of power 
and resistance, complicity and critique. 
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4. Conclusion: Towards a Postfeminist Politics of Resistance 
I began this analysis of postfeminist contexts and texts with an examination of the 
foundations and resignifiable boundaries that delimit postfeminism's domain of meanings 
and possibilities. I have sought to take account of how a paradox recurrently structures 
postfeminist debates and how it is played out in the middle space between dualistic 
formulations and categories. In fact, I have suggested that the multivalent and pluralistic 
postfeminist spectrum exceeds the binary frame itself in its reworking of the logic of non-
contradiction and its displays of ambivalence. Postfeminism depicts the complex 
crossings and interchanges between previously antagonistic stances and it is caught in a 
struggle of signification whereby the binary sides are depolarized and brought into 
contact/conflict. This interrogation of the either/or is manifested in postfeminist practice 
and theory by a non-dichotomous understanding of complicity and critique, feminism and 
femininity, power and disempowerment. The postfeminist frontier discourse relies on a 
process of resignification and iterability that provisionally circumscribes and defines the 
postfeminist site, endowing it with contextualized and temporalized meanings. This 
positional definition makes postfeminist significations relative to a constantly shifting 
network of power/discourse, a constitutive constraint that produces as well as constrains 
postfeminism's realm of possibilities. 
In this way, postfeminism becomes a site for the construction of meaning. a 
contested location that lacks a stable and fixed referent and instead houses an ongoing 
internal negotiation of the usage and meaning of the term. Postfeminism is constituted by 
its contextual surroundings but not determined. where determination forecloses the 
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potential of a 'break with context' and the assumption of a new meaning. Thus, to take up 
the postfeminist signifier implies being inserted into a chain of significations that 
operates through a compulsive repetition and cannot be comprehended in linear terms. 
Postfeminist meanings are regulated contextually, never reaching an absolute certainty 
and only positing ideas that cannot be secured as 'truths'. In this dialectical model, the 
significative resolution or synthesis is not final but provides the basis for further 
resignifications and recontextualizations. Catachresis is a perpetual risk or indeed a 
founding feature of postfeminism, eschewing rigid designations in favour of. what Judith 
Butler calls, an 'economy of difference' that allows for incoherent and paradoxical 
significations (Butler 1993a: 118). The postfeminist landscape gives rise to a number of 
discursive convergences that signify in excess of their originating contexts and produce 
the opportunity for a complex reconfiguration and redeployment. Accordingly, I maintain 
that postfeminism cannot be understood in terms of clear origins or ultimate goals as no 
monological conclusion necessarily follows from these processes of resignification and 
reterritorialization. Instead, it is necessary to release the term from a predetermined 
referent and challenge the foundationalist premises that constrain in advance our 
practices of reading and comprehending postfeminism. This implies reworking the 
historicity of the postfeminist signifier in order to emphasize the conflicts of 
interpretation and signification that arise between contexts. 
While stressing postfeminism's resignifiability and polysemy, I also insist that its 
meanings do not float freely in an inexhaustible ocean of information but they are 
constructed within a given horizon of possibilities that are already established and 
demarcated by contextual/discursive foreclosures. These delimitations delineate what is 
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imaginable and intelligible on the postfeminist landscape, creating a domain of possible 
meanings that are contextually contingent. Moreover, I suggest that postfeminism does 
not effect a radical unmooring, a complete break with its previous contexts, ac; it creates a 
terrain of exchange between its various positionings. Consequently, it is important to 
question what of a prior context is brought forward and how this trace continues to haunt 
the new context/meaning. This contextual residue makes the postfeminist site an 
inherently 'impure' space that incorporates the old into the new, preserving what it seeks 
to superimpose. I have sought to describe this specter by underlining the varied and even 
contradictory interpretations that emerge within the parameters of textual/discursive 
constraints. I have tried to highlight the interconnections between postfeminist contexts 
and the interplay of significations that draw on a both/and dynamic in order to undermine 
an exclusionary logic of antithesis. My purpose has been to understand how an internal 
postfeminist echo acts as a remainder, reverberating in new contexts and disrupting any 
sense of monosemy, any notion of a uniform ground. 
This multiple positionality and signifiability are at the basis of the 
transgression/containment debates that have split contemporary critics and feminist 
theorists with regard to postfeminism's political capacities, its affiliations and affinities 
that are seen to be oppositional and incongruous. These critical attempts to produce a 
non-contradictory coherence can only be achieved at the cost of postfeminist complexity. 
the discursive crossings that generate paradoxical meanings and positions. My own 
approach to the postfeminist problematic has not been led by a desire to resolve the 
struggles of translation and construct a foundationalist frame in which postfeminism is 
always articulated. Instead of determining a universal postfeminist ground/meaning. I 
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have endeavored to interrogate the construction of pregiven premises, highlight their 
resignificatory potential and locate possible interventions into the citational chain. Rather 
than trying to align postfeminism with either patriarchy or feminism, popular culture or 
academia, I want to affirm the movement's postfoundational usefulness whereby it brings 
into question and (mis)appropriates these 'foundations'. I propose that there is no 
opposition between postfeminism's reactionary and progressive usage as these layers of 
signification interact and indeed depend upon one another. In this way, postfeminist 
progressiveness requires and repeats its conservative meaning in order to effect a 
subversive recontextualization. In my discussion of postfeminist texts, this double move 
is exemplified by Weldon's she devil and Whedon's supergirl who both have to be 
subjectivated by a restrictive power structure (as a Cinderella/vampire slayer 
respectively) in order to redefine their subject positions and resignify the norm. 
In Butlerian terms, the 'post-sovereign' subject's liberating determinism is 
expressed by the notion that 'agency ... is an effect of power', emerging from a founding 
limitation or foreclosure that first makes this agency possible (Butler 1997a: 139). The 
interdependency of power and agency has important consequences for our understanding 
of contemporary politics and critical theory as it depicts opposition workingjrom within 
the very terms by which power is elaborated. I propose that this primary complicity with 
power structures does not necessarily lead to a vicious circle in which any effort to 
oppose subordination necessarily re-invokes it. My inquiry has attempted to uncover the 
political and critical dimensions of postfeminism in the practices of resignification that 
contextualize and decontextualize postfeminist meanings. Resignification opens up a 
domain of possibilities immanent to power and thus, creates a site for agentic 
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interventions. This resignifiable potential does not position postfeminism's political 
promise in a utopian beyond but at the center of a politics of hegemony that takes the risk 
of employing the terms that we simultaneously question. The goal of this political 
critique cannot be pure subversion as it has to take into account the interarticulation of 
relations of domination and resistance. In fact, any attempt at subversion is potentially 
recuperable and cannot be calculated or planned in advance as it demands to be 
investigated in context. Thus, postfeminism offers a set of challenges that are historically 
provisional, readable only within specific contextual surroundings and resignifiable in 
new contexts. The notion of postfeminism as both contingent and delimited situates 
power and resistance within the terms of reiteration as active/productive structures. 
Importantly, this conclusion is not to be understood as a conflation of resistance and 
recuperation (Le. as a resistance that is really a recuperation of power or as a recuperation 
that is really a resistance). It is both at once, blurring the binary between these 
dichotomies and modifying the foundationalist frame that positions them in a relation of 
antithesis. As I have endeavored to demonstrate throughout this study, postfcminism's 
blur of the binary does not represent an avoidance of a critical viewpoint or a disavowal 
of politics. On the contrary, postfeminism pursues those moments when, as Butler notes, 
'we're standing in two different places at once; or we don't know exactly where we're 
standing' in order to effect a degrounding and produce a resistance to recuperation 
(quoted in Osborne and Segal 1994: 38). This new postfeminist space challenges our 
modes of knowledge and our capacities to read, prompting us to renegotiate the ways in 
which we make sense of the contemporary age of confusion. Risk will always be an 
unavoidable component of this procedure as postfeminism comes to serve progressive 
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and conservative, feminist and anti-feminist purposes. This inherent paradox requires a 
rethinking of the in-between as a necessary and valid position in its own right, a new 
space of complex identifications and incoherent configurations that exceed and 
undermine the injunctions by which they are generated. 
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Endnotes 
1.1 On Shaky Ground: Defining Postfeminism 
1 Works suggestive of these different definitions of postfeminism would be: Susan Faludi 
Backlash The Undeclared War against Women (1992), Naomi Wolf Fire With Fire: The 
New Female Power and How It Will Change the 21 s1 Century (1993), Ann Brooks 
Postfeminisms Feminism, Cultural Theory and Cultural Forms (1997), Leslie Heywood 
and Jennifer Drake eds. Third Wave Agenda Being Feminist. Doing Feminism (1997). 
2 Moreover, Butler insists that 'a fundamental mistake is made when we think that we 
must sort out philosophically or epistemologically our "ground" before we can take stock 
of the world [ ... ] or engage in its affairs actively with the aim of transformation' (Butler 
1995: 129). 
3 Jackie Stacey employs the term 'politics of location' to refer to 'some fundamental 
changes within feminism during the 1980s and 1990s' (Stacey 1994: 257). She reveals 
that 
typica1Jy it is associated with an emphasis on specificity, rather than generality. It 
has emerged from both a political challenge made by black feminism to the 
oppressive generalizations made by white feminists [and] a 
postmodernistlfeminist theoretical disenchantment with universal theories in 
favour of theories located historically, culturally and geographically. (Stacey 
1994: 257) 
See Jackie Stacey 1994. Star Gazing Hollywood Cinema and Female Spectatorship, 
London and New York: Routledge. 
4 The term 'interdiscursivity' is used by Linda Hutcheon to broaden the scope of 
intertextuality which is considered to be 'too limited a term' for 'the collective modes of 
discourse from which the postmodern parodically draws' (Hutcheon 1989: 12). 
See Linda Hutcheon 1989. 'Historiographic Metafiction: Parody and the Intcrtcxtuality of 
History', in Intertextuality and Contemporary American Fiction, (eds) O'Donnell, P. and 
Davis, R. C., Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 3-30. 
5 Hutcheon reveals that the doubleness of parody and the dispute about its political 
direction stem from the term's etymological root, the Greek prefix 'para' that has two 
meanings. In its more widely known translation, 'para' means 'counter' or 'against' and 
thus, parody becomes 'an opposition or contra'\t between texts [ ... ] one text is set against 
another with the intent of mocking it or making it ludicrous' (Hutcheon 1985: 32). 
However, in Greek, 'para' also carries the meaning of 'beside' or 'near' and therefore, 
'there is a suggestion of an accord or intimacy instead of a contrast' (Hutcheon 1985: 32). 
This second, neglected meaning of the prefix broadens the pragmatic scope of parody that 
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encompasses both a subversion of authority and a conservative re-inscription of the latter. 
Hutcheon concludes that 'the ethos postulated for parody probably should be labeled as 
unmarked, with a number of possibilities for marking' (Hutcheon 1985: 60). In accord 
with the oppositional meaning of 'para' (as 'counter'), one can posit a challenging or 
contesting form of parody whereas the other meaning of the prefix (as 'close to') 
accounts for a more respectful and reverential ethos (Hutcheon 1985: 60). 
6 In a similar manner, Jameson reveals that there is no 'conviction that alongside the 
abnormal tongue you have momentarily borrowed, some healthy linguistic normality still 
exists' (Jameson 1993: 74). 
7 As Todd Gitlin and Simon Dentith point out, 'we have [ ... ] a cultivation of surfaces 
endlessly referring to, ricocheting from, reverberating onto other surfaces'. 'in an 
interminable recycling which mirrors the unending commodity circulation of an 
absolutely extensive capitalism' (Gitlin 1989: 350; Dentith 2000: 155). 
8 Dentith notes that 'there is no general politics of parody; you cannot decide in advance 
whether it seeks to contain the new or deflate the old' (Dentith 2000: 185). 
9 As Hutcheon reveals, nostalgia is 'less a matter of simple memory' than an 'invocation 
of a partial, idealized history' (Hutcheon 1998: 3). In this sense. 'nostalgia is less about 
the past than about the present' (Hutcheon 1998: 3). Moreover. 
[it] may depend precisely on the irrecoverable nature of the past for its emotional 
impact and appeal. It is the very pastness of the past. its inaccessibility. that likely 
accounts for a large part of nostalgia's power. [ ... ] This is rarely the past as 
actually experienced [ ... ] it is the past as imagined, as idealized through memory 
and desire. (Hutcheon 1998: 3) 
10 In particular, parody involves 'the entire enonciation of discourse'. a wide context that 
includes 'an addresser of the utterance, a receiver of it, a time and a place. discourses that 
precede and follow' (Hutcheon 1985: 23). Thus. parody relies on the active participation 
of and the contractual agreement between encoder and decoder as well as on a structural 
and discursive contextualization that frames the production and the reception of parodic 
texts. 
1.2 Beyond the Binary or Theorizing on the Postfeminist Frontier 
1 Harris refers to Derrida in order to explain that a politics of undecidability 'docs not 
mean that decisions cannot or should not be made' but it highlights 'the process of 
negotiation by which they are and must be made' (Harris 1999: 180). As Dcrrida points 
out, undecidability is always a 'determinate oscillation between possibilities. possibilities 
which themselves are highly determined in strictly defined situations' (Derrida 1990: 
148). Thus. the politics of undecidability does not offer absolutism from the 
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responsibility of making decisions and creating meanings but it accepts that these cannot 
be made by applying a pre-existing law and they cannot be made once and for all time. 
2 According to Ang, 'it is important to properly theorize "chaos'" and she dismisses a 
negative theory of chaos as a 'loss of control' and a 'lack of order' (Ang 1996: 174). Her 
positive reading of chaos implies the 'transvaluation of chaos as having primacy over 
order' (Ang 1996: 175). However, Ang also asserts that chaos is not opposed to order. 
Drawing on N.K. Hayles' chaos theory, chaos can be seen as 'the engine that drives a 
system toward a more complex kind of order' (Hayle 1990: 23). Chaos can be described 
as 'an exhaustible ocean of information' rather than a lack, 'a void signifying absence' 
(Hayle 1990: 8). Thus, as Ang suggests, 'the more chaotic a system is, the more 
information it contains, and the more complex the order established out of it' (Ang 1996: 
175). 
See len Ang 1996. Living Room Wars: Rethinking Media Audiences for a Post modem 
World, London and New York: Routledge. 
N.K.Hayles 1990. Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and 
Science, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
3 According to a Foucauldian analysis of power, resistance or a challenge to power does 
not come from the outside but is produced within power structures. In this way, where 
there is power, there is also resistance as dominant forms and institutions are continually 
being penetrated and reconstructed by values, styles and knowledges that have been 
developing and gathering energy, strength and distinctiveness 'at the margins'. Foucault's 
concept of power as both productive and pluralistic can be seen as supportive of different 
forms of power while at the same time producing sites of resistance, struggle and change. 
4 As Foucault notes, 'we can never be ensnared by power: we can always modify its grip 
in determinate conditions and according to a precise strategy' (Foucault 1988a: 123). The 
result is that 
more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, 
producing cleavages in a society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting 
regroupings, furrowing across the individuals themselves. (Foucault 1978: 96) 
5 For further reading on this attack on the Cartesian subject and the 
constituting/constituted dichotomy, see Susan Hekman 1991. 'Reconstituting the Subject: 
Feminism, Modernism and Postmodernism', Hypatia, 6 (2), 44-63. 
6 In Judith Butler's words, the 'ambivalent scene of agency' relies on a seemingly 
p~radoxical conception of the subject as 'the condition for and instrument of agency' and 
sImultaneously, 'the effect of subordination, understood as the deprivation of agency' 
(Butler 1997b: 15; 10). 
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7 As Judith Butler argues, agency is not a transcendental category nor 'an attribute of 
persons, presupposed as prior to power and language' and 'inferred from the structure of 
the self (Butler 1995: 137). On the contrary, it 'is the effect of discursive conditions' and 
therefore, 'it is implicated in what it opposes' (Butler 1995: 137). 
8 Butler notes that 'whether by interpellation, in Althusser's sense, or by discursive 
productivity in Foucault's, the subject is initiated through a primary submission to power' 
(Butler 1997: 2). In this way, 'Althusser's doctrine of interpellation clearly sets the stage 
for Foucault's later views on the "discursive production of the subject''' and both 
theorists 'agree that there is a founding subordination in the process of assujerissement' 
(Butler 1997: 5). 
9 Butler continues to say that subjection consists in 'this fundamental dependency on a 
discourse we never chose but that, paradoxically, initiates and sustains our agency' 
(Butler 1997b: 2). 
10 In addition, Butler also states that 
one is [ ... ] in power even as one opposes it, formed by it a~ one reworks it, and it 
is this simultaneity that is at once the condition of our partiality, the measure of 
our political unknowingness, and also the condition of action itself. (Butler 1993a: 
241) 
11 Art critic Craig Owen expresses a similar idea when he characterizes 'post' movements 
by a sense of 'impossible complicity', noting that 'it is only through complicity that [the] 
postmodern [ ... ] can execute its deconstructive strategies' (quoted in Augsburg 1998: 
302). 
12 Similarly, Page du Bois reveals that 'efforts of subversion [ ... ] are conceived within 
culture, within the languages which speak us, which we must turn to our own purposes' 
(du Bois 1988: 188). This deconstructive strategy of inside subversion has been theorized 
by Derrida in a statement that is worth quoting at length: 
the movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from outside. They are 
not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting 
those structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one always inhabits, 
and all the more when one does not suspect it. Operating necessarily from the 
inside [ ... ] borrowing them structurally, that is to say without being able to 
isolate their elements and atoms, the enterprise of deconstruction always in a 
certain way falls prey to its own work. (Derrida 1974: 24) 
See Jacques Derrida 1974. Of Grammatology, (trans.) Spivak, G. C., Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
13 Patricia Yaeger concurs, revealing that 'a reinscription of phallocentrism may be a 
sign [ ... ] of woman's own ability to signify, that is, her ability to play with, to control. 
and to restructure patriarchal traditions' (quoted in Ka~telein 1994: 169). 
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14 Julie Burchill is most widely known for her work as a journalist and columnist for The 
Guardian (until 2003). Noted for her acerbic writing and controversial views. she has 
been described as the 'Groucho Marx of feminism' and a 'lipsticked feminist' whose 
political positioning is confusing and contradictory (Frost 2002: 1; Brabazon 1997: I). 
'Tory but working class, a woman yet misogynistic', Burchill characterizes herself as a 
'Thatcherite bitch' who 'refuse[s] to be anyone's hard-luck story' and sees 'fame [as] the 
most pleasurable and profitable shortcut to both' 'love and money' (Brabazon 1997:1). 
This focus on personal fame and achievement is contained within the title of her novel 
Ambition (1989) that became one of the 1980s defining blockbusters. 
IS In a similar manner, Judith Butler locates the political in 'the very signifying practices 
that establish, regulate and deregulate identity' and she adamantly asserts that 'the 
deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics' (Butler 1990a: 147; 148). 
1.3 Modern Janus or the Different Faces of Post feminism 
I For the purpose of this study, it is important to note the definitional ambiguity of the 
term 'feminism'. Any definition of feminism is notoriously difficult as it has never 
encompassed a uniform set of ideas or beliefs. It may very generally be categorized as the 
struggle to intervene in and transform the unequal power relations between men and 
women but there has never been a universally agreed agenda for feminism. Any view or 
explanation of the term is context-specific and thus, in relation to postfeminism. 
'feminism' is understood to be synonymous with the Women's Liberation Movement of 
the 1960s and 1970s, commonly referred to as second wave feminism. The feminism of 
women's liberation distinguishes itself from the 'old feminism' of equal rights by a 
sharper and far more radical feminist consciousness. It is the product of a ch~lnged social 
and political context in the '60s and '70s and it is characterized by the double focus on 
women as an oppressed social group and on the female body with its need for sexual 
autonomy as a primary site of that oppression. 
See for example, Sue Thornham 2001. 'Second Wave Feminism', in The R()utledge 
Companion to Feminism and Postfeminism, 29-42. 
2 In fact, postfeminism may even be identified as a cyclical process of rejuvenation 
whereby it occurs whenever feminism is perceived to be out of touch and limited in its 
analyses of women's lives. As Nancy F. Cott reveals in her historical exploration The 
Grounding of Modern Feminism (1987), the term 'postfeminist' made its first appearance 
in the 1920s press after the vote for women had been gained by the suffrage movement. 
As she explains, 
already in 1919 a group of female literary radicals in Greenwich Village [ ... ] had 
founded a new journal on the thinking, "we're interested in people now - not in 
men and women". They declared that moral, social, economic, and political 
standards "should not have anything to do with sex", promised to be "pro-woman 
without being anti-man", and called their stance "postfeminist". (COlt 1987: 282) 
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3 As Sarah Gamble points out, 'it is important to understand that there are different ways 
of seeing which are all feminist, allowing for diversity within disciplines and within the 
feminist movement itself (Gamble 2001: 231). 
4 As Cott explains, 
women [ ... ] are the same as men in a species sense, but different from men in 
reproductive biology and the construction of gender. Men and women are alike as 
human beings, and yet categorically different from each other; their sameness and 
differences derive from nature and culture, how inextricably entwined we can 
hardly know. (Cott 1987: 5) 
5 Given the statistical evidence, it is clear that the claims of popular/media feminism 
cannot be sustained. As Coppock notes, 'this is not to say that nothing has changed for 
women and some aspects of women's daily experiences can be defined as "progressive". 
[ ... ] While things may be different for women, this does not guarantee, nor translate into 
equality or liberation' (Coppock 1995: 180). 
See for example, Vicki Coppock, Deena Haydon and Ingrid Richter 1995. The Illusions 
of 'Post-Feminism' New Women, Old Myths, London: Taylor & Francis. 
Liz Davies 1996. Feminism after Post-feminism Socialist Renewal European Lahour 
Forum Pamphlet No. 10, Nottingham: Russell Press. 
6 Similarly, Elayne Rapping reveals that the implication of postfeminism 'certainly' is 
that 'the basic system and its values are just fine and all we need to do is reach out and 
grab a piece of the pie' (Rapping 1996: 267). 
7 Following Steven Best's and Douglas Kellner's Postmodern Theory (1991). I will 
interpret poststructuralism as a subset of a broader range of theoretical, cultural and social 
tendencies that constitute postmodern discourses. Poststructuralism fornls part of the 
matrix of postmodern theory and it is described as 'a critique of modern theory and a 
production of new models of thought, writing, and subjectivity. some of which are takcn 
up by postmodern theory' (Best and Kellner 1991: 25). Indeed, 'postmodern theory 
appropriates the poststructuralist critique of modern thought. radicalizes it, and extends it 
to new theoretical fields' (Best and Kellner 1991: 25-26). 
See Steven Best and Douglas Keller 1991. Post modern Theory: CriticnJlntcrrogations, 
London: Macmillan. 
8 As Toril Moi declares, 'it still remains politically essential for feminists to ddend 
women as women in order to counteract the patriarchal oppression that precisely despises 
women as women' (quoted in Waugh 1989: 25). 
9 Christine di Stefano expresses similar doubts about the supposedly destructive 
encounter of feminism and postmodernism, declaring that 'the postmodernist project. if 
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seriously adopted by feminists, would make any semblance of a feminist politics 
impossible' (quoted in Cacoullos 2001: 92-93). 
10 Jane Flax concurs that 'the way(s) to feminist future(s), cannot lie in reviving and 
appropriating normative absolutism and totalizing concepts of knowledge (Flax 1990: 
42). Instead, feminist theories 'should encourage us to tolerate and interpret ambivalence, 
ambiguity and multiplicity' (Flax 1990: 56). Flax even adds that '[i]f we do our work 
weB, reality will appear even more unstable, complex, and disorderly than it does now' 
(Flax 1990: 56-57). 
11 This exemplifies an instance of, what I have earlier related to as, political 
postmodernism. As Fredric Jameson points out, such a new form of critique must be 
dialectical, understanding 'the cultural evolution of late capitalism [ ... ] as catastrophe 
and progress all together' (Jameson 1993: 86). The "'moment of truth" of 
postmodernism' is found in an acknowledgement and affirmation of the 'original new 
global space' that is 'no longer endowed with the relative autonomy it once enjoyed' 
(Jameson 1993: 87; 86). Thus, the 'dissolution of an autonomous sphere of culture' is to 
be understood 'positively and negatively all at once', 'at one and the same time the best 
thing that has ever happened to the human race, and the worst' (Jameson 1993: 86). 
12 As Siegel explains, 'just as the same water reforms itself into ever new waves, so the 
second wave circulates in the third, reproducing itself through a cyclical movement' 
(Siegel 1997a: 61). 
\3 Susan J. Douglas examines the contemporary motto of 'I'm not a feminist, but .. .', 
revealing that 
the comma [ ... ] is the fulcrum of the whole statement, which marks the divisions 
- and, more important, the profound connections - between the disavowal of 
feminism in the first part of the phrase and its embrace at the end. The comma 
says that the speaker is ambivalent, that she is torn between a philosophy that 
seeks to improve her lot in life and a desire not to have to pay too dearly for 
endorsing that philosophy. [ ... ] This conversational gambit [means] that the 
speaker probably supports some combination of equal pay for equal work. [ ... J It 
also means that the speaker shaves her legs, bathes regularly, does not want to be 
thought of as a man-hater, a ball-buster, a witch, or a shrew. [ ... ] Most of all, it 
means that the possibility of having, inside you a unified, coherent self that 
always believes the same things at the same time is virtually zero. (Douglas 1995: 
270-273) 
See Susan 1. Douglas 1995. Where the Girls Are: Growing Up Female with the Mass 
Media, London: Penguin. 
14 In a similar vein, Deborah L. Siegel notes that 'the "third wave" is a response to what 
one might caU the cultural dominance of postfeminism', 'a welcome voice of contention 
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for many second wave feminists, for whom the threat of "postfeminism" [ ... ] is 
particularly resonant' (Siegel 1997a: 52). 
2. t Situating the Context 
1 As Amelia Jones maintains, 'interestingly [ ... ] while the postfeminism of popular 
culture works to deny the continuing empowerment offeminist discourse [ ... ] the 
postfeminism of academic criticism works simultaneously to celebrate and absorb 
feminism and feminist theory' (Jones 1994: 23). 
2 The second wave slogan 'the personal is political' describes women's relation to 
patriarchy and it encapsulates the idea that what women viewed as personal, individual 
problems could be traced to their political living in a male-dominated and male-defined 
society. The adage sums up the way in which second wave feminism did not just strive to 
extend the range of social opportunities open to women, but also, through intervention 
within the spheres of reproduction, sexuality and cultural representation, to change their 
domestic and private lives. 
3 In fact, Douglas notes that 
instead of group action, we got escapist solitude. Instead of solidarity, we got 
female competition over men. And, most important, instead of seeing personal 
disappointments, frustrations and failures as symptoms of an inequitable and 
patriarchal society, we saw these [ ... ] as personal failures, for which we should 
blame ourselves. (Douglas 1995: 265) 
4 Dana Cloud reveals that 'a token is a cultural construction of a successful persona who 
metonymically represents a larger cultural grouping' (Cloud 1996: 122). As she notes. 
in popular culture [ ... ] a token can be defined as a persona who is constructed 
from the character and life of a member of a subordinated group, and then 
celebrated, authorized to speak as proof that the society at large does not 
discriminate against members of that group. (Cloud 1996: 123) 
Moreover. J.L. Laws provides an insightful definition of tokenism. noting that 
tokenism is the means by which the dominant group advertises a promise of 
mobility between the dominant and excluded classes. By definition, however, 
tokenism involves mobility which is severely restricted in quantity, and the 
quality of mobility is severely restricted as well. [ ... ] The institution of tokenism 
has advantages both for the dominant group and for the individual who is chosen 
to serve as Token. These advantages obtain, however. only when the defining 
constraints are respected: the flow of outsiders into the dominant group must be 
restricted numerically, and they must not change the system they enter. 
(LawsI975: 51-52) 
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See Dana Cloud 1996. 'Hegemony or Concordance? The Rhetoric of Tokenism in 
"Oprah" Winfrey's Rags-to-Riches Biography', Critical Studies in Mass Communication. 
13, 115-137. 
J.L. Laws 1975. 'The Psychology of Tokenism' , Sex Roles, 1,51-67. 
5 As Denise Riley has forcefully argued, 
"women" is historically, discursively constructed, and always relatively to other 
categories which themselves change; "women" is a volatile collection in which 
female persons can be very differently positioned, so that the apparent continuity 
of the subject of "women" isn't to be relied on; "women" is both synchronically 
and diachronically erratic as a collectivity, while for the individual. "being a 
woman" is also inconstant, and can't provide an ontological foundation. (Riley 
1988: 1-2) 
See Denise Riley 1988. 'Am I That Name?' Feminism and the Category of 'Women' in 
History. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan. 
6 Whelehan pointedly reveals that 'being a feminist' does 'not immunize one from being 
racist' and heterosexist and she states that any degree of unity within the women's 
movement has been achieved 'at the expense of black, lesbian and working-class women' 
(Whelehan 1995: 110; 121). 
7 Yet, postmodernism should not be represented as a natural ally of minority feminisms. 
Anne Koenen reveals that feminists' adoption of a poststructuralist framework 'in a 
mostly unquestioned binary reflex' has created 'an opposition between theory and 
practice in which the theories of women of color were suppressed and silenced or rejected 
as too "essentialist" or "nai've'" (Koenen 1999: 132). She continues to say that 
increasingly, posttheories and black feminist criticism were perceived as 
antithetical, with posttheories supposed to be more sophisticated and black 
feminist criticism trapped in an old-fashioned political essentialism. White 
postfeminism elevated the traditional center of "male, pale, Yale" over the 
periphery of black and female, thus unwittingly duplicating a much-criticized 
hegemonic strategy of studying and canonizing white male master texts [ ... ] 
while relegating the contributions of women of color to the margins. (Koenen 
1999: 132) 
According to Koenen, 'one answer to this dilemma - the tension between minority 
discourses and posttheories' is to question 'the insight into the disintegration of the 
subject as a new universal truth' (Koenen 1999: 133). In effect, this means that 'when 
feminist and black theory are "learning the master's tongue" [ ... J they have to check 
whether the theories of the center make sense to them' (Koenen 1999: 133-134). In other 
words, one has to historicize and situate postmodernism's disintegrating subjectivities as 
'it may well turn out that it means different things for white men than for black women 
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who start from a position of fragmented subjectivity and of "generic" rather than 
individual identity' (Koenen 1999: 134). 
See Anne Koenen 1999. 'The (Black) Lady Vanishes: Postfeminism, Poststructuralism 
and Theorizing in Narratives by Black Women', in Explorations on Post-Theory: Toward 
a Third Space, (ed.) de Toro, F., Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert; Madrid: Iberoamericana, 
131-143. 
8 As Gunew and Yeatman maintain, there is a need 'to dismantle once again the universal 
models which however benign they may appear, work ultimately to confirm the old 
power structures' (quoted in Brooks 1997: 2). 
9 As Joanne Hollows points out, 
we not only need to consider feminist cultural politics, and the ways in which it 
seeks to transform power relations between men and women, but also the cultural 
politics of feminism and the extent to which they reproduce other modes of power 
relations between women. The politics of feminist cultural criticisms, therefore, 
needs to be understood not only in relation to the ways in which masculinities and 
femininities are bound up with power relations in different historical contexts. but 
also in relation to the ways in which different feminine identities (including 
feminist identities) are bound up with power relations in different historical 
contexts. (Hollows 2000: 36) 
2.2 Postfeminist Locations: Feminism and Postmodernism 
J Similarly, Amelia Jones points out that the positioning of 'feminism as a strategy within 
a larger postmodernist project ha[s] unwittingly contributed to the incorporation of 
feminism into postmodernism as [ ... ] an "instance" of the latter' (Jones 1990: 15). 
2 Patricia Waugh notes that the first phase of post-I 960s feminism was characterized by a 
desire to experience a 'whole', 'unitary' or 'essential' subjcctivity. In fact, 'if women 
have traditionally been positioned in terms of "otherness", then the desire to become 
subjects [ ... ] is likely to be stronger than the desire to deconstruct, decentre, or fragment 
subjectivity' (Waugh 1989: 12). Thus, feminism passed through 'a necessary stagc' of 
pursuing a unitary essential self in order that women 'might fully understand the 
historical and social construction of gender and identity' (Waugh 1989: 13). As Waugh 
argues, 
Certainly, for women in the 1960s and early 1970s, "unity" rather than dispersal 
seemed to offer more hope for political change. To believe that there might be a 
"natural" or "true" self which may be discovered through lifting the 
misrepresentations of an oppressive social system is to provide nurturance and 
fuel for revolutionary hope and practice. (Waugh 1989: 13) 
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In this way, feminist thinkers endeavored throughout the 1960s and 1970s to produce 
expansive social theories that could explain the basis for male/female inequalities. In the 
process, they often reified female differences through essentialist (or universal) 
categories that excluded the determinants of race, class, or sexual preference. 
See Patricia Waugh 1989. Feminine Fictions: Revisiting the Post modern, London and 
New York: Routledge. 
3 As Fredric Jameson explains, 'the luxury of the old-fashioned ideological critique [ ... ] 
becomes unavailable' as 'distance in general (including "critical distance" in particular) 
has very precisely been abolished in the new space of postmodernism' (Jameson 1993: 
85; 87). Accordingly, the position of 'the cultural critic and moralist' is interrogated and 
dismissed with the realization that 'we [ ... ] are all somehow secretly disarmed and 
reabsorbed by a system of which [ ... ] [we] might well be considered a part. since [ ... ] 
[we] can achieve no distance from it' (Jameson 1993: 85; 87). 
4 In a similar manner, Ferguson notes that, in conjunction with postmodern theory, 
feminism has to sacrifice 'the wisdom of identity politics to the postmodern skelter of 
ineffectual fragmentation' (Ferguson 1997: 5). 
5 According to di Stefano, this 'postfeminist tendency' is a problematic side-effect of 
feminist postrationalism or postmodernism. In her discussion of the debates on gender 
differences, di Stefano distinguishes three strategic forms for posing the relationship 
between contemporary Western feminism and the Enlightenment legacy of humanistic 
rationalism: (1) feminist rationalism, (2) feminine anti-rationalism and (3) feminist 
postrationalism. (1) Feminist rationalism uses a minimalist notion of gender difference 
and in this way, it enables a critique of sexism as an irrational and hence illegitimate set 
of beliefs and practices. (2) Feminine anti-rationalism, committed to a stronger version of 
difference, levels its protest against the rational/masculine and irrationaVfeminine 
construct and attempts to revalorize, rather than to overcome, traditional feminine 
experience. Di Stefano criticizes both rationalist and anti-rationalist frameworks: With 
regard to rationalism, equality is constituted within a set of terms that disparage things 
female or feminine. 'She' dissolves into 'he' as gender differences are collapsed into the 
(masculine) figure of Everyman. Anti-rationalism, on the other hand, attempts to 
revalorize the feminine but fails to criticize it, sliding into anti-feminism. (3) Feminist 
postrationalism seems to provide the only way out as it rejects the terms and strategies of 
the previous two stances and argues that feminism must initiate a break with the 
rationalist paradigm. Eschewing a position either within or outside of the rationalist 
framework, for or against difference, postrationalism attempts to transcend the discourse 
of rationalism and to offer new, decentered narratives of opposition. Hence, difference is 
simultaneously upheld and deconstructed as a proliferation of differences is counterposed 
to the singular difference of gender. While this strategy is theoretically appealing, di 
Stefano notes that it is also complex and unnerving, inhabiting a constantly shifting 
ground of emerging and dissolving differences. With postrationalism, 'she' dissolves into 
a perplexing plurality of differences, none of which can be theoretically or politically 
privileged over others. 
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See Christine di Stefano 1990. 'Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity, and 
Postmodernism', in Feminism/Postmodernism, (ed.) Nicholson, L. J., New York and 
London: Routledge, 63-82. 
6 As Bordo explains, 
any attempt to do justice to heterogeneity [ ... J devours its own tail. For the 
appreciation of difference requires the acknowledgement of some point beyond 
which the dancer cannot go. If she were able to go everywhere, there would be no 
difference, nothing that eludes. (Bordo 1993: 228) 
7 Similarly. Charles Russell defines postmodemism as 'an art of criticism' and 'unrest', 
revealing that the postmodern interrogatory stance has 'no message other than the need 
for continuous questioning' and 'no clearly defined audience other than those 
predisposed to doubt and search' (Russell 1981: 58). 
8 As di Stefano reveals, 
the postmodemist prohibition against subject-centered inquiry and theory 
undermines the legitimacy of a broad-based organized movement dedicated to 
articulating and implementing the goals of such a constituency. (di Stefano 1990: 
76) 
Similarly, Judith Butler declares that 
without a unified concept of woman [ ... J it appears that feminist politics has lost 
the categorial basis of its own normative claims. 'What constitutes the "who", the 
subject for whom feminism seeks emancipation? (Butler 1990b: 327) 
9 According to Jean Baudrillard. postmodemity signifies the state of contemporary 
culture which exists as a simulacrum of signs and where the information age has 
dissolved identity. Baudri11ard claims that in the postmodern world, the boundary 
between image and reality implodes and with it, the very experience and ground of the 
'real' disappears. In fact, . 
for us the medium, the image medium, has imposed itself between the real and the 
imaginary, upsetting the balance between the two, with a kind of fatality which 
I has its own logic. [ ... J The fatality lies in this endless enwrapping of images [ ... J 
which leaves images no other destiny than images. [ ... J In the absence of rules of 
the game, things become caught up in their own game; images become more real 
than the real. (Baudrillard 1993: 194-195) 
Baudrillard uses the term 'hyperreality' to refer to the blurring of distinctions between the 
real and the unreal whereby the real is produced according to a model. In this way, the 
real is no longer simply given but it is artificially (re)produced as 'real', becoming 'not 
unreal, or surreal, but realer-than-real, a real retouched and refurbished in "a 
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hallucinatory resemblance with itself" (Best and Kellner 1991: 119). With the advent of 
hyperreality, simulations or models replace the real and come to constitute reality itself. 
The reality of simulation becomes the criterion of the real. Baudrillard's 'universe of 
simulacra without referents' can be read as an effect of the poststructuralist critique of 
meaning and reference 'taken to an extreme limit where the effluence of simulacra 
replaces the play of textuality and discourses in a universe with no stable structures in 
which to anchor theory and politics' (Best and Kellner 1991: 121). The very idea of 
resistance and opposition becomes an absurdity as the subject becomes a simulating 
machine and 'human beings are left with no capacity to reshape their world' (Waugh 
1992: 198). 
10 Accordingly, an effective feminism could only be a wholly negative feminism, 
'deconstructing everything and refusing to construct anything' (A1coff 1987-88: 418). 
The French poststructuralist Julia Kristeva is an influential proponent of this view, 
famously noting that 
a woman cannot be; it is something which does not even belong in the order of 
being. It follows that a feminist practice can only be negative, at odds with what 
already exists so that we may say "that's not it" and "that's still not it". (Kristeva 
1981: 137) 
See Julia Kristeva 1981. 'Woman Can Never Be Defined', in New French Feminisms, 
(eds) Marks, E. and de Courtivron, I., New York: Schocken. 
11 As Cathy Schwichtenberg points out, 'male philosophers and cultural theorists' can 
'freely relinquish mastery, foundational truths and unified conceptions of the self while 
women have to 'question such relativistic thinking because they [have] yet to establish an 
adequate foundation for feminism' (Schwichtenberg 1993: 131). 
12 S' '1 I Im1 ar y, Nancy Fraser reveals that 'we are not for "anything goes'" and she stresses 
that 'feminists do need to make normative judgments' in order to offer emancipatory 
alternatives (Fraser 1995: 71). 
13 In a similar manner, Angela McRobbie reveals that 
what is at stake in abandoning modernity as an enabling structure is the fear of 
losing the notion of the women's movement, losing the idea of what it is to be a 
woman, and losing with this a politics of representation, that is abll! to speak on 
behalf of "women". (McRobbie 1994: 7) 
14 As Cressida Heyes reveals, an alternative theory has to be designed that does not 
'throw the baby of political efficacy out with the bathwater of essentialism' and in this 
way, 'the task we have inherited is to take seriously the commitments entailed in anti-
essentialism but to find ways effectively to incorporate them into resistive political 
projects' (He yes 1997: 146). 
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15 As Benhabib summarizes her argument, there are 'weak and strong versions' of the 
thesis of 'the Death of Man' , revealing that 
whereas the weak version [ ... ] entail[s] premises around which critical theorists 
as well as postmodernists and possibly even liberals and communitarians can 
unite, their strong versions undermine the possibility of normative criticism at 
large. [ ... ] The traditional attributes of the philosophical subject of the West, like 
self-reflexivity, the capacity for acting on principles, rational accountability for 
one's actions [ ... ] in short, some form of autonomy and rationality, could then be 
reformulated by taking account of the radical situatedness of the subject. 
(Benhabib 1994: 79) 
See Seyla Benhabib 1994. 'Feminism and the Question of Postmodernism'. in The Polity 
Reader in Gender Studies, Oxford: Polity Press, 76-92. 
16 Following on from her assertion that 'there need not be a "doer behind the deed .. •• 
Judith Butler notes that 'the category of "intention", indeed the notion of the "doer" will 
have its place, but this place will no longer be "behind" the deed as its enabling source' 
(Butler 1990a: 142; Butler 1995: 134). In this way, 
there is no "bidding farewell" to the doer, but only to the placement of that doer 
"beyond" or "behind" the deed'. [ ... ] In this sense, the "doer" will be produced 
as the effect of the "deed", but it will also constitute the dynamic hiatus by which 
further [ ... ] effects are achieved. (Butler 1995: 135; emphasis in text) 
2.3 Postfeminist Locations: Feminism and Popular Culture 
1 Hinds and Stacey point out that 'what is striking about the persistence of this icon is that 
bra-burning seems never to have happened' (Hinds and Stacey 200 1: 157). In fact, 
bras were not burnt, but were just one of many items - including corsets, 
suspender belts, high heels and hair rollers - to be cast into the 'freedom trash 
can". This famous symbolic rejection of all feminine accoutrements was part of 
the women's liberation protest against the sexism and racism of beauty contests 
staged the day before the Miss America pageant in Atlantic City in 1968.lHinds 
and Stacey 2001: 157) 
2 This is exemplified by an article from the Guardian of 21 November 1970 where 
protesters are contrasted to the contestants at the Miss World contest under the headline 
'Beauty O'ershadowed by the Women's Lib' (quoted in Hinds and Stacey 2001: 171). 
Similarly, a Times article from 1971 laments that 
some women's liberation girls decide against caring for their looks. The 
movement rejects the artificiality of bras, deodorants, depilatories and other 
wonders of twentieth-century technology which they feel exploit women 
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commercially and debase them into sex objects. (quoted in Hinds and Stacey 
2001: 161) 
3 Susan Faludi uses the term 'macho feminism' to describe these 'hard-faced women' 
who are determined to carve their place in the world, 'no matter whose bodies they have 
to climb over to do it', even if it turns out to be their own (Faludi 1991: 277-278). 
4In the feminist classic A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), Mary 
Wollstonecraft remarks that 'taught from infancy that beauty is woman's sceptre, the 
mind shapes itself to the body and roaming round its gilt cage, only seeks to adorn its 
prison' (Wollstonecraft 1958: 113). Similarly, in 1991, Naomi Wolf declares that 'we are 
in the midst of a violent backlash to feminism that uses images of female beauty as a 
political weapon against women's advancement: the beauty myth' (Wolf 1991: to). 
See Mary Wollstonecraft 1958. A Vindication o/the Rights o/Woman (1792), in The 
Works of Mary Wollstonecraft, (eds) Todd, J. and Butler, M., vol.5, London: Pickering 
and Chatto. 
Naomi Wolf 1991. The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty Are Used Against Women, 
London: Vintage. 
5 Sandra Lee Bartky associates the cultivation of femininity with 'repressive narcissistic 
satisfactions' that 'fasten us to the established order of domination', forthe same system 
which produces 'false needs' also controls the conditions under which such needs can be 
satisfied (Bartky 1990: 42). As she describes, a woman achieves gratification through 
becoming a sexual object for herself and taking toward her own person the attitude of a 
patriarchal Other. In this way, she takes an erotic and narcissistic satisfaction in her own 
self, simultaneously inhabiting the positions of objectifier and objectified. Narcissism, 
then, is seen as a necessary feature of femininity whereby women embrace and find 
satisfaction in what seems to be the most alienating aspects of her existence. 
See Sandra Lee Bartky 1990. Femininity and Domination Studies in the Phenomenology 
of Oppression, London and New York: Routledge. 
6 In Discipline and Punish (1977), Michel Foucault describes a 'docile body' as 'a body 
[ ... ] that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved' (Foucault 1977: 136). In 
his critique of modern society, Foucault outlines the emergence of a new and 
unprecedented discipline that invades the body and seeks to regulate its forces and 
operations. The disciplinary practices he describes are tied to peculiarly modem forms of 
the army, the school, the hospital, the prison and the aim of these disciplines is to 
increase the utility of the body. Thus, 
what was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act lIpon the body, a 
calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour. The human 
body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and 
rearranges it. A "political anatomy", which was also a "mechanics of power", was 
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being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others' bodies [ ... ]. Thus, 
discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, 'docile' bodies. (Foucault 
1977: 138) 
See Michel Foucault 1977. Discipline and Punish The Birth of the Prison, London: 
Penguin. 
7 Analogously, Mary Daly distinguishes between 'real' females whom she approvingly 
describes as 'witches, nags and hags' and 'plastic', 'mutant', feminine 'painted birds' and 
she champions women to free the hag within and become a 'wild woman' (Daly 1979). In 
other words, Daly inscribes feminist identities through a rejection of conventional 
femininity in her privileging of the untamed hag as a powerful and liberated woman and 
her dismissal of the feminine 'man-made' women who comply with hegemonic ideals 
and popular gender stereotypes. 
See Mary Daly 1979. GynlEcology: the Metaethics of Radical Feminism, Lanham, MD: 
The Scarecrow Press. 
8 Betty Friedan employs the term 'feminine mystique' to describe the raisonnement 
whereby 'the highest value and the only commitment for women is the fulfillment of their 
own femininity' (Friedan 1963: 37). 
See Betty Friedan 1963. The Feminine Mystique, London: Routledge. 
9 Joanne Hollows notes that the opposition between feminist and feminine identities can 
be related to 'certain philosophical discourses [that] produce their own identity by 
projecting an image of an Other who lacks the same identity' (Hollows 2000: 17). In this 
way, the 'feminine anti-heroine' is constructed as an antithetical Other in an attempt to 
distinguish and demarcate a feminist consciousness and subject. 
See Joanne Hollows 2000. Feminism, Femininity and Popular Culture, Manchester and 
New York: Manchester University Press. 
10 Fiske maintains that a popular text should be prodllcerly and, in order to explain the 
term, he refers to Barthes's distinction between readerly and writerly tendencies in texts 
and the reading practices they invite. As he notes, 
a readerly text invites an essentially passive, receptive, disciplined reader who 
tends to accept its meanings as already made. It is a relatively closed text, easy to 
read and undemanding of its reader. Opposed to this is a wrirerly text, which 
challenges the reader constantly to rewrite it, to make sense out of it. It [ ... 1 
invites the reader to participate in the construction of meaning. (Fiske 1989: 103) 
In this way, the term producerly describes 'the popular writerly text' that 'has the 
accessibility of a readerly one, and can theoretically be read in that easy way [ ... ] but it 
has also the openness of the writerly' (Fiske 1989: 1 Q.t). The producer!." text 'offers itself 
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up to popular production', it 'has loose ends that escape control' and 'its gaps are wide 
enough for whole new texts to be produced in them' (Fiske 1989: 1O-t). 
11 For de Certeau, the cultural field is a site of continual conflict between the strategy of 
cultural imposition (production) and the tactics of cultural use (consumption or 
'secondary production'). De Certeau makes a case for 'adaptation' or 'ways ofllsing 
imposed systems', arguing that 
innumerable ways of playing and foiling the other's game ( ... ] characterize the 
subtle, and stubborn resistant activity of groups which, since they lack their own 
space, have to get along in a network of already established forces and 
representations. People have to make do with what they have. In these 
combatants' stratagems, there is a certain art of placing one's blows, a pleasure in 
getting around the rules of a constraining space [ ... ] even in the field of 
manipulation and enjoyment. (de Certeau 1984: 18) 
See Michel de Certeau 1984. The Practice of Everyday Life, Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
12 Fiske emphasizes that 'the politics of popular culture is micropolitics, for that is where 
it can play the greater part in the tactics of everyday life' (Fiske 1989: 56). As he reveals, 
the politics of popular culture has often been misunderstood and its 
progressiveness unrecognized by theories that fail to take account of the 
differences and the relationships between the radical and the progressive, and 
between the micropolitics of everyday life and the macropolitics of organized 
action. The absence of the radical, and of direct effects at the macro level, does 
not mean that the popular is reactionary, or quiescent, or complicit. or 
incorporated but it does point to a major problem facing ( ... ] theorists whose 
focus upon the macro and the radical has led them to negh:ct. or worse still to 
dismiss, the micro and the progressive. (Fiske 1989: 161) 
13 McGuigan defines 'cultural populism' as a consumptionist perspective ~ased on 'the 
intellectual assumption, made by some students of popular culture, that the sym~olic 
experiences and practices of ordinary people are more important analytically and 
politically than Culture with a capital C' (quoted in Storey 1997: 203). 
14 In a similar manner, Joanne Hollows expresses her doubts that 'consumer culture is a 
playground for everyone', a utopian site and a cultural democracy of active consumers. 
busily producing their own meanings and undermining those on offer in hegemonic 
society (Hollows 2000: 129). In fact, the notion of consumer choice and productivity runs 
the risk of 'slipping into an imaginary world of equal opportunities. and thus of hccoming 
a rhetoric that all are equal, even if some remain more equal than others' (1I01l0ws: 2000: 
133). 
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15 The concept of articulation refers to the process of 'establishing a relation among 
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice' (Ang 
1996: 122). Stuart Hall develops the theory of articulation in order to account for the 
double way in which texts work in popular culture: a text-centered way and a reader-
centered way. As John Fiske summarizes the argument: 
to articulate has two meanings - one is to speak or utter (the text-centered 
meaning) and the other is to form a flexible link with, to be hinged with (the 
reader-centered meaning in which the text is flexibly linked with the reader's 
social situation). (Fiske 1989: 146) 
The theory of articulation maintains a balance between seeing the text as a producer of 
meaning and seeing it as a cultural resource, open to a range of creative uses. The notion 
of articulation discusses the way in which 'meaning is a social production, a practice' that 
arises from 'a struggle to articulate, disarticulate and rearticulate cultural texts and 
practices for particular ideologies, particular politics' (Storey 1997: 128-129). In other 
words, no articulation is ever definitive or absolute but it is always unfinished and subject 
to continual rearticulation and reproduction. This dynamic process of fixing and fitting 
together is never final or total but always 'inexorably contextual' (Ang 1996: 122). 
See Stuart Hall 1986. 'On Postmodernism and Articulation: An Interview with Stuart 
Hall', Journal of Communication Inquiry, 10 (2), 45-60. 
16 Black lesbian feminist Audre Lorde famously declared in 1975 that 
the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house. They may allow us 
temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to hring 
about genuine change. (quoted in Frueh 1994: xii) 
See Joanna Frueh, Cassandra L. Langer and Arlene Raven (eds) 1994. New Feminist 
Criticism Art Identity Action, New York: Icon Press. 
17 In this way, Joanne Hollows notes that the problem with this focus on individualism is 
that, while it 'can be positive with its emphasis on entitlement, independence and sexual 
power', it also 'detaches feminism from the social and systemic' that are fundamental to 
the feminist project (Hollows 2000: 195). 
18 In fact, as Vicki Coppock declares, 'the political ideology of freedom is incongruous 
with the reality of a social order characterized by domination and suhordination' 
(Coppock 1995: 183). Similarly, Charlotte Brunsdon claims that the effects of this 
translation of feminism into an individualist rhetoric can be misleading as 'not only do 
the oppositional ideas and practices lose their bite, but they can function to make it 
appear as if change has been effected' (quoted in Macdonald 1995: 92). 
19 This idea is reinforced by Susan Douglas who proclaims that 
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one of capitalism's great strengths - perhaps its greatest - is its ability to co-opt 
and domesticate opposition, to transubstantiate criticism into a host of new, 
marketable products. (Douglas 1995: 260) 
20 Nancy Cott discusses the historical dimensions of this popular co-option technique, 
noting that, already in the early 1920s, 'feminism supplied a resource drawn on by many 
takers' as 'women were lulled into forgetfulness of their contemptible economic status 
and into complacency over their "new freedom", by women's magazines' (Colt 1987: 
174; 173). In this way, 
modern merchandising translated the feminist proposal that women take control 
over their own lives into the consumerist notion of choice [ ... ]. Advertisers 
hastened to package individuality and modernity for women in commodity form 
[ ... ] [and] popular media and advertising took the upper hand in prescribing 
models for fulfilment of womanhood [ ... ]. Women's household status and 
heterosexual service were now defended - even aggressively marketed - in terms 
of women's choice, freedom and rationality [ ... ]. The culture of modernity and 
urbanity absorbed the messages of Feminism and re-presented them. Feminist 
intents and rhetoric were not ignored but appropriated. Advertising collapsed the 
emphasis on women's range and choice to individual consumerism [ .•. ] [and] 
these adaptations disarmed Feminism's challenges in the guise of enacting them. 
(Cott 1987: 172-174) 
See Nancy F. Cott 1987. The Grounding of Modern Feminism, New lIaven and London: 
Yale University Press. 
3.1 The Postfeminist Singleton and the Dilemma of IIm'ing It All 
1 Lee notes that the image of the 'new woman' assumes various and contradictory 
personifications. In this way, 
during the Second World War the propaganda machine got women to work by 
celebrating the "new woman" as one who could labour and love in ~rf~ct unison. 
And when the war was over, that very same "new woman" was the one who 
preferred housework to paid work. Similarly, in the sixties, the enjoyment of sex 
was presented as yet another role for women. The advent of "the Pill" meant that 
women were suddenly being encouraged from almost every direction to have 
more sex. (Lee 1988: 168) 
2 Ally McBeal's fantasy interludes express Ally's tensions in life and at work and the 
sequences include: being pursued by an imaginary baby (intended as a manifestation of 
her biological clock), shrinking to a child-like size When being accused of professional 
incompetence, being crushed by a giant ball when she is shocked to find out that her 
former lover Billy has joined her firm and growing large breasts in front of a mirror when 
she is unsure about her physical attractiveness. 
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3 Bridget can be discussed as a postfeminist embodiment and reinvention of Jane 
Austen's nineteenth-century character Elizabeth Bennet. As Helen Fielding admits in an 
interview introducing the film adaptation, 'the plot of Bridget Jones's Diary wa~ actually 
stolen from Pride and Prejudice' (Bridget Jones's Diary 2001. Working Title). Fielding's 
novel acknowledges its 1813 predecessor in a number of ironic allusions. exemplified by 
Bridget's observation on her first meeting with Mark that 'it struck me as pretty 
ridiculous to be caIled Mr. Darcy and stand on your own looking snooty at a party' 
(Fielding 1996: 13). Commentators have criticized Bridget Jones's Diary's romance 
element, noting that 
as Bridget gets her Darcy at the end of the book, we are not only given a narrJtive 
with some structural similarities to Jane Austen's work, but some of its dominant 
values as well. (Whelehan 2000: 138) 
Fielding takes up the Jane Austen connection in her sequel Bridget Jones The Edge of 
Reason (1999) which mirrors elements of Austen's later work Persuasion (1818) and 
which sees Bridget and Mark pulled apart by misunderstandings and flawed advice. 
4 In this way, the film de-emphasizes the fact that Dan instigates the key events by asking 
Alex out for a drink, trying to cover up his affair by suggesting an abortion, threatening to 
kill her and physically attacking her. 
S This dichotomy is undermined by the film's undercurrent that constantly hints at a 
breakdown in differences between the two principle women. In fact, it has been 
suggested that Alex and Beth, businesswoman and housewife. can be discussed in terms 
of their closeness and overlap. As Kerstin Westerlund-Shands reveals, 
they inhabit different spaces. But the borderline between those spaces is 
precarious: the two women also mirror each other and can be seen as two sides of 
the same woman, or as two sides of Woman. (Westerlund-Shands 1993: 114) 
6 As Faludi records, original screenings of the film were interrupted by moviegoers 
shouting verbal abuse at Glenn Close's character and encouraging Michael Douglas to 
'beat that bitch! Kill her off now' (Faludi 1992: 140). The audience's intensely violent 
feelings towards the single woman were also made explicit by the fact that the film's 
original ending (which sees Alex committing suicide in a white dress and Dan ~ing 
arrested for her murder) was deemed too tame by preview audiences as Alex was not 
sufficiently brought to justice. 
7 In a similar manner, Carrie in Sex and the City (1998-2QO.t. IIBO) offers a poignant 
description of the feminine masquerade. Reflecting on her relationship with her love 
interest Big, she reveals to her friends that 
I think I'm in love with him. and I'm terrified in case he thinks I'm not perfect. 
[ ... ] You should see what I'm like round him - it's like -I wear little outfits. I'm 
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not like me. Sexy Carrie. Casual Carrie. Sometimes I catch myself actually posing 
- it's exhausting! (Season 1, The Drought) 
8 This is also exemplified by Bridget's adoption of Jane Austen'S nineteenth century 
couple 'Darcy and Elizabeth' as her 'chosen representatives in the field of [ ... ] 
courtship' and her simultaneous skepticism and doubts regarding 'the archetypal fairy 
tale' that sees the heroine 'marry a handsome prince' (Fielding] 996: 2-16; Fielding] 999: 
326). Accordingly, she embraces and designates 'Princess Diana' as the 'patron saint of 
Singleton women' because she 'was honest enough' to distrust this romance ideal and 'to 
say that life is not like that' (Fielding 1999: 326). In her eulogy to the late Princess of 
Wales, Bridget praises her for her persistent endeavor to "re-invent herself, 'sort out her 
problems' and 'just try so hard like modern women' (Fielding ]999: 327). 
9 Bridget employs the term 'emotional fuckwittage' to describe the evasive behavior of 
men in their thirties who embark on a liaison with a woman with the clear intention of 
avoiding a long-term relationship. 
]0 Marriage counsellor John Gray uses the metaphor that 'men are from ~1Jrs' and 
'women are from Venus' to illustrate commonly occurring conflicts between men and 
women and explain how these differences can come between the sexes and prohibit 
mutually fulfilling relationships. As he notes, 
imagine that men are from Mars and women are from Venus. One day long ago 
the Martians, looking through their telescopes, discovered the Venusians. [ ... ] 
They fell in love and quickly invented space travel and flew to Venus. [ ... ] The 
Venusians welcomed the Martians with open arms. [ ... ] Though from different 
worlds, they revelled in their differences. They spent months learning ahout each 
other, exploring and appreciating their different needs, preferences, and beha\'iour 
patterns. [ ... ] Then they decided to fly to Earth. [ ... J One morning everyone 
woke up with a peculiar kind of amnesia-selective amnesia! Both the Martians 
and Venusians forgot that they were from different planets and Wt're supposl'd to 
be different. [ ... ] And since that day men and women have been in conflict. 
(Gray 1992: 1) 
3.2 The Postfeminist Cinderella and the Paradox of Choire 
] As de Certeau argues, 
the intextuation of the body corresponds to the incarnation of the law; it surports 
it, even seems to establish it, and in any case it serves it. For the law plays on it: 
"Give me your body and I will give you meaning, I will make you a name and a 
word in my discourse". The two problematics maintain each other, and perhaps 
the law would have no power if it were not able to support itself on the obscure 
desire to exchange one's flesh for a glorious body, to he written, even if it means 
dying, and to be transformed into a recognized word. (de Certeau 198-1: 1.t9) 
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See Michel de Certeau 1984. The Practice of Everyday Life, (trans.) Randall, S., 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
2 Anti-hierarchical thinkers such as Giovanni Francesco Pico della Mirandola presented 
individual autonomy as the central quality ofthe human being. In his Oration on the 
Dignity of Man (1486), Pico has God say to his Adam: 
The nature of all other creatures is defined and restricted within laws which We 
have laid down; you, by contrast, impeded by no such restrictions, may, by your 
own free will [ ... J trace for yourself the lineaments of),ollr own nature. [ ... ] We 
have made you a creature neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor 
immortal, in order that you may, as the free and prolld s/wper of."ollr own being. 
fashion yourself in the form you may prefer. (quoted in Gilman 1999: 70-71; my 
emphasis) 
See Sander L. Gilman 1999. Making the Body Beautiful: A Cultural History of Aesthetic 
Surgery, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
3 As Gilman reveals, 'passing' was the nineteenth-century term for disguising one's 'real' 
(racial) self, noting that 
"passing" is [ ... J moving into and becoming invisible within a desired "naturJI" 
group. The model of "passing" is the most fruitful to use in examining the history 
and efficacy of aesthetic surgery. Taken from the history of the construction of 
race [ ... J it provides the most comprehensive model for the understanding of 
aesthetic surgery. (Gilman 1999: 22) 
4 Historically, aesthetic surgery has been employed as a normalizing practice, allowing 
people of 'difference' to fit in. Thus, the first 'beauty doctors' at the end of the sixteenth 
century offered the means of masking illnesses such as syphilis and making the diseased 
faces pass as healthy. 
!I As Bartky reveals, in contemporary society, femininity is no longer equivalc:nt to 
women's requirements to 'be chaste or modest, to restrict their sphere of acth'ity to the 
home, or even to realize their properly feminine destiny in maternity' (Bartky 1997: l.tS). 
In fact, images of normative femininity have replaced the religious tracts of the past, 
exemplifying 'the growing power of the image in a society increasingly oriented toward 
the visual media' (Bartky 1997: 149). 
6 One can argue that the socially constructed notions of femininity and beauty are held in 
a relationship of interdependency in patriarchal culture. London socialite Elizahcth Rigby 
emphasizes the intrinsic connection between womanliness and beauty in her essay on 
physiognomy for the Quarterly Review (1851), noting that 'it is a woman's business to be 
beautiful' (quoted in Zetzel Lambert 1995: 99). In this way, it is not beauty per sc that 
confines women but the assumption that beauty is imperative to femininity. 
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7 As Monique Wittig suggests, 'false consciousness' involves being 'entrapped in the 
familiar deadlock of "woman is wonderful'" (Wittig 1997: 312). In fact, 
false consciousness [ ... ] consists of selecting among the features of the myth 
(that women are different from men) those which look good and using them a'i a 
definition for women. What the concept "woman is wonderful" accomplishes is 
that it retains for defining women the best features (best according to whom?) 
which oppression has granted us. and it does not radically question the categories 
"man" and "woman", which are political categories and not natural givens. 
(Wittig 1997: 312) 
See Monique Wittig 1997. 'One Is Not Born a Woman', in Writing on the Body: Female 
Embodiment and Feminist Theory, (eds) Conboy. K., Medina. N. and Stanbury, S., New 
York: Columbia University Press, 309-317. 
8 This is reminiscent of Teresa de Lauretis' Woman/women distinction whereby the term 
'Woman' is used to designate 'a fictional construct. a distillate from diverse but 
congruent discourses dominant in Western cultures' whereas 'women' are 'the real 
historical beings who cannot as yet be defined outside of those discursive formations. but 
whose material existence is nevertheless certain' (de Lauretis 1982: 5). Similarly, 
Monique Wittig declares that 
"woman" does not exist for us: it is only an imaginary formation, while '\\'omen" 
is the product of a social relationship. [ ... ] "Woman" is not each of us, but the 
political and ideological formation which negates "women", [ ... ] "Woman" is 
there to confuse us, to hide the reality "women", In order to be aware of being a 
class and to become a class we first have to kill the myth of "woman" including 
its most seductive aspects. (Wittig 1997: 313-314) 
Wittig argues that, as feminists, 'our first task [ ... J is to always thoroughly dissociate 
"women" (the class within which we fight) and "woman", the myth' and thus, 'we have 
to destroy the myth inside and outside ourselves' (Wittig 1997: 313). 
See Teresa de Lauretisl982. Alice Doesn't. Feminism. Semiotics, Cinema, London: 
Bloomington. 
Monique Wittig 1997. 'One Is Not Born a Woman', in Writing on the Body: Fl'male 
Embodiment and Feminist Theory, (eds) Conboy, K., Medina, N. and Stanbury, S., New 
York: Columbia University Press, 309-317, 
9 Accordingly, Margaret Marshment criticizes the beauty lure employed by patriarchal 
structures, lamenting that 
women may themselves be seduced into accepting such images, both hccause 
patriarchal ideology has achieved a general hegemony, and because, however 
much they work against women's interests in the long term, in the short term they 
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may offer what benefits are available to women in a patriarchal society. [ ... ] [I]f 
definitions of femininity and heterosexuality demand that women wear make-up 
and high heels in order to be attractive to men, then not only might women wear 
them for this purpose, they may well come to feel more confident. more beautiful 
when wearing them. If, in this way, women come to be subordinated - even in 
their definitions of themselves and their desires - to the needs of patriarchy, it 
may be argued that this is because definitions of femininity appear to offer 
solutions to their material problems. (Marshment 1993: 126) 
See Margaret Marshment 1993. 'The Picture is Political: Representation of Women in 
Contemporary Popular Culture', in Thinking Feminist: Key Concepts in Women's 
Studies, (eds) Richardson, D. and Robinson, Y., New York: Guilford Press. ) 25-5 1. 
to Riviere describes the cases of three educated and professional American women who 
'wish for masculinity [and] put on a mask of womanliness to avert anxiety and the 
retribution feared from men' (Riviere 1986: 35). She examines one female lecturer who, 
after a public exhibition of intellectual proficiency, adopts a behavior of compulsive 
flirtation and coquetry in order to pre-empt and propitiate paternal punishment or 
vengeance and gain reassurance and sanction through flattery of those members of her 
audience she perceives as father figures. As Riviere argues, the patient's successful 
performance in public 'signified an exhibition of herself in possession of the father's 
penis, having castrated him'. so that 'the coquetting' can be understood as 'an 
unconscious attempt to ward off the anxiety which would ensue on account of the 
reprisals she anticipated from the father-figures' (Riviere 1986: 37). In disguising herself 
as 'merely a castrated woman' and 'masquerading in a feminine guise', Riviere's patient 
seeks to 'evoke friendly feelings toward her in the man' and chiefly 'make sure of safety' 
(Riviere 1986: 38; 41). 
See Joan Riviere 1986. 'Womanliness as a Masquerade', in Formations of Cmtasy, (cds) 
Burgin, Y., Donald, J. and Kaplan, C., London and New York: ~kthuen. 
II As Butler notes, 'the parodic repetition of "the original" [ ... ] reveals the original to be 
nothing other than a parody of the idea of the natural and the original' (8utl~r 19<>Oa: 31: 
emphasis in text). In this way. 'gender parody reveals that the original iJ~ntily after 
which gender fashions itself is an imitation without an origin' ([lutk'r 19(>Oa: 138). 
12 Contrastingly, Butler argues against a Cartesian voluntarism, staling thaI 
there is no volitional subject behind the mime who decid~s, as it were, which 
gender it will be today. [ ... ] Coherent gender produces as its t1]('(,1 the illusion of 
a prior and volitional subject. (Butkr 1993b: 314) 
In this way, "'the doer" is merely a fiction added to the deed - the dl.'cd is everything' 
(Butler I 990a: 25). 
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13 In fact, Butler emphasizes that this performance is not a deliberate or volitional act by a 
free-willed agent, noting that 
performativity must be understood not as a singular or deliberate "acC, but, 
rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the 
effects that it names. [ ... ] [It] is neither free play nor theatrical self-presentation 
[ ... ] [but it] consists in a reiteration of norms which precede, constrain, and 
exceed the performer and in that sense cannot be taken as the fabrication of the 
performer's "will" or "choice". [ ... ] The reduction of performativity to 
performance would be a mistake. (Butler 1993a: 2; 95; 234) 
14 As Tennant reveals, 'my books have run alongside the women's movement'. always 
providing a critical commentary on the various manifestations of feminism throughout 
the decades (Tennant 1989a: 189). In this way, it is interesting to note that Tennant's 
previous novel The Bad Sister (1978) portrays a physical transformation that is in effect 
diametrically opposed to the metamorphosis described in Faustine (1992). In her 
nocturnal wanderings, Jane Wild carries out a ritualistic massacre of her carefully 
constructed feminine image in her quest to escape patriarchal conditioning and return to a 
state of undifferentiation and wholeness. She first cuts off her long, dyed blonde hair and 
then, she feels her breasts shrinking and her hips becoming narrower. This incident is the 
climax of Jane's identity crisis, the war between her submissive, feminine self and a 
burgeoning alter ego, fuelled by a militant rage that has come with her feminist 
consciousness. By demolishing the traditionally feminine persona she has built up, Jane 
expresses her spiritual change and her new, feminist self that forcefully refuses to be 
reduced to an object of male desire. 
15 Barbara Kastelein refers to this paradoxical combination as the 'Janus face of mo(krn 
women as seen from outside', recalling the image of Margaret Thatcher coined by 
Fran~ois Mitterand as 'the eyes of Caligula and the mouth of Marilyn Monroe' (Kastelein 
1994: 96). 
16 In an interview, Green emphasizes her postfeminist convictions, stating that 
I don't believe for a second that being successful in your career precedes wanting 
a relationship. Part of the problem now is that as children of feminism, we take 
equality for granted. Women are fully emancipated, independent. and able to 
achieve whatever they wish for. And for a while we went to the other extreme-
we felt ashamed to talk about marriage, or motherhood. or wanting [ ... ] to give 
up work to be a mother, because we believed we'd be betraying the sisterhood. I 
believe that it's only now. as we're truly learning to live as post-feminists, that we 
have accepted the two can live side by side: we can be career women. And wives. 
And mothers. And that having a career doesn't mean you have to feel guilty about 
wanting to fulfill the other parts of your life as well. (quoted in Wells 2000: 3) 
17 Dancing with her plastic surgeon Mr. Ghengis after her surgery. Ruth notes that 'with 
every step it was as if she trod on knives' (Weldon 1983: 254). 
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18 In an interview, Weldon describes her awareness that 'releasing the potential of women 
into society' is not going to transform the social order instantly (quoted in Kenyon 1989: 
198). Instead, 'now we see that the picture is more confusing than we realized - or 
hoped' (quoted in Kenyon 1989: 198). Noting that 'I don't feel imprisoned by feminism', 
Weldon defends her protagonist's actions and her recourse to cosmetic surgery: 
I'm glad she did it. I'm on Ruth's side though I get a lot oftuttutting from the 
right-minded readers. Irresponsible. Dangerous. Ruth should have done what she 
ought, faced up to things, not what she wanted. [ ... ] But that's always said of 
women, isn't it. (quoted in Kenyon 1988: 120; quoted in Newman 1993: 199) 
The writer notes that inconclusiveness is a major part of her writing strategy as she 
deliberately withholds closure and resolution. As she declares, 'I don't make a moral 
judgment but hand it over to the reader who is expected to come to their own conclusion. 
[ ••• J It requires a personal response' (quoted in Gholson 1990: 47). 
19 In fact, Ruth and Mary Fisher can be discussed as complementary figures who are set 
up as exact opposites and change place, character and face in the course of the narrative. 
While Ruth is engaged in the endeavor to take over the life of the glamorous, rich and 
selfish author, the original version of this feminine stereotype has to disappear or rJther 
be transformed herself. Thus, Ruth's psychological and bodily metamorphoses are 
mirrored by the trajectory of her double as the more power the cheated wife gains hy 
getting rid of her traditional feminine obligations, the more 'real' her opponent becomes. 
Mary Fisher loses her idealized status as 'the material world surges in' and she is forced 
to turn into a suburban housewife, becoming a mother to Ruth's children, a daughter 
caring for her senile mother and ultimately, a betrayed wife to Bohbo (Weldon 1983: 
109). As Pamela Katz suggests, Ruth takes 'Mary's "ruthlessness" away from her' while 
Mary 'becomes as much "ruth" as Ruth ever wa<i' (Katz 1994: 121). On a more physical 
level, there is a similar exchange as Ruth's beautification is diametrically opposed to and 
countered by Mary's bodily deterioration that results in a painful death caused hy cancer, 
the degenerative complement to Ruth's reconstruction. 
3.3 The Postfeminist Supergirl and Living in the In-RehH'en 
1 According to Inness, the tough heroine's paradoxical role exemplifies the conliJdictions 
inherent in popular culture. In fact, 'the popular media are never feeding their audience a 
single message about women's roles; instead, the media convey countless different 
messages, with some contradicting others' (Inness 1999: 49). 
2 The notion of 'open/closed images' is taken from the literary scholar Sharon 
Macdonald. According to Macdonald, imagery is by no means a purely superficial 
phenomenon but rather, it is the means through which we articulate and define the social 
order and nature. She identifies closed images as analogous to symbols and ideals that 
appear fixed in public consciousness. By contrast, open images 'are to he interpreted, 
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read and to an extent repopulated' in an attempt to expose coded symbols and chart new 
meanings for stereotypes (Macdonald 1987: 22-23). 
See Sharon Macdonald 1987. 'Drawing the Lines - Gender, Peace and War: An 
Introduction', in Images of Women in Peace & War: Cross-Cultural and Historical 
Perspectives, (eds) Macdonald, S., Holden, P. and Ardener, S., Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1-26. 
3 See Janet Evanovich 1994. One for the Money, London: Penguin; Helen Fielding 2003. 
Olivia Joules and the Overactive Imagination, London: Picador; Miss Congeniality 
(2000. Warner Bros). 
4 All dialogue is taken from the website 
<http://uk.geocities.com!slayermagic/Scrips.html> 
The episode numbering system I employ here and throughout indicates season and 
episode. Thus, 1002 means first season, second episode. 
5 Whedon declares that Buffy the Vampire Slayer is his 'response to all the horror movies 
[he has] ever seen where some girl walks into a dark room and gets killed' (quoted in 
Early 2002: 13). As he states, 
I saw so many horror movies where there was that blonde girl who would always 
get herself killed, and I started feeling bad for her. I thought, you know, it's time 
she had a chance to take back the night. The idea of Buffy came from just the very 
simple thought of a beautiful blonde girl walks into an alley, a monster attacks 
her, and she's not only ready for him, she trounces him. (quoted in Chandler: I). 
6 Whedon wants to avoid preachiness and 'coming off as dramatized infomercials of the 
National Organization for Women' (Bellafante 1997: 83). As he notes, 
if I can make teenage boys comfortable with a girl who takes charge of a situation 
without their knowing that's what's happening, it's better than sitting down and 
selling them on feminism. (quoted in Bellafante 1997: 83) 
7 The dichotomy between Buffy's femininity and feminism is further problematized by 
the actress Sarah Michelle Gellar who plays the character of Buffy in the series. In an 
interview with Detour Magazine, she controversially proclaims that she is not a feminist. 
In fact, she reveals that 
I hate the word "feminist". It has a bad connotation of women who don't shave 
their legs or under their arms. [ ... ] There's no femininity in feminism, which is 
really weird because it's technically the same word. (quoted in Woodlock: 1) 
338 
Bibliography 
Alcoff, Linda 1987-88. 'Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis 
in Feminist Theory', Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, ] 3,405-436 
Alice, Lynne 1995. 'What is postfeminism? Or, Having it Both Ways', in 
Feminism/PostmodernismlPostfeminism Conference Proceedings, Massey University, 7-
35 
Allen, Graham 2000. Intertextuality, London and New York: Routledge 
Ally McBeal Quotes <http://www.niksula.cs.hut.fi/-jftammin/australialally/ally.htm> (1-
3) [accessed 6 June 2004] 
Ang, len ]996. Living Room Wars: Rethinking Media Audiences for a Post modem 
World, London and New York: Routledge 
Augsburg, Tanya 1998. 'Orlan's Performative Transformations of Subjectivity', in The 
Ends of Performance, (eds) Phelan, P. and Lane, J., New York and London: New York 
University Press, 285-314 
Balsamo, Anne 1996. Technologies of the Gendered Body Reading Cyhorg Women, 
Durham and London: Duke University Press 
Barrett, Michele 1990. 'Feminism's "Turn to Culture"', Woman: A Cultural Review, 1, 
22-24 
Bartky, Sandra Lee 1990. Femininity and Domination Studies in the Phenomenology of 
Oppression, London and New York: Routledge 
Bartky, Sandra Lee 1997. 'Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal 
Power', in Writing on the Body: Female Emhodiment and Feminist Theory, (eds) 
Conboy, K., Medina, N. and Stanbury S., New York: Columbia University Press, 129-
154 
Baudri11ard, Jean 1983. In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, (trans.) Foss, P., Patton P. 
and Johnston, J., New York: Semiotext(e) 
Baudrillard, Jean 1984. 'Game with Vestiges', On the Beach,S (Winter), 19-25 
Baudril1ard, Jean 1993. 'The Evil Demon of Images and the Precession of Simulacra', in 
Postmodernism: A Reader, (ed.) Docherty, T., London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 194-199 
Baumgardner, Jennifer and Richards, Amy 2000. Manifesta Young Women. Feminism. 
and the Future, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 
339 
Bellafante, Ginia 1997. 'Bewitching Teen Heroines They're all over the Deal, Speaking 
Out, Cracking Wise and Casting Spells', Time, 5 May, 149 (18), 82-84 
Bellafante, Ginia 1998. 'Feminism: It's All About Me', Time, 29 June, 151 (25),54-60 
Benhabib, Seyla 1994. 'Feminism and the Question of Postmodernism', in The Polity 
Reader in Gender Studies, Oxford: Polity Press, 76-92 
Benhabib, Seyla et a1.1995. 'Feminism and Postmodernism: An Uneasy Alliance', in 
Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, New York and London: Routledge, 17-
34 
Berger, John 1972. Ways of Seeing, London: British Broadcasting Corporation 
Best, Steven and Kellner, Douglas 1991. Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations, 
London: Macmillan 
Bodger, Gwyneth 2003. 'Buffy the Feminist Slayer? Constructions of Femininity in Buffy 
the Vampire Slayer', Refractory: a Journal of Entertainment Media 
<http://www.refractory.unimelb.edu.au/journalissues/voI2/gwynbodger.htm> (1-10) 
[accessed 21 February 2004] 
Bordo, Susan 1993. Unbearable Weight: Feminism. Western Culture and the Body, 
Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press 
Brabazon, Tara 1997. 'Making it Big: Bitch Politics and Writing in Public' 
<http://www.lib.latrobe.edu.au/AHRlarchivelIssue-June-1997Ibrabazon.html> (1-5) 
[accessed 2 March 2005] 
Bridget Jones's Diary 2001. Dir. Sharon Maguire. Working Title. 
Bromley, Susan and Hewitt, Pamela 1992. 'Fatal Attraction: The Sinister Side of 
Women's Conflict about Career and Family', Journal of Popular Culture, 26 (3), 17-23 
Brook, Barbara 1999. Feminist Perspectives on the Body, London and New York: 
Longman 
Brooks, Ann 1997. Postfeminisms Feminism. Cultural Theory and Cultural Forms, 
London and New York: Routledge 
Brown, Jeffrey A. 1996. 'Gender and the Action Heroine: Hardbodies and the Point of 
No Return', Cinema Journal, 35 (3),52-71 
Brownmiller, Susan 1984. Femininity, New York: Simon & Schuster 
340 
Brunsdon, Charlotte 1991. 'Pedagogies of the Feminine: Feminist Teaching and 
Women's genres', Screen, 32(4), 364-381 
Brunsdon, Charlotte 1997. Screen Tastes: Soap Opera to Satellite Dishes, London and 
New York: Routledge 
Budgeon, Shelley 1994. 'Fashion Magazine Advertising Constructing Femininity in the 
"Postfeminist" Era', in Gender & Utopia in Advertising A Critical Reader, (eds) Manca, 
L. and A., Lisle, IL: Procopian Press, 55-70 
Burchill, Julie 1992. Sex and Sensibility, London: Grafton 
Bushnell, Candace 1997. Sex and the City, London: Abacus 
Butler, Judith 1990a. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, London 
and New York: Routledge 
Butler, Judith 1990b. 'Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory, and Psychoanalytic Discourse', 
in FeminismlPostmodernism, (ed.) Nicholson, L. J., London and New York: Routledge, 
324-340 
Butler, Judith 1990c. 'Lana's "Imitation": Melodramatic Repetition and the Gender 
Performative', Genders, 9,1-18 
Butler, Judith 1992. 'Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of 
"Postmodernism"', in Feminists Theorize the Political, (eds) Butler, J. and Scott, J. W .• 
London and New York: Routledge, 3-21 
Butler, Judith 1993a. Bodies that Matter On the Discursive Limits of "Sex", London and 
New York: Routledge 
Butler, Judith 1993b. 'Imitation and Gender Insubordination', in The Lesbian and Gay 
Studies Reader, (eds) Abelove, H., Barale, M. A. and Halperin, D. M .• London and New 
York: Routledge, 307-320 
Butler, Judith et al. 1995. 'For a Careful Reading', in Feminist Contentions: A 
Philosophical Exchange, New York and London: Routledge, 127-143 
Butler, Judith 1997a. Excitable Speech A Politics of the Performative, London and New 
York: Routledge 
Butler, Judith 1997b. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Suhjection, Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press 
Butler, Judith 1997c. 'Performative Acts and Gender Constitution An Essay in 
Phenomenology and Feminist Theory', in Writing on the Body: Female Emhodiment and 
341 
Feminist Theory, (eds) Conboy, K., Medina, N. and Stanbury, S., New York: Columbia 
U ni versi ty Press, 401-417 
Buttsworth, Sara 2002. '''Bite Me": Buffy and the penetration of the gendered warrior-
hero', Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, 16 (2), 185-199 
Cacoullos, Ann R. 2001. 'American Feminist Theory', American Studies International, 
XXXIX, No.1, 72-117 
Case, Alison 2001. 'Authenticity, Convention, and Bridget Jones's Diary', Narrative, 9 
(2), 176-81 
Chambers, Veronica, Kalb, Claudia and Weingarden, Julie 1998. 'How Would Ally Do 
It', Newsweek, 2 March, 58 
Chandler, Holly. 'Slaying the Patriarchy: Transfusions of the Vampire Metaphor in Buffy 
the Vampire Slayer' <http://www.slayage.tv/essays/slayage9/Chandler.htm> (1-13) 
[accessed 24 January 2004] 
Chick Lit USA. <http://www.chicklit.us/whatisc1.htm> (1-2) [accessed 14 June 2004] 
Chu, Jessie Kuei-yi. 'Linda Hutcheon's "The Politics of Parody'" <http: 
//www.eng.fju.edu.tw/Literary_Criticismlpostmodernism!Hutcheon_outline_2.htm> 
[accessed 20 April 2002] 
Clarke, De 1983. 'What is Beauty, Anyway?' 
<http://www.nostatusquo.comlACLUlNikkilBeautyClarke 1.html> [accessed 16 August 
2001] 
Cleto, Fabio 1999. 'Introduction: Queering the Camp', in Camp: Queer Aesthetics and 
the Performing Subject A Reader, (ed.) Cleto, F., Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1-42 
Cloud, Dana L. 1996. 'Hegemony or Concordance? The Rhetoric of Tokenism in 
"Oprah" Winfrey's Rags-to-Riches Biography', Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 
13(2), 115-137 
Coppock, Vicki, Haydon, Deena and Richter, Ingrid 1995. The Illusions of 'Post-
Feminism' New Women. Old Myths, London: Taylor & Francis 
Cott, Nancy F. 1986. 'Feminist Theory and Feminist Movements: The Past Before Us', in 
What is Feminism?, (eds) Mitchell, J. and Oakley, A., Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 49-62 
Cott, Nancy F. 1987. The Grounding of Modern Feminism, New Haven and London: 
Yale UP 
342 
Covi, Giovanna 1997. 'Decolonialized Feminist Subjects', in Critical Studies on the 
Feminist Subject, (ed.) Covi, G., Trento: Dipartimento di Scienze Filologiche e Storiche, 
19-56 
Coward, Rosalind 1997. 'Slim and Sexy: Modem Woman's Holy Grail', in Feminisms, 
(eds) Kemp, S. and Squires, J., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 358-362 
Coward, Rosalind 1999. Sacred Cows: Is Feminism Relevant to the New Millennium?, 
London: Harper Collins 
Cox, Ana Marie et al. 1997. 'Masculinity without Men: Women Reconciling Feminism 
and Male Identification', in Third Wave Agenda Being Feminist Doing Feminism, (eds) 
Heywood, L. and Drake, J., Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 
178-199 
Daly, Mary 1979. GynlEcology: the Metaethics of Radical Feminism, Lanham, MD: The 
Scarecrow Press 
Damon, Maria. 'Disillusion' <http://www.aItx.comlebr/ebr3/forumlfem.htm> [accessed 5 
June 2000] 
Daniele, Daniela 1997. 'Locations: Notes on (Post) Feminism and Personal Criticism', in 
Critical Studies on the Feminist Subject, (ed.) Covi, G., Trento: Dipartimento di Scienze 
Filologiche e Storiche, 79-99 
Daughtery, Anne Millard 2002. 'Just a Girl: Buffy as Icon', in Reading the Vampire 
Slayer, (ed.) Kaveney, R., New York: Tauris Parke 
Davies, Liz 1996. Feminism after Post-feminism Socialist Renewal European Lahour 
. Forum Pamphlet No.1 0, Nottingham: Russell Press 
Davis, Kathy 1991. 'Remaking the She-Devil: A Critical Look at Feminist Approaches to 
Beauty', Hypatia, 6 (2), 21-43 
Davis, Kathy 1995. Reshaping the Female Body: The Dilemma of Cosmetic Surgery, 
London and New York: Routledge 
Davis, Kathy 1997a. 'Embody-ing Theory Beyond Modernist and Postmodernist 
Readings of the Body', in Embodied Practices Feminist Perspectives on the Body, (ed.) 
Davis, K., London: Sage Publications, 1-23 
Davis, Kathy 1997b. "'My Body is my Art" Cosmetic Surgery as Feminist Utopia?', in 
Embodied Practices Feminist Perspectives on the Body, (ed.) Davis, K., London: Sage 
Publications, 168-181 
343 
de Certeau, Michel 1984. The Practice of Everyday Life, (trans.) Randall, S., Berkeley: 
University of California Press 
de Lauretis, Teresa 1982. Alice Doesn't. Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema, London: 
Bloomington 
de Lauretis, Teresa 1987. Technologies of Gender: Essays on Theory, Film and Fiction, 
London: Bloomington 
de Lauretis, Teresa 1993. 'Upping the Anti [sic] in Feminist Theory', in The Cultural 
Studies Reader, (ed.) During, S., London and New York: Routledge 
Delmar, Rosalind 1986. 'What is Feminism?', in What is Feminism?, (eds) Mitchell, J. 
and Oakley, A., Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 8-33 
Delombard, Jeannine 1995. 'Femmenism', in To Be Real Telling the Truth and Changing 
the Face of Feminism, (ed.) Walker, R., London: Anchor Books, 21-33 
Denf eld, Rene 1995. The New Victorians: A Young Woman's Challenge to the Old 
Feminist Order, New York: Warner Books 
Dentith, Simon 2000. Parody, London and New York: Routledge 
de Toro, Fernando 1999. 'Explorations on Post-Theory: New Times', in Explorations on 
Post-Theory: Toward a Third Space, (ed.) de Toro, F., Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert; 
Madrid: Iberoamericana, 9-23 
di Stefano, Christine 1990. 'Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity, and 
Postmodernism', in FeminismlPostmodernism, (ed.) Nicholson, L. 1., New York and 
London: Routledge, 63-82 
Doane, Mary Ann 1991. Femmes Fatales Feminism, Film Theory, Psychoanalysis, 
London and New York: Routledge 
Doane, Mary Ann 1992. 'Film and the Masquerade: Theorizing the Female Spectator', in 
The Sexual Subject A Screen Reader in Sexuality, London and New York: Routledge, 
227-243 
Do1limore, Jonathan 1991. Sexual Dissidence: Augustine to Wilde, Freud to Foucault, 
Oxford: Clarendon 
Dollimore, Jonathan 1999. 'PostIModern: On the Gay Sensibility, Or the Pervert's 
Revenge on Authenticity', in Camp: Queer Aesthetics and the Performing SUhject A 
Reader, (ed.) Cleto, F., Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 221-236 
344 
Douglas, Susan J. 1995. Where the Girls Are: Growing Up Female with the Mass Media, 
London: Penguin 
Douglas, Mary Vavrus 2000. 'Putting Ally on Trial: Contesting Postfeminism in Popular 
Culture', Women's Studies in Communication 23 (3),413-428 
Dow, Bonnie J. 1996. Prime-Time Feminism Television. Media Culture. and the 
Women's Movement since the 1970s, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 
du Bois, Page 1988. Sowing the Body: Psychoanalysis and Ancient Representations of 
Women, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Dworkin, Andrea 1974. Woman-Hating, New York: Dutton 
Eagleton, Terry 1991. Ideology: An Introduction, London and New York: Verso 
Early, Frances 2001. 'Staking her Claim: Buffy the Vampire Slayer as Transgressive 
Woman Warrior', Journal of Popular Culture, 35 (3), 11-27 
Elam, Diane 1997. 'Sisters are Doing it to Themselves', in Generations Academic 
Feminists in Dialogue, (eds) Looser, D. and Kaplan, A. E., Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 55-68 
Elsby, Kirsten. 'I'm not a feminist but .. .' 
<http://www.tfk.elte.hulhirnoklfeminizmus/elmeletlnotafemi.htm> [accessed 23 April 
2000] 
Erickson, Gregory 2002. '''Sometimes You Need a Story" American Christianity, 
Vampires, and Buffy', in Fighting the Forces What's at Stake in Buffv tIl(> Vameire 
Slayer, (eds) Wilcox, R. V. and Lavery, D., Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 108-119 
Eurudice, 'History' <http://www.altx.comlebr/ebr3/forurnlpofem.htm> [accessed 5 June 
2000] 
Ewington, Julie 1994. 'Past the Post: Postmodernism and Postfeminism'. in Dissonance: 
Feminism and the Arts 1970-90, (ed.) Moore, C., St. Leonards Australia: Allen & Unwin, 
109-121 
Faludi, Susan 1992. Backlash The Undeclared War against Women, London: Vintage 
Fatal Attraction 1987. Dir. Adrian Lyne. Paramount. 
Fekete, John 1987. 'Introductory Notes for a Postmodern Value Agenda', in Life after 
Postmodernism, (ed.) Fekete, J., New York: St. Martin's Press 
345 
Fenton, Natalie 2001. 'Feminism and Popular Culture', in The Routledge Companion to 
Feminism and Postfeminism, (ed.) Gamble, S., London and New York: Routledge, 104-
116 
Ferguson, Ann 1997. 'Moral Responsibility and Social Change: A New Theory of Self, 
Hypatia 12(3),116-141 
Fielding, Helen 1996. Bridget Jones's Diary, London: Picador 
Fielding, Helen 1999. Bridget Jones The Edge of Reason, London: Picador 
Fielding, Helen 2003. Olivia Joules and the Overactive Imagination, London: Picador 
Fiske, John 1989. Understanding Popular Culture, London and New York: Routledge 
Flax, Jane 1990. 'Postmodemism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory', in 
Feminism/Postmodemism, (ed.) Nicholson, L. J., London and New York: Routledge, 39-
62 
Flinn, Caryl 1999. 'The Deaths of Camp', in Camp: Queer Aesthetics and the Performing 
Subject A Reader, (ed.) Cleto, F., Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 433-457 
Foucault, Michel 1977. Discipline and Punish The Birth of the Prison, London: Penguin 
Foucault, Michel 1978. The History of Sexuality Volume 1, New York: Random House 
Foucault, Michel 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings t 972-
1977, (ed.) Gordon, C., Brighton, Sussex: The Harvester Press 
Foucault, Michel 1988a. in Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy. Culture, (ed.) 
Kritzman, L. D., London and New York: Routledge 
Foucault, Michel 1988b. 'An Aesthetics of Existence', in Politics. Philosophy. Culture: 
Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984, (ed.) Kritzman, L. D., London: Routledge 
Fraser, Nancy and Nicholson, LindaJ. 1990. 'Social Criticism without Philosophy: An 
Encounter between Feminism and Postmodemism', in Feminism/Postmodemism, (ed.) 
Nicholson, L. 1., London and New York: Routledge, 19-38 
Fraser, Nancy et al. 1995. 'False Antitheses: A Response to Seyla Benhabib and Judith 
Butler', in Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, New York and London: 
Routledge, 59-74 
Fraser, Nancy et al. 1995. 'Pragmatism, Feminism, and the Linguistic Tum', in Feminist 
Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, New York and London: Routledge, 157-171 
346 
Freedman, Rita 1986. Beauty Bound, Lexington, Massachusetts and Toronto: Lexington 
Books 
Friedan, Betty 1963. The Feminine Mystique, London: Routledge 
Frost, Caroline 2002. 'Julie Burchi11: The Brighton Belle' 
<http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi/in_depth/ukl2000/newsmakers/2045348.stm> (1-4) [accessed 
28 February 2005] 
Fudge, Rachel 1999. 'The Buffy Effect: a Tale of Cleavage and Marketing', Bitch: 
Feminist Response to Pop Culture 10 
<http://daringivens.home.mindspring.com/buffyeffect.html> (1-4) [accessed 10 
December 2000] 
Gamble, Sarah 2001. 'Postfeminism', in The Routledge Companion to Feminism and 
Postfeminism, (ed.) Gamble, S., London and New York: Routledge, 43-54 
Gamble, Sarah (ed.) 2001. The Routledge Companion to Feminism and Postfeminism, 
London and New York: Routledge 
Gamman, Lorraine and Marshment, Margaret (eds) 1988. The Female Gaze: Women as 
Viewers of Popular Culture, London: The Women's Press 
Gholson, Craig 1990. 'Fay Weldon', Bomb, 30, 45-47 
Gill, Rosalind 2003. 'From Sexual Objectification to Sexual Subjectification: The 
Resexualisation of Women's Bodies in the Media', Feminist Media Studies, 3 (1), t 00-
106 
Gillespie, Rosemary 1996. 'Women, the Body and Brand Extension in Medicine: 
Cosmetic Surgery and the Paradox of Choice', Women and Health, 24 (4),69-85 
Gilman, Sander L. t 999. Making the Body Beautiful: A Cultural History of Aesthetic 
Surgery, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 
Gitlin, Todd 1989. 'Postmodernism: Roots and Politics', in Cultural Politics in 
Contemporary America, (eds) Angus, I. and Jhally, S., London and New York: 
Routledge, 347-360 
Gray, John 1992. 'Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus: A Practical Guide for 
Improving Communication and Getting What You Want in your Relationships' 
<http://www.bookbrowse.com> (1-3) [accessed 11 June 2004] 
Green, Jane 1998. Jemima J., London: Penguin 
347 
Green, Keith and LeBihan, Jill 1996. Critical Theory and Practice: A Coursebook, 
London and New York: Routledge 
Greene, Gayle 1991. 'Feminist Fiction and the Uses of Memory', Signs: Journal of 
Women in eu Iture and Society, 16(2), 290-321 
Haffenden, John 1985. Novelists in Interview, London: Methuen 
Hamilton, Lauren K. 1995. Circus of the Damned, New York: Ace Books 
Hamilton, Laurell K. 2000a. Guilty Pleasures, London: Orbit 
Hamilton, Lauren K. 2000b. The Laughing Corpse, London: Orbit 
Hamilton, Lauren K. 2000c. The Lunatic Cafe, London Orbit 
Hamilton, Lauren K. 2000d. Bloody Bones, London: Orbit 
Hamilton, Laurell K. 2000e. The Killing Dance, London: Orbit 
Hamilton, Laurell K. 2000f. Burnt Offerings, London: Orbit 
Hamilton, Laurell K. 2000g. Blue Moon, London: Orbit 
Hamilton, Laurell K. 200 I a. Obsidian Butterfly, London: Orbit 
Hamilton, Laurell K. 200lb. Narcissus in Chains, New York: Berkley Books 
Hamilton, Laurell K. 2003. Cerulean Sins, London: Orbit 
Haran, Maeve 1991. Having It All, London: Signet 
Harris, Geraldine 1999. Staging Femininities Performance and Performativity, 
Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press 
Harts, Kate 2001. 'Deconstructing Buffy: Buffy the Vampire Slayer's Contribution to the 
Discourse on Gender Construction', Popular Culture Review, 12 (1), 79-98 
Hartsock, Nancy 1990. 'Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?', in 
Feminism/Postmodernism, (ed.) Nicholson, L. J., London and New York: Routledge, 
157-175 
Hayles, N.K.1990. Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and 
Science, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 
Heilbrun, Carolyn G. 1988. Writing a Woman's Life, New York: Ballantine Books 
348 
Helford, Elyce Rae 2000. 'Postfeminism and the Female Action-Adventure Hero: 
Positioning Tank Girl', in Future Females, the Next Generation: New Voices and 
Velocities in Feminist Science Fiction, (ed.) Barr, M. S., Lanham, Boulder, New York, 
Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 291-308 
Heyes, Cressida J. 1997. 'Anti-Essentialism in Practice: Carol Gilligan and Feminist 
Philosophy', Hypatia, 12(3), 142-163 
Heywood, Leslie and Drake, Jennifer 1997. 'Introduction', in Third Wave Agenda Being 
Feminist Doing Feminism, (eds) Heywood, L. and Drake, J" Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1-20 
Heywood, Leslie and Drake, Jennifer 1997. 'We Learn America Like a Script: Acth'ism 
in the Third Wave; or, Enough Phantoms of Nothing', in Third Wave Agenda Being 
Feminist Doing Feminism, (eds) Heywood, L. and Drake, J., Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 40-54 
Heywood, Leslie and Drake, Jennifer 1997. 'The Third Wave and Representation'. in 
Third Wave Agenda Being Feminist Doing Feminism, (eds) Heywood, L. and DrJke, J., 
Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 101-102 
Hills, Elizabeth 1999. 'From "Figurative Males" to Action Heroines: Funher Thoughts 
on Active Women in the Cinema', Screen, 40( 1), 38-50 
Hinds, Hilary and Stacey, Jackie 2001. 'Imaging Feminism, Imaging Femininity: The 
Bra-Burner, Diana, and the Woman who Kills', Feminist Media Studies. 1 (2). 153-177 
Ho]]ows, Joanne 2000. Feminism, Femininity and Popular Culture, Manchester and New 
York: Manchester University Press 
hooks, bell 1994. Outlaw Culture: Resisting Representations. New York and London: 
Routledge 
hooks, be111996. 'Dissident Heat: Fire with Fire', in "Bad Girls" "Good Girls" Wl'ml·n. 
Sex, and Power in the Nineties, (eds) Bauer, N. M. and Perry, D., New Brunswick, New 
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 57-64 
Hsu, Max and Ghazarian, Dave 2001. 'One Girl Revolution', performed by Supcrchic[k]. 
Legally Blonde, MOM 
Hutcheon, Linda 1985. A Theory of Parody: The Teachings of Twentieth-C't'ntury Art 
Forms, London: Methuen 
Hutcheon, Linda 1988. A Poetics of Postmodernism: History. Theory. Fiction, London 
and New York: Routledge 
349 
Hutcheon, Linda 1989a. The Politics of Postmodemism, London and New York: 
Routledge 
Hutcheon, Linda 1989b. 'Historiographic Metafiction: Parody and the Intertextuality of 
History', in Intertextuality and Contemporary American Fiction, (eds) O'Donnell, P. and 
Davis, R. C., Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 3-30 
Hutcheon, Linda 1990. 'An Epilogue: Postmodern Parody: History, Subjectivity, and 
Ideology', in Ouarterly Review of Film and Video, 12, 125-133 
Hutcheon, Linda 1998. 'Irony, Nostalgia and the Postmodern' 
<http://www.library.utoronto.calutel/criticismlhutchinp.html> (1-12) [accessed 10 July 
2002] 
Imbert, Patrick 1999. 'Literary Theory in the Age of Post-Theory: The Permanent 
Transition', in Explorations on Post-Theory: Toward a Third Space, (ed.) de Toro. F., 
Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert; Madrid: Iberoamericana, 25-36 
Inness, Sherrie A. 1999. Tough Girls Women Warriors and Wonder Women in Popular 
Culture, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 
Jacobson, Aileen 2004. 'Books and the Single Girl', NYNewsday.com 
<http://www.nynewsday.comlfeatureslbooksmags/n y-
p2tw03794825mayll ,0,7870216.story?coll=nyc-books-bottom-promo> (1-5) [accessed 
14 June 2004] 
Jaggar, Alison M. 1983. Feminist Politics and Human Nature, Totowa, NY: Rowman & 
Allanheld 
James, Tim and Armato, Antonina 2001. 'Perfect Day', performed by Hoku, Legally 
Blonde, MOM 
Jameson, Fredric 1983. 'Postmodernism and Consumer Culture', in The Anti-Aesthetic: 
Essays on Postmodern Culture, (ed.) Foster, H., Port Townsend, Washington: Bay Press, 
111-125 
Jameson, Fredric 1993. 'Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism', in 
Postmodernism: A Reader, (ed.) Docherty, T., London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 62-92 
Jones, Amelia 1990. "'Post-Feminism" - A Remasculinization of Culture', 
MIE/AINIIINIG An Anthology of Artists' Writing, Theory and Criticism, 7, 7-23 
Jones, Amelia 1994. 'Postfeminism, Feminist Pleasures, and Embodied Theories of Art', 
in New Feminist Criticism Art Identity Action, (eds) Frueh, J., Langer, C, L. and Raven, 
A., New York: Icon Press, 16-41 
350 
Kalbfleisch, Jane 1997. 'When Feminism Met Postfeminism: The Rhetoric of a 
Relationship', in Generations Academic Feminists in Dialogue, (eds) Looser, D. and 
Kaplan, A. E., Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 250-266 
Kaminer, Wendy 1995. 'Feminism's Third Wave: What Do Young Women Want?', The 
New York Times Book Review, 4 June, 3, 22-23 
Karras, Irene 2002. 'The Third Wave's Final Girl: Buffy the Vampire Slayer' <http: 
//www.thirdspace.calarticles/pckar.htm> (1-1 J) [accessed 23 June 2002] 
Kastelein, Barbara 1994. Popular/Post-Feminism and Popular Literature, (unpublished 
doctoral thesis, University of Warwick, Department of English and Comparative Studies) 
Katz, Pamela 1994. 'They Should Have Called It "She-Anger", in Fay Weldon's Wicked 
Fictions, (ed.) Barreca, R., Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 114-
132 
Kavka, Misha 2002. 'Feminism, Ethics, and History, or What is the "Post" in 
Postfeminism', Tulsa Studies in Women's Literature, 21(1), 29-44 
Kenyon, Olga 1988. Women Novelists Today: A Survey of English Writing in the 
Seventies and Eighties, Brighton: The Harvester Press 
Kenyon, Olga 1989. Women Writers Talk Interviews with 10 Women Writers, New 
York: Carroll & Graf Publishers 
Kim, L.S. 2001. "'Sex and the Single Girl" in Postfeminism The F Word on Television', 
Television & New Media, 2 (4), 319-334 
Kocourek, Rostislav 1996. 'The prefix post- in contemporary English terminology: 
Morphology, Meaning, and Productivity of Derivations', Terminology: International 
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Issues in Specialized Communication, 3 (1), 85-110 
Koenen, Anne 1999. 'The (Black) Lady Vanishes: Postfeminism, Poststructuralism, and 
Theorizing in Narratives by Black Women', in Explorations on Post-Theory: Toward a 
Third Space, (ed.) de Toro, F., Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert; Madrid: Iberoamcricana, 
131-143 
Krimmer, Elisabeth and Raval, Shilpa 2002. "'Digging the Undead" Death and Desire in 
Buffy', in Fighting the Forces What's at Stake in Bltffy the Vampire Slayer, (eds) Wilcox, 
R. V. and Lavery, D., Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 153-
164 
Kristeva, Julia 1981. 'Woman can Never Be Defined', in New French Feminisms, (eds) 
Marks, E. and de Courtivron, I., New York: Schocken 
351 
Kroker, Arthur and Kroker, Marilouise (eds) 1987. Body Invaders: Panic Sex in America, 
New York: St. Martin's 
Lee, Janet 1988. 'Care to Join Me in an Upwardly Mobile Tango? Postmodernism and 
the "New Woman"', in The Female Gaze: Women as Viewers of Popular Culture, (eds) 
Gamman, L. and Marshment, M., London: The Women's Press, 166-172 
Legally Blonde 2001. Dir. Robert Luketic. MGM. 
Lippert, Barbara 1997. 'Hey There, Warrior GmI', New York, December 15,24-25 
Lloyd, Moya 1999. 'Performativity, Parody, Politics', Theory, Culture & Society, 16(2), 
195-213 
Lotz, Amanda D. 2001. 'Postfeminist Television Criticism: Rehabilitating Critical Terms 
and Identifying Postfeminist Attributes', Feminist Media Studies, 1 (1), 105-121 
Loudermilk, Kim 1997. 'Feminist Backlash finds Roots in 1980s Popular Culture' 
<http://www.emory.eduIEMORY _REPORT ... erjuly.1417 _14_97FirstPerson.html> (1-2) 
[accessed 18 March 2001] 
Lyotard, Jean-Fran~ois 1984. The Post-Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 
Macdonald, Myra 1995. Representing Women: Myths of Femininity in Popular Media, 
London: Edward Arnold 
Macdonald, Sharon 1987. 'Drawing the Lines - Gender, Peace and War: An 
Introduction', in Images of Women in Peace & War: Cross-Cultural and Historical 
Perspectives, (eds) Macdonald, S., Holden, P. and Ardener, S., Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1-26 
Machelidon, Veronique 2000. 'Masquerade: A Feminine or Feminist Strategy?', in 
Psychoanalyses/Feminisms, (eds) Rudnytsky, P. L. and Gordon, A. M., New York: State 
University of New York Press, 103-120 
MacKinnon, Catherine A. 1982. 'Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda 
for Theory', Signs, 7, 515-544 
Mann, Patricia S. 1994. 'On the Postfeminist Frontier'. Socialist Review, 1-2, 223-241 
Mann, Patricia S. 1997. 'Musing as a Feminist on a Postfeminist Era', in Feminism and 
the New Democracy: Re-siting the Political, (ed.) Dean, J., London: Sage, 222-243 
352 
Marchetti, Gina 1989. 'Action-Adventure as Ideology', in Cultural Politics in 
Contemporary America, (eds) Angus, I. and Jhally, S., London and New York: 
Routledge, 182-197 
Marshment, Margaret 1993. 'The Picture is Political: Representation of Women in 
Contemporary Popular Culture', in Thinking Feminist: Key Concepts in Women's 
Studies, (eds) Richardson, D. and Robinson, V., New York: Guilford Press, 125-51 
Martin-Barbero J. 1988. 'Communication from Culture: The Crisis of the National and 
the Emergence ofthe Popular', Media, Culture and Society, 10 (4), 447-465 
Mascia-Lees, Frances E. and Sharpe, Patricia 2000. Taking a Stand in a Postfeminist 
World Toward an Engaged Cultural Criticism, Albany: State University of New York 
Press 
Matrix, Sidney Eve. 'Badgirls, Cyberchicks, and Postfeminists in US Pop Culture' 
<http://www.tc.umn.edu/-matriool/wost3306IDescription.htm> (1-3) [accessed 31 May 
2001] 
McNay, Lois 1999. 'Subject, Psyche and Agency: The Work of Judith Butler'. Theory, 
Culture & Society, 16 (2), 175-193 
McRobbie, Angela 1982. 'The Politics of Feminist Research: Between Talk, Text and 
Action', Feminist Review, 12,46-57 
McRobbie, Angela 1993. 'Shut Up and Dance: Youth Culture and Changing Modes of 
Femininity', Cultural Studies, 7 (3),406-426 
McRobbie, Angela 1994. Postmodernism and Popular Culture, London and New York: 
Routledge 
Meijer, Irene Costera and Prins, Baukje 1998. 'How Bodies Come To Matter: An 
Interview with Judith Butler', Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 23 (2), 
275-286 
Memorable Quotes from "Ally McBeal" <http://www.imdb.com/title/ttOI18254/quotes> 
(1-7) [accessed 16 June 2004] 
Mills, Sara 1998. 'Post Feminist Text Analysis' 
<http://www.shu.ac.uk/schools/cs/cri/staff/mills/postfem.html> (1-15) [accessed 21 April 
2002] 
Miss Congeniality 2000. Dir. Donald Petrie. Warner Bros. 
Modleski, Tania 1991. Feminism without Women Culture and Criticism in a 
"Postfeminist" Age, London and New York: Routledge 
353 
Moi, Toril 1985. 'Power, Sex and Subjectivity: Feminist Reflections on Foucault', 
Paragraph, 5, 95-102 
Morgan, Kathryn Pauly 1991. 'Women and the Knife: Cosmetic Surgery and the 
Colonization of Women's Bodies', Hypatia, 6 (3), 25- 53 
Moseley, Rachel and Read, Jacinda 2002. "'Having it Ally: Popular Television (Post-) 
Feminism', Feminist Media Studies, 2 (2), 231-249 
Narine, Shaun 2003. 'Where Angels Fear to Tread: The Buffy-Spike Relationship' 
<http://www.the-buzz.comlb_7_18a.html> (1-6) [accessed 21 February 2004] 
Neustatter, Angela 1989. Hyenas in Petticoats: A Look at Twenty Years of Feminism, 
London: Harrop 
Newman, Jenny 1993. "'See Me as Sisyphus, But Having a Good Time": The Fiction of 
Fay Weldon', in Contemporary British Women Writers: Texts and Strategies, (ed.) 
Hosmer, R.E., Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 188-211 
Nicholson, Linda 1. 1990. 'Introduction', in FeminismlPostmodernism, (ed.) Nicholson, 
L. J., London and New York: Routledge, 1-16 
Nicholson, Linda 1995. 'Introduction', in Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical 
Exchange, Benhabib, S., Butler, J., Cornell, D., Fraser, N., New York and London: 
Routledge, 1-16 
O'Donnell, Patrick and Davis, Robert Con 1989. 'Introduction: Intertext and 
Contemporary American Fiction', in Intertextuality and Contemporary American Fiction, 
(eds) O'Donnell, P. and Davis, R. C., Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, ix-xxii 
Olson, Gary A. and Worsham, Lynn 2000. 'Changing the Subject: Judith Butler's Politics 
of Radical Resignification', JAC: a Journal of Composition Theory, 20 (4), 727-765 
Orr, Catherine M 1997. 'Charting the Currents of the Third Wave', Hypatia 12 (3), 29-45 
Osborne, Peter and Segal, Lynne 1994. 'Gender as Performance An Interview with Judith 
Butler', Radical Philosophy, 67, 32-39 
Ostriker, Alicia 1982. 'The Thieves of Language: Women Poets and Revisionist 
Mythmaking', Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 8 (1), 68-90 
Owen, Susan A. 1999. 'Vampires, Postmodernity, and Postfeminism: Buffy the Vampire 
Slayer', Journal of Popular Film and Television, 27 (2), 24-31 
354 
Owens, Craig 1983. 'The Discourse of Others: Feminists and Postmodernism', in The 
Anti-Aesthetic, (ed.) Foster, H., Port Townsend, WA: Bay Press, 57-82 
Pender, Patricia 2002. '''I'm Buffy and You're . .. History" The Postmodern Politics of 
Burffy' in Ficrhtin cr the Forces What's at Stake in Buffv the Vampire Slayer, (eds) Wilcox, 
, b = 
R.V. and Lavery, D., Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 35-44 
Petrova, Erma 2003. "'You Cannot Run from your Own Darkness"/ "Who says I'm 
Running?": Buffy and the Ownership of Evil', Refractory: A Journal of Entertainment 
Media <http://www.refractory.unimelb.edu.au/journalissues/voI2/ermapetrova.htm> (I-
ll) [accessed 21 February 2004] 
piggford, George 1999. "'Who's that Girl?" Annie Lennox, Woolfs Orlando, and 
Female Camp Androgyny', in Camp: Queer Aesthetics and the Performing Subject A 
Reader, (ed.) Cleto, F., Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 283-299 
Poster, Mark 1988. 'Introduction', in J. Baudrillard, Selected Writings, (ed.) Poster, M., 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 
Press, Andrea and Strathman, Terry 1993. 'Work, Family, and Social Class in Television 
Images of Women: Prime-Time Television and the Construction of Postfeminism', 
Women and Language, 16 (2), 1-15 
Probyn, Elspeth 1990. 'New Traditionalism and Post-Feminism: TV does the Home', 
Screen 31 (2), 147-159 
Projansky, Sarah 2001. Watching Rape: Film and Television in Postfeminist Culture, 
New York: New York University Press 
Rapping, Elayne 1996. 'None of my Best Friends: The Media's Unfortunate 
"Victim/Power" Debate', in "Bad Girls" "Good Girls" Women, Sex. and Power in the 
Nineties, (eds) Bauer N. M. and Perry, D., New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 264-274 
Rich, Adrienne 1979. On Lies, Secrets, and Silence Selected Prose 1966-1978, New 
York: Norton 
Riley, Denise 1988. 'Am I That Name?' Feminism and the Category of 'Women' in 
History, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan 
Reed, Jennifer 1997. 'Roseanne: A "Killer Bitch" for Generation X', in Third Wave 
Agenda Being Feminist, Doing Feminism, (eds) Heywood, L. and Drake, J., Minneapolis 
and London: University of Minnesota Press, 122-133 
Renstrom, Joel1e. 'Is the Slayer Destined to be Alone? Is the Mission All that Matters?' 
<http://www.the-buzz.comlb_7_19a.html> (1-5) [accessed 20 February 2004] 
355 
Richard, Nelly 1993. 'Postmodernism and Periphery', in Postmodernism: A Reader, (ed.) 
Docherty, T., London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 463-470 
Riviere, Joan 1986. 'Womanliness as a Masquerade', in Formations of Fantasy, (eds) 
Burgin, V., Donald, J. and Kaplan, c., London and New York: Methuen 
Robertson, Pamela 1996. Guilty Pleasures Feminist Camp from Mae West to Madonna, 
Durham and London: Duke University Press 
Rothenberg, Molly Anne and Valente, Joseph 1997. 'Performative Chic: The Fantasy of a 
Performative Politics', College Literature, 24 (1),259-304 
Russell, Charles (ed.) 1981. The Avant-Garde Today: An International Anthology, 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press 
Rutland, Barry 1999. 'The Other of Theory', in Explorations on Post-Theory: Toward a 
Third Space, (ed.) de Toro, F., Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert; Madrid: Iberoamericana, 
71-83 
Schwichtenberg, Cathy 1993. 'Madonna's Postmodern Feminism: Bringing the Margins 
to the Center', in The Madonna Connection: Representational Politics, Subcultural 
Identities, and Cultural Theory, (ed.) Schwichtenberg, C., Boulder, San Franscisco, 
Oxford: Westview Press, 129-145 
Selden, Raman, Widdowson, Peter and Brooker, Peter 1997. A Reader's Guide to 
Contemporary Literary Theory, 4th edition, London: Prentice HaW Harvester Wheatsheaf 
Senna, Danzy 1995. "'To Be Real''', in To Be Real Telling the Truth and Changing the 
Face of Feminism, (ed.) Walker, R., London: Anchor Books, 5-20 
Shalit, Ruth 1998. 'Canny and Lacy: Ally, Dharma, Ronnie, and the Betrayal of 
Postfeminism', The New Republic, 6 April, 27-32 
Siegel, Deborah L. 1997a. 'The Legacy ofthe Personal: Generating Theory in 
Feminism's Third Wave', Hypatia, 12 (3), 46-75 
Siegel, Deborah L. 1997b. 'Reading Between the Waves: Feminist Historiography in a 
"Postfeminist" Moment', in Third Wave Agenda Being Feminist, Doing Feminism, (eds) 
Heywood, L. and Drake, J., Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 55-
82 
Siemann, Catherine 2002. 'Darkness Falls on the Endless Summer: Buffy as Gidget for 
the Fin de Siec1e', in Fighting the Forces What's at Stake in Buffy the Vampire Slayer, 
(eds) Wilcox, R. V. and Lavery, D., Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 120-129 
356 
Silverton Rosenfelt, Deborah 1991. 'Feminism, "Postfeminism" and Contemporary 
Women's Fiction', in Tradition and the Talents of Women, (ed.) Howe, F., Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 268-291 
Singer, Linda 1992. 'Feminism and Postmodernism', in Feminists Theorize the Political, 
(eds) Butler, J. and Scott, J. W., London and New York: Routledge, 464-475 
Skurnick, Lizzie 2003. 'Chick Lit 101 A Sex-Soaked, Candy-Colored, Indiscreet Romp 
Through the Hottest Gal Tales of the Season' <http:www.citypaper.coml2003-09-
lOlbigbooks.html+chick+lit&hl=en> (1-8) [accessed 14 June 2004] 
Smith, Dorothy 1990. Texts, Facts and Femininity, Exploring the Relations of Ruling, 
London and New York: Routledge 
Smith, Patricia Juliana 1997. Lesbian Panic: HOInoeroticism in Modern British Women's 
Fiction, New York: Columbia University Press 
Smith, Paul 1988. Discerning the Subject, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 
Sonnet, Esther 1999. '''Erotic Fiction by Women for Women": The Pleasure of 
Postfeminist Heterosexuality', Sexualities, 2 (2), 167-187 
Spicer, Arwen. "'Love's Bitch but Man Enough to Admit it": Spike's Hybridized 
Gender' <hup://www.slayage.tv/essays/slayage7/Spicer.htm> (1-6) [accessed 20 
February 2004] 
Stables, Kate 200 1. 'Run Lara Run', Si ght and Sound, 11 (8), 18-20 
Stacey, Jackie 1994. Star Gazing Hollywood Cinema and Female Spectatorship, London 
and New York: Routledge 
Stacey, Judith 1987. 'Sexism by a Subtler Name? Postindustrial Conditions and 
Postfeminist Consciousness in the Silicon Valley', Socialist Review, 96, 7-28 
Steinem, Gloria 1995. 'Foreword', in To Be Real Telling the Truth and Changing the 
Face of Feminism, (ed.) Walker, R., London: Anchor Books, xiii-xxviii 
Storey, John 1997. An Introduction to Cultural Theory and Popular Culture, 2nd edition, 
Harlow, Essex: Prentice Hall 
Suleiman, Susan Rubin (ed.) 1985. The Female Body in Western Culture: Contemporary 
Perspectives, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
Tasker, Yvonne 1993. Spectacular Bodies Gender, Genre and the Action Cinema, 
London and New York: Routledge 
357 
Tennant, Emma 1989a. 'A Pandora's Box for Writing', in Delighting the Heart A 
Notebook by Women Writers, (ed.) Sellers, S., London: The Women's Press, 189-190 
Tennant, Emma 1989b. 'Openings', in Delighting the Heart A Notebook by Women 
Writers, (ed.) Sellers, S., London: The Women's Press, 75-76 
Tennant, Emma 1995. Travesties The Bad Sister. Two Women of London. Faustine, 
London: Faber and Faber 
thesite: The New Girl Order 
<http://www.zdnet.com/zdtv/thesite .. .Iiview/iview1022jump2_110497.html> (1-2) 
[accessed 23 April 2000] 
Thompson, Deborah 1997. 'Revolting Figures: Karen Finley's Bulimic/Anorexia 
Performances', in Critical Studies on the Feminist Subject, (ed.) Covi, G., Trento: 
Dipartimento di Scienze Filologiche e Storiche, 335-367 
Thompson, Jim 2003. "'Just a Girl"- Feminism, Postmodernism and Bufty the Vampire 
Slayer', Refractory: a Journal of Entertainment Media 
<http://www.refractory.unimelb.edu.au/journalissues/voI2/jimthompson.htm> (1-8) 
[accessed 21 February 2004] 
Thornham, Sue 2001, 'Second Wave Feminism', in The Routledge Companion to 
Feminism and Postfeminism, (ed.) Gamble, S., London and New York: Routledge, 29-42. 
Tseelon, Efrat 1995. The Masque of Femininity: The Presentation of Woman in Everyday 
Life, London: Sage 
Vint, Sherryl. '''Killing Us Softly"? A Feminist Search for the "Real" Buffy', Slayage 
The On-line International Journal of Bufty Studies 
<http://www.slayage.tv/essays/slayage5/vint.htm> (1-9) [accessed 24 January 2004] 
Walker, Rebecca 1995. 'Being Real: An Introduction', in To Be Real Telling the Truth 
and Changing the Face of Feminism, (ed.) Walker, R., London: Anchor Books, xxix-xl 
Walters, Suzanna Danuta 1991. 'Premature Postmortems: "Postfeminism" and Popular 
Culture', New Politics, 3, 2 (10), 103-112 
Walters, Suzanna Danuta 1995. Material Girls Making Sense of Feminist Cultural 
Theory, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press 
Walters, Suzanna Danuta 1996. 'From Here to Queer: Radical Feminism, 
Postmodernism, and the Lesbian Menace (Or, Why Can't a Woman Be More Like a 
Fag?)' , Si gos: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 21 (4), 830-869 
358 
Ward, Alyson 2003. 'Chick Lit Inc.', Star-Telegram. com 
<http://www.dfw.comlmldlstartelegramlliving/6397052.htm> (1-4) [accessed 14 June 
2004] 
Waugh, Patricia 1989. Feminine Fictions: Revisiting the Postmodern, London and New 
York: Routledge 
Waugh, Patricia 1992. 'Introduction'. in Postmodernism: A Reader, (ed.) Waugh. P., 
London: Edward Arnold, 1-10 
Waugh, Patricia 1992. 'From Modernism, Postmodernism, Feminism: Gender and 
Autonomy Theory', in Postmodernism: A Reader, (ed.) Waugh, P., London: Edward 
Arnold, 189-204 
Weber, Samuel 1995. 'Upping the Ante: Deconstruction as Parodic Practice', in 
Deconstruction is/in America A New Sense of the Political, (ed.) Haverkamp, A., New 
York and London: New York University Press, 60-75 
Weldon, Fay 1983. The Life and Loves ofa She Devil, London: Sceptre 
Wells, Kim 2000. 'Fairy Tales for Feminists: Jane Green's Jemima J. and Ugly Duckling 
to Swans' <http://www.womenwriters.netleditorials/wellsfairytale.html> (1-4) [accessed 
22 October 2000] 
Westerlund-Shands, Kerstin 1993. 'Female Fatality in the Movies', Moderna Sprak, 87 
(2), 113-120 
Whelehan, Imelda 1995. Modern Feminist Thought: From the Second Wave to 'Post-
Feminism', Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 
Whelehan, Imelda 2000. Overloaded: Popular Culture and the Future of Feminism, 
London: The Women's Press 
Whelehan, Imelda 2002. Helen Fielding's Bridget Jones's DiaD' A Reader's Guide, New 
York and London: Continuum 
Wilcox, Rhonda V. and Lavery, David 2002. 'Introduction', in Fighting the Forces 
What's at Stake in Buffv the Vampire Slaver, (ed.) Wilcox, R. V. and Lavery, D., Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield, xvii-xxix 
Wilde, Alan 1988. "'Bold, But Not Too Bold": Fay Weldon and the Limits of 
Poststructuralist Criticism', Contemporary Literature. 29 (3),403-419 
Wilson, Elizabeth 1995. Adorned in Dreams, Berkeley: University of California Press 
Winship, Janice 1987. Inside Women's Magazines, London: Pandora 
359 
Wittig, Monique 1997. 'One Is Not Born a Woman', in Writing on the Body: Female 
Embodiment and Feminist Theory, (eds) Conboy, K., Medina, N. and Stanbury, S., New 
York: Columbia University Press, 309-317 
Wolf, Naomi 1991. The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty Are Used Against Women, 
London: Vintage 
Wolf, Naomi 1993. Fire with Fire: The New Female Power and How It Will Change the 
21 sl Century, New York: Random House 
Wollstonecraft, Mary 1958. A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), in The Works 
of Mary Wollstonecraft, (eds) Todd, J. and Butler, M., vol.5, London: Pickering and 
Chatto 
Woodlock, Delanie. 'A Call for Young Womento Get Mad!' 
<http://feminista.com/v4n2/woodlock.html> [accessed 25 July 200 1] 
Zeisler, Andi 1999. 'Marketing Miss Right' 
<http://www.bitchmagazine.com/archives/12_99missr/miss.htm> (1-3) [accessed 19 
February 2001] 
Zetze] Lambert, Ellen 1995. The Face of Love Feminism and The Beauty Question, 
Boston: Beacon Press 
